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Abstract
This thesis provides a comprehensive examination of British policy during the 
Ruhr occupation crisis of 1922-1924. It addresses central questions raised in 
the historiography of the 1920s, shedding light both on Britain’s policy and that 
of other powers, particularly France. Based on a thorough examination of the 
British archives, analysis also focuses on the process of policy-formation, 
revealing the significance for this of administrative and personal relationships 
and of domestic political constraints.
The thesis begins with an analysis of Britain’s role at the onset of the crisis. It 
evaluates the influence on Britain’s policy both of the international situation 
and of internal factors after the collapse of the Lloyd Gleorge coalition. Britain’s 
ambiguous position of benevolent neutrality from January to April 1923 is 
then analysed and its inadequacy dem onstrated by revealing the  
contradictions involved when implementing it on the spot in the Rhineland and 
Ruhr. The thesis explores the search for alternatives during the summer of 
1923, when policy-makers tentatively tried to encourage negotiations, but in 
fact simply compounded Britain’s difficulties.
Discussion then moves to events in the autumn of 1923. Once German 
passive resistance ceased the European situation became more fluid. Britain 
was at last able to pursue an effective policy . She distanced herself from 
events on the spot and played an important role both in establishing  
international enquiries to investigate reparations, and in ensuring that the 
experts’ reports (particularly those of the Dawes Committee) were adopted at 
the London Conference in 1924.
This thesis explores Britain’s attitude to reparations and to broader questions 
of post-war European reconstruction and stability, revealing the dilemmas 
caused by Britain’s underlying strategic and economic weakness after the war. 
It highlights the difflculties Britain encountered when dealing with her 
European neighbours and provides a valuable insight into the complexity of 
British foreign policy during this brief but crucial period.
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Introduction
The occupation of the Ruhr marked the culmination of the bitter dispute over 
German reparations which had poisoned European relations since the signing 
of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. On 26 December 1922 the Reparation 
Commission declared that Germany was in default on timber deliveries, and on 
9 January that she had “voluntarily” defaulted on coal. On 11 January 1923 
the governments of France and Belgium sent engineers accompanied by troops 
into the Ruhr valley in order to ensure coal and timber deliveries.!
The resulting crisis quickly escalated. The Germans launched “passive 
resistance” (effectively a government-sponsored general strike), and the 
French reacted by increasing their presence. It was not until 26 September 
that the Germans finally announced the cessation of passive resistance. This 
decision was not taken in time to save Germany fi o^m political chaos, economic 
collapse and hyper-infiation, or to prevent serious challenges to the very 
structure of the Reich - from Separatists in the Rhineland and Ruhr, from 
Hitler’s Beer Hall Putsch in Bavaria, and from a revolutionary communist 
movement in Saxony. France, though ostensibly the victor, also suffered in  
real terms. D espite an agreem ent in November 1923 establish ing  
international expert committees of inquiry into the reparations issue, she 
refused to evacuate the Ruhr. The occupation continued to take a huge 
economic toll and in January 1924 the franc collapsed, leaving France 
financially vulnerable and therefore, it has been argued, diplomatically 
constrained. When the experts’ reports were published, France had little 
alternative but to accept their proposals - in particular those of the Dawes
1 The Italian Government sent a token few engineers.
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committee - at the London Conference in July-August 1924.
These events have received considerable historiographical attention. 
Significantly, the majority of this has focussed on France, particularly since 
the French archives were opened in the 1970s. The trend has been to move 
away from viewing the occupation of the Ruhr as a calculated, vindictive 
attempt by France to attack, suppress and exploit Germany. Historians such 
as Stephen Schuker, Walter McDougall, Marc Trachtenberg and Charles 
Maier have distanced themselves from the traditional view of the 1920s as 
merely an era of illusions and a prelude to the 1930s and have come to view the 
decade as a time when the conditions for international stability were defined, 
the limits of the return to the pre-World War I status quo were reached, and 
developments took place which prefigured the post-World War II settlement.2 
Charles Maier has even explained the Ruhr crisis as part of a much broader 
progression towards eventual post- Second World War European stabilisation 
and integration and the ultimate triumph of conservative bourgeois forces.3
Walter McDougall has argued that throughout the post-war period, French 
policy was consistent, positive and rational. It was aimed at seeking parity 
and partnership with Germany and was based on the assumption that a 
weakened Germany and a strengthened France could have been integrated into 
the Western European community in the 1920s in the way that they were 
after World War II. Thus France sought to enlist the help of her allies to 
internationalise European stabilisation in order to solve her twin dilemmas of
2 For an excellent overview of this revisionist literature, see J. Jacobson, ‘Is there a new 
International History of the 1920s?’, American Historical Review. Vol. 88, No. 3 (1983), pp. 
617-645.
3 C.S. Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilisation in France. Germanv and Italv in the 
Decade after World War I. (Princeton, 1975).
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security and reparation and avoid internal domestic conflict.4 Jacques Bariéty 
shares this supportive appraisal of French policy. 5
Marc Trachtenberg and John Keiger are also sympathetic to France. While 
they do not attribute to her the farsighted consistency and clarity of purpose of 
McDougall, they see Poincaré as well-intentioned and justified in his German 
policy and desire for reparation. Facing an increasingly complex and difficult 
situation, both internationally and domestically, and - crucially - lacking the 
support of his allies, Poincaré was increasingly overwhelmed by events and his 
policy became essentially reactive in nature until, by January 1923 he had no 
real alternative but occupation.6
Stephen Schuker and Bruce Kent are more critical. Kent, like Trachtenberg 
and Keiger, emphasises the immense difficulties facing France and the 
influence on Poincaré of domestic-political factors. He also criticises Britain 
and the US for irresponsibly abandoning her. None of this, however, is 
sufficient justification for the Ruhr occupation - an act which he condemns as 
‘criminal foliy. 7 Stephen Schuker argues that France was throughout 
motivated by considerations concerning the British and Americans. Her 
failure to overcome her post-war fiscal and budgetary problems (which, 
according to Schuker, could have been solved) left France dependent on 
reparation. When this was not forthcoming, France launched the Ruhr 
occupation in order to enlist British and American support. The plan backfired. 
The crisis left France immensely weakened, dependent on the US and Britain,
4 W.A. McDougall, France's Rhineland Diplomacy. 1914-1924: The Last Bid for a Balance 
of Power in Europe. (Princeton, 1978); W.A. McDougall, ‘Political Economy versus National 
Sovereignty: French Structures for German Economic Integration after Versailles’, Journal of 
Modem Historv. Vol. 51, No. 1 (1979), pp. 4-23.
5 J, Bariéty, Les relations franco-allemandes après la première guerre mondiale. 10 
novembre 1918- 10 janvier 1925. de l’exécution à la négociation. (Paris, 1977).
6 M. Trachtenberg, Reparation in World Politics: France and European Economic Diplomacv 
1916-1923. (New York, 1980); J.F.V. Keiger, Ravmond Poincaré. (Cambridge, 1997).
7 B. Kent, The Spoils of War: the Politics of Reparations. 1918-1932. (Oxford, 1989), pp. 
203.
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and so forced to surrender in the post-Ruhr settlement. 8
All these works attribute great importance to the role of Britain throughout 
the crisis. Keiger and McDougall claim that much of the confusion in French 
policy resulted from Poincare's inability to secure what he really wanted - a 
pact with Britain; Trachtenberg and Kent point to the problems Britain’s 
refusal to cooperate caused France; while Schuker sees French policy as 
continually motivated by the need for British and American financial support.
The same is true for the historiography on Germany. Here two key works 
stand out amongst the many more general accounts of Weimar. 9 These are 
Hermann Rupieper’s work on the Cuno government, which makes extremely 
detailed and thorough use of the German archives, as well as some use of 
French, American and British materials,lo and Gerald Feldman’s monumental 
and exhaustively researched work on the German inflation, n  Together these 
comprise a highly detailed examination of the German side of the equation. 
Interestingly, they too point to the importance of Britain’s role and criticise 
Britain for adding confusion and uncertainty to an already volatile situation. It 
is therefore somewhat surprising that very little attempt has been made to
8 S.A. Schuker, The End of French Predominance in Europe: the Financial Crisis of 1924 
and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan. (Chapel Hill, 1976). For an extremely interesting 
critique of this, see R.W.D. Boyce, ‘Review’, Historical Journal. Vol. 21, No. 3 (1978), pp. 
757-759.
9 See for example J. Hiden, Germanv and Europe. 1919-1939. (London, 1977); A.J. Nicholls, 
Weimar and the Rise of Hitler. (MacMillan, 1991); E. Kolb, The Weimar Republic. (London, 
1988); and M.M. Lee & W. Michalka, German Foreign Policv 1917-1933: Continuitv of 
Break?. (Berg, 1987). There is also a vast wealth of material on the role of Gustav 
Stresemann. See for example, M. J. Enssle, ‘Stresemann’s diplomacy fifty years after 
Locarno: some recent perspectives’. Historical Journal, vol. 20, no. 4 (1977), pp. 937-948); R. 
Grathwol, ‘Gustav Stresemann: Reflections on his foreign poHcy,’ Journal of Modem Historv. 
vol. 45, no. 1 (1973), pp. 52-70; R. Grathwol, ‘Stresemann revisited’, European Studies 
Review, vol. 7, no. 3 (1977), pp. 341-52;K.P. Jones, ‘Stresemann, the Ruhr Crisis and 
Rhenish Separatism: a case study of WestooZi^ ife’.European Studies Review, vol. 7, no. 3 
(1977), pp. 311-340; and L.E. Jones, ‘Gustav Stresemann and the Crisis of German 
Liberalism,’ European Studies Review, vol. 4, no. 2 (1974), pp. 141-163.
10 H.J. Rupieper, The Cuno Government and Reparations 1922-23: Politics and Economics. 
(The Hague, 1979).
11 G. Feldman, The Great Disorder: Politics. Economics and Societv in the German 
Inflation. 1914-1924. (Oxford, 1993).
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analyse the content and dimensions of British policy in the same depth as 
those of France and Germany. Only Stephen Schuker has looked in any real 
detail at the British archives, and then only for 1924.
This imbalance has not been redressed by the liistoriography on Britain’s role. 
Very little has been written from the British perspective on the Ruhr crisis, 
and no attempt has been made to address the criticisms and questions raised 
by the revisionist historians outlined above. What commentary there is is 
scattered through a range of works and lacks a thorough grounding in the 
British archives. For example, F.S. Northedge, The Troubled Giant, and M. 
Howai'd, The Continental Commitment provide broad overviews. 12 J.R. Ferris’ 
work on the evolution of British strategic policy, while concentrating on 
strategy and security, and not on diplomatic concerns such as the Ruhr, is 
interesting on the decision-making process and conflicts within and between 
Whitehall departments. More recently, G.H. Bennett’s work on foreign 
pohcyi4 and Ephraim Maisel’s on the Foreign Office and foreign policy during 
the early 1920s is do cover the Ruhi" crisis, but only sketchily, while Anne 
Orde’s work on Eur opean reconstruction after World War I centres on the 
Genoa Conference of 1922.16
12 F.N. Northedge, The Troubled Giant: Britain among the Great Powers. 1916-1939. 
(London, 1966). Basing his account primarily on DBFP and Cabinet records, Northedge 
takes the traditional line of British common sense and reasonableness towards Germany 
contrasted with French vengefulness. M. Howard, The Continental Commitment: the 
Dilemma of British Defence Policv in the Era of the Two World Wars. (London, 1972). 
Howai d is concerned more with global developments than with specifically European events. 
He stresses the role of Empire and the attitudes of the Dominions. For more on the 
Dominions, see R.F. Holland, Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance. 1918-1939. 
Basingstoke, 1981). Other works of general interest are C.J. Lowe and M.L. Dockiill, The 
Mirage of Power: British Foreign Policv 1914-1922. (Vol. II, London, 1972); F.L. Carsten, 
Britain and the Weimar Republic: the British Documents (London, 1984); and R.W.D. 
Boyce, British Capitalism at the Crossroads. 1919-1932. (Cambridge, 1987).
13 J .R . Ferris, Men. Money and Diplomacv: the Evolution of British Strategic Policv. 1919- 
1926. (Ithaca, 1989).
14 G.H. Bennett, British Foreign Policv during the Curzon Period. 1919-1924. (London, 
1995).
15 E. Maisel, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policv 1919-1926. (Brighton, 1994).
16 A. Orde. British Policv and European Reconstruction after the First World War. 
(Cambridge, 1990). See also, A. Orde, Great Britain and International Security. 1920-26. 
(London, 1978).
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Two articles are devoted solely to Britain’s role in the crisis. The first, by D.G. 
Williamson, does not take into consideration the revisionist literature on 
France and adheres to the traditional line of a Britain pursuing a consistent 
and positive approach to Germany but frustrated by an irresponsible 
France. 17 The second is a brief, but much more recent article by Alan Sharp, 
centring on the personal role of Curzon. is Thus in order to find any real detail 
on Britain’s role in the crisis it is necessary to turn to biographies of the major 
actors: for example, Robert Blake on Andrew Bonar Law, David Gilmour on 
Lord Curzon, Keith Middlemas and John Bames on Stanley Baldwin, David 
Marquand on Ramsay MacDonald, and Sybil Crowe and E.T. Corp on Sir Eyre 
Crowe. 19
This thesis provides a detailed study of Britain’s policy and the Ruhr 
occupation from the onset of the crisis in November 1922 to its resolution at 
the London Conference in July-August 1924. It both addresses the broad 
issues raised by the revisionist literature and examines the influences, 
tensions, and constraints shaping British policy. At times it is critical of the 
British - particularly in August and September 1923 - for their inconsistent 
and contradictory behaviour and for spreading uncertainty and confusion 
abroad. However, ju st as Trachtenberg and Keiger em phasise the 
mushrooming combination of factors which so compromised Poincaré, so this 
study points to the range of constraints and influences - both external and 
domestic-political - affecting British policy-makers. None the less, the picture
17 D. G. Williamson, ‘Great Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, 1923-4’, British Journal of 
International Studies. 3 (1977), pp. 70-91.
18 A.J. Sharp, ‘Lord Curzon and British Policy towards the Franco-Belgian Occupation of the 
Ruhr in 1923’ Diplomacy and Statecraft , vol. 8, no. 2 (July 1997), pp. 83-96.
19 R. Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister: the life and times of Andrew Bonar Law. 
(London, 1955); D. Gilmour, Curzon. (London, 1994); K. Middlemas and J. Barnes, 
Baldwin, a Biography. (London, 1969); D. Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald. (London, 1977); 
and S. Crowe and E. Corp, Our Ablest Public Servant: Sir Eyre Crowe. GCB. GCMG. ICCB. 
KCMG. 1864-1925. (Braunton, 1993).
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presented is one not of a country shortsightedly ignoring its responsibihties but 
rather of policy-makers trying to steer a middle path towards stability and 
cooperation in an increasingly polarised Europe.
As the French and German stances hardened, Britain’s options diminished 
until she was essentia lly  left with a choice between two unwelcome 
alternatives - to align either with France or with Germany. British policy­
makers were unable to make this choice. Had they done so it would have had 
huge implications for the European situation. The result was to leave Britain’s 
middle position increasingly squeezed. Thus, as Chapters I to IV show, the 
most difficult time for the British was when the crisis was at its height - from 
January to September 1923. With Germany and France resolutely and 
diametrically opposed to each other, the British appeared wavering, indecisive 
and unsure. On the other hand, when the positions of France and Germany 
became more fluid, the pressure on Britain eased. After the end of September 
the height of the crisis had passed, leaving both the French and Germans 
exhausted and weakened. Their stances became less rigid, and so the preferred 
British middle ground position became a more viable policy alternative once 
again. Chapters V to VII demonstrate how from the autumn of 1923, Britain, 
aided by a shift in United States policy, once more played a more active role in 
European affairs.
What follows rests on an extensive examination of the British archives. In 
order to explore fuUy the true nature of policy formation it has been essential to 
adopt an inter-departmental approach. Thus a wide range of official 
documents has been consulted, including the records of the Cabinet (CAB), 
Foreign Office (FO), War Office (WO), Board of Trade and Department of 
Overseas Trade (BT), Colonial Office (CO), and Intelligence (HW). Foreign 
Office correspondence files (F0371) have proved the most fruitful, especially
12
as sadly little embassy or consular information has survived for this period 
from either France or Germany. In particular, the reparations and Ruhr files 
for 1923 (C l/18 and 0313/18 respectively) are colossal and contained 
countless hundreds of immensely interesting and relevant documents.
But to rely solely on F0371 gives a distorted picture. The centrality of 
reparations to the whole crisis meant that the Treasury had a great input into 
developments. Treasury files have been vital for this study and have provided 
important information not only on the content of policy, but also on its 
formation and on the relationship between the Treasury and the Foreign Office. 
The Bank of England Archives have also provided some interesting insights 
into Britain's financial role. Newspapers and Hansard have heen used to 
gauge the influence of external factors such as public and parliamentary 
opinion, while private papers have added a more personal dimension. 
Particularly enlightening have been those of the key figures - Curzon, Baldwin 
and MacDonald.
This thesis sheds light on both Anglo-French and Anglo-German relations and 
contributes to a more complete understanding of the ramifications of 
reparations, the fate of the Treaty of Versailles and the origins of Germany's 
international rehabilitation. It explores British perceptions of the European 
situation and demonstrates the dilemmas caused by underlying strategic and 
economic weaknesses after the war and how the overwhelming desire to avoid 
dangerous commitments constrained and at tim es undermined British  
diplomacy. It analyses Britain’s pohcy on the spot in the Ruhr and particularly 
regarding the British zone of occupation in the Rhineland, and evaluates the 
impact which this had on Britain's high policy and diplomacy at each stage in 
the crisis. Finally, the thesis provides a valuable insight into the process of 
policy-formation. It considers the role of individuals and the influence of
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domestic considerations and party politics, of public opinion and of inter­
departmental administrative conflicts in shaping the policy pursued.
Chapter I covers the origins of the crisis, from November 1922 to January 
1923. It shows how the critical European situation was compounded for the 
British by internal domestic-political fluidity. The following chapter examines 
Britain’s initial policy of ‘benevolent neutrality . It demonstrates the 
ambiguities and difficulties this entailed for Britain on the ground in the Ruhr 
and Rhineland, and reveals how, as the pressures on Britain’s position 
increased, the quest for alternatives began. By April a change had taken place 
and benevolent neutrality became a way of tentatively intervening and offering 
mediation. Chapter III chronicles British attempts to nudge France and 
Germany towards a settlement and shows how, as successive attempts failed, 
discontent over Ruhr policy increased within Britain. Conflicting views 
surfaced, particularly in the Cabinet, and when British policy continued to 
seem inadequate, domestic-pohtical and administrative differences combined to 
seriously undermine Britain’s position. During August and September 1923, 
dealt with in Chapter IV, Britain’s policy vacillated between France and 
Germany, her policy-makers unable to choose between them. Thus, when 
passive resistance ended on 26 September British policy was in disarray. It 
recovered only because Poincaré threw away the initiative. The next chapter 
evaluates events in the autumn of 1923, demonstrating how Poincaré became 
increasingly embroiled in chaotic and confused events on the spot. In contrast 
Britain distanced herself from these practical difficulties, intervening only 
when absolutely necessary. Instead, Britain concentrated on securing an 
international settlement of the reparation issue. Chapter VI details Britain’s 
role in establishing the committees of experts and analyses the recovery of 
British policy, in particular showing how Baldwin’s ministry operated with 
greater unity and clarity of purpose than previously. Finally, Chapter VII
14
examines the impact on Ruhr policy of the new Labour government, revealing 
MacDonald to have built on the achievements of the preceding ministry, 
working with great success for the adoption of the experts’ reports at the 
London Conference in July-August 1924. The findings of this thesis are 
summarised and their implications explored in the conclusion.
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Chapter I
The B onar L aw  C abinet and  
th e O rigins o f  th e  R uhr C risis.
The context within which foreign policy is formulated is of crucial importance to 
the study of any country's diplomacy. An examination of the primary actors 
concerned - their political relationships and career ambitions - and of with the 
tensions and factions among their officials - adds an enlightening and often 
neglected insight into the true workings of any pohcy-making machine. British 
foreign policy during the Ruhr occupation crisis is no exception. i In the closing 
months of 1922 an escalating diplomatic confrontation in Europe coincided 
with a fluid domestic political scene. This combination of circumstances was to 
have a profound effect on the origins of the Ruhr crisis.
This chapter will be divided into thi ee sections. First the scene will be set with 
a brief overview of the domestic-political position in Britain. Next the 
reparation issue will be outlined and the full extent of the dilemma facing the 
British government will be evaluated. In the third and longest section, the 
government’s responses to this dilemma and the course of events from the end 
of November 1922 to the beginning of January 1923 will be subjected to 
detailed analysis. This last section will deal first with the London Conference of 
December 1922, before looking at developments between the London and Paris 
Conferences and culminating in an examination of the Paris Conference from 2 
- 4 January 1923.
1 The importance of analysing the High Political setting has been emphasised hy Maurice 
Cowling. See M, Cowling, The Impact of Labour: the Beginning of Modem British politics. 
(London, 1971).
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S ettin g  th e Stage: th e D om estic-P o litica l Scene.
In the autumn of 1922 the governing coalition of Conservatives and Liberals 
which had guided Britain since the war dramatically broke down. On 19 
October 1922, at a meeting of Conservative backbenchers at the Carlton 
Club, a majority of MPs voted against continuing under Lloyd George’s 
leadership. While unhappiness with Lloyd George had long been festering, the 
catalyst for the revolt was anger at Lloyd George’s warmongering tactics 
towards Turkey and the subsequent climb-down by Britain over the Chanak 
affair in October 1922.
Yet although the backbenchers revolted, most prominent Conservatives, 
including Austen Chamberlain, Lord Birkenhead and Lord Balfour, remained 
loyal to the Coalition. The most senior Conservative to abandon Lloyd George 
was his Foreign Secretary, Lord C u r z o n .2 Although he kept his silence at the 
Carlton Club, on 23 October he proposed and Stanley Baldwin seconded 
Andrew Bonar Law as leader of the Conservatives. The result was that Bonar 
Law, though in failing health, emerged from one and a half years’ retirement to 
form a new and largely inexperienced Conservative a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 3 He 
quickly proved himself by leading his party to victory at a hastily called general 
election.
Curzon’s political manoeuvring secured him continuation at the Foreign Office, 
while the previously unknown Baldwin became Chancellor of the Exchequer.
2 As David Gilmour explains: “The sulky giants of the Coalition flung derisive epithets at 
Law’s grey and modest-looking team, dismissing as ‘second-class brains’ and a ‘Government 
of the second eleven’ a Cabinet most of whose members had far higher academic 
qualifications than themselves”. D. Gilmour, Curzon (London,1994), pp. 555.
3 On 6 October 1922 Bonar Law had signalled his return to the limelight by warning in a 
letter to the Times that: “We cannot alone act as policeman of the world” . R. Blake, The 
Unknown Prime Minister: the life and times of Andrew Bonar Law 1858-1923 
(London, 1955), pp. 448.
17
Curzon, however, was motivated not merely by personal career ambitions, but 
also by longstanding grievances over Lloyd George’s handling of foreign, and 
particularly European, policy. Ever since bis participation in the negotiation of 
the Treaty of Versailles Lloyd George bad maintained a close interest in 
European policy, trying to use bis personal charisma and oratorical skills to 
solve problems through conference diplomacy. Unsurprisingly, this bad quickly 
led him into conflict w ith that bastion of the traditional diplomatic 
administration - the Foreign Office. Lloyd Greorge tended to bypass the Foreign 
Office whenever possible, using bis private secretaries and bis notorious 
“Garden Suburb” as instruments of diplomacy. The result of this bigb-banded 
approach was to provoke internal administrative tensions and inefficiencies.^
Curzon’s frustration with the situation is clear not only from bis actions on 23 
October, but also from a memorandum which be wrote while attending the 
conference on the Near East at Lausanne in November 1922.5 Lloyd George, 
be wrote,
“bad no instinctive appreciation of diplomacy, no knowledge of bis 
subject, no conception of policy. He despised and disliked the 
instrument through which be was obliged steadily to work - viz. 
the F.O., never losing an opportunity in Cabinet or elsewhere of 
denouncing its officials and their work. He set up bis own personal 
Secretariat to operate behind the back of the F.O., conducting 
intrigues, sending messages, bolding interviews of which we were 
never informed until it was too late or only beard by accident...”6
Curzon went on to say that the only reason be was able to tolerate the 
situation was because Lloyd George tended to confine bis meddling to the issue 
of European policy, “...outside the main lines of European Policy - as shaped at 
Paris - be took little interest in foreign affairs and left the Foreign Office
4 See G.H. Bennett, Foreign Policv during the Curzon period. (London, 1995), pp. 3-4.
5 This conference was held after the war scare over Chanak in September 1922. Its aim 
was to formulate a final peace settlement for Turkey after World War I to replace the 1920 
Treaty of Sevrés.
5 Curzon Papers MSS Eur. F 112/319 Memo by Curzon (Lausanne), 30.11.22
18
alone.”7 It is very significant that Curzon had for several years acquiesced in 
leaving the financial issue of reparation and hence European pohcy to someone 
else. He was to continue to do this even after the fall of Lloyd Greorge because, 
as Foreign Secretary in the new administration, he felt that his first priority 
should be to redress the blow to British prestige dealt by Chanak. Curzon 
therefore gave top priority to the Lausanne Conference, and the division of the 
Foreign Secretary's attentions, which began under the Lloyd George 
administration, continued into the Bonar Law one.
At first the implications of this were not recognised. Despite its rather chaotic
origins in domestic-political confusion and party fluidity, the Bonar Law
administration began on an optimistic note regarding all aspects of foreign
policy. In his November election manifesto Bonar Law emphasised that his
foreign policy aims were: “tranquillity and stability both at home and abroad”. 8
He was also adamant that his administrative practice would prove a sharp
break with Lloyd Greorge's style and that the work of the Foreign Office would
be removed from the Cabinet Secretariat and returned to the Foreign Office.9
A rather disgruntled note by the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Maurice Hankey,
shows that this did in fact occur:
“The political rumpus is having a reaction on the work of this 
office. Bonar Law intends to keep the system of recording 
Cabinet conclusions, but for political reasons the Office [Cabinet 
Secretariat] will have to be a good deal cut down. There has been 
some scurrilous and wholly baseless press attack, suggesting that 
this Office has intruded into foreign affairs and influenced the 
foreign policy of the country... ”io
7 ibid
8 Blake, Unknown, pp. 466. Austen Chamberlain wrote: “B.L. struck the right note when 
he said that the change in Government would be rather of temperament than of policy and 
when he promised tranquillity - though as L.G. pertinently said tranquillity depends on the 
sea and not on the ship.” [Austen Chamberlain Papers: AC5/1/252: Austen to his sister Ida, 
21 .11.22 .]
9 Bonar Law’s stated aim was that: “The work of the Foreign Office wiU in future be done by 
the Foreign Office, subject to the control of the Cabinet, and, of course,under the personal 
supervision of the Prime Minister.” [Bonar Law papers. Box 113, folder 10, doc. 1: Cambray 
to Waterhouse, 10.11.22 enclosing “Principles of Unionist Foreign policy.”]
10 D’Abemon Papers, Vol. 48927B: Hankey (London) to D’Abemon (Berlin), letter, 24.10.22.
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Bonar Law intended his approach towards foreign policy to improve 
efficiency.il Yet at the very time when Bonar Law was returning autonomy 
over foreign policy to the Foreign Office, his Foreign Secretary was leaving for 
Lausanne. 12 Moreover, the reparation dispute was once more intensifying. It 
remained to be seen whether the Bonar Law government would prove any 
more successful than Lloyd George had been in dealing with the deteriorating 
situation in Europe.
11 K. Middlemas and J. Bames, Baldwin, a Biography (London,1969),pp. 126.
12 Curzon left London on 17.11.22.
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T he R eparation  Q uestion  and th e D ilem m a In h erited  b y B onar Law.
Bonar Law assumed office at precisely the time when the reparation 
controversy was taking on critical proportions. Reparation had heen a running 
sore ever since the end of the First World War. The cost of the First World 
War was huge. Not only were millions killed and injured, hut vast areas of 
Europe were left devastated, industries and coal mines were destroyed and 
countless ships sunk. It was natural for the allies, flushed with victory, to 
desire Germany to shoulder this burden. But the issue of reparation quickly 
proved immensely complicated. Rather than easing the problems the allies 
faced in the post-war world, it added to them by exacerbating divisions between 
the victors.
Traditionally France has heen viewed as the villain of the reparation saga. 
However, more recent research has questioned such a conclusion. Marc 
Trachtenberg has demonstrated the relative moderation of France’s claims, 
given the physical destruction she suffered. Rather, it was Britain, who, 
anxious for a share in any spoils on offer, forced up the demands on Germany. 15 
Under pressure from the Dominions to compensate them for their war effort, 
and facing a general election with a newly enfranchised working class 
electorate, Lloyd George adopted a harsh stance towards Germany in the 
autumn of 1918. Although he won the election, he was left dependent 
politically on Conservative support, and compromised in his dealings with
13 For more background on reparations, see Kent, Spoils: Trachtenberg, Reparation: Maier, 
Recasting, especially Chapter 4; Schuker, End, pp. 1-28. A very detailed account of 
negotiations at Versailles is given in P.M. Burnett, Reparation at the Paris Peace 
Conference from the Standpoint of the American Delegation. (2 vols), (New York, 1940). For 
a comprehensive but concise account, see A. Sharp, The Versailles Settlement. Peacemaking 
in Paris. 1919. (Basingstoke, 1991).
14 Trachtenberg, Reparation, pp. 32.
15 See R. E. Bunselmeyer, The Cost of War 1914-1919: British Economic War Aims and the 
Origins of Reparation. (Hamden, Connecticut, 1975).
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Germany by his need to deliver on his electoral promises. Consequently, 
despite a superficial show of moderation towards Germany - epitomised by the 
Fontainebleau Memorandum of March 1919 - Lloyd George sought to postpone 
agreement regarding reparation at the Paris peace negotiations.
Interalhed negotiations at Paris were extremely problematic. Aside fi'om its 
domestic-political connotations, reparation was in itself immensely complex. 
Agreement had to be reached concerning Grermany s^ liability, over her capacity 
to pay, over how she was to pay, and for what period. Differences between the 
allies - particularly between Britain and France - hindered agreement.
Some progress was made on the first issue. In order to justify reparation, the
alUes decided that Germany must accept that she had been responsible for the
outbreak of the war, and therefore that she was liable to compensate the
victors for all loss and damage resulting. This was incorporated in the Treaty
of Versailles as Clause 231 - the famous war guilt clause:
“The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany 
accepts the responsibility of Germany and her Allies for causing 
all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated 
Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a 
consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of 
Germany and her AUies.”i6
But rather than simplify matters, this allied agreement over German liability 
exacerbated the reparation problem. Germany did not accept that she had 
been responsible for the war, and so always opposed the reparation demands. 17 
Similarly, although at Paris the Allies did manage to establish the categories of 
claims for which Germany was liable to pay compensation, this too involved
16 For relevant sections of the Treaty of Versailles, see J.A.S. Grenville, The Mai or 
International Treaties. 1914-1945. A Historv and Guide with Texts. (London, 1987), pp. 
59-71. The full text of the Treaty of Versailles can be found in F[oreign] R[elations] of the 
U[nited] S[tates], The Paris Peace Conference 1919. vol. XIII. (Washington, 1947), pp. 57- 
742..
17 See S. Marks, ‘Smoke and mirrors: in smoke filled rooms and the galérie des glaces. 
Reparations at the Paris Peace Conference’, An unpublished paper from ‘Versailles: 75 
Years AfteF, (Conference at Berkeley, California, 1994).
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hidden difficulties.
All agreed that Germany should pay for the physical destruction caused by the 
war. However, while under such terms the British would get compensation for 
the losses to their shipping, the lion’s share of payments would go to Belgium  
and France for the reconstruction of their devastated areas. In order to 
increase their own share of the spoils, the British therefore pushed for the 
inclusion of pensions for allied servicemen and their dependents, effectively 
doubhng the figure Germany was expected to pay.
Fixing German liability so high immediately raised other questions. As there 
was no way Germany could pay everything she was liable for, the question 
became one of deciding how much Germany could pay - in other words, on fixing 
German capacity to pay. This in turn raised questions of how Germany was to 
pay (for example in cash or kind) and when she was to pay, especially as 
Grerman capacity might increase as time went on. Agreement on these issues 
proved impossible, despite protracted negotiation. Rather than settling issues, 
the Treaty of V ersailles sim ply shelved them . It provided for the  
establishment of a Reparation Commission, on which each of the major powers 
involved would have a representative. The Commission was to examine 
reparation and in May 1921 was to announce the sum for which Germany was 
liable. The Commission was also to decide the means and time-scale for 
payments. In the meantime, Germany was to make an interim payment of 20 
billion Gold Marks by 1 May 1921.19
18 In the event, the refusal of the US Congress to ratify the Treaty of Versailles meant that 
the US had only an unofficial representative on the Reparation Commission. As a result 
France, which chaired the Commission, had the casting vote,
19 For excellent summaries of the historiographical debate over reparation at Versailles, see 
W.M. McDougall, ‘Political Economy versus National Sovereignty: Structures for Germany 
Economic Integration after Versailles’; M. Trachtenberg, ‘Reparation at the Paris Peace 
Conference’; and C.S. Maier, ‘The Truth about the Treaties’, all in a special issue of the 
Journal of Modem Historv. vol. 51, no. 1 (1979) devoted to this debate.
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Little had really been solved by the reparation clauses of the treaty. As the 
allies bad been unable to agree on a sum at Paris, it was unrealistic to expect 
the Reparation Commission to manage this. Moreover, by making the war 
guilt clause the foundation for reparation, the treaty provided the Germans 
with all the justification and ammunition they needed to adopt delaying tactics 
regarding the initial payment of the 20 billion gold m a r k s .  20
Interalhed differences continued. A succession of conferences at Spa (July 
1920), Brussels (December 1920) and London (March 1921) failed to produce 
any real consensus. In Britain there was a reaction against reparation, fuelled 
by publications such as Keynes’s, The Economic Consequences of the Peace .21 
which argued that German recovery was essential for post-war international 
and therefore British prosperity. On the other hand, for France, reparation had 
become linked to her fundamental security dilemma.22 The refusal of the 
Americans to ratify the treaty deprived France of the vital Anglo-American 
guarantee. France was left isolated and vulnerable. Her safety depended on 
the survival of the integrity of the Versailles Treaty, and therefore she was 
determined that it must be upheld, including this first real test of its provisions:
reparation. 23
In March 1921 France - angry at Germany’s continued default over the initial 
payments stipulated under the Versailles Treaty - insisted on the allied 
occupation of three Rhineland towns, Duisburg, Ruhrort and Düsseldorf. The
20 For an excellent article on the effects of the war guilt clause on the politicisation of 
reparations, see H.H. Herwig, ‘”Clio Deceived”; Patriotic Self-Censorship in Germany after 
the Great WaP, International Security. Vol. 12, No. 2 (1987), pp. 5-44.
21 J.M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace. (London, 1919).
22 See below, pp. 28.
23 See Schuker, End, pp. 3-5.
24
crisis passed when Germany accepted the London Schedule of Payments in 
May 1921. But by now Germany’s delaying tactics and propaganda against 
war guilt and reparation were having some effect, at least on the British. 
Although the London Schedule of Payments set the total German indemnity at 
132 billion Gold Marks, it was in reality not as harsh as it appeared. O f the 
overall total, 82 billion marks were to be payable in essentially worthless ‘C’ 
bonds, which would only he paid at some future, unspecified point when the 
German economy had sufficiently recovered and when ‘A’ and ‘B’ bonds had 
already been discharged. Therefore, Germany’s immediate obligations in 1921 
were under 50 billion Gold Marks (roughly the sum recommended by Keynes). 
Germany was to make annual payments of around 2,000 million Gold Marks, 
coupled with 26% of the value of Germany’s annual e x p o r ts .2 4
Germany, however, failed to meet even these more limited payments. On 14 
December 1921 the German Government applied for a suspension of certain of 
the payments due in 1922 under the Schedule of Payments, and on 21 March 
1922 the Reparation Commission agreed to reduce payments due in 1922 by 
approximately a third. Yet Germany still failed to meet the instalments and on 
14 July asked for another reduction for 1922 as well as for 1923 and 1924. The 
allies met this July request by persuading the Belgians to accept German 
treasury bills in lieu of cash payments. This basically amounted to the 
granting of a moratorium until 15 January 1923. The question of 1923 and 
1924 payments remained unresolved and was to be raised immediately for 
Bonar Law when on 14 November (the eve of the British general election) 
Germany put fresh proposals to the Reparation Commission, asking for a 
further moratorium on the grounds that payments were impossible until the 
mark was stabilised.25
24 N, Ferguson, 'Constraints and room for manoeuvre in the German inflation of the early 
1920s’, Economic Historv Review. Vol. 49, No. 4 (1996), pp. 635-666; S. Marks, ‘The Myths 
of Reparations’, Central European Historv. Vol. 9, No. 3 (1978), pp. 232-236.
25 CAB 24, 140 CP 4348: Foreign Office Memorandum on the Reparation Position, 5.12.22.
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Germany's reasons for failing to meet her obligations were extremely complex. 
Historians disagree over whether Germany could, from a purely economic 
perspective, have made the payments. For example, Gerald Feldman argues 
that the allied peace terms made impossible demands on the Germans.26 Niall 
Ferguson, on the other hand, claims that it was possible for Germany to have 
fulfilled the more limited allied demands embodied in the London Schedule of 
Payments and that a tighter fiscal and monetary stance would in fact have 
proved a more effective weapon against reparation than the inflationary 
pohcies pursued. 27
However, whether or not it was economically possible for Germany to have 
met the payments, the politicisation of reparation stemming from its 
association with war guilt made payment in practical terms an un viable 
option. Reparation had implications not only for the economic situation but 
also for domestic-political cohesion and indeed for the very survival of Weimar 
democracy. The governments of Weimar at this time were weak and 
frequently changing coalitions. They were leading a republic horn in defeat, 
burdened by association with an unpopular peace and merely tolerated by 
many of the entrenched elements within German society. They rejected the 
war guilt clause and the reparation which it justified. Moreover, they were 
unwilling to pay reparation because to do so would have meant fundamental 
reform of the taxation system - a reform which would have opened class 
conflict and exacerbated tensions within German s o c i e t y .28
When in May 1921 the allies forced the Germans to accept the London 
Schedule of Payments, the existing Cabinet fell and was replaced by another
26 G. Feldman, The Great Disorder: Politics. Economics and Society in the German 
Inflation. 1914-1924. (Oxford, 1993).
27 Ferguson, ‘Constraints’, pp. 642-3. Also see Trachtenberg, Reparation, pp. 337-342.
28 Maier, Recasting, pp. 249.
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coalition, under Chancellor Joseph Wirth. Wirth hoped to put pressure on the 
West to reduce their demands of Germany. He tried various strategies. For 
example, he sabotaged the Genoa Conference for European Reconstruction in 
the spring of 1922 by concluding the Rapallo Treaty to establish economic 
links with the Soviets, thus alarming the West with the bogey of a bolshevik 
bloc.29 He also attacked reparations with an “Offensive of Fulfilment,”30 
hoping to prove by genuine attempts to meet the reparation demands that to 
do so was impossible. It was hoped that the allies would then abandon 
reparation in favour of credit-based reconstruction. Yet as the situation  
dragged on, Germany faced mounting economic turmoil. This is clear even 
from a cursory glance at the mark exchange rate:
1 January 1921 288 marks to the £
1 January 1922 771 marks to the £
1 June 1922 1,188 marks to the £
1 September 1922 5,725 marks to the £
1 November 1922 20,000 marks to the £3i
The political situation was also degenerating. In November 1922 Wirth’s 
governing coalition collapsed and he resigned. His resignation posed the 
problem of who should replace him. As the parties failed to reach any kind of 
agreement, President Friedrich Ebert presented his own candidate and 
authorised Wilhelm Cuno, the head of the Hamburg-Amerika shipping line, to 
form a Cabinet. Cuno’s first attempt to do this failed. But rather then  
dissolve the Reichstag and hold an election, which under the circumstances 
would merely have added to the economic, social and political chaos already 
existing in Germany, Ebert authorised Cuno to have a second try. He also
29 See Kent, Spoils, pp. 177-9; and A. Or de, British Policy and European Reconstruction 
after the First World War. (Cambridge, 1990). On the Genoa Conference as a whole, see C. 
Fink, The Genoa Conference: European Diplomacy. 1921-2. (Chapel Hill, 1984)
30 Kent, Spoils, pp. 151.
31 CAB 24 140, CP 4348: FO Memorandum: The Reparation Position’, 5.12.22.
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persuaded the parties to agree to allow their members to work independently in 
a Cuno Cabinet. After difficult negotiations Cuno was finally able to form a 
‘Government above Parties’, commonly referred to as the ‘Business Cabinet’. 
The fact that Ebert bad bad to resort to such extreme measures is indicative 
of the extent of the crisis of parliamentary democracy already existing in  
Germany even before the occupation of the Rubr.32
Just as for Germany the reparation issue was tied to domestic political 
stability, so too was it for France. France, like Germany, bad borrowed to pay 
for the war. Subsequently, rather than attempt unpopular fiscal reform, 
French politicians preferred to try to make Germany pay. Moreover, 
reparation for France also represented part of her much broader security 
problem, stemming fi'om her geographical location next to a naturally stronger 
Germany. As the Germans procrastinated and avoided paying reparation, so 
the French public lost patience. In January 1922, Raymond Poincaré 
assumed office, promising to turn the reparation illusion into a r e a b ty .3 3
Poincaré increasingly lost patience with German evasion of the reparation 
demands throughout the opening months of 1922. By the summer of 1922, (at 
the London Conference in August) Poincaré insisted that any further grant of a 
moratorium should be dependent on allied possession of “productive pledges” or 
“g a g e s . ”34 Poincaré was prevented from seizing these “gages” when the 
Belgians were persuaded to accept German treasury bills, thus granting a 
moratorium in effect though not in name. Poincaré was angry at this, viewing
32 For a full commentary on the situation in Germany at this time, see: H. Rupieper, The 
Cuno Government and Reparations. 1922-1923. (The Hague 1979).
33 Schuker, End, pp. 11-18.
34 In August 1922 Poincare said that these “gages” should comprise AlHed control of all 
German customs tariffs; the establishment of a customs barrier between occupied and 
unoccupied Germany and around the Ruhr basin; the levy by the allies of certain taxes in 
the occupied territory; and delivery to the Allies of certain state mines and forests. (CAB 24 
140, CP 4348 P.O. memo on Reparation Position, 5.12.22.) Poincaré subsequently began to 
fix his sights on the Ruhr Valley.
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it as yet another ploy by Grermany to evade her responsibilities. He blamed 
Britain for taking Grerman/s side, and throughout the autumn months of 1922 
his relations with British officials and policy makers became increasingly 
strained and acrimonious. That British officials and policy makers had 
difficulty dealing with Poincaré is clear. When negotiating with him in  
September 1922 over the Near East, Curzon described him as “that horrid 
little man”, and said that: “...it was hard to deal with a man who [was] always a 
lawyer and sometimes a lunatic.”35 The British Ambassador in Paris, Lord 
Hardinge, wrote of Poincaré: “I have seldom come across, in my diplomatic 
career, an official who I dislike more.”36 Sir William Tyrrell, Assistant Under 
Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, commented: “The more I see and hear 
of him the more convinced I am that he is a very shifty customer...”37
With Lloyd Gleorge out of office, Poincaré saw a chance to try to push Britain 
into adopting a firmer stance towards Germany. As Hardinge reported: 
“...Poincaré has got it into his head that we are ready now, since the 
disappearance of Lloyd George, to back him up in his enterprises against 
G e r m a n y .”38 Poincaré’s sense of urgency in foreign policy was directly related 
to his own domestic-political position. He relied on support from an uneasy 
coalition of parties in the French Chamber. While using domestic policy to 
appease the Left, he tried to woo the Right with a strong foreign policy. Unless 
he could deliver results his position would be far fi-om s e c u r e .  39 Reports soon
35 Gilmoiir, Curzon. pp. 544
36 Curzon Papers, MSS Eur. F.112/200b; Hardinge to Curzon, 1,11.22
37 FO 800/ 243: Tyrrell (Lausanne) to Crowe, 7,12.22.
38 Curzon Papers, MSS Eur. F.112/200b: Hardinge to Curzon, 2.12,22.
39 The British were well aware of Poincaré’s predicament. On 1 November, Hardinge 
reported from the French embassy : “Signs have not been wanting for some time that the 
“union sacrée” of parties, formed under the stress of war, was breaking up...” [FO 425 390: 
W9078/4/17: Hardinge, disp. 2551, 1.11.22.] Mr. Campbell (also of the Paris Embassy) 
added: “For some months M. Poincaré has been thought to be drifting towards the Left in 
internal poHtics. At the same time his foreign policy has, on the whole, been of a completely 
“Nationalist” complexion... As regards the Right, M. Poincaré has mainly relied, in order to 
preserve their favour, on a blustering foreign policy towards Germany and on intransigence 
in his dealings with ourselves.” [Memo by Campbell (n.d.) encl. in FO 425 390: W9078/4/17: 
Hardinge, disp. 2551, 1.11.22.]
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suggested, however, that Poincaré’s tactics were not working. On 12 October 
Poincaré’s reparation policy was criticised in the French Chamber, and a major 
attack was also launched on the government’s 1923 budget proposals, 
culminating in a heated debate on 6 and 7 N o v e m b e r .4 0
The whole issue of reparation became even more critical when the Germans 
requested a fresh moratorium on 14 November. The German proposals for 
stabilisation of the mark now needed to be considered by the allies. These 
proposals contained only vague and ineffective measures, requesting a four 
year moratorium but providing no guarantee of future payment. Even the 
Foreign Office, usually more sympathetic to German requests, concluded that 
they were absolutely inadmissible. 4i Poincaré was angrier still. He began to 
put pressure on Britain to hold an interallied conference at Brussels, and he 
became more vociferous in his demand that no further moratorium should be 
granted without the implementation of “productive pledges” - which by this 
stage meant the occupation of the Ruhr. By the end of November he began to 
threaten independent action, and on 27 November Poincaré issued a press 
communiqué saying that independent coercive action would he taken by 
France unless her financial problems were solved by a comprehensive 
settlement of reparations and war debts. But Poincaré had not at this stage 
finally decided on military action. He hoped to bully the allies into co-operation 
by bluster so that he could silence his Rightwing critics in France without 
having actually to act. Two days later, on 29 November, he admitted as much 
to the Senate, saying he only wanted to use the threat of occupation for 
bargaining p u r p o s e s .4 2
40f O 371 7486, C15331/99/18: Hardinge, disp. 2601, 8.11.22. Hardinge reported that the 
Socialist Léon Blum had said in the French Chamber on 7 November that: “The various 
schemes which have been advocated by successive French governments for the payment of 
reparations were illusory... The occupation of the Ruhr would be merely an expense to 
France...” Louis Loucheur had agreed with Blum. Hardinge added, however, that as Blum 
was a Socialist his views were not given much credence in France.
41 FO 371 7487, C16157/99/18: FO minute, 23.11.22.
42 Keiger, Poincaré, pp. 295.
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Bonar Law faced an immensely difficult situation. The reparation issue was 
extremely complicated in itself - tied as it was to issues of domestic-political 
stability and democratic cohesion in Germany, as well as to party politics and 
the security dilemma in France. As we have seen, in all these areas, 
circumstances were reaching a critical stage. Furthermore, the situation was 
not helped by the positions of other countries involved.
Belgium’s role tended to complicate matters. Divergences of opinion within 
Belgium were often translated into her foreign policy, making it difficult to 
predict how she would act. While it is perhaps more usual to emphasise the 
power of French influence within Belgium, there were also strong anti-French 
elements - comprising, for example, the majority of the Flemish and Socialist 
P a r t ie s .4 3  Even from a purely diplomatic perspective, Belgium was somewhat 
schizophrenic. Ideally she sought to maximise her position as the smallest 
alliance partner, trying to maintain a key international diplomatic position as 
the ‘hinge’ of the E n t e n t e .  44 In practice she was caught up in a difficult and 
unenviable relationship with France. The result of all these conflicting forces 
was a vacillating foreign policy, which at times provoked uncertainty and 
exasperation abroad. For example, Belgium sided with Britain over the 
treasury bills affair in September 1922, but then subsequently moved back 
towards France. This may have owed something to Poincaré’s bullying and 
bribes, but another strong consideration for Belgium was that she could not 
afford to see France get sole control over the Rhineland and so entirely 
surround Belgium. In the last resort Belgian policy-makers preferred to co­
operate with France in order to maintain as much influence and power as
43 FO 425 390, C16831/99/18: Grahame, disp. 776, 22.11.22.
44Marks, S., Innocent Abroad: Belgium at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 (Chapel Hill, 
1981), pp. 383. For more background on Belgian policy, see J.E. Helmreich, Belgium and 
Europe: a Study in Small Power Diplomacy. (The Hague, 1976)
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possible.45
The conclusion which the British drew was that the Belgians could not be 
trusted regarding the Ruhr. A Foreign Office minute on 5 December 1922 
remarked:
“There are... indications that, opposed as they are to such an 
extension of French influence, they are not prepared to risk a 
breach with France to prevent it. They would gladly see others 
pull the chestnuts out of the fire. They do not intend to risk  
burning their own fingers. Rather than see France act alone, they 
would, however unwillingly, join her in an aggressive territorial 
policy on the R h in e .”46
Italy, the last country on the Reparation Commission, was another unknown
quantity - especially so since her premiership had recently been taken over by
the unpredictable M u s s o l in i .4 7  Although anxious to remain on good terms with
Britain, Italy could by no means be relied on, as she was extremely unlikely to
risk a major rupture with France. Indeed, even by December Mussolini had not
declared where his allegiance lay. The Foreign Office concluded:
“The attitude of the Italian government is, as usual, vague and 
uncertain... [A]s in the case of Belgium, it m ust always be 
remembered that Italy is unlikely to risk a definite breach with 
France. It will be well not to count upon any Italian support 
should Great Britain find herself compelled to pursue a line of 
policy not favoured by F r a n c e .”48
The position of the United States was even more perplexing than that of Italy 
or Belgium. The refusal of the United States Congress to ratify the Treaty of
45 These fears were borne out by a report by the Ambassador in Brussels, Sir George 
Grabame, of a conversation with the Belgian premier on 26 November, Tbeunis bad said: 
“...that if the situation were to develop in a certain way, Belgium might conceivably find 
herself forced to accompany France in action against Germany so as to avoid result to 
Belgium of having let her take it alone.” [FO 371 7488, 016688/99/18: Grabame, tel. 103, 
26.11.22.1
46 FO 371 7488, 016643/99/18: FO memorandum, 5.12.22: ‘Tleparation Position”
47 For background regarding Italy, see A. Oassels, Mussolini’s Earlv Diplomacv. (Princeton, 
1970); O.J. Lowe & F. Marzari, Italian Foreign Policv 1870-1940. (London, 1975); S. Marks, 
‘Mussolini and the Ruhr Orisis’, International Historv Review. Vol. 8, No, 1 (1986), pp. 56- 
69.
48 FO 371 7488, 016643/99/18: FO Memorandum, 5.12.22: “Reparation position”.
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Versailles left the principal European states, already weakened by the war, 
grappling with the burden of upholding the peace settlem ent. Had the 
Americans not isolated themselves from European affairs their diplomatic 
strength and unrivalled economic superiority would have been sufficient to 
have guaranteed some form of settlement of European affairs - both in terms 
of security and reparation. As it was the abstention of the United States as a 
powerful arbitrating and stabilising force left the way open for heightened 
Anglo-French rivalry. Moreover, it added an extra element of uncertainty as 
the Europeans were always aware of the potential which America had to settle 
reparation and security and therefore the British, in particular, treated the 
United States with kid gloves.
Not only did the United States maintain its distance fi-om European affairs, 
but it further compounded the difficulties facing the Europeans by refusing to 
admit the existence of any connection between reparation and war debts. The 
allies - particularly Britain, but also France, Italy and Belgium - had borrowed 
heavily from the United States Treasury during the war. The Europeans 
viewed these sums as part of a common effort to defeat Germany and felt that, 
with the war over, the United States should ease the burden of war debts 
repayments so that they could relax their demands for reparation. To further 
complicate debtor/creditor relationships, the British at the same time as 
borrowing from the United States, had also lent large sums to their allies, 
particularly to France. In order to repay the United States, the British needed 
the French to pay their debts to them. The French claimed they could not 
repay these debts unless Germany first paid reparation. Thus what Britain 
needed was a general settlement reducing both reparation and war debt. This 
was the reasoning behind the “Balfour Declaration” of August 1922, in which 
the British publicly offered to renounce their financial claims on the allies in  
return for a similar renunciation by the United States. The United States
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were unmoved, but rather offended and angered by the attempt to make them  
appear u n g e n e r o u s .49 The United States, particularly after the more 
moderate Woodrow Wilson was replaced by a Republican administration, had 
steadfastly refused to countenance a war debt/reparation agreement. Rather 
the Americans remained determined that the debts owed to them must be 
repaid, but played no role in seeking to facilitate a reparation settlement. 
Though United States presidents were undoubtedly motivated by domestic 
considerations, this refusal to forgive British and European debts greatly 
exacerbated the difficulties the allies faced regarding r e p a r a t io n s .so
Thus Bonar Law faced an immensely difficult international situation. The 
reparation problem was inherently complex. It highlighted fundamental 
structural economic weaknesses in both France and Germany, and at the 
same time raised grave diplomatic problems relating to the security of Europe. 
These critical international problems were further compounded for Bonar Law 
by certain aspects of his internal position. Here he faced two further problems 
- an absentee Foreign Secretary, and administrative tensions between the 
Foreign Office and the Treasury. Both of these factors adversely affected his 
ability to address the international situation.
Let us first examine the role of his Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon. Curzon 
outlined his approach to foreign policy in an introductory address to the new 
Cabinet on 1 November. Although he sweepingly said that he wanted “to clear 
up the whole situation with F r a n c e ,”5 i  he vaguely dismissed both reparations 
and war debts, merely saying that: “These matters were too big to enter into at 
the moment.” He immediately made it clear that primacy should be given to
49 Kent, Spoils, pp. 188-9.
50 For more information on war debts, see D. Artaud, La question des dettes interalliées et 
la reconstruction de l'Europe (1917-1929). (Lille, 1978). For a more concise account, see 
D.H. Aldcroft, From Versailles to Wall Street. 1919-1929. (Berkeley, 1977), especially pp. 
78-96.
51 CAB 23 31: Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 1.11.22.
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the Lausanne Conference: “What he would like to do... was to clear the board of
our foreign difficulties with France in regard to Europe. He would, however,
begin in the East, and if  agreement could be reached there he might indicate
that this was a prelude to clearing the whole board, and progress might be
made.”52 In practice, Curzon did not simply ‘begin in the E ast’, but
concentrated on it to the exclusion of all else. On 28 November he wrote to
Bonar Law from Lausanne:
“I sent yesterday a telegram to the Foreign Office telling them  
that it is quite impossible for me to deal with the question of 
reparations here, or to answer the telegrams that pour in from 
Paris and Brussels. I had gathered that as soon as you were free 
from Parliamentary duties you were disposed to take up the 
job...”53
Curzon then informed the Foreign Office that Bonar Law would assume 
control, adding: “At present we are drifting and merely making everyone angry 
at our assumed indifFerence.”54
Even when Bonar Law had taken over European policy, Curzon still 
emphasised the primacy of the Near East. The only advice he gave the Prime 
Minister was that nothing should be done to jeopardise the chances of success 
at L a u s a n n e ,5 5  and that the outcome of the Lausanne Conference depended 
on friendship with France. For example, on 4 December Curzon wrote: “I am 
afraid that if  you break with Poincaré in London, it will mean the failure of my 
already slender chances h e r e .”56 Hardinge shared his worries: “Poincaré is 
such a mean little man that if he experiences any failure in London or Brussels
52 ibid
53 Bonar Law Papers, Box 112, Folder 12, Doc. 35: Curzon to Bonar Law, 28.11.22
54 Minute by Curzon 28.11.22 on FO 371 7487, C16100/99/18: Grahame tel. 102,
26.11.22.
55 Throughout Curzon’s correspondence with Bonar Law at this time he dwelt on the 
importance of the Lausanne Conference, often mentioning the European situation only in 
passing. [See Bonar Law Papers, Box 112, Folder 12: Correspondence between Curzon and 
Bonar Law.]
56 Bonar Law Papers, Box 112, Folder 12, Doc 39: Curzon to Bonar Law, 4.12.22
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he is bound to make it felt at L a u s a n n e .”57
Bonar Law desperately tried to comply with his Foreign Secretary’s wishes, 
even though this in practice meant continuing the policy of drift which Curzon 
had intended to end by handing over control to him. On 5 December, Bonar 
Law wrote to Curzon: “As regards the whole position, I have done my best to 
postpone reparations from the fear that once we tackle it it will be found that 
we cannot agree with Poincaré and that the French will be much less amenable 
at L a u s a n n e ”.58 Two days later he added: “I do not know in the least what 
Poincaré will propose but again I will do my utmost to make sure that nothing 
in the nature of a break happens now and endeavour, if necessary, to arrange a 
subsequent meeting at Paris in ten days time or so rather than have any 
difficulties n o w .”S9
This, basically, was to be Bonar Law’s approach. Presented with a spiralling 
conflict in Europe and an absentee Foreign Secretary, it is understandable, if  
not excusable, that Bonar Law opted for procrastination. This is particularly 
the case when it is appreciated that Bonar Law also had to contend with an 
administration divided over the reparation issue. The main fault line was 
between the Foreign Office and the Treasury.
Foreign Office officials appreciated that as the Anglo-American guarantee to 
France, intended at Versailles, had not become a reality, France had legitimate 
grounds to fear Germany. The Head of the Central Department of the Foreign 
Office, M iles Lampson, recognised France’s problems in a minute of 9 
December 1922:
“...there can be little if  any doubt that underlying the whole
French policy in the matter or reparations is a feeling of
57 Curzon Papers, MSS Eur. F.112/200(b): Hardinge (Paris) to Curzon (Lausanne), 2.12.22.
58 Bonar Law Papers, Box 112, Folder 12, Doc. 38: Bonar Law to Curzon, 5.12.22
59 Bonar Law Papers, Box 112, Folder 12, Doc. 40: Bonar Law to Curzon, 7.12.22
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uneasiness as to the safety of her western frontiers and of distinct 
soreness at having been, as she thinks “let down” over the 
American and British treaties of guarantee...// [I]s it not fairly 
obvious that, until France in some form or other is convinced that 
the safety of her western frontier is permanently guaranteed 
against Grerman attack, no lasting settlement of this question is 
likely to be reached?”60
The Foreign Office was also aware of the dangers of treating Germany too 
leniently with regard to reparations. On 5 December a Foreign Office minute 
commented:
“[UJnless some effective guarantee of a fair reparation payment 
is extracted from Germany in the more or less immediate future, 
there is clearly a danger that by the mere efflux of time it will 
become more and more difficult to extract such a payment, with 
the not improbable result that in the end Germany will pay 
nothing at all. She would then, owing to her inflationist 
proceedings he the one great industrial power in Europe enjoying 
all the advantages accruing from the extinction of both foreign 
and internal deht.”6i
However, although Foreign Office officials understood the logic behind the 
French case, and although they were afraid of damaging Anglo-French 
relations by refusing to cooperate with Poincaré’s seizure of gages and were 
under no illusions as to Germany’s willingness to pay reparations, they still felt 
that the risks involved in supporting Poincaré’s Ruhr policy were too great. 
The Ruhr policy would destroy any chance of getting reparations and would 
precipitate the collapse of Germany. It would represent a major advance of 
French strength in Europe and would further embitter Franco-German 
relations. It would also disrupt international trade and weaken the French
60 Minute by Lampson, 9.12.22 on; FO 371 7489, C l7052/99/18: Ryan (Coblenz) to 
Lampson 7.12.22.
61 FO 371 7488, C16643/99/18: FO minute on “Reparation Position”, 5.12.22.
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exchange rate.62 Facing a Catch 22 situation of unwelcome alternatives, the 
Foreign Office was essentially paralysed, unable to suggest any real way 
forward unless the government broke the vicious circle by offering France a 
security guarantee.
Unlike the Foreign Office, the Treasury, alHed with the British Delegate on the 
Reparation Commission, Sir John Bradbury, did take a definite Hne. It was far 
more concerned with the financial aspects of the situation than with its 
security implications. Its goal was to obtain payment of the war debts owed to 
Britain, so that she could repay to the US what was owed to the latter. 
Britain’s main debtor was France, and in the Treasury’s eyes, France was 
merely making an excuse of the reparation issue so as to avoid paying Britain, 
while simultaneously seeking to destroy the German economy for selfish  
strategic purposes. Treasury proposals for a settlement were usually largely 
influenced by Bradbury and were always based on the premise that Germany 
must be revived so that she could pay, and not, as the French envisaged, forced 
by sanctions or external control into a fulfilment of her obligations.
On 23 November Bradbury imposed this Treasury view on the Prime Minister 
so forcefully that the Foreign Office was in uproar. Bonar Law asked Bradbury 
whether it might be advisable to allow the French to have their way regarding 
pledges. Bradbury was adamant: such pledges were illegal under the Treaty of
62 These equally unwelcome alternatives are clearly laid down in a Foreign Office 
memorandum of 23 November 1922, which is worthy of quotation: “The seizure by France of 
a pledge of this kind may be repugnant to the British government. They may object on the 
score of an accession to France of strength such as to overset the balance of power in Europe. 
They may object upon the ground that war between France and Germany will thereby once 
more be rendered inevitable. They may object upon the ground that the seizure of such a 
pledge would give a fresh and severe shock to the convalescent structure of British industry 
and would constitute the death blow to the tottering financial credit of France. But it will be 
well to remember also the strain to the Entente which will be involved...The advocacy of 
further concessions to Germany may force France to act in Germany alone. France may also, 
through failure to obtain the support of the partner to the Entente, be compelled to seek new 
alliances and new diplomatic arrangements. // It will be well also not to forget the meagre 
results of the so-called “change of heart” in which post-war Germany has during the last few 
months repaid the British Government for the efforts made to mitigate the fate which 
Germany had brought upon herself.”[FO 371 7487, C16157/99/18: FO minute, 23.11.22.]
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Versailles (itself a highly contentious claim) and would ruin Europe. On the
contrary, the French should be restrained by postponing any inter-allied
conference and instead summoning a bankers’ conference to consider the issue.
Furthermore, Bradbury declared that he would pursue this approach on the
Reparation Commission regardless of Bonar Law’s views. Ralph Wigram, a
clerk in the Central Department who attended the meeting, commented:
“Sir John Bradbury concluded his lecture - for from the tone in 
which his remarks were delivered, they can be described as little 
else - by a clear indication that he had a policy of his own on 
these matters which he intended to pursue on the Commission, 
that it might not always be that of HM Government, but that if  
the Prime M inister thought Sir John’s policy was likely to 
embarrass him, he was ready to resign f o r t h w i t h .”63
Wigram was incensed by Bradbury’s behaviour:
“I would add that the impression left on my mind by the views 
which Sir John Bradbury outlined to the Prime Minister only 
served to intensify and to throw into still stronger relief the 
conviction which I have long held of the extreme danger of allowing 
a question of the prime political importance of reparation to be 
dealt with by a few Treasury officials and ex-officials acting in 
complete independence of the Foreign S e c r e t a r y . . .”64
Lampson sympathised with Wigram’s displeasure. Although he advised
against taking issue with the Treasury at this point, it is interesting that this
was because he felt that the Treasury had already bungled the reparation
issue so much that it was better to leave it holding ultimate responsibility!
Already on 18 November he had commented:
“We should go a little warily over this [relations between the 
Foreign Office, the Treasury and the Reparation Commission] or 
we shall find ourselves landed with the whole responsibility for 
Reparations, and that seems unwise now that they have become 
tangled up as result of actions and decisions taken on the 
in itiative of others... [S]hould not that Departm ent [the 
Treasury] rather than the Foreign Office remain responsible tothe 
British public for Reparation p o lic y ? ”65
63 FO 371 7487, C16116/99/18: Memo by Wigram, 23.11.22.
64 FO 371 7487, 016116/99/18: Memo by Wigram, 23.11.22.
65 Minute by Lampson, 18.11.22 on: FO 371 7487, 015635/99/18: Oentral Department 
Minute, ‘Relations between the British Delegation to the Reparation Oommission and the 
Treasury and the Foreign Office’, 14.11.22.
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Sir Eyre Crowe, the Permanent Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, 
also agreed that the Treasury influence was too great. But unUke Lampson, he 
still hoped to curtail it and suggested that Reparation Commission reports 
should be sent to the Foreign Office and only then passed on to the T r e a s u r y .66 
This would solve the problems the Foreign Office was having in simply 
obtaining up to date information on developments from the Treasury.
The problems, however, were not satisfactorily resolved. While the Foreign 
Office officials themselves had no real answers to offer unless the politicians 
were prepared to tackle the fundamental issue of French security, they had 
little choice but to acquiesce in the Treasury’s primacy over reparation policy. 
Meanwhile, the disagreements within the administration, coupled with 
Curzon’s emphasis on Lausanne and the im m ensely difficult European 
situation, all made Bonar Law’s task much more challenging. It is perhaps 
understandable that Bonar Law acquiesced in Bradbury’s forcefully put view of 
trying to delay the Brussels Conference indefinitely. When Poincaré’s 
obstinacy made this impossible, Bonar Law then merely stalled for time for the 
Lausanne Conference by agreeing to a preliminary meeting in London. Until 
the last minute Bonar Law pinned his hopes on reports that Poincaré was 
bluffing and that his position was too tenuous to support an aggressive policy. 
It was not until the eve of the London Conference that any plan for a 
compromise with Poincaré was produced.
Reports that Poincaré’s position was in reality extremely weak reached the 
Foreign Office in early November. On 6 November Hardinge had remarked 
that: “My own opinion is that Poincaré is too big for his boots and I am 
beginning to think that he wiU not last long now. His position is considered to
66 Minute by Crowe, 20.11.22 on: FO 371 7487, 016001/99/18: D'Abemon disp. 891,
19.11.22.
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be far less good than it was a fortnight a g o .”67 A few days later Hardinge 
continued: "... he has not the courage to take any decided action, and public 
opinion is getting sufficiently well educated to know that little if  anything is to 
he got from the Ruhr...”68
But by the beginning of December doubts were creeping in. Hardinge now
changed his tune:
“...till a few days ago, my impression has been that although 
Poincare would bluff a great deal about going into the Ruhr, he 
would never have the courage to do so. But I am not so sure that 
he will not do so if provoked, as public opinion is hardening against 
the bad faith of Germany, and Poincaré, who has been losing 
ground very rapidly in the Chamber, sees in an incursion in to the 
Ruhr, the means of recovering his position in the country and 
especially with the ‘Bloc National’ in the C h a m b e r .”69
Fuelled by these reports of Poincaré’s weakness, the British had at first simply 
tried to put off Poincaré indefinitely. For example, at the beginning of 
November, Curzon had used the excuse of the election and an impending trip 
by the Chancellor (Baldwin) to the US to discuss war debts to defer the 
C o n fe r e n c e .7 0  Plausible though this reasoning may have appeared on the 
surface, it was clearly really only a barely concealed attem pt at 
procrastination. By the end of November, Poincaré was again demanding a 
conference. Now the British response subtly changed. The principle remained 
the same: to concede as Little as possible while stalling for time, but the answer 
now was to hold a preliminary conference in London in order to avoid a grand 
showdown at Brussels. The initiative came from the Treasury?! but members
67 Curzon Papers: MSS Eur. F,112/200(b), Hardinge to Curzon 6.11.22.
68 Curzon Papers; MSS Eur. F.112/200(b): Hardinge to Curzon 10.11.22.
69 Curzon Papers: MSS Eur. F.112/200(b): Hardinge to Curzon, 2.12.22. The Bloc National 
was the rather uneasy coalition of parties upon which Poincaré relied for his Parliamentary 
support.
70 Curzon Papers, MSS Eur. F. 112/240: Curzon to Grahame, 1.11.22.
71 On 20 November Lampson remarked: “I understand that the Treasury do not favour such 
a Conference [ ie the Brussels Conference] unless some working plan has been reached 
beforehand with the French: otherwise, they point out, the result will be similar to that last 
August when only bad blood was engendered.” [Minute by Lampson 20.11.22 on: FO 371 
7487, C15686/99/18: D’Abemon disp. 867, 11.11.22.]
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of the Foreign Office soon adopted the approach. On 27 November Lampson 
wrote:
“One thing is essential, namely that if  there is to be a fresh 
Conference the Allies should know beforehand what they are 
prepared to accept. It is positively dangerous to have another 
abortive Conference, the sole result of which was to demonstrate 
to the world (and Germany) that this country and France are at 
loggerheads over R e p a r a t io n s .”72
Therefore when the French Ambassador again asked Bonar Law to agree to 
hold the Brussels Conference before the end of the year, Bonar Law’s response 
was not so negative. He agreed that a preliminary meeting of Prime Ministers 
could take place on the weekend of 9-10 December in London. 73 The next day, 
Bonar Law was informed that Poincaré would come to London74 and the 
Belgian and Italian Prime Ministers were also invited.
The problems facing Bonar Law were vast. The reparation crisis had long been 
escalating and was now reaching its culmination. Moreover, as the crisis was 
inherently linked to the domestic political situations in both France and 
Germany, which were diametrically opposed to each other, the British position 
was increasingly squeezed. The European situation was further complicated 
by the ambiguous role of the other main countries involved: Belgium, Italy and 
particularly the United States. At the same time the Lausanne Conference 
was underway, which preoccupied the Foreign Secretary and caused him to 
give primacy to a united allied front. Finally, tensions w ithin the 
administrative machine, between the Foreign Office and the Treasury, were 
fermenting, and by early December were only barely concealed below the 
surface. When all of these factors are considered, as well as the relative 
inexperience in foreign affairs of the majority of the new government and even
72 Minute by Lampson 27.11.22 on FO 371 7487, C16100/99/18: Grahame tel. 102,
26.11.22.
73 FO 371 7488, C16247/99/18: Memorandum on Conversation between Bonar Law and 
the French Ambassador in London, 28.11.22.
74 FO 371 7488, 016343/99/18: Minute by Crowe, 29.11.22.
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the Prime Minister, it is hardly surprising that British foreign pohcy had drifted 
into an essentially negative policy of ad hoc manoeuvring, drift and delay. 
Even these efforts had not been entirely successful. Although the Brussels 
Conference had been postponed, Bonar Law now faced a London Conference at 
which he was uncertain of his approach and of whose outcome he was 
doubtful. It remained to be seen to what extent his fears were justified.
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T he L ondon C onference, 9-10 D ecem ber 1922.
The preliminary conference having been agreed on, the British now needed to 
formulate a plan of campaign. The possibility was suggested of Britain 
renouncing her share of reparations and decreasing the war debts owed to her 
by France. In return it was hoped that France would agree to a reduction in 
reparations and that Germany, presented with these more reasonable terms, 
could be induced to c o o p e r a te .7 5
This idea (almost certainly originating in the Treasury) was to form the basis
of the British approach at both London and, subsequently, at Paris. Bonar
Law, unable to come up with any alternative, probably opted for the scheme
as a face-saving device. If Britain hinted to France that she might make a
generous offer, then, if France refused, Britain would at least be able to justify
herself to the world as having tried everything to find a settlement. As
Hardinge advised:
“...if it is seen that M. Poincaré’s obstinacy is likely to make a 
comprehensive settlem ent in London impossible, the widest 
publicity should be given to the terms offered by HMG to the 
French government instead of the unsubstantial policy of 
‘productive pledges’ advocated by M. P o in c a r é .”76
Yet despite cautious optimism for this approach in some quarters 77, Bonar 
Law was never hopeful of success. On 6 December Bonar Law remarked to C. 
P. Scott (the editor of the ‘Manchester Guardian’) that:
75 Minute by Wigram, 27,11.22 on FO 371 7487, C16100/99/18: Grahame, tel. 102, 
26.11.22.
76 FO 371 7488, 016803/99/18: Hardinge, disp. 2867, 7.12.22.
77 The ‘Times was most hopeful and described the London Conference as a “Great 
Opportunity”. In an article on 30 November it advocated what was to become the 
Government line with such accuracy that it could hardly have been mere coincidence: “If the 
present Government understand the realities of the situation and have the courage to face 
them... they will remit the whole or a large part of the loans due England from her Allies, 
and a large part of the reparations due to her from Germany.” These concessions could be 
made in return for a “satisfactory international settlement” for Europe. [The Times.
30.11.22, pp. 13.]
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“For the first time I am going into a conference without any policy 
in my own mind... I may have to choose between two evils - 
between a breach with France which would mean chaos in Europe 
or concessions to France which would also involve great
misfortunes.”78
Lord Robert Cecil also remarked on Bonar Law’s despondency: “He was very 
fnendly and very despairing, and looked to me very t ir e d .”79
The London Conference convened at Downing Street on the morning of
Saturday 9 December. Early in the first meeting Bonar Law tentatively
proposed the Treasury plan by hinting that Britain might be prepared to go
hack on the Balfour Declaration of August 192280 :
“What he had proposed was to treat the Allied debts in such a 
manner that some definitive arrangement could be reached with 
the Germans. In such an event, and provided the arrangement 
was definitive, he was ready to arrange the debts in such a 
manner as even to run some risk of having to pay more to 
America than we should receive from the Allies and from 
Gtermany.”8i
While politely expressed, Poincaré’s response was both immediate and 
essentially negative. He said that: “... no French Government could agree 
spontaneously to any further advantage to G e r m a n y .”82 He did however add 
that the only reduction that France could possibly make to her claim on 
Germany would he the amount Britain sacrificed to France. It was 
unfortunate that Poincaré made this qualification as it gave some factions 
within the British administration false hope and prevented them from entirely 
abandoning the scheme. It was to be revived at the Paris Conference in
78 Blake, Unknown, pp. 485
79 Cecil Papers, vol. 51095: memorandum by Cecil on 7.12,22 of a conversation between 
Cedi and Bonar Law.
80 This declaration had stated that Britain expected the allies to repay their war debts to 
Britain in order that Britain could discharge her debt to the US.
81 Parliamentary Papers 1923 XXIV, Cmd. 1812, ICP 254: Notes of conversations held at 
10 Downing Street on 9.12.22. (These are also reproduced in CAB 29/102)
82 Parliamentary Papers 1923 XXIV, Cmd. 1812, ICP 254: Notes of conversations held at 
10 Downing Street on 9.12.22. (These are also reproduced in CAB 29/102)
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January, with disastrous consequences.
But Poincaré had managed to seal the fate of the scheme as the basis for 
agreement at London. As ever, Bonar Law’s answer was to resort to delaying 
tactics. His approach to the remainder of the conference was to play for time 
for Curzon at the Lausanne Conference and to try to keep relations with 
Poincaré as amicable as possible. His task was not made any easier by the 
German government. On 10 December, Bonar Law received a note from Cuno 
containing fresh German proposals for reparation payments. The German 
Government offered to begin the stabilisation of their currency with their own 
reserves in the hope that foreign credit would then be forthcoming. In return, 
the Germans requested an immediate moratorium in the form of a gold loan on 
highly favourable terms which could be used to cover Germany’s treaty 
obligations for a further four or five y e a r s .8 3
Poincaré was incensed, rejecting the German scheme out of hand, and insisting 
that the alHes take productive pledges in the form of the occupation of Bochum 
and Essen. Even Bonar Law was disappointed with the German note, saying 
that: “...there was much of M. Poincaré’s criticism with which he did not 
d is a g r e e .”84 But Bonar Law was desperate that a break should not occur at 
the conference. The tactics he used were extremely astute. He met Poincaré 
alone outside the official conference meetings and, saying that it would be very 
difficult for his own political position if his first act after coming into power was 
to announce a break with France, he managed to persuade Poincaré to adjourn 
proceedings until 2 January in P a r is .8 5
83 Appendix 1: Cuno to Bonar Law, 9.12.22, enclosed in Parliamentary Papers 1923 XXIV, 
Cmd. 1812, ICP 256; Conversation at 10 Downing Street, 10.12.22.
84 Parliamentary Papers 1923 XXIV, Cmd. 1812, ICP 256: Conversation at 10 Downing 
Street, 10.12.22. (These are also reproduced in CAB 29/102)
85 Hankey Papers, Box 1/6: Diary 12-21 December 1922.
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The result was that at the end of the conference, superficially at least, 
relations between Britain and France seemed somewhat improved. As Crowe 
reported: “Monsieur Poincaré, whilst firmly upholding the government’s 
decision to occupy the Ruhr after January 15th, was throughout extremely 
courteous and conciliatory in tone and manner, and parting was on entirely 
friendly terms.”86
Bonar Law himself, however, was under no illusions as to the success of the
Conference. He realised that differences had merely been papered over and
that there had been no real progress towards real solutions. He told Curzon:
“As regards our Conference it has been a complete failure as 
indeed was inevitable for Poincaré came determined on 2 points:
(1) that whatever happened he would occupy Essen, (2) that he 
could not reduce the amount of the French claims except to the 
extent by which we reduced their debt to us. I had really therefore 
nothing to do but play for time for the sake of Lausanne and I am 
sure you will have respite there until the beginning of J a n u a r y .  ”87
It is an interesting reflection on the nature of Bonar Law’s Cabinet that its 
members simply accepted this situation almost unquestioningly when they 
met to discuss the conference. Ministers concentrated on agreeing a bland 
official statement saying that owing to pressures of time the conference had 
been adjourned until January. There was no real policy debate, and no 
discussion of any long term strategy or plan for the approaching Paris
meetings.88
Parliament was also quiet and did not make life too difficult for Bonar Law. 
Largely this was because the House of Commons rose for the Christmas 
recess on 15 December, and so throughout the difficult period before and during 
the Paris Conference Bonar Law had few questions to face. Yet even before
86 FO 371 7489, C17084/99/18; Crowe to Curzon, tel. 71, 11.12.22.
87 Bonar Law Papers, Box 112, Folder 12, Document 44: Bonar Law to Curzon, 12.12.22.
88 CAB 23 32: Conclusions of Cabinet meeting 11.12.22.
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the recess he had little trouble dealing with the Commons. When asked what 
Britain would do if France occupied the Ruhr he simply refused to answer such 
“a hypothetical question.”89 When asked what the government's views were on 
the eve of the London Conference he retorted only: “They have many views and 
it would take a very long time to express them."so After the London 
Conference, Bonar Law did agree to a debate on reparations and interallied 
debts. Although this lasted for over seven hours, it was, from Bonar Law's 
perspective, a rather tame affair. Bonar Law used the fact that he was in the 
middle of crucial and delicate discussions with the French as an excuse to avoid 
saying anything of real significance, and then simply sat back and watched as 
the debate degenerated into a slanging match over Lloyd Greorge's original role 
in determining reparation amounts.
89 See for example, Hansard 159 HC Deb 5s, col, 506, 28.11.22: Question by Wallhead; and 
col. 887-8, 30.11.22: question by Wallhead.
90 Hansard, 159 HC Deb 5s, col. 1984-6, 7.12.22: answer by Bonar Law to question from 
Lieut. -Commander Kenworthy, MP for Hull.
91 Hansard 159 HC Deb 5s, beginning at col. 3222, 14.12.22.
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From  L ondon to  P aris
The stage was set for a difficult few weeks. The complete collapse of the
London Conference had revealed the difficulties involved when negotiating the
reparation question. Moreover, the entirely inadequate nature of the German
proposals that had been submitted had fuelled France’s conviction that
Germany would never pay and that the only language she would listen to was
that of force. Bonar Law had much justification for his pessimism when he
wrote to Curzon on 21 December:
“I have no hope of the Conference of the 2nd January unless 
something unexpected happens. The real truth is that French 
finance is so bad that for them to agree to any arrangement 
which is possible to Germany would be equivalent to declaring 
that they are practically b a n lm ip t.’’92
It would however, be wrong to describe the European situation as entirely 
hopeless at this point. According to the American ambassador in Brussels, the 
Belgians were not entirely despondent. On the contrary, Henri Jaspar, the 
Belgian Foreign Minister, reportedly: “thinks situation was improved by the 
London conversations and is not entirely hopeless.”93 Lord D’Abernon, the 
British Ambassador in Berlin, was also optimistic. On 23 December he 
reported: “On return here I found the general situation less pessimistic than I 
had anticipated...// I do not think successful negotiation altogether
impossible.”94
There was, then, in some minds the possibility of coming to some kind of 
negotiated agreem ent. This fact has been em phasised in recent 
historiography. Both Marc Trachtenberg and John Keiger have argued that
92 Bonar Law Papers, Box 112, Folder 12, Doc. 48, Bonar Law to Curzon, 21.12.22.
93 HW12 41; Fletcher (Brussels) to Hughes (Washington) tel. 95, 14.12.22.
94 D’Abemon Papers, Vol. 48927B: D’Abemon to Bonar Law, 23.12.22.
49
Poincaré was actually extremely unwilling to occupy the Ruhr, hut that he was 
forced into it by sheer weight of events. Both are highly critical of Britain’s role 
in limiting France’s options. The approach chosen hy the British was to 
present at the Paris Conference their own proposals, on which to build a 
reparation agreement. In the event, however, the British proposals, far from 
forming the basis of allied agreement, actually precipitated the Ruhr 
occupation hy provoking not only France, but also Belgium and Italy. This 
British Paris plan has since been greatly criticised by historians, and the 
British have been accused of “goading” Poincaré into the R u h r .s s  Why did 
British policy-makers decide to pursue so controversial a policy? Did they 
realise that the plan was contentious, and if  so what did they hope to achieve 
by it? Were there any alternative strategies available or indeed pursued at 
this time? These are all questions which have yet to he answered convincingly 
in the historiography of the period, which has mainly approached the issue 
from the French standpoint.
The British plan began in the form of proposals hy Bradbury dated 15 
December 1922.96 These were discussed by the Treasury and then a scheme 
was outlined hy Sir Otto Niemeyer, Controller of Finance at the Treasury, to 
Lampson and Wigram on 20 December. The basic idea was that Britain was 
to wipe out the war debts owed to her by the allies (around £1174 million) and 
in return France would wipe out the war debts owed to her by her allies (around 
£78 million) and agree to decrease Germany’s outstanding reparations from 
£6,650 million to £2,500 m il l i o n .97 This plan was simply an elaboration of the 
tentative offer to renege on the Balfour Declaration already made, an offer 
which had already met with an unfavourable French reception. Economically, 
the plan made some sense and it is perhaps understandable why the Treasury,
95 Keiger, Poincaré, pp. 297.
96 FO 371 8626, C327/1/18: FO minute by Wigram, 4.1.23.
97 FO 371 7491, 017656/99/18: FO minute by Lampson 20.12.22.
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with its strongly Franco-phobic views on reparation questions, favoured it. 98 
What needs to be asked is why the Foreign Office officials, who had previously 
proved more able to see both sides of the situation, did not predict the plan’s 
reception, and try to stop the Cabinet adopting it as government policy.
Indeed, not only did Foreign Office officials go along with the plan, but they even 
squashed the one Treasury proposal of any real significance - that France be 
bribed into accepting the British reparations proposals by the offer of a treaty 
of guarantee. Niemeyer asked for the view of the Foreign Office on this 
suggestion when he outlined the plan to them on 20 December. Lampson 
commented: “Personally I have always thought there might be a good deal in 
this...”99 , but he was overruled by Crowe who noted that the government’s 
position was that before a pact could be offered all outstanding differences of 
any kind must be settled. lOO
This, then was the real crux of the problem - that the government did not 
sanction any real change of direction of policy which could have made a true 
accommodation with France possible. At no point did the Cabinet consider the 
basic issue of French security or seriously contemplate the effects of a policy 
of either breaking from France or joining with her. Bonar Law simply 
continued the policy of procrastination begun before the London Conference.
Lampson was left to justify the Treasury plan on the entirely negative ground 
that at least it could be used to save face in the eyes of the world when, as
98 Even three months after the event, Bradbury still had no regrets. On 10 April he wrote: 
“It [the Paris Plan] was, I think, worth making at that time, because by reason of the 
previous history of the question, we could not leave the French in the lurch and there was 
fairly strong ground for hoping that Germany could bear the burden which we proposed to 
put upon her, and would see the advantage of shouldering it rather than exposing herself to 
the ruinous effects of coercive measures.” [T190/10: Bradbury to Baldwin, 10.4.23.]
99 FO 371 7491, C17656/99/18: FO minute by Lampson 20.12.22.
100 Minute by Crowe 20.12.22 on FO 371 7491, C17656/99/18: FO minute by Lampson
20 . 12 .22 .
51
seemed inevitable, Poincaré occupied the Ruhr:
“Will France be prepared to give up that demand [ie no 
moratorium without pledges] in return for the offer of remission of 
debt? That is really the whole point. If they are not, then we can 
go to the whole world with a very clean conscience that this 
country at least has gone to all lengths to keep in with France and 
that the failure is not our fault. // Personally, I very much doubt 
whether in anv circumstances Poincaré will abandon his Ruhr 
scheme; and his position still seems as secure as it was when he 
visited London last week.”ioi
Bonar Law had already shown him self to be susceptible to this argument. 
Before the London Conference he had written: “If there is to be a break I think 
it is essential that we should submit proposals which can be given to the world 
and will show how reasonable we a r e .”102
Crowe however, was more positive in his appraisal. He felt that the British
Paris Plan afforded the Germans one last chance. It represented the furthest
concessions the British would make before the evidence of German bad faith
was absolute. If Germany faded to fulfil even these most reasonable proposals
then Britain would be justified in taking joint coercive action with France in
order to secure the fulfilment of a revised and workable reparation scheme. On
20 December Crowe minuted:
“...the occupation of the Ruhr would be an effective means of 
coercing Germany into acceptance and fulfilm ent of the 
reasonable demands... Therefore provided such reasonable 
demands can be formulated, we should not refuse our associating 
ourselves with the occupation in case of Germany not carrying 
out what she may be induced to promise, and that the exact 
coercive measures (and machinery of) ought to be worked out in 
some detail in agreement between the A l l i e s .
This argument by Crowe may well provide the key to understanding why
Britain tabled the Paris proposals. While the Treasury had taken the initiative
in formulating the plan, the Foreign Office accepted its terms and were
101 Minute by Lampson, 19.12.22 on: FO 371 7490, C17273/99/18: Phipps (Counsellor of 
Paris Embassy), disp. 2944, 17.12.22.
102 Bonar Law Papers, Box 112, Folder 12, Doc. 40: Bonar Law to Curzon 7.12,22.
103 Minute by Crowe 20.12.22 on: FO 371 7490, C1744/99/18: note by Trough ton, 
10 . 12 .22 .
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prepared to stand by them. Moreover, the Foreign Office believed that France 
would welcome a British initiative. On 27 December Count Saint-Aulaire, the 
French Ambassador in London, reported that Poincaré wanted the British to 
table proposals (though he certainly did not intend the ones he got!).i04 Thus 
the plan seemed to offer the best way forward: should it be accepted, then a 
new and (in Treasury eyes) realistic basis would be given to reparation - one 
that in future Britain would be prepared to act with France to uphold; should 
the plan be rejected, then Britain would at least score an important advantage 
in the eyes of the world.
Two other policy options were considered. First was the possibility of 
persuading the Germans to make fresh proposals. Crowe favoured this as he 
thought that the best way to get the Germans to agree to fulfil reasonable 
proposals was not for the allies to dictate them, but for the Germans 
themselves to offer them. But the Foreign Office was divided over the idea. 
Lampson felt: “It has always seemed to me that each fresh German plan only 
gave the French something jfresh to fasten onto and upon which to base further 
charges of bad f a i t h . i n  the event, the Germans, influenced by 
Bradbury, 106 did formulate some kind of scheme and sent the economist Carl 
Bergmann to the Paris Conference, to table it orally if required. It is unlikely 
that this approach by Britain could ever have yielded really positive results. 
Whatever proposals Germany tabled at Paris, it is unlikely that they would
104 On 27 December the French Ambassador in London reported that: “M. Poincaré, feeling 
convinced that nothing but the seizure of pledges will advance matters, regrets to find that 
the British Government, whilst frankly and loyally expressing their condemnation of this 
particular policy, maintain a negative attitude of criticism, but do not themselves offer any 
alternative plan,..(H)e ventures to express the earnest hope that they [HMG] will be able 
and ready to submit their alternative proposition for the consideration of the French 
government.” [FO 371 7491, C17747/99/18: Conversation between Crowe and French 
Ambassador, 27,12.22.]
105 Minute by Lampson, 27.12.22 on FO 371 7491, C17597/99/18: D’Abemon tel. 225,
23.12.22.
106 On 28 December Crowe commented: “I understand Sir J. Bradbury has been in 
communication with M. Bergmann and has given some useful advice.” [Minute by Crowe, 
28.12.22 on FO 371 7491, C17597/99/18: D’Abemon tel. 225, 23.12.22.]
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have stopped French action and Britain would have been left with the same 
dilemma of whether to act or not.
The second policy option considered had far greater potential. This was an 
attempt to involve the United States. On 16 December, the Foreign Office 
sent a telegram  to Sir Auckland Geddes (the British Ambassador in  
Washington) asking him to emphasise to Charles Hughes (the United States 
Secretary of State) that “In our opinion the only possibility of avoiding this 
catastrophe is by the intervention of the United States”, and asking the United 
States to send an observer to the Paris conference, as: “... without American 
assistance the prospect is almost hopeless.
Accordingly, Geddes called on Hughes on 18 December. Although he had in fact 
received his instructions through the Foreign Office, he said that he: “had 
received a direct message from Bonar Law, a message which had not gone 
through the Foreign Office, to inform the Secretary as to the Premier’s view of 
the present s i t u a t i o n .” 108 Geddes explained that Bonar Law took a “most 
gloomy” view of prospects. He could not, however, persuade Hughes to 
participate at Paris on even an unofficial basis unless America received an 
invitation from all the allies. He therefore asked if  the American Government 
would make a public declaration of their attitude to the occupation of the 
Ruhr. While Hughes did not want to make a public statement at that time, he 
said that:
“the French Government had no reason to doubt the attitude of 
the American Government or the American people with respect 
to that question; that the futility of expecting an economic return 
from such an occupation was quite clear, and that the dangerous 
consequences which might ensue were fairly obvious.”i09
107FO 371 7490, C17369/99/18: Tel. 363 to Geddes, 16.12.22.
108 FRUS 1922, Vol II: Memorandum by Hughes of interview with Geddes, 18.12.22.
109 FRUS 1922, vol II: Memorandum by Hughes of interview with Geddes, 18.12.22.
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The United States had in fact already approached France on the issue and had
suggested allowing an impartial committee of experts to consider the
reparation issue. As early as 7 November, the United States Ambassador in
Paris (Myron T. Herrick) wrote to Poincaré:
“I need not repeat that we all recognise, even the remotest 
country, that the delay in settling the question of Reparations is 
largely responsible for the present economic disorganisation and 
that there is great necessity for prompt action. However, there 
appears to me to he little prospect of this unless governments 
can arrange to interpose between themselves and their public the 
findings of an impartial committee.”no
Again on 14 December, Hughes told the French ambassador in Washington 
(Jules Jusserand) that: "... we had got to a point where if the matter were to be 
considered on its merits there should be called in those who would faithfully 
advise the Governments in a dispassionate and authoritative manner with 
respect to an economic solution...” He again called for an impartial enquiry, 
and added that it would achieve nothing: “...unless Foreign Offices kept their 
hands ofF...”in
In Britain, the Foreign Office heard rumours of an exchange between the 
United States and France. It waited with baited breath, hopeful that a way 
out might result, but itself unwilling to intervene further lest it do anything to 
damage prospects. Lampson remarked: “If the French would agree (which is 
most unlikely) arbitration by an American... as to the amount Germany could 
reasonably pay might be a good way out. America is not inclined to deal 
leniently with G r e r m a n y .. .”H 2  Crowe however, was more cautious: “But I have 
no confidence whatever that France would agree to an Am erican
arbitrator.”ii3
110 FRUS 1922, vol. II; Herrick to Poincaré, 7.11.22.
lllFR US 1922, vol. II: Memorandum by Hughes of conversation with Jusserand, 14.12.22.
112 Minute hy Lampson, 19.12.22 on: FO 371 7490, C l7399/99/18: Geddes, tel. 499,
18.12.22.
113 Minute by Crowe, 19.12.22 on: FO 371 7490, C17399/99/18: Geddes, tel. 499,
18.12.22.
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Crowe’s pessimism was well founded. Even in the initial conversation with 
Hughes on 14 December, Jusserand had pointed out that: “...the situation was 
made a great deal more difficult for his Government than it otherwise would be 
because of the tendency in Great Britain and in the United States, as shown 
by the press, rather to favour Germany and to put France in the w r o n g .”i i 4
On 21 December 1922 Poincare gi aciously but definitely rejected the American 
suggestion. Poincaré said that it was necessary first to exhaust the existing 
opportunities for France to secure an agreement with the other governments, 
that the allies were meeting on 2 Januaiy and that: “he did not think that any 
such suggestion could be followed up before that time, and before it was 
ascertained that it would be impossible for them to arrive at an a g r e e m e n t .”H 5
Despite this rejection by France, on 29 December at New Haven Hughes 
finally declared publicly that the United States was in favour of appointing 
some form of authoritative committee of financial experts to discuss 
r e p a r a t io n s .  116 Perhaps the United States merely wanted to vindicate itself in 
the eyes of the world before Poincaré marched into the Ruhr; or perhaps they 
were at last galvanised into action when the Reparation Commission on 26 
December declared Germany to be in default. Whatever his motives, Hughes’ 
speech came far too late to halt the events of the Paris Conference. H7 The 
Foreign Office had already reverted to the plan of campaign outlined by
114 FRUS 1922, vol. II: Memorandum by Hughes of conversation with Jusserand, 14.12.22.
115 FRUS 1922, vol. II; Memorandum by Hughes of conversation with Jusserand, 21.12.22.
116 For a more detailed account of US policy at this point, see K.L. Nelson, Victors Divided: 
America and the Allies in Germanv. 1918-1923. (London, 1975).
117 In the event the US offer was simply left unanswered. On 9 January 1923, Harriman 
(the US Chargé d’Affaires in London ) told Lampson that: “...America having declared her 
willingness to intervene to the extent indicated in [the] Newhaven speech, and that offer not 
having been accepted by all interested parties, there was nothing for it but for the offer to 
lapse. If at a later date all parties concerned agreed to accept the good offices of America, 
matters might be revived.” [Memo by Lampson 9.1.23 enclosed in FO 371 8627, 
C545/1/18, Disp. 68 to Geddes, 10.1.23.
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Alexander Cadogan, First Secretary in the Foreign Office, on 19 December 
when he had first heard rumours of the United States initiative: “If the 
proposal is not accepted, the US Government definitely will not intervene any 
further. The last hope will then be for us to put up a scheme on January 2nd 
that may be acceptable to France.
On the very day of the New Haven declaration, and only two days before Bonar 
Law left for Paris, the Cabinet finally accepted the Bradbury/Treasury 
schemeii9 . Ministers were not optimistic of the chances of the plan’s success 
and spent most of the Cabinet meeting discussing how Bonar Law should react 
if  the French rejected the plan: “In the event of a fixed determination on the 
part of the French to take independent coercive action against Germany, and a 
refusal to discuss any reasonable proposals, the Cabinet agreed with the 
course proposed hy the Prime Minister”. This course was basically to say that 
large questions were raised, and that it was necessary to consult the
Cabinet. 120
The morale of the Cabinet was not helped by international developments. On 
26 December Bradbury was outvoted on the Reparation Commission, and 
Germany was declared to be in voluntary default in timber deliveries. 121 The 
next day Saint-Aulaire informed Crowe that: “... there can be no question of 
France receding in any way from her policy of seizure of remunerative pledges 
as one of the conditions on which any grant of a moratorium can be
118 Minute by Cadogan, 19.12.22 on FO 371 7490, C17399/99/18; Geddes, tel. 499,
18.12.22.
119 The plan was thus adopted hastily on the eve of the Paris Conference. One minister, 
Lloyd Graeme, later complained that the Embassies in Paris and Brussels had not warned 
the Cabined of the likely reception of the plan. Wigram responded in an internal 
memorandum that the hasty formulation of the plan and its last-minute adoption by the 
Cabinet as government policy had not left the Foreign Office enough time even to send a 
draft to the Embassies for comment. [FO 371 8626, C327/1/18: Minute by Wigram, 4.1.23.]
120 CAB 23 32, Conclusions of meeting of Cabinet, 29.12.22.
121F0 801/9: Minutes of Reparation Commission, No. 343, Decisions 2306-2311, 26.12.22.
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executed.”122 Once more Bonar Law left for a conference feeling that he had 
virtually no chance of success. As Hankey commented on the eve of the 
conference: "Personally I am not unhopeful of our prospects here. Bonar 
however as usual is very depressed”i23 Bonar Law later told Neville  
Chamberlain that: "...he had realised that agreement with France was 
impossible from the first meeting he had with Poincaré in London when the 
latter said ‘...We must have the Ruhr.’”i24
Yet was Poincare really as extreme and unwavering at this point as the 
British seemed to think? Was Poincaré really convinced that a break from 
Britain and occupation of the Ruhr was inevitable? It must he remembered 
that on 27 December he had asked Britain to make suggestions and that he 
had told Hughes that there was a possibility of agreement at Paris. His most 
recent biographer, John Keiger, sees him as the unw illing victim of 
circumstance at this point. If Poincaré was still desperately trying to find 
some way out of embarking on the Ruhr occupation, but was finding himself 
railroaded by force of circumstance, this would explain his frustration and 
surprise at the Paris Conference when he heard the details of the British 
proposals. However, given Poincaré’s domestic political position, the 
importance he had publicly attached to obtaining reparation and the financial 
situation in France, it is hard to envisage a compromise even had Britain 
produced a more stringent plan at Paris. It is to the events at this conference 
that we must now turn.
122 FO 371 7491, C17747/99/18: Disp. 3879 to Phipps (Paris), 28.12.22.
123 Hankey Papers, Box 3/31: Hankey (Paris) to his wife Adeline, 1.1.23.
124 Neville Chamberlain Papers: NC2/21: Neville Chamberlain’s diary, 10.1.23.
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T he P aris C onference, 2-4 Jan u ary  1923.
The failure of the Paris Conference had been generally anticipated. What had 
not been expected was the speed of the collapse of negotiations. In fact a deep 
rift appeared so quickly that the Conference broke up on 4 January - after only 
three days - and the French, with support from the Belgians and (to some 
extent) from the Italians took coercive action in the Ruhr on the 11th January, 
four days before the expected date of 15th January.
The proceedings were opened hy Poincaré on 2 January 1923. Poincaré made 
a short introductory speech in which he immediately dismissed the possibility 
of hearing any further German proposals. 125 Poincaré then handed round 
French proposals for the allies’ next action. These basically outlined the 
sanctions to be taken in order to secure payment by Germany. The Italian 
representative. Marquis della Torrettai26  ^ then spoke briefly before Bonar 
Law occupied the centre stage to outline the British plan.
Basically, Bonar Law proposed that Germany should pay nothing for four 
years; then 2 hilhon German Marks per annum for the next four years; and 2.5 
billion German Marks per annum for the following two years. After 10 years, 
she would pay 3.5 billion German Marks per annum. In return for these 
favourable terms, Germany would have to stabilise the mark, agree to some 
financial supervision by the allies, and submit to sanctions (including military
125 Poincaré said that on the previous day the German ambassador had told him that 
Bergmann was coming to Paris to present fresh proposals. Poincaré said that: “The 
proposal was less definite than the one made in London, which had at least been in writing. 
Now there was nothing more than an overture announcing a visit. If his colleagues saw no 
inconvenience in this course, he thought the best plan would be to postpone until later on 
the examination of the reception which should be given to this German suggestion.” 
[Parliamentary Papers 1923 XXIV, Cmd. 1812, ICP 258: Minutes of meeting at Paris,
2.1.23.]
126 Mussolini did not attend the Paris conference. Della Torretta was the Italian 
Ambassador in London.
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occupation) if she failed to satisfy her obligations. Bonar Law then moved onto 
war debts and outlined the British proposals to reduce inter-allied debts 
(excluding the United States), with the effect that Britain would be making 
much the largest sacrifice. 127
After Bonar Law had outlined the plan the conference adjourned until the 
following day for the delegates to consider the proposals. On 3 January the 
conference reconvened and Poincaré immediately launched into a detailed 
criticism of the British scheme, concluding by: “declaring it to be absolutely 
unacceptable.”i28 it  was perhaps predictable that the French would disagree 
with the British proposals. What had such a detrimental effect on the 
conference was the effect of the plan on the other delegates. The Belgians were 
horrified at the plan’s extreme leniency towards Germany, in particular as one 
of the plan’s provisions was for the cancellation of Belgian priority. It was this 
which caused Georges Theunis, the Belgian Premier, to say that: “He would not 
hide that when they read the note of the British Government the Belgian 
Government had felt a disappointment as deep as that of the French 
Government.”i29 Even the Italians refused to accept the British proposals. 
Della Torretta diplomatically declared: “The Enghsh plan is animated with the 
noblest intentions, but it does not succeed in solving the grave problem of 
reparations in an equitable manner.”130
Although Bonar Law, quickly realising the provocative effect his plan was 
having, tried to save the situation by saying that Britain was prepared to 
waive her proposal of Belgium abandoning her priority and that “we did not
127 Parliamentary Papers 1923 XXIV, Cmd, 1812, ICP 258: Minutes of meeting at Paris,
2.1.23.
128po 371 8626, C287/1/18: tel. from Ambassador in Paris, Lord Crewe (unnumbered),
3.1.23. enclosing a message from Bonar Law.
129 Parliamentary Papers 1923 XXIV, Cmd. 1812, ICP 259: Minutes of meeting at Paris,
3.1.23.
130 Parliamentary Papers 1923 XXIV, Cmd. 1812, ICP 260: Minutes of meeting at Paris,
4.1.23.
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regard our scheme as unalterable in d e t a i l s ,”i 3 i  the damage had already been 
done. Even some members of the Treasury recognised that the plan had been 
misjudged. Sir Andrew McFadyean, Secretary to the British Delegation on the 
Reparation Commission, subsequently commented: "... it certainly was a 
mistake to issue so complicated a technical paper in dry Treasury form for the 
appreciation of the French public. It would have been comparatively easy in 
two or three days to give it a diplomatic form and make it r e a d a b le . . .
In the event, the impact of the British plan was so profound and exacerbated 
the differences between the allies to such an extent that the Glermans were not 
even given the opportunity to make the proposals they had prepared. On 4 
January, Bonar Law informed the Cabinet that: “Conference held its last 
meeting today. It became quite clear that it would be impossible to reconcile 
the British and French points of view. Latter was fully supported by Italy who 
thus followed in the steps of B e l g i u m . ” 133 Poincaré had maintained his 
insistence on only allowing a moratorium with pledges. The British continued 
to emphasise that such pledges would prevent the recovery of German credit.
The rift was now public knowledge, especially after a statement to the press 
quoting Bonar Law’s exact words at the conference was made. Bonar Law had 
stated that:
"His M ajesty’s Government, after giving the most earnest 
consideration to the French proposals, are definitely of the opinion 
that these proposals, if  carried into effect, will not only fail in 
attaining the desired results, but are likely to have a grave and 
even disastrous effect upon the economic situation in Europe, 
and, in these circumstances, they cannot take part in, or accept
131 FO 371 8626, C287/1/18: tel. from Crewe (imnumbered), 3.1.23, enclosing a message 
from Bonar Law.
132 McFadyean Papers, box entitled ‘Treasury Business, 1919-1923’: McFadyean to Sir 
Hugh Levick (Standard Bank of South Africa), 15.1.23. McFadyean was still highly critical 
of the French. He added: “The lightness, amounting almost to semi-frivolity with which the 
French rejected the British plan which was at any rate a good basis for discussion almost 
defies explanation.”
133 FO 371 8625, C240/1/18: tel. from Crewe (unnumbered), 4.1.23, enclosing a message 
fi’om Bonar Law.
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responsibility for t h e m , ”i3 4
Yet despite the obvious rupture, the British were extremely anxious to
maintain friendly relations, especially as Curzon was still negotiating at
Lausanne. Hence, on 3 January Bonar Law had reported that, “The tone of
the discussion was M e n d l y  t h r o u g h o u t . . .”135 and the new Ambassador in Paris,
Lord Crewe, wrote to Curzon:
“...the personal cordiality and friendliness of everyone was quite 
remarkable. We have been told that for the last two days 
Poincaré has heen most anxious that nothing irreparable should 
be said when the moment of rupture came and that he was 
immensely relieved afterwards. So that for the present I do not 
think there is likely to be any trouble [at L a u s a n n e ] .”i36
Hankey reported:
“On the last day Poincaré tried once or twice to work himself into 
a rage, but Bonar Law was so good tempered and agreeable in 
manner that Poincaré couldn’t work up anything like a real 
outburst. The rupture therefore was a mild one and we parted 
more in sorrow than in a n g e r .”i37
The French also seemed eager to keep the breach to a minimum, and were
anxious to avoid a large-scale military operation in the Ruhr. The legal
formalities were soon completed. On 9 January the Reparation Commission,
again by a majority of three to one (Bradbury abstaining), ruled that Germany
had Voluntarily defaulted’ on her coal d e l iv e r ie s .  138 Qn 10 January the French
informed the Germans of the impending sanctions, saying:
“The measures in question are taken in virtue of paragraph 18 of 
Annex II to part 8 of the Treaty o f  V e r s a i l l e s .  139 They do not
134 FO 371 8625, C240/1/18: tel. from Crewe (unnumbered), 4,1,23, enclosing a message 
from Bonar Law.
135 FO 371 8626, C287/1/18: tel, from Crewe (unnumbered), 3.1.23, enclosing a message 
from Bonar Law.
136 Curzon Papers, MSS Eur. F.112/201(a): Crewe to Curzon, 5.1.23.
137 Hankey Papers, vol. 1/7: diaries, 7.1.23.
138 FO801/9: Minutes of Reparation Commission, no. 346a, decision 2321a, 8&9.1.23.
139 This paragraph reads: “The measures which the Allied and Associated Powers shall 
have the right to take, in case of voluntary default by Germany, and which Germany agrees 
not to regard as acts of war, may include economic and financial prohibitions and reprisals 
and in general such other measures as the respective governments may determine to be 
necessary in the circumstances.”
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denote on the part of France any idea of a military occupation or 
of an occupation of a political character... The French  
Government are sending into the Ruhr only the troops necessary 
to safeguard the mission and to guarantee the execution of its
mandate.”i40
But even at this early stage the underlying threat was clear:
“Should, by some manoeuvre the operations of the officials of the 
mission and the installation of the troops who accompany them  
be hindered or compromised and should the local authorities 
create by their action or abstention from action any trouble 
whatever for the material and economic life of the area all the 
coercive measures and all the sanctions considered necessary 
would at once be taken.”i4i
On 11 January 1923 the French and Belgians sent a mission of control 
composed of engineers into the Ruhr in order to ensure coal and timber 
deliveries. It was accompanied by troops to act, as the French insisted, as 
safeguards. The Italians, eager to keep on good terms with both the French 
and British, sent a token few engineers.
Within Britain the reaction to events is interesting. On 11 January the 
Cabinet approved the line taken by the Prime Minister and emphasised its 
“satisfaction that in spite of the impossibility of reaching agreement on the 
questions before the conference, there had been no breach between the British
and French Governments.”i42
Yet there were some dissenting voices. As early as 3 January, Crewe wrote to 
Curzon:
“Between ourselves, I do not think that our financial provisions 
have been happily put. They are too obviously Treasury, and 
therefore will invite opposition for which it would surely have been 
politic to wait by making the least of our reduction in the first 
instance. Personally, though no doubt this is not the Government 
view, I would have chanced public opinion in England, and have
140 CAB 24 158, CPU: Communication from Paris to German Embassy, 10.1.23.
141 ibid.
142 CAB 23 45, Conclusions of Cabinet Meeting, 11.1.23, 11.30am.
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asked the Allies for l e s s . ” i4 3
Curzon too was critical of the conduct of the conference, although it is 
interesting that his criticisms were all made with the benefit of hindsight and 
that during the critical period before the conference he was unhelpful and 
indifferent. “If you ask my private opinion”, he wrote, “I think that the 
business in Paris has been deplorably m i s m a n a g e d .”144 He went on to say 
that it had probably been a mistake to publish the British scheme in advance, 
and had certainly been a mistake to allow the break to occur so quickly. 
Curzon reported that he had had a very brief meeting with Bonar Law (his one 
and only during this period) in Paris before the conference, and that at this 
meeting Bonar Law had assured him that the Paris discussions would last at 
least a fortnight. Typically, even at this stage, Curzon was far more concerned 
about Lausanne than Europe: “...on that understanding I engaged to hurry on 
the matters here with a view to arriving at a decision while matters in Paris 
were still in suspense. The idea of an immediate breakdown never occurred to 
me and was never hinted at by him.”
Curzon then launched a vicious attack on Bonar Law: “I am afraid that his 
ignorance of the proceedings not merely of Conferences, but of diplomacy in 
general, led him to precipitate matters in a manner which was both 
unnecessary and unwise.” Despite the fact that it was Curzon’s absence 
which had left Bonar Law in the lurch and that Curzon had given him no 
helpful advice or support, Curzon then went on to say quite clearly what line he 
would have pursued between London and Paris. He would “have heen no party 
to the production of a sudden scheme at the last moment.” Rather he would 
have sought to try to clear the ground between France and Britain. Then, at 
Paris, negotiation should have been approached from the more favourable
143 Curzon Papers, MSS Eur. F.112/201(a): Crewe to Curzon, 3.1.23.
144 Curzon Papers: MSS Eur. F.112/201(a): Curzon to Crewe, 5.1.23. See also Crewe 
Papers, C12.
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angle “rather than from the end where disagreement was unavoidable.”
Not content with criticising Bonar Law, he also sought other scapegoats.
Naturally the Treasury was an easy target, and, more particularly, Bradbury:
“I take it that the British plan was the work, in the main, of 
Bradbury. Now I profoundly distrust these Treasury experts, 
who fancy that they are politicians and who, in the case of 
Bradbury in particular, claim to dictate the policy of their 
country. I have always thought that Bradbury ought to be got rid 
of...”
Even when discussing the repercussions of the Paris breakdown, Curzon 
seemed oblivious of its connotations for Europe, speaking only of the Near 
East: “It cannot improve my chances h e r e . . . ”i45
Thus Curzon, probably at last realising that a showdown in Europe had 
arrived, and that it placed Britain in an exceedingly embarrassing position, 
desperately sought to find somebody else to blame for it. Curzon was probably 
right that so provocative a British plan should not have been published and 
that Bonar Law had bungled the conference. It is also true that Curzon did 
have an entirely full agenda and was needed at another important conference 
at that time. Even so, for Curzon to alienate him self so entirely from 
European affairs and to fail to give the new Prime Minister any advice other 
than that it was Lausanne that mattered, was unwise. That Curzon (rather 
belatedly) realised this is surely reflected in this rather unprofessional attempt 
to vindicate himself in the eyes of his new Paris ambassador.




Britain’s foreign policy on the eve of the Ruhr occupation was in the main 
reactive and ad hoc. For the most part, the only approach which politicians 
and officials advocated was one of procrastination - first to delay the Brussels 
Conference indefinitely, and then to try to forestall it by holding the preliminary 
London meeting. When this simply confirmed the deadlock the British tried 
halfheartedly to involve the United States, and then at the last minute they 
hastily adopted a Treasury plan for reparation settlement, tabling it at Paris 
with disastrous consequences.
Revisionist historians have stressed the range of factors combining against 
Poincaré. Desperate to uphold the peace settlem ent and facing difficult 
internal problems and pressures, Poincaré found him self pushed tentatively 
and unwillingly towards the Ruhr. Trachtenberg explains: “There was no 
headlong rush to coercive tactics; indeed the way Poincaré backed into the 
occupation of the Ruhr and hardly knew what he wanted to do once he got 
there, is one of the most striking aspects of the s t o r y .”i46  Keiger agrees: “This 
timidity could be explained largely by the fact that Poincaré had been cornered 
into the occupation of the Ruhr. To a large extent the threat of occupation had 
been Poincaré’s bluff, which had been c a l l e d .”i47  Kent is more critical of 
Poincaré’s inability to withstand the pressure - by January 1923: “...only an 
improbable eleventh hour intervention by the United States could now have 
prevented Poincaré from launching his nation into a self-indulgent act of 
criminal f o l ly .”i48
146 Trachtenberg, Reparation, pp. ix,
147 Keiger, Poincare, pp. 298.
148 Kent, Spoils, pp. 203.
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At the same tim e the revisionists criticise British policy for wilful 
irresponsibility and misjudgment. Keiger actually claims that the British were 
“as much to blame as Glermany for finally goading Poincaré into the Ruhr.”i49 
These claims are unjust. This chapter has shown that the British position was 
not dissimilar to that of France. British statesmen too were constrained by 
both external and internal factors. Bonar Law was elderly and in failing health. 
He emerged from retirement to head a largely inexperienced Cabinet when the 
Lloyd George Coalition broke up with huge political fracas. Moreover, he 
inherited a critical foreign policy problem in the form of reparations with which 
he had to cope without the assistance of his Foreign Secretary. Bonar Law 
also had to contend with a bureaucracy strained after years of Lloyd Georgian 
mismanagement, and divided over the reparation issue between the Foreign 
Office and the Treasury. His task was further complicated by another factor - 
public opinion.
It is impossible to gauge with any real accuracy the role of public opinion in 
influencing Britain’s foreign pohcy on the eve of the Ruhr crisis. Apart from the 
odd aside by politicians or officials, one is left having to depend on the 
notoriously unreliable source of newspapers. The result is that much of what 
can be gleaned is mere supposition and guesswork, and it is for this reason that 
such conclusions have been omitted from the main body of the chapter, and 
will be added here, in a qualified form. To the extent that it is possible to gauge 
the state of public opinion, it seems that it was divided over the reparations 
issue, and as such may have added yet further confusion to Bonar Law’s 
already complex set of problems. An aside by Crewe on 3 January that: 
“Personally I would have chanced public opinion in England, and have asked 
the Allies for l e s s ”i50  suggests that public opinion was in favour of a lenient 
reparation settlement - in other words that it was not sympathetic to the
149 Keiger, Poincaré, pp. 297.
150 Curzon Papers, Mss Eur F.112/201(a): Crewe to Curzon, 3.1.23.
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French position. This was the opinion put forward by some of the major 
newspapers. For example, both The Times and the Manchester Guardian 
approved the British Paris plan. i5i On the other hand, there existed in Britain 
a strong element of opinion favourable to France and opposed to further 
concessions to Germany. Although it seems that this body of opinion was not 
as large as the Germanophile group, it was nonetheless very vocal, and had 
some crucial press support. For example, on 4 January 1923, the DailvMail 
criticised the British plan, concluding: “The Germans have persistently cheated 
us in the past. If experience counts for anything, they will do so again. That is 
why France wants securities, and France is right. ”152 The Morning Post 
agreed, and on 12 January ran a leading article titled: “Good Luck to 
France.”i53 Divisions in public opinion may therefore have been a further 
influence deterring Bonar Law from firm action.
Given all these factors, it is hardly surprising that Bonar Law chose to avoid 
the Herculean task of major policy reorientation and succumbed instead to a 
watery prescription of procrastination doctored on occasion with potentially 
lethal Treasury proposals for reparation reduction. The Paris plan certainly 
fell into this latter category. While it earned some praise in elements of the 
British press, it did not provide a realistic starting point for interallied  
negotiations. But the significance of the Paris plan should not be 
overemphasised. While the Treasury’s document was misjudged and 
needlessly provocative, and the Foreign Office foolish in accepting it, it is
151 On 4,1.23, in an article titled ‘Misunderstandings’.The Times reported: “The Allies have 
got down to business at last, and are discussing not merely the vague politics, but the 
actual economics of reparations. That is the great advantage of the clear presentation of a 
British scheme which, whatever controversy there may be about details, does, in its main 
features, express the business sense of the British community.” The Manchester Guardian 
agreed. In an article on 3.1.23, entitled, “The British Plan”, it claimed that the plan: “Has 
the supreme merit of attempting a final and thoroughgoing settlement. It is jar the most 
honest and conscientious attempt at a settlement which the Government of this or any other 
country has yet made.”
152 'DailvMail’. 4.1.23: “Why did he do it?”
153 ‘Morning Post’. 12.2.23.
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unlikely - given the state of Franco-Grerman relations and Poincaré’s domestic 
political position by January 1923 - that a compromise could have been 
reached at Paris. By this stage, the only way that Britain could have altered 
events would have been by a fundamental rethink of the basis of her European 
policy, including the crucial issue of French security. Despite occasional 
murmurings by both the Treasury and the Foreign Office this question was 
never discussed at length at Cabinet. Partly this was due to the internal 
factors and considerations already mentioned. However, a Trim at der 
Innenpolitik’ approach does not provide a complete explanation. ‘Aussenpolitik’ 
must also be considered. As important as domestic-political considerations to 
Britain’s foreign policy were overriding external constraints - and, more 
specifically, Britain’s desire to avoid onerous commitment.
By the closing weeks of 1922, Europe was divided, with Britain left stranded in 
the middle, ‘caught between two poles’.is4 Anglo-French relations had long 
been troubled both by reparation and by more general British fears regarding 
French strength and motives. They were also soured by an intense personal 
dislike between key statesmen. Britain was not prepared to give France a firm 
commitment of support, especially as it was by no means certain that such a 
commitment would moderate French reparation policy. Indeed a guarantee to 
France would entail the immediate and overriding risk of getting dragged into 
the Ruhr - an expensive and dangerous operation which the British were 
convinced could only bring disaster to Europe. On the other hand, British 
policy-makers did not want to break with France and side with Germany. 
Although they did not want fully to commit themselves to France, they at the 
same time recognised the long-term importance of good Anglo-French relations. 
Breaking with Britain’s wartime ally and aligning with her erstwhile enemy so
154 Bennett, British, pp. 35.
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soon after the end of the First World War was simply not an option. 155 These 
external constraints, coupled with internal domestic-political factors, explain 
why British policy, increasingly hemmed in by France and Germany, drifted in 
the way that it did. With compromise impossible there was nothing in practice 
which Britain could do to prevent the final schism at Paris. But with the 
situation in Europe now openly confrontational, Britain’s position was yet more 
difficult. It remained to be seen whether she would be able to continue to 
charter a middle course through such turbulent and stormy waters.
155 John Ferris agrees that, from a strategic perspective, Britain feared future Franco- 
German antagonism, and that British statesmen saw French military programmes as a 
threat to Britain. However, Britain also feared a more long-term threat from Germany. He 
concludes: “In all, Britain sought to alter the Treaty of Versailles and the French security 
system in Europe. It hoped that his delicate and gradual policy would lead Germany to 
accept the postwar order.” Ferris, Men, pp. 41.
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Chapter II
From  B en evo len t N eu tra lity  to  T en ta tive  In terven tion ,
Jan u ary  - A pril 1923
Bonar Law’s stance at the Paris Conference, where he had sought to minimise
the breach with France, left Britain with little room for manoeuvre when
French and Belgian troops first entered the Ruhr on 11 January 1923. The
British position was confirmed at a Cabinet meeting on 11 Januaryi and was
subsequently tagged one of ‘benevolent neutrality towards France. As Curzon
explained on 20 March,
“[Britain’s] policy has more than once, and not unfairly been 
described as one of benevolent neutrality. Its benevolence has 
consisted in the fact that while unable to associate themselves 
with the measures which have been taken by France and 
Belgium, His Majesty’s Government have endeavoured at every 
stage to make matters as little difficult as possible for their Allies, 
and to interpose no obstacle to the successful prosecution of their 
undertaking. Its neutrality has consisted in the fact that His 
Majesty’s Government have held aloof from the dispute with 
Germany, and have refrained from taking sides in the  
controversy. ”2
While the British were attempting to m aintain this distance from the 
European situation, the French and Germans were finding themselves drawn 
into a dangerous confrontation. Historians who have analysed both France 
and Germany at this point emphasise the reactive nature of the escalation. 3 
Poincaré entered the Ruhr without a clear plan of exploitation and found 
him self im plementing more extreme m easures in response to German 
resistance. On the German side, passive resistance began spontaneously with
1 CAB 23 45: Cabinet Conclusions to meeting on 11.1.23, 11.30am.
2 FO 371 8724, C5302/313/18; Memo communicated to the French ambassador, 20.3.23.
3 For more information on this, see: McDougall, France's, pp. 252; Trachtenberg,
Reparation, pp. 293; Kent, Spoils, pp. 211; Keiger. Poincaré, pp. 298, Rupieper, Cuno. 
Chapter 4; and Feldman, Disorder. Chapter 14.
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the preemptive withdrawal of the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate from 
Essen on 10 J a n u a r y , 4 and only received official government support and co­
ordination when it was clear that it had the support of the local populace.s 
Thus both Poincare and Cuno found themselves in situations which neither had 
predicted. The Ruhr confrontation became a battle of wills between the two 
nations, with the stakes much greater than mere reparation. 6 A chronology of 
the escalation is provided in Table 1 below.
In these circumstances, internal factors and domestic political pressures 
assumed paramount importance. Poincare's position in the bloc national 
coalition meant that he wanted to avoid antagonising the moderate Left at 
home7 but at the same time found him self under increasing pressure, 
particularly from certain officials, to implement a more extreme occupation 
policy.8 Historians differ on the impact of these domestic considerations on 
Poincare's policy. For example, Keiger and Trachtenberg argue that in the 
circumstances what was remarkable was the limited scope of the French 
occupation.9 Poincare refrained from more extreme measures of coercion - for 
example he rejected a plan to paralyse industry in the occupied territorylo and 
did not encourage a policy of separating the Rhineland from Germany. In 
particular, he vetoed any suggestions of introducing a new Rhenish currency, 
even though from an economic perspective this would have been quite 
justifiable.il Rather, Poincaré wanted to win over the Rhenish population
4 See Feldman, Disorder, pp. 633 and McDougall, France's, pp. 269.
5 Feldman, Disorder, pp. 632-4.
6 See Feldman, Disorder, pp. 632, McDougall, France’s . pp. 269, Rupieper, Cuno. pp. 103.
7 Keiger, Poincaré, pp. 298.
8 McDougall, France’s . pp. 260.
9 Trachtenberg, Reparation. pp,301, Keiger, Poincaré, pp. 298.
10 Trachtenberg, Reparation, pp. 295.
11 Trachtenberg, Reparation, pp. 299.
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TABLE I:
The P rogress o f th e R uhr O ccupation , January-M arch 1923.
11.1.23 French and Belgian troops occupy Essen.
15.1.23 Berlin issues instructions that reparation coal deliveries must stop. 
Citing this as their justification, French and Belgian troops occupy 
Dortmund-Bochum.
16.1.23 Reparation Commission declares Germany to be in default on coal 
and livestock deliveries on both reparation and restitutionaccount.
17.1.23 France announces decision to seize customs in whole occupied area
18.1.23 French troops advance on Hamm.
19.1.23 German Government issues instructions to cease deliveries of 
reparations in kind to France and Belgium.
20.1.23 German Government forbids its officials in occupied territories to 
execute orders of occupying authorities.
French arrest 13 mine magnates.
24.1.23 Threats of general strike cause French to put ‘Railway Defence 
Scheme’ into operation in their zone.
26.1.23 Reparation Commission declares German to be in General Default.
1.2.23 France and Belgium refuse to allow coal and coke to pass from
occupied to unoccupied Germany.
2.2.23 Upon cancellation of Paris-Bucharest and Paris-Munich-Prague 
expresses by the Germans, the French order extension of occupation 
to include Offenberg and Appenwier.
Reports of wholesale arrests, expulsions and proclamation of Martial 
Law by the French in their zone.
12.2.23 French introduce a customs line, including a 10% ad valorem duty on
all imports and exports.
13.2.23 Extension of occupation to Wesel and Emmerich, to control customs 
clearance of goods.
25.2.23 Occupation of territory between bridgeheads of Mainz & Coblenz, and 
between bridgeheads of Coblenz and Cologne; occupation of 
Konigswinter, Kaub, Lorch, Hausen, Liederdollendorf & 
OberdoUendorf.
3.3.23 Occupation of Mannheim, Port of Karlsruhe and Darmstadt railway
station.
8.3.23 10% ad valorem duty suspended.
9.3.23 French order that Essen colliery owners should pay 40% coal tax and 
arrears by 10.3.23.
French establish customs posts at Lenep, Remschild, Wipperfiihrt & 
Gummersbach.
French occupy Rheinau
12.3.23 Police at Oberhausen, Bottkop, Gladbeck, Buer & Horst dismissed.
20.3.23 Reports reach FO of 100,000 men in Ruhr; hut that occupation is 
unproductive regarding reparations.
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with kindness rather than coercion: “A Rhenish political entity created by the 
local population would be more acceptable internationally, more palatable even 
to the Germans, than one designed by the F r e n c h .”i2
On the other hand, McDougall emphasises the severity of the measures taken 
by the occupying forces in the opening months of the occupation, viewing them 
as a positive attempt by key French officials to precipitate the formation of a 
separate Rhenish state - an attempt which was at least tolerated and at times 
actively encouraged by Poincare, is He concludes that, only months into the 
occupation, “Rhenish separation or permanent French control in the area had 
become a serious alternative in the French government’s negotiating plan.”i4
In Germany the unforeseen escalation of the crisis shook the country to its 
foundations and exacerbated internal tensions and divides.is Recent studies 
have revealed that passive resistance, far from uniting Germany, actually 
increased social and economic tensions as each stratum saw others as making 
lesser sacrifices, is The government found itself locked into a scenario of crisis 
management. Passive resistance became an end in itself, w ith the 
government desperately trying to create a stable currency in order to prolong 
that resistance. In the light of the internal chaos in Germany, it is hardly 
surprising that the attempt failed. In mid April 1923 the situation became 
critical when the mark suddenly collapsed. 17
In these circumstances the role of Britain was vital. Did Britain, as McDougall 
argues, still retain some influence over France, because Poincaré was always 
striving for an international settlement of the reparation question and so “could
12 Trachtenberg, Reparation, pp. 306.
13 McDougall. France’s, pp. 253-261.
14 McDougall. France’s, pp. 261.
15 Feldman, Disorder, pp. 632.
16 Feldman, Disorder, pp. 634-7; Rupieper, Cuno. pp. 107.
17 Rupieper, Cuno. pp. 107-111.
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not afford to go it alone even in triumph . . . ”18 ? Or was there, as Rupieper 
suggests, nothing Britain could have done?i9
The existing literature provides virtually no detailed information or analysis 
about the role of Britain at this point. Bennett simply dismisses the early 
months of benevolent neutrality as representing a policy of ‘attrition’ and 
moves on to a swift analysis of the exchange of notes in the summer months of 
1923.20 Williamson, taking the traditional view of a vengeful and vindictive 
France, portrays benevolent neutrality as “in fact the only realistic option 
open to the British government if it wished to exert a restraining influence on 
France and limit the economic and military repercussions of the occupation.”2i 
Only Maisel and Crowe & Corp have made any attempt to look within the 
administration at this point, and in each case the attempt is sketchy and 
lacking in substance. Crowe & Corp see Sir Eyre Crowe as the only prudent 
and consistent driving force behind British policy. The continuation of Curzon’s 
policy of benevolent neutrality is criticised as pro-French and in conflict with 
Crowe’s opinion that the occupation was illegal - an opinion which, these 
authors claim, ultimately triumphed with the 11 August note which declared 
the occupation to be illegal and vaguely threatened independent British
18 McDougall, France's, pp. 264. Also see Kent, Spoils, pp. 210: “...Anglo-Saxon 
isolationism permitted the Ruhr tragedy to drag on until Germany had capitulated and 
France and Belgium had established their illusory reparation province.”
19 Rupieper, Cuno. pp. 118: “From the beginning of the occupation, it was clear that 
Germany stood alone and could not rely on foreign help, neither the United States nor Great 
Britain could have stopped France and Belgium.”
20 Bennett, British, pp. 36: “Curzon’s policy was attritional. It was not going to produce 
quick results, which were almost certainly unattainable, but given the enforced neutrality of 
British policy it was rather clever”. Sharp agrees, actually citing this quotation from 
Bennett. [Sharp, ‘Lord Curzon’.]
21 D.G. Williamson, “Great Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, 1923-1924”, British Journal of 
International Studies. 3 (1977), pp. 70-91, pp. 73.
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a c t io n .2 2  Ephraim Maisel’s argument is rather unclear regarding the Ruhr 
crisis. Although he points to an increase in the influence of the Foreign Offlce 
‘stand’ in Cabinet after March 1923, he does not explain what this stand was. 
Rather he points to three views within the Foreign Office: Crowe’s, that the 
occupation was illegal; Curzon’s, that the Entente should be preserved; and a 
general belief that Britain should “wait and see” what the outcome of the Ruhr 
crisis would b e .2 3
This chapter examines the true dimensions of benevolent neutrality. It looks 
at the difficulties inherent in the approach, the alternatives discussed within 
the British polity, and the revised approach that was ultimately adopted. In 
particular it explores the interaction between events on the spot in the Ruhr, 
international diplomatic considerations and internal domestic-political and 
administrative forces that shaped and constrained Britain’s policy. Benevolent 
neutrality was hastily adopted. Consequently, as it will be argued here, the 
implementation of the policy was to involve the British government (and 
particularly the Foreign Office) in endless difficulties and embarrassment. 
These practical difficulties, coupled with mounting economic problems and 
increasing international diplomatic pressure as the occupation crisis 
progressed were ultimately to force a change in the British approach and 
prompt a tentative move towards intervention.
22 Crowe and Corp, Ablest, pp. 428-430. For Crowe’s role in the 11 August note, see below. 
Chapters III and IV. Crowe’s role in these early months of the occupation will be discussed 
later in this chapter. It is worth mentioning, however, that the thesis purported in the 
Crowe-Corp biography rests on the assumption that the Franco-Belgian action was illegal, 
and that therefore the British should have wasted no time in telling the French so. In 
reality this was not the case. The question of the legality of the Ruhr occupation was 
extremely difficult to resolve - a fact of which the Foreign Office, and Crowe, were well aware.
23 E. Maisel, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policv. 1919-1926. (Brighton, 1994), pp. 124-5.
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P ressu res from  P ractica lities: 
The R eality  o f B en evolen t N eu tra lity .
It is necessary first to examine the situation on the ground, as the increasingly 
untenable nature of Britain’s position in the Ruhr - particularly regarding its 
zone of occupation in the Rhineland - was a major factor contrihuting to a shift 
in the overall policy approach between January and April 1923.
From the start Foreign Office officials had trouble obtaining reliable 
information about the Franco-Belgian action. Only days into the occupation 
conflicting quotations of troop numbers were r e c e i v e d .  24 On 17 January, 
Wigram remarked: “I don’t think we are being supplied with proper information 
about what goes on in the R u h r . . .”25 Yet while these difficulties in tracking 
precisely what was happening on the ground in the Ruhr (especially when this 
was happening away from the British zone of occupation) proved a constant 
source of irritation to the British, they only posed them really serious policy 
problems during the separatist disturbances in the autumn of 1923.26 At the 
beginning of the occupation information supply paled into insignificance beside 
the problems the British encountered when actually trying to put into practice 
the policy of benevolent neutrality.
Benevolent neutrality immediately caused problems for the British position on 
various interallied bodies. Bradbury, the British Delegate on the Reparation 
Commission, and Lord Kilmarnock, the British High Commissioner on the 
Interallied Rhineland High Commission at Coblenz, were left in the awkward
24 D’Abemon put the figure at 10,000 [F0371 8703, C872/313/18: Colonial Office to 
Dominions, tel. 15.1.23], while Crewe reported that 17,000 were involved [FO 371 8704, 
C924/313/18: Crewe to FO tel. 16.1.23].
25 Minute by Wigram, 17.1.23 on: FO 371 8703, C886/313/18: Edward Thurstan (British 
Consul General at Cologne) to FO, letter, 12.1.23.
26 See below. Chapter V, pp. 225-237.
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and embarrassing positions of attending meetings but abstaining from any 
decisions regarding the R u h r .27 Kilmarnock soon found that this ambiguous 
position rendered the British open to mounting pressure from both the French 
and the Germans.
With the onset of passive resistance, the German government began passing 
legislation to stop reparation deliveries. This was an act of flagrant defiance of 
the Rhineland High Commission, which was supposed to approve all legislation 
in the occupied territories. It placed Kilmarnock in a very difficult position. 
Basically, any German in the Rhineland who obeyed a German order bidding 
him to discontinue deliveries under the treaty was at the same time 
committing an offence against the ordinances of the High Commission. Should 
such an incident occur in the British zone, the British would be faced with the 
choice of either using British courts to try the German offender (and so by 
default, supporting France) or refusing to do so (and so appearing to favour 
G e r m a n y ) .2 8  Already the British position was alarmingly vulnerable, and was 
dependent on the goodwill of hoth the French and the Germans not to provoke 
incidents in the British z o n e .2 9  The Foreign Office was aware of the
27 On 11 January the Cabinet authorised instructions to be sent to Kilmarnock and 
Bradbury. Kilmarnock’s read; “ The policy of undiminisbed friendship with France will, so 
far as the Interallied Rhineland High Commission is concerned, be best served by your 
continued attendance at its meetings. Should, however, any question come before the High 
Commission arising out of, or affecting French independent action ... you should declare that, 
under the instructions of your government, you are precluded from taking part in any 
decision on that particular matter.” [CAB 23 45: Cabinet Conclusions, 11.1.23: Dispatch 
agreed to be sent to Kilmarnock and, altered accordingly, to Bradbury.]
28 FO 371 8705, C1167/313/18: Kilmarnock to WO, tel., 19.1.23.
29 Bennett agrees that the French had the opportunity to cause problems for the British in 
this area, though he gives no details and does not mention Germany’s role [Bennett, British. 
pp. 35]. Crowe and Corp disagree, saying that Curzon “failed completely to make use of the 
leverage which Britain undoubtedly possessed as a result of their zone of occupation in the 
Rhineland... Instead he [Curzon] went out of his way [to give help and facilities to the 
French], giving them the right to run railway lines and move troops across it, to collect 
customs, to deliver coal and to interfere in policy matters.” [Crowe and Corp, Ablest,pp. 
428]. Williamson gives the most detailed account of the practical difRculties facing the 
British, but like Bennett he blames these on the French and does not discuss their impact 
on the overall policy of benevolent neutrality. [Williamson, ‘Great Britain’, pp. 74-5.]
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difficulties30 , but was unable to come up with any real answers. 3i The issue 
came before Cabinet on 26 J a n u a r y .3 2  it  was agreed that both the French and 
Germans should be warned of the importance of avoiding incidents in the 
British zone and that the threat be made that if the position of the British local 
authorities was rendered too difficult then the British might be forced to 
withdraw their troops a lt o g e t h e r .3 3  This had some effect. On 1 February 
assurances were received that Poincaré would avoid incidents in the British
zone. 34
However the British had only secured this respite by threatening to use their 
ultimate sanction - that of withdrawing their presence altogether. Both 
Bennett and Sharp claim that the possible withdrawal of the British occupying 
force in the Rhineland was one of the few cards which Britain held at the outset 
of the occupation and which could be used to express publicly Britain’s 
disapproval of French policy. 35 In fact however withdrawal of British troops 
was never really a viable alternative. The issue was debated during the last 
week in January, but the consensus opinion was overwhelmingly in favour of 
remaining. Subsequently the question was not raised. Both the French and
30 On 22 January, Lampson commented on the extremely difficult situation which the 
British authorities on the spot are faced, and the likelihood that they will become worse” 
[Minute by Lampson, 22.1.23 on: FO 371 8705, C1213/313/18: General Godley 
(Commanding Officer of the British Army of Occupation in the Rhineland) to War Office, tel.,
21.1.23].
31 On 22 January Kilmarnock was once more sent ambiguous instructions: “If... you are 
requested to proceed against a German national in British zone for acting in accordance with 
the orders of his government contrary to orders of the High Commission, you should express 
your inability to do so but at the same time you may intimate that you wül place no obstacle 
in the way of allied authorities enforcing their decision within the British zone provided that 
there can be no question of employment of either British troops or officials or of their 
becoming involved”. [FO 371 8705, C1167/313/18: Tel. 6 To Kilmarnock, 22.1.23.].
32 CAB 23 45: Conclusions of Cabinet meeting on 26.1.23.
33 CAB 23 45: Appendix to Conclusions of Cabinet meeting on 26.1.23: tel. 19 to 
D’Abemon, 24.1.23; and tel. 14 to Kilmarnock, 24.1.23.
34 On 1 February Crewe telegraphed the FO that: “In a note received today Monsieur 
Poincaré informs me that Monsieur Tirard has seen Lord Kilmarnock and has given him 
satisfaction in regard to French action in the British zone which will be reduced to minimum 
necessary to maintain order and putting into force orders of High Commission.” (FO 371 
8709, C2023/313/18: Crewe, tel. 129, 1.2.23)
35 Bennett, British, pp. 35; Sharp, ‘Lord Curzon’, pp. 86.
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German governments clearly wanted British troops to remain - the French as
a sign of the continuation of the Entente, and the Germans out of fear of a
further increase in French power if they left. For example, after visiting Paris
in March, Lord Derby, the Secretary of State for War, confidentially informed
Bonar Law: “I am quite convinced that they [the French] are very anxious that
we should remain at Cologne. They feel that as long as we are there the
Entente lasts...”36 ; while Frederic Rosenberg, the German Minister for Foreign
Affairs, told D’Abernon that: “he would be very glad if  His M ajesty’s
Government could decide to retain troops...”37 Thus retention of the British
troops greatly strengthened the British position when dealing with both the
French and the Germans. Moreover, as Kilmarnock pointed out:
“I am convinced that withdrawal would be interpreted ... as a 
definite taking of sides with Gormany against France... We should 
surrender our whole influence on the continent of Europe and be 
left in a position of impotent spectators deprived of all our 
prestige. We should, moreover, sacrifice last chance of obtaining 
anything in the way of reparations through allied action... If we 
remain we are still capable of putting a check on French to some 
extent and can exercise direct influence on course of events and in 
final settlement.”38
Given the extreme difficulties, weaknesses and vulnerability of the British 
position otherwise, it is hardly surprising that this was viewed as the overriding 
consideration and that it was decided to maintain the British p r e s e n c e .3 9
However, this decision to remain, while it might have solved some problems, at 
the same time created others. Although Poincaré had been persuaded (at least 
for the time being) to refrain from causing problems in the British zone, the
36 Bonar Law Papers, Box 108, Folder 6: Derby to Bonar Law, letter, 12.3.23. Derby had 
already emphasised this view in an earlier letter to Bonar Law on 24 January: “I am quite 
convinced that we ought to keep our troops at Cologne if it is humanly possible to do so”. 
[WO 137/1, Derby to Bonar Law, 24.1,23]
37 FO 371 8707, C1568/313/18: D’Abemon tel. 54, 25.1.23 .
38 FO 371 8707, C1558/313/18: Kilmarnock tel. 29, 25.1.23 .
39 CAB 23 45: Conclusions of Cabinet on 26.1.23. The Cabinet concluded: “That the policy 
of the Government should be to maintain the British garrison in the Rhineland as long as 
possible, and to do their utmost to avoid any incident which might necessitate the 
withdrawal of British forces.”
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British position was still vulnerable. Poincaré was to exploit this vulnerability 
over two key issues: over the question of a customs sanction, and over the 
question of transporting reparations requisitioned in the Ruhr to the Allied 
countries - a transport movement which the French insisted had no alternative 
but to cross the British zone.
The T ransport Q uestion
It was Bonar Law who first alerted the Foreign Office to the possibility of
trouble in this area by requesting information on the passage of coal through
the British zone.^o The Foreign Office was quick to ascertain that reparation
deliveries en route to Lorraine and to eastern France did pass through
Cologne.4i A weary Lampson commented:
“I am afraid that we may have trouble over this. For in all 
probability the German railway employees in the British zone will 
refuse to handle reparations coal and coke. We shall then be 
faced with another problem. But frankly the problems are so 
many and the situation so involved that I would submit that in 
this case it is better to await until the problem presents itself in  
concrete form before considering what measures are possible to 
meet it. ”42
The predicted situation, of course, soon arose. Only two weeks into the 
occupation, the arrests of several Ruhr magnates prompted workers to 
threaten a general railway strike if they were punished. 43 In response, the 
French put into force in their zone what was called the “Railway Defence 
Scheme”; and suggested that they might also do this in the British zone. 
Although General Alex Godley (the officer in command of the British Army of 
Occupation in the Rhineland) replied that present circumstances did not yet 
warrant such action, the issue was far from closed.44 i f  there was a strike
40 FO 371 8706, C1293/313/18: Message to FO from Prime Minister’s Private Secretary,
22.1.23.
41 FO 371 8706, C1413/313/18: Kilmarnock, tel. 17, 23.1.23.
42 Minute on above by Lampson, 24.1.23.
43 See FO 371 8705, 01173/313/18: D’Abemon to FO, tel. 45, 20.1.23, and FO 371 9705, 
01198/313/18: D’Abemon tel. 46, 21.1.23.
44 FO 371 8706, 01518/313/18: Kilmamock, tel. 28, 24.1.23.
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then the British would not have sufficient technical personnel in their zone to 
run the railways, and so the French would have a very strong case for sending 
in their staff. The question would then arise as to whether to use British troops 
to protect the French workers or whether to allow French troops into the 
British zone for this purpose. Cadogan emphasised the problems: “....we are 
faced with the alternative of either directly hampering French action in the 
Ruhr or actively assisting it with the presence of our troops. The one is as 
undesirable as the o t h e r .”45 Lampson agreed, concluding: “Frankly I am at a 
loss to make any suggestion as it is a matter of policy which the Government 
alone can d e c id e .”46
The situation continued to deteriorate. On 30 January, General Wilhelm 
Groner (the German Minister of Transport) ordered that “Coal and wood trains 
to France or Belgium are not to he moved either in old or new occupied area or 
in English z o n e .”47 Although to a large extent the point at issue was an 
academic one, as in reality virtually no reparation cargoes were being moved 
anyway, Lampson was to be proved right when he m inuted on this 
communication: “This may well bring matters to a head in our z o n e .”48
On 6 February the French Ambassador in London handed to the Foreign Office 
an official note from the French Gk)vernment requesting British permission for 
the French authorities to take the measures necessary to ensure the 
transport of reparation coal and coke from the Ruhr across the British zone to 
F r a n c e .4 9  This prompted Lampson to minute:
“I am tempted to wonder whether the French are not coming to
45 Minute by Cadogan 25.1.23 on: FO 371 8706, CIS 18/313/1 BiKilmarnock, tel. 28,
24.1.23.
46 Minute by Lampson, 25.1.23 on: FO 371 8706, C1518/313/18:Kilmamock, tel. 28,
24.1.23.
47 FO 371 8708, C1866/313/18: D’Abernon, tel. 61, 30.1.23.
48 Minute on above by Lampson, 31.1.23.
49 FO 371, 8711 C2329/313/18: Note from French Ambassador, 6.2.23; and letter 482 to 
Crewe in reply, 9.2.23.
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the conclusion that our continued presence at Cologne merely 
hampers them and that we would be as well out of the way. That 
would explain this move which otherwise seems unnecessary at 
the moment seeing that little or no coal is at present leaving the 
Ruhr for F r a n c e .”50
Indeed, such fears of a more stringent tendency in French policy had been 
foreshadowed in earlier reports. For example, on 26 January Crewe had 
reported that:
“...I think it is quite clear that French government are embarking 
upon a new and more drastic stage in their Ruhr policy with 
definite object of isolating Ruhr and setting up administration 
under French high commissioner with every prospect of an 
occupation which may last an indefinite t i m e .”5 i
The Foreign Office was aware of the weakness of the British position in the 
face of more hostile French acts. Lampson commented on 13 February: “The 
more one considers this problem the more difficult does it seem to harmonise 
the policy of passivity with our declared intention of throwing no obstacle in 
France’s w a y .”52
Yet unless the Cabinet sanctioned a change to the overall policy of benevolent 
neutrality, all Foreign Office officials could do was to try to cobble together 
some kind of m akeshift agreement acceptable to both the French and 
Germans. There were some possibilities, though none appeared satisfactory. 
Kilmamock suggested allowing the French to transport coal and coke from the 
Ruhr via the Gravenbroich-Düren line. This, as is illustrated in the map below, 
crossed the British zone at only a small corner, which Kilmamock argued could 
be transferred to France as “it is not of any intrinsic importance and no British 
troops have ever been stationed t h e r e .”53
50 Minute on above by Lampson, 6.2.23.
51 FO 371 8707, C1666/313/18; Crewe, tel. 103, 26.1.23.
52 Minute by Lampson, 13.2.23 on; FO 371 8712, 02699/313/18: Kilmarnock, dispatch 56,
11.2.23.
53 FO 371 8712, 02580/313/18: Kilmarnock, tel. 54, 10.2.23.
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54 Source: F0371 8732, C10498/313/18: Kilmarnock, disp. 360, 14.6.23.
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On 10 February Kilmarnock actually met with General Jean-Joseph-Marie 
Dégoutté, the officer in command of the occupying forces, to discuss this 
alternative. Meanwhile General Godley suggested that 28 trains a day could 
till carry reparation coal from Germany to France and Belgium hy alternative 
routes which avoided the British zone altogether. 55 The Foreign Office seized 
on this idea, and on 9 February, Crewe was instructed to suggest it to Poincare 
- once more using the threat of withdrawal of British troops as a bargaining 
c a r d .56 Crewe duly saw Poincare, who wished to send General Jean-Marie- 
Charles Payot, a military transport expert, over to London to discuss the whole 
transport q u e s t i o n .57
A meeting was hastily scheduled for the morning of 15 February. Present were 
General Payot, M. Yves Le Trocquer (the French Minister of Public Works), 
Bonar Law, Curzon and Derby, as well as various officials, including Crowe, 
Lampson and Hankey. 58 On 16 February, after Bonar Law had consulted the 
C a b in e t ,5 9  Le Trocquer agreed to consult Poincaré on a basis favourable to the 
B r i t i s h .60 The French abandoned their initial request for the use of all the 
railways in the British z o n e 6 i  and agreed instead to try the British
55 Minute by Lampson on; FO 371 8711, C2329/313/18: note from French Ambassador,
6.2.23. The idea for this suggestion had originally come from Lord Derby. On 25 January 
he wrote to Godley: “...the only thing I can think of is one I put to you very tentatively and in 
strict confidence. Do you think it would be possible to arrange with the German railway 
officials that they should work such a number of coal trains through as have been worked on 
say a monthly average before the French entered the Ruhr?” [WO 137/1, Derby to Godley,
25.1.23].
56 FO 371 8711, C2329/313/18: FO to Crewe, letter 482, 9.2.23.
57 FO 371 8712, 02596/313/18: Crewe, tel. 73, 11.2.23.
58 FO 371 8713, C2922/313/18: Notes of meeting on 15.2.23. The Foreign Office had 
anticipated a visit by General Godley only (to be met by Derby) and were thrown into a 
complete flurry when, on the morning of 14 February the Quai d’Orsay telephoned Lampson 
to say that Le Trocquer, the French Minister of Public Works, would also be arriving in 
London - at 10 o’clock that same night. [FO 371 8713, C2859/313/18: memo by Lampson,
14.2.23.] Curzon’s displeasure was clear: “I think it not only discourteous but wrong that 
the French should attempt to rush us in this way without warning.” [Minute by Curzon,
14.2.23 on: FO 371 8713, C2859/313/18.]
59 CAB 23 45: Conclusions of Cabinet, 15.2.23, 6pm
60 FO 371 8713, C2945/313/18: Notes of meeting on 16.2.23.
61 FO 371 8713, C2922/313/18: Notes of meeting on 15.2.23.
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compromise of using the Gravenbroich-Düren line, along with the comer of the 
British zone which it c r o s s e d .62
It was decided to leave the job of finalising the finer details of the working
arrangements to the “men on the spot.” Thus once again they were left with
the unenviable task of implementing London policy decisions, while, as ever,
fears remained that the French would seek to exploit the practicalities of the
situation in their favour:
“If we are not careful as to the instructions under which General 
Godley w ill have to act in m aking the desired working 
arrangement with General Payot, we may find ourselves 
committed, before we quite know where we are, to allowing the 
passage of a number of trains quite out of proportion to what is 
required for the French t r o o p s . . .”63
Godley and Kilmarnock therefore began negotiating details with Dégoutté and 
Payot at Cologne. On 5 March an agreement was reached. As well as ceding 
the area traversed by the Düren-Gravenbroich r a i lw a y 6 4  , the British allowed 
the French to run in each direction through the British zone ten military trains 
and two food trains a d a y .6 5  Kilmamock concluded: “Unless your Lordship is 
prepared to take the matter up again with the French Government, I do not 
feel that we can obtain any further concessions on the s p o t .”66
Yet as late as 22 March this agreement had not been put into e f f e c t .  67 This 
time it was the Germans who were delaying the operation of the trains 
through the British zone. Wigram was convinced that they were purposely
62 FO 371 8713, C2922/313/18: Notes of meeting on 15.2.23. On 20 February the British
were informed that Poincaré was in favour of this offer. [FO 371 8715, C3191/313/18:
minute by Lampson, 20.2.23.]
63 Minute by Crowe, 18.2.23 on: FO 371 8714, C3009/313/18: D’Abernon, tel. 92, 17.2.23.
64 Instructions concerning that had been sent to General Godley on 19 February. [FO 371 
8714, C3009/313/18: Tel. 41 to Kilmamock, 19.2.23]
65 FO 371 8719, C4284/313/18: Kilmamock, dispatch 97, 6.3.23.
66 FO 371 8719, C4284/313/18: Kilmarnock, dispatch 97, 6.3.23.
67 FO 371 8724, 05406/313/18: Kilmarnock, tel. 156, 22.3.23.
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“making every difRculty they possibly can for us” with “the deliberate object of 
splitting us from the F r e n c h ”.68 On 26 March Lampson met Friedrich 
Sthamer, the German Ambassador in London and spoke in strong tones about 
the m a t t e r .69 The Germans clearly took heed. On 29 March, Kilmarnock 
telegraphed: “Agreement is now in force and trains under it will begin running 
as soon as technical details have been worked out. French have been 
informed.”70
The complex situation seemed, at last to have been settled, but this was due 
largely to the tact and subtlety of the men - both French and British - who 
were involved on the ground in the Ruhr^i , and to the fact that in the final 
analysis, both France and Germany had refrained from pushing Britain too far.
The C ustom s S an ction
With the apparent solution of the transport question, British problems were by 
no means over. As well as creating difficulties over the railways, both the 
French and Germans ensured that the British were kept constantly occupied 
with the customs sanction. Indeed, the customs sanction had become an issue 
even before the transport question, and was to remain a thorn in the side of 
Whitehall long after the railway settlement.
British difficulties began when on 17 January, the French Ambassador told 
Bonar Law that owing to the continued German default the French were to
68 Minute by Wigram, 23.2.23 on FO 371 8724, C5406/313/18: Kilmamock, tel. 156,
22.3.23.
69 FO 371 8725, C5691/313/18; Conversation between Lampson and the German 
Ambassador, 26.3.23.
70 FO 371 8725, 05895/313/18: Kilmamock, tel.178, 29.3.23.
71 It is interesting that British officials on the spot showed sympathy for their French 
colleagues at times. For example, General Godley wrote on 16 February: “From a soldier’s 
point of view I cannot but have the greatest sympathy with Dégoutté as regards his line of 
communications...” [D’Abernon papers, vol. 48927A, Godley to D’Abemon, 16.2.23.]
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take further measures. A customs sanction consisting of discriminatory duties 
to be levied on German trade would be imposed. It would be implemented by 
ordinances of the Rhineland High Commission and executed by military 
d e c r e e .7 2  Saint-Aulaire then asked Bonar Law to allow the application of this 
sanction in the British zone a ls o  73 . Thus the French bad put Bonar Law in a 
very unenviable position. Either be could refuse to allow the customs sanction 
to be implemented in the British zone, in which case the French would claim 
that Britain was actively taking the German side by undermining the customs 
sanction in the French zone also; or be could agree to the sanction, which the 
Germans would undoubtedly object to as a pro-French move.
Faced with such an unwelcome choice, Bonar Law tried desperately to 
maintain benevolent neutrality. He agreed to allow the French to implement 
their sanction on condition that neither Lord Kilmamock nor British troops he 
in any way in v o lv e d .7 4  This decision added yet more diffîcxilties to the practical 
problems facing the British on the spot. The dangers were immense. Although 
Bonar Law had agreed to allow the customs sanction in the British zone, it was 
unlikely that the Germans would co-operate. The French might then demand 
the wholesale arrest of recalcitrant Germans, to which it would be impossible 
for the British to agree as their administration simply could not function with 
such important losses of p e r s o n n e l .75
Fortunately for the Foreign OfRce, events did not immediately follow this
72 FO 371 8704, C988/313/18: Memo by Lampson on conversation between Bonar Law
and the French Ambassador,17.1.23.
73 FO 371 8704, C988/313/18: Memo by Lampson on conversation between Bonar Law
and the French Ambassador, 17.1.23.
74 FO 371 8704, 0988/313/18: Memo by Lampson on conversation between Bonar Law
and the French Ambassador, 17.1.23.
75 The potential for problems of this kind was quickly evident. On 21 January, General 
Godley reported that a French customs inspector had visited the local office of the Inland 
Revenue, and that the German in charge had refused to produce the necessary books. The 
French were now demanding the expulsion of the offending German [FO 371 8705, 
01213/313/18: Godley to WO, tel., 21.1.23.].
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course. Partly this was because of an agreement between Kilmarnock and 
Paul Tirard (the President of the Rhineland High Commission) whereby Tirard 
agreed to do his best not to embarrass the British Rhineland a d m in is tr a t io n .'^ e  
It was also because the French themselves were having problems organising 
an effective sanction. It was not until 12 February that the French pushed the 
customs sanction through the Rhineland Commission, with Kilmarnock 
abstaining. Even then the measures proposed were merely temporary - until a 
detailed scheme of duties had been worked out, a blanket duty of 10% on all 
exports and imports would be introduced. However, in a more stringent move, 
the French called for the introduction of an entirely new customs organisation 
and the dismissal of the existing customs officials. This would have involved 
French demands for wholesale arrests in the British zone and so certainly had 
the potential to make the British position untenable. But fortunately the 
British were saved from this embarrassment because the French did not in 
practice push for the introduction of an entirely new administration in the 
British zone. The French and Belgians soon found that they did not have 
sufficient skilled and experienced personnel to replace the German 
administration in their own zones, let alone to tackle the British zone as well.??
Although spared the most extreme difficulties, British officials were still left in 
the position of having to co-operate with the French 10% ad valorem rate, and 
this in itself was to cause more than its fair share of problems. Unsurprisingly, 
the German government refused to recognise the validity of the Rhineland High 
Commission’s ordinances regarding customs, and demanded that duties should 
also be paid to licensing offices in unoccupied territory.?^ Thus all trade 
between occupied and unoccupied Germany was now subject to two sets of 
duties - the allied duty on goods entering or leaving occupied territory, and the
?6 FO 371 8705, C1213/313/18: Godley to WO, tel., 21.1.23.
?? FO 371 8721, 04704/313/18: Kilmarnock, tel. 125, 12.3.23. 
78 FO 371 8711, 02411/313/18: Thurstan, dispatch 80, 5.2.23.
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Grerman duty on goods entering or leaving unoccupied territory. Complaints 
from British traders affected in this way soon flooded into Whitehall. 79
By this stage the Department of Overseas Trade was on the verge of panic, 
claiming that the 10% import tax made it impossible for firms to buy raw 
materials at competitive prices, while the export tax was strangling trade. The 
result was that the Grerman markets which Britain had so painstakingly re­
established since the war were being destroyed.so
Yet unless Bonar Law’s overall policy towards the customs sanction changed, 
there was little that Foreign OfBce officials could do. An interdepartmental 
meeting was held on 26 February to consider the affects of the occupation on 
British trade. All that could be suggested was to try to obtain concessions 
from the French authorities on the spot and at the same time make 
representations to the GJermans on behalf of British traders.si This D’Abernon 
did on 9 March, but he met with a cold reception from Rosenberg, who declared 
that the “problem is not due to German action but to French illegality”, and 
concluded that should the Grerman government force traders to conform to the 
Franco-Belgian licensing regulations it would “be regarded as a complete 
suiTender” and “would probably lead to a ministerial crisis.. .”82
79 At the beginning of March John Stemdale Bennett (Second Secretary in the Central 
Department) minuted: “As regards commercial difficulties in the Ruhr we are ourselves being 
inundated with complaints from British firms many of whom demand that protests shall be 
made to the French government." [ FO 371 8717, 03645/313/18: Minute by Stemdale 
Bennett, 1.3.23.] On 7 March the Board of Trade reported that: “The pressure of work in 
the Department resulting from the disturbance of British trade with the Ruhr and 
Rhineland due to the economic measures taken by the French and Belgians has increased 
considerable during the last week. A large number of appeals have been received for getting 
goods out of, and into, the occupied Territory.” [BT 196/19: Board of Trade report No. 266, 
for week ending 7.3.23.]
80 FO 371 8721, 04477/313/18: Department of Overseas Trade to FO, 9.3.23.
81 See Minute by Stemdale Bennett, 27.2.23 on FO 371 8717, 03709/313/18: FO memo on 
Restrictions on trade on Rhineland and Ruhr & FO 371 8796, 03547/2751/18: Minutes of 
interdepartmental meeting, 26,2.23.
82 FO 371 8721, 04523/313/18: D’Abemon, tel. 117, 9.3.23.
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Fortunately the situation was to some extent relieved by the French and
Belgians. Faced with mounting chaos in the Ruhr owing to their customs duty,
as well as increased international unpopularity as a result of the disruption to
international trade, the Rhineland High Commission decided on 8 March to
modify the 10% ta x 8 3  and on 10 March began to consider reintroducing in the
occupied territories the German import tariff as it had stood on 20 April
1 9 2 2 .8 4  Although the British recognised that this would not be a final
s o lu t io n 8 5  they were anxious to encourage such a development and so began to
apply direct pressure. On 12 March Crewe and Sir George Grahame, British
Ambassador in Brussels, were instructed to ask the French and Belgians to
make concessions regarding British trade interests, explaining that:
“Delays and losses to British trade resulting from measures taken 
hy French and Belgian authorities in old and new occupied 
territories are creating most unfortunate impression here and are 
exposing H is M ajesty’s Government to strong pressure in  
Parliament and from numerous trade interests a f f e c t e d .”86
While on 16 March Sir Eric Phipps, Chargé d’Affaires at the Paris Embassy,
and Grahame were instructed to speak in no uncertain terms to the French
and Belgian governments:
“His Majesty’s Government are fast losing patience at all these 
vexatious restrictions on legitimate British trade. You should at 
once bring above to French [/Belgian] notice and urge them in firm 
language to instruct their local authorities to desist from payment 
of duties and t a x .”87
These representations did have some effect, and the French and Belgians 
seemed more understanding of British trade interests. On 12 March, 
Kilmarnock reported: “We have now got from our allies practically all the
83 FO 371 8720, C4360/313/18: Kilmamock, tel. I l l ,  8.3.23.
84FO 371 8721, C4528/313/18: Kilmamock, tel. 116, 10.3.23.
85 As Cadogan noted: “...this will not materially affect the deadlock, which is due to the fact 
that duty (at whatever rate) has to be paid to the AlHed authorities instead of to the 
German customs” [Minute by Cadogan 8.3.23 on FO 371 8720, C4360/313/18: Kilmamock, 
tel. I l l ,  8.3.23.]
86 FO 371 8719, C4320/313/18: tel. 117, to Crewe, 12.3.23; & tel. 43 to Grahame,
12.3.23.
87 FO 371 8722, C4766/313/18: tel. 126, to Phipps, 16.3.23; & tel. 50, to Grahame,
16.3.23.
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concessions asked for ... Trouble we are now experiencing comes from Grerman
side.”88
Pressure was also put on the Germans. On 14 March D’Abemon was 
instructed to tell Rosenberg that the situation whereby British traders were 
forced to pay double was unacceptable, especially as the German customs 
officials were lucky to be able to function in the British zone at all. 89 Like the 
French, the Germans also seemed to relent. On 16 March D’Abemon reported 
that in the case of three major firms the Germans had agreed to waive their 
licenses and export duties and to guarantee the refund of a percentage of 
reparation tax already paid.^o
Once again the British position had narrowly been maintained. When it came 
to the crunch neither the French nor the Germans wanted to risk entirely 
alienating Britain. But, at the same time, they were both anxious to maintain 
some way of wielding influence over Britain. In this each succeeded, as Britain 
was still dependent on the goodwill of both the French and German 
governments to safeguard the interests of her traders. Once again the acute 
vulnerability of the British position had been revealed.
88 FO 371 8721, C4704/313/18: Kilmamock, tel. 125, 12.3.23.
89 FO 371 8721, 04704/313/18: FO to D’Abemon, tel. 57, 14.3.23.
90 FO 371 8723, 04967/313/18: D’Abemon, tel. 128, 16.3.23.
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Tow ards In terven tion : 
The R evision  o f th e  B ritish  A pproach.
The continuing practical difficulties of implementing so ambiguous and delicate 
a balancing act as that entailed in benevolent neutrality proved a constant 
irritant and rendered life for British officials and civil servants far from easy. 
Their task was not helped by a lack of effective leadership at the top level. 
Bonar Law, though well-meaning and conscientious, was overworked and his 
health was failing. With his Foreign Secretary absent at the Lausanne 
Conference until 5 February, he faced an unenviable task. Desperately trying 
to keep his country out of troublesome involvements and committed by his 
election manifesto to maintaining friendship with France, it is not surprising 
that he clung to benevolent neutrality. But he lacked a full awareness of the 
practical difficulties involved in the implementation of the policy and was apt 
to make policy decisions with little understanding of what they really entaüed. 
This is amply illustrated by the enormous difficulties into which he launched 
the Foreign Office by agreeing quite happily to allow the French to implement 
their customs sanction in the British zone.
Curzon’s role, at least at first, was also open to criticism. Although it is true
that he was entirely occupied with the Lausanne Conference, he did not so
much as offer advice to Bonar Law. On the contrary, he was quick to criticise
the struggling Prime Minister and to blame him for the situation. On 25
January, Curzon told Crewe:
“I will not say anything about the Ruhr, which is being dealt with 
by Bonar at home, except that I think we, as well as the French, 
are getting into a more difficult position every day, and that great 
pressure will be put upon us, when Parliament meets, to define 
our position more clearly and to extricate ourselves from the 
dangers in which we may probably find ourselves involved.”9i
91 Curzon Papers Mss Eur. F.112/201(a): Curzon (Lausanne) to Crewe (Paris), letter,
25.1.23.
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Curzon was right. By the time he did return to the helm of the Foreign Office 
the British position was strained almost to breaking point, as, far from getting 
easier as the occupation progressed, the initially complex British position had 
become even more untenable as time passed and the deadlock deepened. The 
situation in the Ruhr and Rhineland was causing increasing embarrassment 
and making Britain dependent on both French and Grerman cooperation. The 
economic effects were also becoming more serious.
Although some British industries (for example coal) may have benefited from 
the loss of a major competitor, in general the economic repercussions of the 
Ruhr crisis were unfavourable. By April the Department of Overseas Trade 
reported that apart from, for example, coal, iron and steel, "... the uncertainty 
of the situation on the Continent has proved a set-back to r e c o v e r y . . . ”92 
British trade with the Ruhr and Rhineland, as well as with unoccupied 
Germany was severely disrupted. Complaints flooded in from British  
businessmen and merchants, while fears mounted of wholesale collapse of 
markets in Europe.
Increasing practical difficulties coupled with mounting economic discontent 
might not alone have been sufficient to produce a change in the British 
position. Yet when these two factors were coupled with a third component the 
pressure was to prove irresistible. This third factor was mounting diplomatic 
pressure from other countries, who were becoming more desperate for a 
solution. Initially tentative attempts to suggest negotiations became much 
more pressing - and naturally Britain was the first to be targeted as it was 
assumed that her influence could break the stalemate.
In the diplomatic sphere it was at first relatively straightforward for Britain to
92 BT 207/4: Department of Overseas Trade Bulletin of Information, volume VII, No, 5, 
April 1923.
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maintain her neutral stance. Like her, most other countries wanted to 
maintain their distance from the crisis, in general desiring no part in the 
French action and often disapproving of it. For example, the Hungarian press 
portrayed the occupation as a punitive French attempt to render Germany 
politically h e lp le s s ,9 3  while the Netherlands Foreign Minister thought that the 
French had ulterior m o t iv e s .9 4  Even the Swedish Church was alarmed by the 
humanitarian effect of the French action on the population in the occupied 
t e r r i t o r y .95 Russia also protested, claiming to be speaking on behalf of the 
Ruhr p r o le ta r ia t .9 6
Despite these reports of international disapproval of the French (which may 
indeed have reinforced the British in their decision to take no part in the French 
action) there was as yet no great diplomatic pressure for Britain to assume a 
role in mediation. There was a vague attempt by Sweden to push for League of 
Nations m e d ia t io n ;9 7  but at this stage i t  proved quite easy for Britain to stand 
aloof, as the French were quick to stamp out any hint of League 
in t e r v e n t io n .9 8  The United States also seemed quite uninterested. Geddes 
reported that American public opinion was mixed: “Serious threat to future 
stability of Europe hardly seem s to he appreciated at all outside of 
administrative and financial c i r c l e s . . .”99
In the opening stages of the crisis Germany frequently approached Britain, hut 
failed to exert any real pressure on her policy. Regular protests were handed to
93 FO 371 8703, C829/313/18: Hohler (Budapest), letter, 11.1.23.
94 FO 371 8704, 01110/313/18: Marling (Hague), letter, 17.1.23.
95 FO 371 8711, 02367/313/18: Barclay (Stockholm), dispatch 49, 2.2.23.
96 FO 371 8707, 01682/313/18: D’Abemon, disp. 60, 24.1.23.
97 FO 371 8703, 0899/313/18: Barclay (Stockholm), letter, 9.1.23..
98 Minute by Stemdale Bennett, 1.2.23 on FO 371 8709, 02004/313/18: Barclay 
(Stockholm), letter 41, 26.1.23. If successful, this attempt to involve the League could have 
compromised Britain’s position of neutrahty, or at least have dragged her even more into the 
centre of the troubles.
99 FO 371 8705, 01259/313/18: Geddes (Washington), tel. 28A, 21.1.23.
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the Foreign Office by the Grerman ambassador, but these either met with little 
or no reply. For example, a protest by the German government against the 
ordinances issued by the Rhineland High Commission,lOO and another 
protesting at the expulsion of German officials from the occupied territories loi 
were merely officially acknowledged.
In the same way, early German feelers towards mediation left the Foreign 
Office singularly unimpressed. On 24 January, Kilmarnock reported that the 
businessman Dr. Paul Silverberg had visited Berlin and had met with Cuno and 
Rosenberg. Silverberg reported that the German Government would welcome 
British mediation in the direction of a form of round table discussion. 
Kilmamock was encouraged by this report: “This is first sign I have seen of 
any desire on the part of German Government to negotiate”i02  ^ but Lampson 
was unimpressed: “I mistrust information conveyed so indirectly...I think Lord 
Kilmarnock is unduly impressed with alleged desire by Germany for 
m e d ia t io n .”i03 Lampson’s views were justified when it transpired that the 
Germans would categorically refuse to negotiate unless the French first 
withdrew their troops.
This intransigent Grerman position meant that negotiations or mediation by 
Britain during the early weeks of the occupation were not on the agenda in any 
case. However, as the crisis progressed, several countries began to desire a 
more active role by Britain. This, coupled with mounting economic pressure 
and the increasingly problematical position on the spot rendered the British 
stance exceptionally difficult. In consequence, when Curzon did at last return 
and turn his attention to the European situation, he began tentatively to
100 FO 371 8706, C1407/313/18: Letter from German Ambassador, 23.1.23.
101 FO 371 8706, C1408/313/18: Letter from German Ambassador 23.1.23.
102 FO 371 8706, C1485/313/18: Kilmamock, tel. 21, 24.1.23.
103 Minute on above by Lampson, 25.1.23.
104 FO 371 8707, 01598/313/18: D'Abemon, tel. 55, 25.1.23.
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explore alternatives.
It was in fact Mussolini, undoubtedly anxious for a seat at the top table of 
international diplomacy, who initially was responsible for increasing the 
pressure on the British. 105 Although at first his ideas were scathingly snubbed 
by the British, his persistence soon became far more trying. Italy’s initial 
advances were obviously an attempt by Mussolini to keep all his options open. 
He was anxious not to alienate Britain even though he had halfheartedly 
supported the Franco-Belgian action. The British were in fact intercepting 
telegrams between Rome and London at this time, and learned that as early as
14 January Mussolini had told Torretta: “The attitude of Italy is much closer to 
that of England than it is to that of F r a n c e .”i06  This was confirmed when on
15 January Mussolini explained to his Council of Ministers that he: “urged 
France to lim it the military nature of the operation and hoped that an 
agreement would be swift - although he felt that a solution could only be found 
with English participation and c o n s e n t .” 107 Mussolini having thus prepared the 
ground, on 17 January the Italian Charge d’Affaires, Sr. Preziosi, asked Ronald 
Lindsay, Assistant Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, if  Britain 
could persuade Berlin to adopt a more moderate line. Lindsay replied that the 
British government were not prepared to intervene at B e r l in ,  los
Mussolini was not deterred. On 1 February, he categorically denied ever having 
been involved in the French action: “The resistance of Germany in regard to 
economic matters has produced measures of a political and military character
105 On the vacillations of Italian foreign policy at this stage, see; A. Cassels, Mussohni’s 
Early Diplomacy (Princeton, 1970), pp. 60-67.
106 HW 12 42, No. 012330: Mussolini to Italian Embassy, London, tel. 168, 14.1.23.
107 FO 371 8704, C1085/313/18: Graham (Rome), letter, 16.1.23.
108 FO 371 8704, C1073/313/18: memo by Lindsay, 17.1.23. The unwillingness of the 
British to co-operate with Mussolini at this point may also have owed something to rumours 
(quickly denied by Mussolini) that he had countenanced some form of continental bloc 
excluding Britain. [See C.J. Lowe & F. Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy. 1870-1940 (London, 
1975), pp. 192-3; D. Mack Smith, Mussolini (London, 1981), pp. 61; and Cassels, 
Mussolini’s, pp. 61-3.]
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on the part of France and Belgium, from which Italy, in accordance with her 
own hne of conduct, has remained completely aloof.”i09 Cadogan was not in the 
least impressed: “I suppose the Italian Engineers went to the Ruhr for their 
health.”iio Crewe agreed: “The Italians have cut a wretched figure over the 
Ruhr business, trying to acquire merit with the Germans by refusing to send 
soldiers, and with the French by urging us to press Germany to come to 
terms.”i i i
On 7 February the Italian Ambassador approached Crowe, suggesting that co­
operation between Italy and Great Britain could produce a solution to the Ruhr 
crisis. Crowe refused to be drawn, emphasising that “it was a little late in the 
day now for Italy to try to dissociate herself from what she had then so fatally 
e m b r a c e d . . .”112 But the Italians were nothing if  not persistent. The following 
week the Italian Ambassador called on Curzon and “...professed the most 
complete assent to the British point of view” and emphasised that he “eagerly 
awaited the moment when ...intervention might be found possible, and 
promised... the heartiest co-operation of his Government in any measures for 
bringing it about.”H3
Disappointed in the British response, Mussolini now modified his approach and 
began to make overtures in another direction - that of Belgium. At the 
beginning of April M ussolini and Jaspar met informally to discuss the 
possibility of negotiations. H4 The Italian ambassador then approached
109 FO 371 8710, C2180/313/18; Graham, letter 113, 2.2.23.
110 Minute on above by Cadogan , 5.2.23.
111 Crewe Papers, C12: Crewe to Curzon, 20.1.23.
112 FO 371 8712, C2569/313/18: Conversation between Crowe and Italian Ambassador,
7.2.23.
113 FO 371 8714, C3113/313/18: Conversation between Curzon and the Italian  
Ambassador, 15.2.23.
114 The meeting took place when Jaspar was ostensibly taking a holiday in the Italian 
lakes. [FO 371 8723, C5014/313/18: Grahame, tel. 60, 17.3.23].
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Curzon to tell him of the latest d e v e l o p m e n t s By this stage the  
persistence of Mussolini’s efforts meant that they were not so easily ignored 
and so it was decided to ask the Italians for more information. H6
This did allow a shght respite for the British - a respite which was particularly 
welcome as there was at the same time a development in another direction - 
an initiative from France. This took the form of a visit by Louis Loucheur, who 
had been Briand’s Minister for the Liberated Regions, to Bonar Law on 7 April 
when he tabled a plan for the whole question of reparation and interallied 
debts. 117 As the plan provided for a completely autonomous Rhenish state 
along with the gradual evacuation of the Ruhr once reparation payments had 
been resumed, the British were not optimistic of its chances of success with 
the Germans. On 9 April Curzon wrote to Bonar Law: “I am not very sanguine 
about Loucheur’s Rhine Province scheme, nor indeed about the entire 
plan...”118 The Treasury were even more pessimistic. Niemeyer wrote: 
“This scheme seems to me financially quite impossible. Apart from that, it 
involves sacrifices by Great Britain far exceeding even the generous 
cancellation offers made in January.” H9 Bradbury agreed: “As regards the 
suggestions themselves, they strike me as both fantastic and impudent.”i20
115 The Italian ambassador apparently cornered Curzon at a chance meeting in a railway 
carriage. [Minute by Curzon, 4.4.23 on: FO 371 8726, C6153/313/18: FO memo, 3.4.23.] 
Crowe was not at all impressed by this behaviour, commenting: “I regard it as an example 
of the ineffectual way of doing business which is characteristic of the Italians”. [Minute by 
Crowe, 3.4.23 on, FO 371 8726, C6153/313/18: FO memo, 3.4.23.]
116 FO 371 8726, C6647/313/18: Grahame, tel. unnumbered, 7.4.23.
117 Loucheur’s proposals were that Germany would be given a loan of 500m Gold Marks, 
underwritten by a consortium of German industries. This would enable Germany to 
stabilise her finances and begin reparation payments (at a rate of between 2 and 3.5 billion 
Gold Marks per annum). France would evacuate the Ruhr as payments were made. 
Germany would also take over Allied debts to the US and all other inter-allied debts would 
be cancelled. Finally, in order to guarantee France’s security, the Rhineland would become a 
completely demilitarised, autonomous state. [S.D. Carls, Louis Loucheur and the shaping of 
modem France 1916-1939 (London, 1993), pp. 241].
118 Bonar Law Papers, Box 108, Folder 7: Curzon to Bonar Law, letter, 9.4.23.
119 T194/10: Niemeyer to Bradbury, 9.4.23.
120 T194/10: Bradbury to Chancellor, 10.4.23.
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Moreover, uncertainty existed amongst British circles as to the extent to which 
the Loucheur proposals had the blessing of Poincaré. This uncertainty soon 
seemed justified. Tyrrell reported to Curzon on 13 April: “The outcome of 
Monsieur Loucheur’s visit is... that Loucheur is disavowed, that the French 
attitude has if  possible stiffened and that for the purposes of finding a solution 
the French have passed the buck to u s . ” 121 Yet, although the Loucheur 
incident ended in nothing, the fact that an approach, however 'semi-official’ and 
half-hearted, had come from France, served to emphasise how widespread was 
the desire for a settlement of the Ruhr question, and so how hard it was for 
Britain to continue to stand aside and do nothing. As Bradbury commented: 
“Loucheur’s mission is interesting as indicating that the French government is 
becoming convinced of the futility of its present policy and is anxious to resume 
co-operation with u s . ”i22
As well as Italian and French initiatives, pressure also came fi*om Belgium and
Germany. By 24 February, Belgium’s initially energetic support of France was
wavering. Grahame reported that:
“Minister for Foreign Affairs emphasised very strongly to me 
today that Belgian government had no unavowed political designs 
with regard to Ruhr and Rhineland. All they sought was 
undertakings and guarantees for payment of r e p a r a t io n s . . .”123
At this stage the British attitude to the Belgians was firm. As Crowe minuted
121 FO 371 8730, C8384/313/18; Tyrrell to Curzon, 13.4,23, According to Carls, Loucheur 
did suggest the trip, but received the full backing of Poincaré, After he had met with Bonar 
Law, Loucheur then told Poincaré that the time was ripe for commencing official 
negotiations, Poincaré now refused to back Loucheur up, allowing him to bear the brunt of 
press criticism for his unofficial diplomacy and apparent leniency regarding the Ruhr, In this 
way, Poincaré secured his party-political objective of outmanoeuvring Loucheur as a 
potential rival for power, [See Carls.Loucheur. pp, 241-2] The Foreign Office was well aware 
of these machinations. On 13 April, Tyrrell minuted: “There is no doubt in my mind that 
Loucheur came here with the blessing of Millerand and Poincaré (perhaps more of the former 
than of the latter) but that the indiscreet use which Loucheur made of this blessing is now 
being exploited by Poincaré to strengthen his own position and to damage both Loucheur 
and Millerand,” [FO 371 8730, C8384/313/18: Tyrrell to Curzon, 13,4,23,] On the 
Loucheur visit see also, Kent, Spoils, pp. 215-6; McDougall, France's, pp, 265-7; Rupieper, 
Cuno. pp, 136-7,
122 T194/10: Bradbury to Chancellor, 10.4.23,
123 FO 371 8716, C3472/313/18: Grahame, tel, 33, 24,2,23,
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on 26 February: "... we are hardly called upon to overflow with complements to 
the Belgians just now. They have often in the past claimed to have acquired 
merit by their “mediatory” attitude between us and France, but, in fact, they  
always come down, in the end, on the French s id e .”i24
But reports of Belgium’s wavering continued to arrive. For example, on 12 
March Derby felt that the Belgians “are getting scared at the idea of the 
French remaining in the Ruhr. They find themselves practically surrounded 
by France and they do not like it . . .”125 Such sentiments had already been more 
explicitly stated by the Belgian Ambassador himself at a meeting with Curzon 
on 26 February. He claimed that: “Belgian government had been forced by 
sheer necessity to go in with the French, whose embraces were sometimes of a 
very inconvenient description, and he disowned, on behalf of his country, any 
object but that of exacting reparations. . . ”126 By 14 March the Belgian  
ambassador was making definite suggestions for negotiations to Crowe: “The 
Ambassador said that all that was required was that Germany should come 
forward with proposals. These would at once be received and discussed in a 
friendly spirit, and if found reasonable, would be accepted.”i27 it  is interesting 
that while at this point Crowe refused to be drawn, a httle more than a month 
later the British were actively implementing precisely that policy which the 
Belgian Ambassador had suggested and were encouraging the Germans to 
make proposals.
The Germans too were making more promising moves toward negotiation. As 
with the earlier Belgian hints, a tentative German approach at the end of 
February got nowhere. When on 22 February, M. Dufour Feronce of the
124 Minute on above by Crowe, 26.2.23.
125 Bonar Law Papers, Box 108, Folder 6, Derby to Bonar Law, letter, 12.3.23.
126 Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F. 112/240: Curzon to Grahame, letter, 26.2.23.
127 FO 371 8722, C4835/313/18: Conversation between Crowe and Belgian  
Ambassador, 14.3.23.
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German Embassy asked if  Britain could suggest a compromise, Lampson 
answered that “so far all the indications from both sides were that intervention 
would be u n w e lc o m e .” 128 But by mid March German advances seemed more 
genuine - and so more difficult for the British to deal with. On 10 March, 
Sthamer told Crowe that his government “...were most anxious to find a way 
out of the present deadlock with France over the occupation of the R u h r . . .”i29  
Sthamer also raised the December 1922 New Haven suggestion of an 
impartial expert enquiry, and said that: “The German Government were ready 
to undertake to accept in advance the decision of such a b o d y ” .i3 0  Sthamer 
concluded by suggesting that his government should lay such proposals 
formally before the British government for the British to communicate to their 
allies. Crowe discouraged this latter suggestion, and indeed was very non 
committal with regard to the whole idea. Yet the significance of this German 
move was not lost. Crowe minuted: “It looks like the first symptom of German 
surrender .”131
Such views were reinforced by a report from Kilmarnock on 12 March:
“The general impression gained by members of my staff in many 
conversations with Germans recently is that the latter consider 
that if an occasion for negotiations could be found which does not 
mean absolute surrender to France it should be seized, but there 
is little confidence in France alone... Almost all believe vaguely 
that Great Britain could do “something”, and that the United 
States would h e l p .”i32  
Even so, it remained evident that the stalemate was far from broken - on 22
March Cuno was still insisting on the unconditional evacuation of invaded
territory as a prerequisite to any d i s c u s s io n .  133
128 FO 371 8716, C3419/313/18: Communication between Lampson and M. Dufour 
Feronce, 22.2.23,
129 FO 371 8721, C4585/313/18: Conversation between Sthamer and Crowe, 10.3.23.
130 ibid
131 Minute on above by Crowe, 10.3.23.
132 FO 371 8723, C4987/313/18: Kilmarnock, dispatch 114, 12.3.23.
133 FO 371 8724, C5440/313/18: William Seeds (Consul-General for Bavaria, stationed at 
Munich), tel. 6, 23.3.23.
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Despite the continuation of the stalemate, all these hints toward negotiations 
increased the burdens on British diplomats trying to implement their 
government’s policy of benevolent neutrality. They also served as indications 
that the time was approaching when an attempt at a solution might prove 
fruitful. By mid March, as we have seen, Italy, Gormany, Belgium and even, 
arguably, France had demonstrated a desire for an end to the deadlock. These 
indications were not lost on Curzon, who was now hack from the Lausanne 
Conference. Furthermore, even reports from America were more encouraging.
At the end of January, the role of the US was dismissed by the Foreign Office: 
“Mr. Hughes is quite unable to do anvthingf even if he wanted to... Mr. Hughes is 
no more dependable than the rest of his country where European politics are 
c o n c e r n e d .”134 There had, however, been some encouraging signs. For 
example, the US government’s desire to avoid involvement in the French 
action by withdrawing its army of occupation from the Rhineland at the 
beginning of January could be interpreted as a protest against French 
a c t io n .  135 By mid February, Hughes seemed more prepared to act, and asked 
Geddes if  there was anything that he could do which might help to ease the 
situation on the C o n t i n e n t .  136 Although the Foreign Office felt that
intervention at that stage was premature - “There seems to be no prospect of 
successful mediation by anyone until France at least states the terms which 
she is prepared to offer G e r m a n y ” 137 - they were nevertheless encouraged by 
Geddes’ report: “...w e gather for the first time that America might be ready to 
intervene between Germany and France. That is a distinct step and may well
134 Minute by Lampson, 27.1.23 on FO 371 8707, C1654/313/18: Geddes, tel. 37,
25.1.23.
135 See K. Nelson, Victors Divided: America and the Allies in Grermanv 1918-1923 (London, 
1975), pp. 246-253 .
136 FO 371 8712, 02577/313/18: Geddes, tel. 66, 9.2.23.
137 Minute by Sterndale Bennett on above, 12.2.23. See also FO 115 2852: Curzon to 
Geddes, tel. 65, 15.2.23.
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prove useful.”i38 When Geddes relayed these view s to Hughes on 23 
February, Hughes agreed, saying that “each side would probably have to ‘enjoy 
its own bit of chaos’ until a disposition to a fair settlem ent had been 
reached.”i39
Thus, by mid March, international diplomatic pressure on Britain had
increased. Several other factors also encouraged action. One, rather
surprisingly, may well have been rumours of indirect links and negotiations
between interest groups in France and Germany. For example, at the end of
January, D’Abemon noted:
“French industrialists continue to propose negotiations to 
German mine-owners through neutral intermediaries. It is 
impossible to say how far those proposals are business - how far 
merely feeling of political pulse. Persistence of attempts is,
however, remarkable.”i40
By early February, D’Abernon was sending more serious communications, 
reporting that he had heard that a “French personality of similar status to 
Franklin Bouillon” had approached the Germans and that “negotiations to be 
absolutely confidential and notably to be kept secret from England until 
c o m p le t e .”141 On 7 February D’Abemon continued the account, reporting that 
the French proposals had proved quite unacceptable to the Germans. He 
added:
“In both cases interm ediaries have declared that their 
governments are ignorant of their communications and are not 
bound by them but there is little  doubt that the French 
government are acquainted with proceedings as German 
government unquestionably a r e .”i42
Although in early February such moves were bound to lead nowhere, British
138 Minute by Lampson, 12.2.23 on; FO 371 8712, C2577/313/18: Geddes, tel. 66, 9.2.23.
139 FRUS, 1923, vol. II: Memo by Hughes of a conversation with Geddes, 23.2.23.
140 FO 371 8708, 01704/313/18: D’Abernon, tel. 57, 28.1.23.
141 FO 371 8710, 02268/313/18: D’Abemon, tel. 70, 5.2.23. Franklin BouUon had been a 
French deputy and foreign affairs expert during the war.
142 FO 371 8711, 02444/313/18: D’Abernon, tel. 75, 7.2.23.
104
officials may well have been concerned. If contact was being made at the 
height of hostilities, what might happen when the desire for a solution 
increased? If Britain proved too isolationist she might find herself left entirely 
out in the cold as a settlement was worked out between France and Germany 
direct. Indeed, rumours of links between French and German industrialists 
continued, until on 6 March Lampson raised the issue with the German 
ambassador, who did not categorically deny it, saying that they were ill-founded 
"according to such information as he had been able to g a t h e r . . . ”143
As well as all this external, diplomatic pressure, the government also faced 
internal domestic-political pressure - both extra-Parliamentary (from public 
opinion) and Parliamentary (from the opposition parties and from its own 
backbenches). The evidence available suggests that public opinion was divided 
over French action in the Ruhr. For example, on 27 January the Italian 
Ambassador in London observed to Rome: “Public opinion is greatly exercised 
over the situation; all the different parties are pressing upon the Government 
various alternatives to its present a t t i t u d e .” 144 On 24 January Derby wrote to 
Bonar Law:
“Public opinion is in a very funny state at the present moment.
While you have got one body of opinion very strongly in favour of 
withdrawing the troops and another in favour of participating 
more actively in the French adventure, the vast bulk of the 
thinking public is rather undetermined as to what we ought to do 
or what we ought to have d o n e . . .”i45
Alex Uxbridge, in his study of British political opinion towards France and the 
German problem at th is time, concludes that while there was always a 
minority of extreme opinion in support of France (epitomised, for example, by 
the Morning Post), as the French stepped up their occupation in the Spring of 
1923, so public opinion as a whole moved against the French and became more
143 FO 371 8719, C4169/313/18: Minute by Lampson, 6.3.23.
144 HW 12 43; No. 012463: Torretta, London, to Rome, tel. 101, 27.1.23,
145 WO 137/1: Derby to Bonar Law, 24.1.23.
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critical of the British government’s inactive p o l ic y .  146 For example, the
Westminster Gazette headhne on 8  March was: “Wanted: A Foreign P o l ic y ”i47  , 
while on 12 March the Manchester Guardian said that Britain’s policy “stands 
in need of revision in the light of what we have since heard of the policy of 
F r a n c e .”i4 8  Even the Times was adopting a more critical tone. On 14 March it 
announced, “A mere hesitating policy of passivity is of no advantage either to 
France or to Europe”, and on 18 April, “...the profound anxiety awakened in  
Great Britain by the French advance into the Ruhr has not been allayed but 
has rather been increased by the incidents of the occupation and the results 
obtained h i t h e r t o .  ”i49
These divisions and trends in public opinion were reflected in the House of
C o m m o n s .  150 Here both the Labour and Liberal parties opposed the French
measures. The Labour Party was the most critical. While Parliament was in
recess, MacDonald wrote to Bonar Law that France’s policy was:
“...one of the greatest danger as it is not only destroying what little 
beginnings have been made in the settlement and reconstruction 
of Europe, but is intensifying the dislocation of the world’s trade 
and must result in serious damage and deepened distress to 
ourselves. Taken in conjunction with what is happening at 
Lausanne, it threatens a renewed outbreak of war on a very wide 
scale...”151
MacDonald concluded by requesting that Parliament be resumed immediately 
in order for a debate to take place. Bonar Law refused this r e q u e s t  152 - but in
146 A, Uxbridge, ‘British Political Opinion towards France and the German Problem, 1918- 
1925’, (PhD Thesis, University of Sussex, 1979), pp. 60 & pp. 111.
147 Cited in Uxbridge, ‘British Political’, pp. 111.
148 Manchester Guardian. 12.3.23, pp. 6.
149 The Times. 14.3.23, pl3; and 18.4.23, pp. 13.
150 Bonar Law also had to contend with the silent criticism of the ex-coalitionists. For 
example, Austen Chamberlain wrote, “I do not admire Bonar’s diplomacy and think... that 
the occupation of the Ruhr could and ought to have been prevented.” [Austen Chamberlain 
Papers, AC /5/1/260: Austen to his sister Hilda, 20.2.23.]
151 Bonar Law Papers, Box 112, Folder 27, Document 2: MacDonald to Bonar Law, letter,
29.1.23.
152 Bonar Law Papers, Box 112, Folder 27, Document 3: Bonar Law to MacDonald, letter,
30.1.23.
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doing so he only managed temporarily to postpone the issue. On 13 February 
Parliam ent resumed anyway, and the opportunity for difficult and 
embarrassing questions was ripe.
As soon as the House sat, MacDonald began asking awkward questions, trying 
to get a clearer exposition of the government’s position: “Has there been any 
suggestion that our presence in the Cologne occupied area should be used for 
the purpose of helping France in any way whatever?... What is the position of 
our representative on the Rhineland Commission: is he to continue to sit there, 
and, if  he does, is he going to share either actively or passively, the 
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y . . .”153 On 19 February the House of Commons debated a motion 
to invite the League of Nations to appoint a committee of experts to report on 
German capacity to pay r e p a r a t io n .  154 Bonar Law carried the day with his 
argument that: “There is no use in appeahng to the League of Nations when we 
know that nothing effective can come, and that all it will do will be to irritate 
our A l ly .”i5 5  It is significant, however, that both the Asquithian and Lloyd 
Georgian Liberals and the Labour Party had been unanimous in their view that 
France’s Ruhr policy would reduce reparation receipts, disrupt European (and 
so British) trade and foster a revenge mentality in Germany, thus weakening 
democratic forces th e r e .1 5 6  Thus MacDonald continued to take every 
opportunity of pressing the government. For example, on 6 March he again 
advocated mediation by some form of representative c o m m it t e e .  157
While facing constant Parliamentary pressure to define more clearly the 
British position, Bonar Law also had to take account of the opinions of his own 
backbenchers. In contrast to the Parliamentary pressure, these opinions were
153 Hansard; 160 H.C. Deb 5 s, col. 26-7, MacDonald speech, 13.2.23.
154 Hansard: 160 H.C. Deb 5 s, col. 665-774, 19.2.23.
155 Hansard; 160 H.C. Deb. 5 s, col. 774, 19.2.23.
156 Uxbridge, ‘British Political’, pp. 108-9.
157 Hansard; 161 H.C. Deb. 5 s, col. 315-378, 6,3.23.
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much more markedly pro-French and go far to explaining Bonar Law’s initial
abhorrence of any form of harsher pressure on France. On 15 January,
William Davison reported on opinion amongst grass roots Conservatives:
“I trust that though we do not approve of the sending of British 
troops in support of France we will give her all the moral support 
in our power, as nearly all the Conservatives at the last election 
placed a firm and abiding friendship with France as the first and 
most important plank in our Foreign Policy... I still believe that 
the action taken by France may resu lt in some very fat 
chestnuts being pulled out of the fire, as I am convinced that 
Grermany will do nothing except under compulsion. ”158
These opposing domestic-political forces may explain why Bonar Law, though 
adopting an essentially pro-French tilt in his ‘benevolent neutralitÿ, anxiously 
tried to avoid taking any really decisive action. However, given all the 
developments both on the ground and at a diplomatic level, it is hardly 
surprising that British policy was ultimately forced to change. Yet before the 
evolution of the British stance can be fully appreciated, a closer examination of 
the attitudes and opinions of some of the key officials and politicians is 
warranted. It is interesting in the light of the ‘benevolence’ of Britain’s 
neutrality that, to the extent that there was any consensus, it was to be much 
more universally damning of French policy than of German and that despite 
broader developments in the situation these attitudes remained relatively 
constant. While in public politicians had to he more guarded in their 
comments, in private, both officials in London and diplomats across Europe 
were highly suspicious of French motives.
For example Bonar Law commented:
“I have always thought the French were not really so stupid as to 
imagine that action such as they are taking now would accelerate 
payment of reparations, and that security (as they see it) is their 
first preoccupation. But for various reasons reparation is the 
pretext given to the w o r ld .”i5 9
158 Bonar Law Papers, Box 111, Folder 126, Document 125; W, Davison to R. McNeill, 
letter, 15.1.23, enclosed in letter form McNeill to Bonar Law, 26.1.23. Also see: Uxbridge, 
British, pp. 321-3.
159 Minute by Bonar Law, undated, on: FO 371 8707, C1557/313/18: WO to FO, 17.1.23.
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Crewe agreed: “It must be remembered that behind the economic motives of 
the French action there lies the strategic motive which is more fundamental 
and ultim ately even more important.”i60 Grahame’s comments were also 
strong:
“Poincaré is and always has been a dangerous man, and has 
arrived at the last pitch of obsession about Grermany, so much so 
that it is a question whether he is any longer in a normal state. It 
is dreadful to reflect that the hopes of European recovery are at 
the mercy of such a man!”i6i
D’Abernon voiced still greater suspicions about the French action He 
sympathised with the views of a “leading continental steel authority” (probably 
Hugo Stinnes) who argued that France was bent on political control of the 
Ruhr and Rhineland in order to become self-sufficient in coal and coke, so that 
in a future war she would not be dependent on Britain and the United States 
for steel as she had been during the First World War. This independence of 
means would mean that when contemplating war, France would not have to 
give such consideration to British and United States views. 162
Suspicion of France was further fuelled by the issue of who was to pay for the 
Ruhr occupation. As early as 19 January the Treasury raised this question 
with the Foreign Office, whose response was: “We are anxious that the 
question should not be raised sooner than can be helped as our general policy is 
to avoid friction with the French Government in connection with their 
operations as much and as long as we c a n .”i63  But the question could not be 
delayed indefinitely. On 18 March Kilmarnock reported that France and 
Belgium intended that “proceeds of sanctions shall be handed over to
160 FO 371 8711, C2398/313/18; Crewe, dispatch 301, 5.2.23.
161 FO 371 8708, C1898/313/18: Grahame to Sydney Waterlow (Department of Overseas 
Trade), letter , 23.1.23.
162 FO 371 8715, 03359/313/18: D’Abemon, dispatch 86A, 2.2.23.
163 Reply by Philhps ,15.1.23, to a letter contained in a Treasury communication, FO 371 
8714, C3151/313/18, 19.2.23.
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Reparations Commission after deduction of expenses incurred in c o U e c t io n .”i64  
Lampson commented angrily: “In some respects (for example the 10% levy  
and the general customs policy introduced in the Rhineland) this means that 
we are contributing to the payment of the French and Belgian hill. ”165
There was, however, some sympathy for France. For example, on 24 January, 
Derby wrote to Bonar Law: "... I do not feel sure but that the French policy will 
prove to be in the end a success and certainly in this case... I do wish them the 
best of luck.” 166 But even Derby did not advocate any alternative policy at 
this stage. On 25 January he wrote to General Gk)dley: “We have... got to steer 
a half-way course, never a very satisfactory one, but I think the only one 
possible at the present moment, and we must trust that the French do not 
raise unnecessary difficulties...”167
Only Kilmarnock suggested a policy of more active help to France. On 22
January he telegraphed his views of the situation:
“Most important factor in my opinion is that French cannot afford 
to he defeated. Much must depend on our attitude and question I 
ask myself is whether, much as we disapprove of French action, 
we can afford to let them be defeated. If, as I anticipate, struggle 
proves to be long and bitter time will come when we shall have to 
decide what would be position if Germans were to win. The last 
shot of the allies would have been fired and would have failed in its 
effect. No other really effective means of pressure would remain 
and Germany should be in a position practically to defy further 
execution of Treaty o f  V e r s a i l l e s .”168
Kilmarnock’s evaluation demonstrates an openness of mind and farsightedness 
unusual amongst the detailed, day-to-day considerations and machinations of 
the British policy machine. He was raising unwelcome questions and querying 
the whole basis of the British stance. His views were simply dismissed and.
164 FO 371 8723, C5046/313/18: Kilmarnock, tel. 140, 18.3.23.
165 Minute on above by Lampson, 19.3.23.
166 WO 137/1: Derby to Bonar Law, 24.1.23.
167 WO 137/1: Derby to Godley, 25.1.23.
168 FO 371 8706, 01300/313/18: Kilmarnock, tel. 15, 22.1.23.
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unlike many of the anti-French reports, were never even shown to the Prime
Minister. 169 Lampson’s response to this is most revealing:
“...it is quite true that the position will not be easy if the French 
have to give way to the Germans over the Ruhr. But I do not 
anticipate HMG have any intention of modifying their attitude. I 
do not see that the defeat of the French over the Ruhr necessarilv 
implies that ‘the last shot of the Allies will have been fired’. It is 
by no means a necessary sequel that the treaty of Versailles will 
have to be recast. But that is in the realm o f speculation and I  
hardly see that any useful purpose would he served by discussing it 
at the moment
While views of France were increasingly harsh, the Germans were viewed, on 
balance, with more sympathy. The Foreign Office was by no means blind to 
German antics - for example, when the Germans caused problems in the 
British zone, Lampson was quick to snap: “The Germans have behaved with 
their normal stupidity.” i^i But in general their motives were recognised with 
more compassion than those of the French. For example, when the French 
extended their occupation to Appeneier and OfFenburg, Lampson commented 
that: “The German protest... seems to me fully justified. But situated as we 
are we can only send a formal a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t . ” 172 Similarly, while individual 
Frenchmen, especially Poincaré, were often regarded with contempt (for 
example, Curzon said of Poincaré: “I do not think that in public life I have ever 
known a man of Poincaré’s position whose mind and nature were so essentially 
small, or whose temper was under such imperfect control!” 173 ); D’Abernon 
actually said of Rosenberg: “I have come to like Rosenberg - he has such an 
engaging naivete...”174
169 For example, a report from Joseph Addison (Berlin) on 29.1.23, emphasising the strong 
likelihood of a French victory and the destruction of Grermany, was passed on to the PM at 
Lampson’s behest (FO 371 8710, C2159/313/18; Addison to Lampson, letter, 29.1.23).
170 Minute By Lampson, 23.1.23 on FO 371 8706, 01300/313/18: Kilmarnock, tel. 15 (my 
italics).
171 Minute by Lampson 20.1.23. on FO 371 8705, 01167/313/18: Kilmarnock to WO, tel.
19.1.23.
172 Minute by Lampson on FO 371 8711, 02495/313/18: Protest from German 
Ambassador, 8.2.23.
173 Ourzon Papers, Mss Eur. F.112/201a: Ourzon to Orewe, letter, 20.2.23.
174 Ourzon Papers, Mss Eur, F. 112/205: D’Abernon’s diary, 12.1.23.
I l l
Reports of the instability and vulnerability of Germany's young democracy
also provoked sympathy. For example, in early March D’Abemon emphasised
the difficult political position of the German government by sending an account
of a Reichstag debate on the Ruhr:
“To avoid opposition from Left, government had to express 
general readiness to negotiate: to avoid difficulties from the Right 
they had to refuse all negotiation which does not promise 
complete evacuation of the Ruhr. They have contrived to keep 
narrow path between these two requirements with marked 
parliamentary s k i l l . ”176
In general, then, the British attitude was one of greater tolerance towards the 
Germans than towards the French. In view of this, and bearing in mind all the 
increased pressure on Britain, it is hardly surprising that patience with the 
original policy of “benevolent passivity towards France” 176 began to wane.
The first active steps to modify the British stance involved a closer
examination of the legal position: in other words the question of whether the
British government accepted the French claims that the occupation was
justified under a specific clause of the Treaty of Versailles. This issue had
originally been avoided because of its very uncertain nature. For example, on
25 January a Central Depai tment memo concluded that:
“His Majesty’s Government have never considered that the  
action taken by the French and Belgian governments either in the 
Ruhr or in the Rhineland could properly be taken under paragraph 
18... On the other hand. His Majesty’s Government have never 
considered that the French and Belgian action was, because it  
was not covered by the treaty, contrary to the treaty.”i77
But by early March, increased pressure from the Germans was making it more 
difficult to avoid the question. A German protest note on 23 February met
175 FO 371 8720, C4455/313/18: D’Abemon, tel. 16, 9.3.23.
176 Phrase used in minute by Lampson, 26,1.23 on FO 371 8707, 01535/313/18: 
Kilmarnock, dispatch, 23.1.23.
177 01407/313/18, FO 371 8706: Memo by Oentral Department, 25.1.23,
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with secret sympathy in the Foreign Office. Crowe minuted:
“As a legal argument the German memorandum no doubt 
establishes with much cogency the illegality  of the French 
proceedings... But it is rather futile to treat this matter as a 
question of how to construe the clauses of certain treaties and 
conventions. Whatever the French may at tim es say, their 
action is a series of measures of force. Legal arguments seem  
beside the p o in t .”i78
Despite Curzon’s apparent indifference: “It is not much good using legal 
arguments when there is no legal tribunal to whom they can in the 
circumstances be a d d r e s s e d ,”179 he did feel that the question should be 
examined and the Law Officers c o n s u l t e d ,  iso On 4 April an appropriate letter 
was duly dispatched, and on 11 April a reply was received.
The conclusions of this report were somewhat ambiguous, but basically the 
Law Officers agreed that as Germany had defaulted on payment the 
Reparation Commission were justified in acting under paragraph 18 of Annex 
n  to the Treaty of Versailles. The problem was therefore one of interpreting 
the nature of the action permitted by this clause. The phrase in the Treaty 
mentioned ‘economic and financial prohibitions and reprisals.’ Britain could 
therefore make out a case that the Reparation Commission was not 
interpreting the Treaty correctly. This, however, was a difficult legal argument 
- it rested on interpretation, and so could easily merely be refuted by the 
French. Furthermore, in March 1921 Britain herself had advocated sanctions 
against Germany. Therefore any protest by Britain now would easily provoke 
quite well founded accusations o f  h y p o c r i s y .i8i
On balance, Curzon decided not to raise the question: “...it is clear that we shall
178 Minute by Crowe, 13.3.23, on FO 371 8718, 03989/313/18: note from German 
Ambassador, 23.2.23.
179 Minute on above by Curzon, 13.3.23.
180 Minute by Curzon, 19.3.23, on FO 371 8721, C4535/313/18: Crewe, dispatch 600,
10.3.23.
181 FO 371 8727, C6636/313/18: Report from Law Officers, 11.4.23.
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do no good by raising the legal question and I certainly have no intention of 
d o in g  it.”i82 It was, however, felt that there was a legal case to be made if  it 
became necessary. As Cadogan commented: “...if for any reason we wished to 
protest, this paper affords us the legal arguments for justifying our position to 
our own p e o p le .”i83
The fact that this question was debated and proved too ambiguous to raise is 
extrem ely significant in the light of Crowe and Corp’s thesis that the 
occupation was illegal, that Crowe consistently advocated declaring it such, 
and that such a declaration would have been by far the better course for 
Britain. 184 In fact, although it is true that he tended to the view that French 
action was illegal, Crowe was not sufficiently confident to advocate raising the 
issue at this point. Contrary to the Crowe/Corp argument, the legal 
uncertainty over whether France was actually in breach of the Treaty of 
Versailles (a treaty which Britain was committed to uphold) meant that it was 
very difficult for Britain to exert any really effective overt pressure on France 
to compromise over the Ruhr occupation.
On the other hand, the Foreign Office also opposed joining the French action or
forming any kind of binding pact. The Foreign Office examined and rejected this
possibility in early April. Although on 26 March Poincaré told French
journalists that he had not given up all hope of forming a pact of guarantee
with Britain, the Western Department concluded that:
“French public opinion as reflected in the French press will not be 
satisfied except by a bilateral agreement under which this 
country undertakes to assist France with a definite number of 
armed forces, the casus foederis being laid down in the very widest 
terms to cover all possible contingencies. In the present state of 
public opinion here it seems im possible that the House of
182 Minute on above by Curzon, 16.4.23.
183 Minute on above by Cadogan,13.4.23,
184 Crowe & Corp, Ablest, pp. 429-430.
114
Commons would agree to any such arrangement.”i85 
Another important consideration arguing against a pact with France was the 
attitude of the Dominions. Jan Smuts, the Prime Minister of South Africa, 
remained as vociferous as ever with his Francophobie views. On 29 March he 
wrote to Bonar Law: “If Germany goes the British empire will also have to face 
the new France which will be in command of much larger resources than ever 
before and may even be at the head of a European combination.”i86 This may 
well have been a primary concern for Bonar Law, as on a further memo 
compiled by Gerald Villiers, head of the Western Department of the Foreign 
Office, on 17 April, Crowe minuted that the Prime Minister at present believed 
that a pact was out of the question because of the views of Smuts and of the
Canadian Government. 187
Thus the only remaining policy alternative seemed to be to try to initiate some 
form of negotiations. But, still anxious to keep out as far as possible, Curzon 
decided first to sound the United States. On 12 March a memo had been drawn 
up tabulating the United States role to date. 188 Crowe concluded from this 
that “the best course for the Germans to pursue if  they still wish to avoid 
approaching France direct, would be to get Mr. Hughes to move again.” 189 On 
23 March Curzon met the United States Ambassador, and emphasised the 
dangerous nature of the situation, saying that it could boil over at any 
moment. 190 But the United States government was not ready to intervene. 
Indeed on 28 March Geddes reported that the United States was experiencing 
a groundswell of opinion hostile to Britain: “Public opinion in the United States
185 Curzon Papers, Mss Eur, F.112/242: Memo on ‘Present Position in relation to the Anglo- 
French Pact’, Western Department, FO, 10.4.23.
186 CO 532 238: Tel. from Smuts to Secretary of State for the Colonies (enclosing a message 
for Bonar Law), 29.3.23.
187 Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F.112/242: Memo by Villiers, 17.4.23.
188 FO 371 8723, C4925/313/18: FO memo, 12.3.23.
189 Minute on above by Crowe, 13.3.23.
190 FO 371 8725, C5812/313/18: Conversation between US Ambassador and Curzon,
23.3.23.
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is at present passing through an interesting phase. There is no doubt that... 
there has been a distinct growth of feeling, among the common, unthinking 
mass of Americans, less Mendly to Great Britain... These thoughts are almost 
strictly confined to the really ignorant, common people. Better educated people 
of course are not so s i l l y . C r o w e  commented: “This is significant and may 
account for President Harding’s silence and inactivity.
With a pact with the French ruled out and the United States extremely 
unlikely to take any initiative, a tentative attempt was made to exert some 
pressure on the French, even though this was rendered very difficult by the 
legal situation. After consultation with Bonar Law, Curzon himself drafted a 
top secret memo dated 20 March which he gave to the Count de Saint-Aulaire 
on 21 M a r c h . 193
The memo began : “His Majesty’s Government feel impelled to call the 
attention of the French Government to certain important considerations 
affecting the situation in the Ruhr and the policy which has hitherto been 
pursued by His Majesty’s Government in connection therewith. That policy 
has more than once, and not unfairly, been described as one of benevolent 
n e u t r a l i t y . . .”194 Curzon went on to emphasise the mounting difficulties of the 
situation:
“His Majesty’s Government, however, can no longer conceal from 
the French Government not merely, as is well known, that this 
attitude has constantly placed the British authorities on the spot 
in a situation of great embarrassment, but that it is daily 
exposing His Majesty’s Government at home to an increasing 
stream of adverse criticism, both in the British press and in 
Parliament. His Majesty’s Government are being strenuously 
 exhorted no longer to play a passive part, but to intervene
191 FO 115 2852, A1895/1895/45: Geddes tel. 333, 28.3.23.
192 Minute by Crowe, 19.4.23 on: FO 371 8727, C6789/313/18: Geddes, disp. 385, 28.3.23.
193 FO 371 8724, C5302/313/18: Memo communicated to the French Ambassador, 20.3.23. 
That this was to be kept secret is revealed by the interdepartmental minutes enclosed. 
Lampson commented on 21.3.23: “This is to be kept absolutely secret”, while Crowe on
4.4.23 wrote: “Do not circulate.”
194 FO 371 8724, C5302/313/18: Memo communicated to the French Ambassador, 20.3.23.
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actively in a matter which, it is generally urged, concerns this 
country too closely to justify Great Britain in remaining a mere
spectator. ”195
Curzon concluded by asking the French government to give information about 
“the aims to which Franco-Belgian policy is directed, and of the manner in 
which the measures so far taken, or yet to be taken, are expected to bring 
about its realisation” 196 so that an authoritative statement could be made to 
Parliament. Clearly Curzon’s intention was to hint to the French that British 
policy was being forced to change (hence a policy statement to Parliament). In 
asking for a fuller exposition of French policy he probably hoped that Poincaré, 
anxious to keep Britain on his side, would make some concession and perhaps 
point to a way out of the stalemate. This might then pave the way for secret 
negotiations. He was to be disappointed. Poincaré replied on 23 March that he 
had made known his Ruhr policy in January, and that nothing had changed 
since. 197 The initiative had failed. Curzon, after consulting Bonar Law, 
commented on 25 March: “We think that it is of no use to pursue the matter at
present”. 198
Curzon was now in a difficult position. As the Italian Ambassador observed on 
27 March: “Today I found Curzon much preoccupied by the fact that the Ruhr 
question has made no progress, and the asperity of Franco-German relations 
increases daily. His anxiety is due also... to the fact that public opinion 
irrespective of party does not approve, but views with increasing impatience 
the present policy of the g o v e r n m e n t .  ”199
Curzon’s options were certainly limited. Increasingly forced to alter the British
195 FO 371 8724, 05302/313/18: Memo communicated to the French Ambassador, 20.3.23,
196 FO 371 8724, 05302/313/18: Memo communicated to the French Ambassador, 20.3.23.
197 FO 371 8725, 02769/313/18: Memo from Poincaré communicated by French 
Ambassador, 23.3.23.
198 Minute by Ourzon, 25.3.23 on FO 371 8725 05769/313/18: Memo from Poincare 
communicated by French ambassador, 23.3.23.
199 HW 12 45: No. 02955: Torretta to Mussolini, tel. 283, 27.3.23.
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stance he did not feel justified in raising the legal argument; negotiations via 
the United States were futile; and negotiations via Italy or Belgium were liable 
to alienate France. As Bonar Law explained to Smuts: “...no new policy seems 
to me possible which would not be to take directly the side of the Germans 
against the French,” and he concluded, “Black therefore as the outlook is the 
best hope seems to be that the Germans may make proposals which the 
French will look at more reasonably than would have been the case before the 
occupation of the R u h r .”200 This, then, seemed the only alternative remaining; 
and, rather than leaving such an event to providence, Curzon decided, on 
advice fi“om D’Abemon, to encourage such a German advance. D’Abemon had 
suggested that: “If it is desirable for Germany to make some new offer at an 
early date, a strong hint in that direction is advisable, otherwise Rosenberg is 
inclined to postpone any new d e c la r a t io n .”20i
Such an approach was probably also in tune with Treasury thinking at this 
stage. There is little archival material concerning the Treasury’s view of the 
Ruhr crisis during these early months. It is probable that the Treasury was 
preoccupied during the opening weeks of 1923 with the Anglo-American debt
200 Bonar Law Papers, Box 108, Folder 9, Document 58, Bonar Law to Smuts, letter,
18.4.23.
201 Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F. 112/205: D’Abemon’s Diary, 9.4.23, sent to Curzon, who 
sidelined this passage.
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settlem ent and Baldwin’s trip to Washington .202 What evidence there is
suggests that the key man behind the Treasury’s reparation policy continued
to be Bradbury. His views at this point were ambiguous, and as such could
well have added to the indecision in the Foreign Office over the best course to
pursue. Bradbury’s preferred course was to do nothing. He remained adamant
that Britain should maintain her neutrality and certainly should not become
involved in imposing a French-style reparation settlement on Germany that
Germany could not execute. Rather than this, Bradbury wanted to stand aside
and see France taught a lesson.
“I am convinced that we ought to leave the policy represented by 
the Ruhr occupation severely alone until the French have learnt 
their lesson. The price of premature intervention on our part will 
he that they will bleed us without saving either Germany or 
themselves. If on the other hand we leave Gaul and Teuton to 
bleed each other to exhaustion, (in spite of the mischief that the 
process is bound to do us), we may yet be able to intervene with 
advantage while there is still something of European civilisation 
left to save. But I fear it will be a near thing.”203
Given, however, that the Foreign Office were rapidly coming to the conclusion 
that to appear to stand aside while Germany and France ‘bleed each other to 
exhaustion’ was not a viable policy from either an international or a domestic- 
political perspective, Bradbury agreed that the best hope was for negotiations
202 In January 1923 Baldwin visited Washington and almost prompted Bonar Law’s 
resignation by committing Great Britain to repayment of Britain’s war debt to the US. 
Bruce Kent suggests that this commitment compromised Britain’s freedom for manoeuvre 
regarding the Ruhr: “...Britain’s efforts to secure a Franco-Belgian withdrawal were 
foredoomed to failure by her uncompromising financial policy in the wake of her onerous 
debt-funding arrangement with the United States...” [Kent, Spoils, pp. 210]. However, there 
is no archival evidence that the debt settlement altered Britain’s reparations policy in any 
way. Middlemas and Bames describe the settlement, especially in view of American opinion 
at this stage, as a triumph for Baldwin. [Middlemas & Barnes, Baldwin, pp. 129-148]. 
Certainly the Treasury remained constant in its view, both before and after the settlement, 
that France should repay her debt to Britain, regardless of Britain’s debt to the US. In an 
undated minute (probably autumn 1923) that department concluded: "... the fact that we 
are actually paying America is our strongest claim to receive money from France... The 
advantages of the debt settlement are manifold; and it has in no way affected France’s 
attitude with regard either to reparations, or to her debt to this country.” [T172/1314: Memo 
on American Debt Settlement, unsigned, n.d.]. Similarly, on 18 April, Mr. Phillips 
commented on the Treasury’s reparation policy: “The main lines of policy have not been 
much affected by recent events...” [FO 371 8633, C7301/1/18: Memo by Mr. Phillips,
18.4.23]. For more information on the Debt Settlement, see Middlemas & Bames, Baldwin, 
pp.129-148, and Blake, Unknown, pp. 490-96.
203 T194/10: Bradbury to Chancellor, 12.3.23.
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based on some form of German offer: “Now that France herself has broken up 
the inter-allied soHdarity, we are not any longer bound to her chariot-wheels, 
and when a sincere German offer is forthcoming, as it must be sooner or later 
under French pressure, we shall, if we keep our hands free, be in a position to 
see fair p la y .”204
This was the advice which the Treasury gave Curzon when (acting on
D’Abernon’s suggestion) he asked for the Treasury's view before making a
pubhc declaration on policy. Although Niemeyer stated in his reply of 18 April
that: “It is hardly necessary to add that the present moment (with M.
Loucheur’s visit still much discussed in France) is hardly very suitable for any
general pronouncement by His Majesty’s Government” 205  ^ the memo by F.
Phillips, Assistant Secretary at the Treasury, concluded,
“All the concessions which Great Britain has made to her Allies 
throughout a succession of conferences have had one main object 
- to keep the French from occupying the Ruhr. Through the 
obstinacy of the present French Government that object has not 
been obtained, and we ought therefore to keep our hands 
completely free of embarrassing commitments. // The best, 
perhaps the only chance, that now remains for securing any 
substantial payment on account of reparations is that Germany 
may be persuaded or cajoled into making a voluntary o f f e r .”206
This memo may well have been what finally swung Curzon. Facing increased
international and internal domestic-political pressure to modify benevolent
neutrality, but at the same time presented with limited options, this was the
only possible way forward. Thus, on 20 April, he made a cleverly constructed
speech to the House of Lords, in which he - very subtly and ever so slightly -
redefined the British stance. Neutrality, he now explained, did not necessarily
mean non-intervention:
“The neutral, as surely the experience of the last war sufficiently 
 showed, is by no means a lay figure. He may start by being a
204 T194/10: Bradbury to Chancellor, 10.4.23.
205 FO 371 8633, C7301/1/18: Memo by Niemeyer, 18.4.23.
206 Memo by Phillips, 18.4.23, enclosed in: “FO 371 8633, C7301/1/18: Memo by Niemeyer,
18.4.23.
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spectator, but at any moment he is capable of being converted 
into an agent, and a very useful agent. ”207
Although Curzon was most careful to maintain British impartiality to either
side, emphasising that the present deadlock was the fault of both the French
and the G e r m a n s ,  208 he went on to stress that the only way forward was by
means of some form of German offer:
“...I cannot help thinking, for my part, that if  Grermany were to 
make an offer of her willingness and intention to pay and to have 
the payment fixed by authorities properly charged with the duty, 
and if  she were at the same time to offer specific guarantees for 
the continued payments, an advance might he made.”209
He concluded: “As soon as a move is made, and I have indicated how I think it 
might be made, our help will be forthcoming to both parties.”2io
Curzon was well aware that by this speech he was making a definite policy
move and was directly encouraging a German initiative. On 24 April he
explained to the Italian ambassador that:
“...it seemed scarcely credible that the German Government 
would not act upon the suggestion that I had made: in other 
words, they would presently be found submitting a proposal, 
whether it were good or bad, either to the French Government or 
to the Allied Powers in general.”2ii
However, while from the point of view of foreign policy the speech marked a 
major departure, in other respects it reaffirmed the British approach. Curzon, 
carefully following the Treasury line, stressed that the British position 
regarding reparation and war debts had not changed. For example, he praised 
Bonar Law’s January proposals, saying that they were “a definite and 
carefully thought out plan” of a veiy generous nature. 212 At the same time he 
was careful not to provoke the French too much: “Our guiding consideration
207 53  h.L. Deb 5 s, col. 788: Curzon’s speech to House of Lords, 20.4.23.
208 ibid, col. 793.
209 ibid, col. 796.
210 ibid, col. 7 9 7 .
211 FO 371 8720, C7400/31318: Dispatch no. 535 to Graham, 24.4.23.
212 53  h.L. Deb. 5 s, col. 784: Curzon’s speech, 20.4.23.
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throughout has been that the Entente between Britain and France and their 
Allies should not be broken. We are convinced that the Entente is the basis of 
... European recovery and of... European peace...”213
Thus, although a move towards negotiations had been made, immense 
obstacles remained before any lasting settlem ent could be reached. In 
overcoming these obstacles the Foreign Office would not be assisted by the 
Treasury. Although Bradbury expressed satisfaction at Curzon’s speech: ““I 
think Lord Curzon’s speech was excellent... (T)he plain fact remains that if  the 
Germans make a sensible offer and the French call on us to discuss it, the 
whole conduct of the negotiations will be substantially in our h a n d s . . . ”2 i4  , he 
remained acutely pessimistic about the overall prospects of success: “I do not 
believe that a real settlement is possible until there has been a complete 
change in French temper, and I doubt whether this can be hoped for until there 
has been a general debacle in Germany and a financial crash in F r a n c e .”2 i5
The first phase of the occupation crisis was over. As the deadlock between 
France/Belgium and Germany had deepened, Britain’s ‘neutral’ position had left 
her increasingly squeezed between the two sides. Although the second stage of 
the crisis promised at least an attempt at negotiations, it was unlikely that the 
pressure on Britain’s position would relax in the immediate future.
213 53  H.L. Deb. 5 s, col. 784: Curzon’s speech, 20.4.23.
214 T194/10: Bradbury to Baldwin, 25.4.23.
215 Baldwin Papers, Box 125, pp. 15-19: Bradbury to Baldwin, letter, 25.4.23.
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C onclusion
The Ruhr occupation entailed immense difficulties for the British. While 
Britain was certainly not p o w e r le s s 2 i6  , her policy-makers did not in practice 
have the freedom for manoeuvre which McDougall and Kent s u g g e s t .2 i7  The 
policy adopted was not, as Bennett claims, a straightforward one of wearing 
down the F r e n c h 2 i8  , nor was it designed purely as a method of Hmiting French 
a c t io n .2 1 9  It was not dictated solely by the Foreign O f f i c e 220 , nor can i t  he 
understood merely in terms of differences between Crowe and Curzon and 
mistakes by the l a t t e r .221 As this chapter has shown, the true picture is one of 
far greater complexity.
Benevolent neutrality, by definition ambiguous, proved virtually untenable in 
practice. Britain already had an active interest in the Rhineland both through 
her zone of occupation and through her representatives on the interallied 
commissions. The French and Germans exploited these areas of vulnerability, 
embarrassing the British representatives. The weakness of Britain’s position 
was clearly demonstrated by her obvious dependence on both French and 
German cooperation.
As well as these difficulties, the British government also faced three other 
broad areas of pressure, all of which intensified as time progressed: mounting 
economic dislocation; increased diplomatic appeals for some kind of 
intervention by Britain, and finally increased domestic-political dissatisfaction
216 Rupieper. Cuno. pp. 118.
217 McDougall. France’s, pp. 264, Kent, Spoils, pp. 210.
218 Bennett, British, pp. 36.
219 Williamson, ‘Great Britain’, pp. 73.
220 Maisel, Foreign, pp. 124-5.
221 Crowe & Corp, Ablest, pp. 428-30.
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with apparent British impotence. In view of all these factors, and with the 
Foreign Secretary at last home from the Lausanne Conference, it is hardly 
surprising that a cautious reappraisal began.
Tentative enquiries soon eliminated several possibilities. Pressure on France 
through open disapproval of her action was ruled out by the legal niceties, while 
a pact with France was deemed impossible given pubhc opinion in Britain and 
the attitude of the Dominions. An effort to involve the United States led 
nowhere, as did an attempt to prompt some form of compromise in the French 
stance and aims. The only alternative remaining therefore seemed to try to 
initiate negotiations by prompting the Germans to make an offer of some kind. 
This was the rationale behind Curzon’s speech to the House of Lords on 20 
April.
Thus by the end of April the character of British policy had changed. Although 
ostensibly benevolent neutrality still remained the guiding principle, a 
fundamental shift had in fact occurred from neutrality as a means of 
maintaining distance from the Franco-Belgian action and of keeping out of the 
crisis to neutrality accompanied by tentative intervention and offering 
mediation to encourage negotiations.
As well as this shift in the nature of policy, there had also been a shift in the 
dynamics behind it. Chapter I emphasised the inadequacy of the role played 
by key politicians. This deficiency continued in the opening weeks of the 
occupation, with policy in practice being guided by officials on the spot in the 
Ruhr. In the Foreign Office it was officials such as Lampson who were doing 
most of the work, with apparently little input from, for example, C r o w e .222 
With the return of the Foreign Secretary to London on 5 February however.
222 It is worth mentioning that Crowe actually went to Lausanne to assist Curzon from 17 
January until 5 February.
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European policy at last received some of the guidance it had heen lacking. This 
trend of increased involvement by more influential figures was to continue in 
the summer months.
None the less, the shift should not he over-emphasised. This chapter has 
demonstrated that throughout the Spring of 1923 British policy, like that of 
France and Germany, was shaped hy a complex interaction of forces: 
international, domestic-political, and administrative. The result was that the 
new approach of 'tentative intervention’ reflected this interaction and was in 
many ways an inadequate compromise. It had, in the main, been forced on the 
government. Britain was still straining to tread the ever dangerous middle 
path. Although it seemed likely that Curzon’s speech would prompt some 
German advance, the prospect of reaching a successful compromise solution to 
the occupation crisis remained iraught with difficulties.
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Chapter III
A ttem pts to  prom pt n ego tia tion s, A pril - J u ly  1923.
This chapter concentrates on the new policy approach, henceforth termed 
“tentative intervention”, which was inaugurated by Curzon’s 20 April 1923 
speech. It examines the dynamics, constraints and conflicts shaping British 
policy during the first months of the summer of 1923. Despite Curzon’s hopes, 
little progress was made towards a resolution of the crisis. The speech 
triggered a protracted diplomatic exchange which did nothing either to relieve 
the stalemate on the Continent or to ease the domestic-political difficulties 
facing British policy-makers.
By the summer of 1923, Germany was increasingly feeling the strains of 
passive resistance. After mid-April all attempts to stabilise the mark 
collapsed and massive inflation seized Grermany. Interest groups polarised and 
eyed each other with hostility. Big business and industry angered the trade 
unions by refusing to make sacrifices to support the government, instead 
forcing workers to carry the burden of occupation costs by refusing to raise 
real wage levels. i The middle class itself divided, with the legal and medical 
professions resentful of the civil service’s real wage increases. 2 But despite all 
their differences, all parties began to unite in opposition to the Cuno 
government’s total incompetence in dealing with the situation. The Cabinet 
was overwhelmed by the task of financing passive resistance, and Cuno and 
Rosenberg’s lack of diplomatic progress added to their unpopularity. By the 
end of July Germany was on the brink of economic disintegration and the Cuno 
government, formed as a ‘Business Cabinet’ with supposed financial expertise,
1 Feldman, Disorder, pp. 675.
2 Feldman, Disorder, pp. 680.
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entirely discredited. 3
Poincaré also faced mounting difficulties. The Ruhr occupation was not 
producing swift rewards, but was demanding renewed sacrifice and patience 
from the French people. Public opinion, particularly on the left, began to 
question the occupation, and even Poincare's middle-class supporters were 
worried by the effects on the franc. 4 Poincare's preoccupation with foreign 
policy also meant that he neglected domestic politics. Dissatisfaction grew and 
on 15 July he was called to defend his domestic policy before the Chamber. 
Although he gained a majority of 200 votes, this was down by 180 from 
January,^ and revealed that Poincaré was increasingly dependent on the right 
for support.6 Poincaré's difficulties, however, were not on the scale of Cuno's. 
In circumstances of national emergency the French Chamber would continue 
to support its premier. Moreover, the French were aware of the severity of the 
German situation and were at last scenting the fragrance of victory. 
Poincaré's poHcy hardened. He began to hold out for a total victory in the Ruhr, 
hoping this would salvage his domestic position and restore his electoral 
prospects.
Thus, by the summer of 1923 compromise between France and Germany was 
more remote than ever. In these circumstances, Curzon's ostensibly “new" 
approach failed to conceal the fact that Britain was still prevaricating between 
France and Germany, procrastinating rather than making a decision. At the 
same time domestic-political problems in Britain were surfacing. The 
Conservative Party was still recovering from its break with the Coalitionists in 
the previous October. Its unity was in many respects extremely superficial
3 Feldman, Disorder, pp. 659-693; and Rupieper, Cuno. pp. 144-173.
4 McDougall, France’s, pp. 277-9.
5 McDougall, France’s, pp. 280.
3 Trachtenberg, Reparation, pp. 280.
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and a priority of its leaders had to be to avoid any potentially divisive issues. 
In these circumstances foreign policy soon became extremely contentious. 
While Curzon tried to push for negotiations, so divisions within the government 
- and within public opinion - grew. Conversely, however, at the very time that 
Cabinet divisions heightened, two key administrative departments - the 
Foreign Office and the Treasury - began to converge on a distinctly  
Francophobie strategy.
By the end of April, Bonar Law’s health was failing and so he decided to take a 
sea voyage in the hope of it producing some improvement. He recommended 
Curzon to act as Deputy Prime Minister in his absence. Bonar Law’s health 
did not improve. On 17 May he was diagnosed as having throat cancer and 
was given a maximum life expectancy of six months. Although he himself was 
not told of the diagnosis, his health was such that he realised that he could no 
longer cope with the demands of office. On 19 May he returned to London, and 
on the following day he sent a letter of resignation to the King.
The question now was who should succeed. The obvious choice was Curzon. 
He was by far the most experienced member of the Party, and was already 
acting as Deputy Prime Minister. The credentials of his closest rival for the 
post - Stanley Baldwin - did not seem to come near his. Solid, but not 
apparently exceptional, Baldwin had spent four years as a “competent but not 
distinguished Financial Secretary to the Treasury”, ? before in 1921 becoming a 
relatively unimpressive President of the Board of Trade. In October 1922 
Bonar Law had thought Baldwin too inexperienced to be Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and had only offered him the position when his first choice - 
Reginald McKenna - had refused it. Bonar Law’s doubts seemed confirmed 
when, as Chancellor, Baldwin almost provoked the Prime Minister’s resignation
7 Gilmour, Curzon. pp. 579
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by his Washington trip. Yet despite Curzon’s apparent superiority of claim for 
the post of Prime Minister, Bonar Law refused to recommend him, informing 
the King that, owing to his ill-health, he preferred not to be consulted and was 
unwilhng to take the responsibility for any recommendation.
It seems that Bonar Law assumed that Curzon would succeed him, but that 
he refused to be actively instrumental in his appointment because of doubts 
over the suitability of Curzon’s character for the position.8 In these  
circumstances, Bonar Law’s Private Secretary, Colonel Waterhouse, was able 
to interfere and influence the course of events against Curzon. Waterhouse 
handed the King a memo which he said, “practically expressed the views of Mr. 
Bonar Law”9 and which argued that, “temperamentally”, Curzon, “did not 
inspire complete confidence in his colleagues, either as to his judgment or as to 
his ultimate strength of purpose in a crisis.”io
One cannot but sympathise with Curzon. Called to London expecting to be 
instated in Number 10, he was bitterly disappointed to learn that the post had 
gone to a man clearly less qualified for the position than he. The proffered 
reason that the Prime Minister should be from the House of Commons barely 
concealed the personal slight to Curzon’s character. Yet Curzon behaved with 
great magnanimity. On 23 May he congratulated Baldwin on his appointment 
as Prime Minister, and agreed to continue to serve as Foreign Secretary, 
believing it to be in the public interest. On 28 May he proposed Baldwin as 
leader of the Conservative Party.
These dramatic political events were bound to affect foreign policy. Once again 
Curzon had other priorities on his agenda at a critical time in the Ruhr crisis.
8 For further information, see: Roy Jenkins, Baldwin. (London, 1987); Middlemas and 
Bames, Baldwin: Blake, Unknown.: and Gilmour, Curzon..
9 Blake, Unknown, pp. 520.
10 Gilmour, Curzon. pp. 581-582.
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Naturally preoccupied at the end of May with the leadership contest, from the 
end of April he was acting Prime Minister and so faced a greatly increased work 
load. Relations between Curzon and Baldwin must also have been affected. 
Baldwin was aware of Curzon’s strong claims to be Prime Minister and acutely 
conscious of his disappointment. Anxious not to offend this senior member of 
his government, he was unlikely to relish the prospect of crossing swords with 
him over foreign policy. However, as we have seen, Curzon was not the most 
dynamic of Foreign Secretaries, and with an equally passive Prime Minister 
the possibility of an active, decisive foreign policy seemed small. Finally, it is 
also significant that for the first three months of his premiership Baldwin 
retained the Chancellorship. He was thus likely to succumb to Treasury 
views.
With all these considerations in mind, it is now time to return to the situation 
regarding the Ruhr crisis, as only through a detailed examination of the 
development of events throughout the summer months of 1923 can a true 
evaluation of British pohcy be achieved.
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The G erm an N ote o f M ay 2 1923
On 20 April 1923 Curzon made his landmark speech to the House of Lords in 
which he stated that Britain, as a neutral, m ight at any moment be, 
“converted into an agent, and a very useful agent”, and suggested that, “...if 
Germany were to make an offer... an advance might be made.”n  The 
Germans eagerly seized on Curzon’s carefully couched suggestion and began to 
formulate a plan for submission to the Allies. 12 Curzon, anxious that tentative 
intervention should not compromise Britain’s overall neutrality, refused to give 
any further hints or advice to the Germans regarding the content of their
proposals. 13
On 2 May the German proposals arrived. D’Ahemon immediately recognised 
the folly of having left the Germans to their own devices when drawing up the 
note: “There may be horses on whose necks it is safe to drop the reins, hut 
such have no relationship with the German steed.” 14 The Germans’ offer 
merely amounted to a revamped version of the one they had prepared in 
December 1922 (but which had not in fact heen put forward at the Paris 
Conference). The Germans offered no concrete guarantees for payment and 
reaffirmed their intentions to continue passive resistance until the Ruhr was 
evacuated. They offered a total of 30 billion marks, of which 20 billion were to
11 See above, Chapter II, pp. 121.
12 FO 371 8728, C7145/313/18: D’Abemon, tel. 175, 21.4.23.
13 On 23 April Curzon minuted, “... if I send for Herr Sthamer he will ask my advice as to 
the actual reply his Government should make and thus endeavour to shift the responsibility 
to me.” [Minute by Curzon, 23.4.23 on FO 371 8728, C7177/313/18: D’Abemon tel. 176,
22,4,23]. On 27 April, Lampson noted that he had had a conversation with the Counsellor 
of the German Embassy, but that, “Mindful of Lord Curzon’s decision that we should be 
careful not to commit ourselves in any shape or form to advice to Germany as to the nature 
of the offer she should make to France, 1 said 1 was afraid 1 must decline to express any 
opinion.” [FO 371 8633, C77441/l/18:Memo by Lampson, 27.4.23] Similarly, on 26 April, 
D’Abemon commented: “1 have kept quite clear of Government circles for the last few days, 
as 1 do not want to suggest any particular line.” [Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F. 112/205: 
D’Abemon’s Diary, 26.4.23].
14 Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F. 112/205: D’Abemon’s Diary, 2.5.32.
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be paid by means of loans by July 1927. 5 billion instalments would then be 
made in 1929 and 1931, provided Germany could manage the payments. 
Moreover, during the four year moratorium on the first 20 billion, Germany 
would pay no interest. On the contrary, the loans themselves would be used to 
pay the interest on the repayments, thus reducing the real value of the offer to 
a mere 15 billion marks, is To expect the French to accept these terms was 
entirely unrealistic. Rather the Cuno Cabinet, facing mounting parliamentary 
opposition, hoped to force diplomatic progress hy dividing Britain and F r a n c e .
The reactions within the British Government to the proposals are interesting.
In particular, the favourable response of the Treasury needs to he emphasised.
Seizing on the offer in the German note to submit the whole matter to an
impartial tribunal, Niemeyer told Crowe:
“I am quite sure that this is the only way in which a decision can 
be reached. While at the moment the French would be most 
unwilling to contemplate any such thing, it seems to me that it 
would be a great mistake on our part for us not to express, so far 
as we are concerned, our readiness to accept such a solution... I 
very much hope, therefore, that we shall not be led into a hasty 
endorsement of the French rejection, and that we shall seriously 
consider whether we should not express public approval of the 
suggested reference to an independent b o d y .”i7
At this stage Foreign Office officials were more cautious. If they pushed for a 
settlem ent by means of an independent body it would certainly alienate 
France, and there was a strong possibility that it would destroy the Entente. 
What would the situation then be with regard to the Treaty of Versailles and 
the future treatment of Germany? What would happen to British security if  
she were at obvious loggerheads with the other principal European power? As 
Lampson commented: “Of course the essence of the whole problem is whether 
a settlement is generally desired or not? And if so, are we prepared to see a
15 Feldman, Disorder, pp. 662-3.
16 Rupieper, Cuno. pp. 149.
17 FO 371 8634, C7984/1/18; Niemeyer to Crowe, 4.5.23.
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widening rift in our relations with France in order to achieve it?”i8
The French, already angered by Curzon’s 20 April speech 19 , adamantly 
refused to have anything to do with the German note. On 3 May Crewe was 
informed that a French rejection had been prepared. 20 The Belgian response 
was more encouraging. The Belgians had heen more favourably disposed to 
Curzon’s original speech 21 and now that the German proposals arrived, Jaspar 
told Grahame that the Belgian government was in favour of sending a 
collective alhed reply22. Although this reply would have to take the form of a 
rejection of the German note, it would allow Britain to “without detriment to 
her own standpoint resume her place in allied councils” and would provide 
Britain with a much better way of controlling the French, as “if  French 
government accepted this procedure they would inevitably be bound 
henceforward to give due heed to British views, which would increase chances 
of a reasonable settlement.”23
Curzon, anxious that his attempt to prompt negotiations should not fail, seized 
on this slender opportunity even though it risked upsetting the Treasury by 
associating the British with some form of French rejection. He immediately 
instructed his ambassadors in Brussels and Paris to express Britain’s support 
for “a friendly exchange of views between the principal allied governments” 
before addressing a reply to the German note. 24 The French, however, soon
18 Minute by Lampson, 5.5.23 on FO 371 8634, C7984/1/18: Niemeyer to Crowe, 4.5.23.
19 See FO 371 8729, C7516/313/18: minute by Crowe, 25.4.23; and minute by Lampson,
26.4.23 on FO 371 8729, C7315/313/18: D’Abemon, dispatch 268, 17.4.23.
20 FO 371 8634, C7903/1/18: Crewe, tel. 454, 3.5.23.
21 On 24 April Grahame reported that: “Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed to me today 
great admiration for your speech... He hoped and believed speech would bring settlement 
with Germany nearer.” [FO 371 8729,07334/313/18: Grahame, tel. 8 6 , 24.4.23.]
22 FO 371 8634, C7899/1/18: Grahame, tel. 92, 3.5.23.
23 FO 371 8634, C7899/1/18: Grahame, tel. 92, 3.5.23.
24 FO 371 8634, C7899/1/18: Tel. 69 to Grahame, 4.5.23; and FO 371 8634, C7903/1/18: 
tel. 192 to Crewe, 4.5.23.
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stamped out any chance of such d i s c u s s i o n s .  25 On 4 May Jaspar received an
urgent note from Poincaré proposing a Franco-Belgian meeting to discuss a
separate reply.26 Grahame persuaded the Belgians to ask the French to
delay the dispatch of a separate rejection to Germany by 48 h o u r s ,27 hut
Poincaré refused to budge. Railroading the Belgians into compliance, the
French dispatched a note to the Germans on 6 May. Grahame commented:
“I was particularly disgusted with the Belgian Government for 
running away a second time... M. Poincaré must then have 
brought out his worst thunderbolt, for otherwise the Belgian 
Government would surely not have humiliated themselves in our 
eyes by curtailing the already ridiculously short delay which they
had demanded.”28
This incident was a major contributor to sealing Belgium’s fate as a second
class power in Europe. The Foreign Office was now convinced that the Belgians
were entirely in the hands of Poincaré, and in future it would pay little regard to
the appeals or suggestions of its junior alliance partner. For example, when
later in May Crewe reported that the Belgians were once more taking a
tougher line with France,29 Lampson scathingly remarked:
“I much misdoubt these ‘firm attitudes’ on the part of Belgium.
When it comes to the point Poincaré dictates to them what they 
are to do. But it sounds very nice to he so independent before the
event. ”30
Curzon now faced the question of what to do next. The most pressing issue  
was how the British themselves should reply to the German note. Although 
Curzon’s first attempt at tentative intervention had failed, he still saw the 
subtleties of that approach as affording the best prospects for progress. He
25 Curzon had in fact been afraid that this would happen. On 4 May he wrote to Grahame 
that he: “earnestly hoped that M. Jaspar, having appealed for British support, would not 
now be frightened by M. Poincaré and run away.” [Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F.112/240: 
Curzon to Grahame, 4.5.23.]
26 FO 371 8634, C7961/1/18: Grahame, tel. 93, 4.5.23.
27 FO 371 8633, C8049/1/18: Grahame, tel. 101, 5.5.23.
28 Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F. 112/230: Grahame to Curzon, 9.5.23.
29 FO 371 8637, C9075/1/18: Crewe, tel. 520, 22.5.23.
30 Minute by Lampson, 25.5.23 on FO 371 8637, C9217/1/18: D’Abemon tel. 210, 23.5.23.
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therefore allowed himself to be encouraged by vague signs that France might 
agree to negotiate if  the Germans produced more ‘reasonable’ proposals. On 3 
May Crewe had reported that Poincaré “did not desire to close any door, and 
other amended proposals, which could in any way be regarded as acceptable, 
would receive due consideration.”3i The Germans also hinted that they would 
like another chance. On 6 May, Sthamer told Curzon that he “hoped that the 
imperfect tone and language of the note would nevertheless not result in the 
door being slammed in the face of n e g o t i a t i o n s .”32
In effect Curzon decided to try the same tactic as he had used in his 20 April
speech. Once again he would prompt German proposals and then encourage
general negotiations whilst all the time maintaining British neutrality. The
difference was that this time he hoped to obtain a much more promising start
from the Germans. On 7 May Curzon put his proposed policy before Cabinet
along with a draft reply to the German note of 2 May. The proposed reply
began in a severe tone: “I cannot conceal from Your Excellency that the
proposals of your government have come as a great d i s a p p o i n t m e n t . . .”33 But
towards the end, the hint in favour of further German move was obvious:
“His Majesty’s Government for their part are persuaded that in 
her own interest Germany will... proceed to reconsider and expand 
their proposals in such a way as to convert them into a feasible 
basis of further discussion. In such discussion His Majesty’s 
Government wiU at the suitable moment be ready to take part hy 
the side of their a l l i e s . . .”34
Curzon’s plan was to collaborate with the Italians so that each country 
produced similar repUes to the German n o te .3 5  In this way Britain’s hand 
would be strengthened when dealing with France. As Curzon was acting Prime
31 FO 371 8634, C7903/1/18: Crewe, tel. 454, 3.5.23.
32 Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F.112/240: Curzon to D’Abemon, 6.5.23.
33 CAB 23 45: Appendix to Cabinet minutes, 7.5.23: Draft reply To German note of May 2.
34 ibid.
35 It is interesting that, now that he was more desperate in his dealings with France, 
Curzon was prepared to try to enlist the help of the Italians whom he had treated with such 
cynical disdain earlier in the crisis. [See above. Chapter II, pp. 97-98.]
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Minister at this stage, the Cabinet had little choice but to agree to his proposed 
course of action and approve the draft reply he had p r e p a r e d .3 6  There was, 
however, some d is s e n t .3 7
Consultation with the Italians was in fact already underway. On 4 May 
Mussolini had suggested that the British and ItaHans should exchange views on 
the r e p ly ,3 8  while on 6 May Curzon was informed that Mussolini agreed that 
the Italian and British notes should express the same broad i d e a s . 39 On 7 
May, the Foreign Office telegraphed Curzon’s proposed reply to the Italians. 
The Foreign Office also gave a copy of the draft to the Japanese E m b a s s y .4 0
Given his anxiety to reinforce his second attempt at tentative intervention by
coordination with the Italians and the Japanese, it is interesting that Curzon
did not suggest consultation with the United States. This alternative was
raised in the Foreign Office. On 9 May Lampson suggested giving the United
States Embassy a copy of the draft British note, arguing that:
“If we do not do so, they wiU probably resent it: and as sooner or 
later America may well he drawn into any final settlement (or, in 
the alternative, if  it should come to a real split with the French 
over this wretched question) we may quite conceivably wish to 
have American goodwill on our side.”4i
The Treasury also favoured approaching the United States. On 4 May 
Niemeyer suggested: “I suppose that there would be no chance of getting the 
Americans à propos of the note [ie the German proposals] to repeat Hughes’s 
suggestion in some slightly more definite fo r m ? “42 At this point the suggestion 
of involving the United States was rejected hy Crowe, who commented: “I see
36 CAB 23 45: Minutes from Cabinet meeting on 7.5.23, 12 noon.
37 See below, pp. 142.
38 FO 371 8634, C8069/1/18: Tel. 124 to Graham, 4.5.23.
39 FO 371 8634, C8069/1/18: Tel. 124 to Graham, 6.5.23.
40 FO 371 8635, C8313/1/18: Memo by Lampson, 7.5.23.
41 Minute by Lampson, 9.5.23 on FO 371 8635, C8382/1/18: Conversation between Crowe 
and Italian Charge d’Affaires, 9.5.23.
42 FO 371 8634, C7984/1/18: Niemeyer to Crowe, 4.5.23.
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no objection, but also no n e c e s s i t y ; ”43 and by Curzon, who decided: “I see no 
n e c e s s i t y ^ .4 4  Curzon probably felt that the United States was not yet ready 
to intervene, and that therefore any approach to Washington might result in 
more harm than good. It is important to remember that reports on the 
situation in the US which were reaching the Foreign Office stated that 
American opinion was more sympathetic to the French than to the Germans. 
On 2 May, Lampson minuted: “American feeling has throughout been 
distinctly p r o - F r e n c h . ”45
This evaluation was probably correct. Hughes did not want to become involved 
at this stage and was keen for France and Germany to find their own 
so lu t io n .4 6  On 3 May Hughes told the German Ambassador in Washington 
that,
“...he supposed that the matter came down in the last analysis to 
an agreement between the Germans and the French, that the 
French were in possession and that it seemed to him that the 
question could only be solved by the most direct and intimate 
negotiations to find a satisfactory hasis...The Secretary also 
suggested that action seeming to be intended to bring pressure on 
France from the outside would have the immediate effect of 
causing an unpleasant French reaction and m ake the  
negotiations more d if f ic u l t .  ”47
Hughes repeated this advice to the Germans on 7 June. 48 It is also interesting 
that the State Department, worried by the American Ambassador in Berlin’s
43 Minute by Crowe, 9.5.23 on FO 371 8635, C8382/1/18: Conversation between Crowe and 
the Italian Chargé d’Affaires, 9.5,23.
44 Minute on ibid by Curzon, 9.5.23.
45 Minute by Lampson, 2.5.23 on FO 371 8730, C7583/313/18: Geddes dispatch 491,
20.4.23.
46 For further information see M.P. Leffler, The Elusive quest: America’s Pursuit of 
European Stabilitv and French Securitv 1919-1933 (Chapel Hill, 1979), pp. 78-9 & pp. 83-6.
47 FRUS 1923, Vol. 11, pp. 60-61; Memo by Hughes on conversation with the German 
Ambassador, 3.5.23. Hughes repeated this advice to the Belgians: “...he wondered if it were 
not possible for the French and Belgians and Germans to find a practicable way of 
conducting negotiations to a point of reasonable adjustment. [FRUS 1923, vol. 11, pp. 61; 
Memo by Hughes on conversation with Belgian Ambassador, 3.5.23.]
48 FRUS 1923, vol. 11, pp. 64; Memo by Hughes on conversation with the German 
Ambassador, 7.6.23.
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pro-Gterman t e n d e n c i e s ,49 kept him in Washington from May to July so that 
he could not mislead the G e r m a n s .so
In the light of this American attitude, the British were forced to rely on the 
Italians and Japanese. On 10 May the Italian draft reply was receivedsi, and 
on 14 May the J a p a n e s e .  52 Both agreed with the main principles of the British 
note - that Germany^s proposals were inadequate and that she should come 
forward with improved ones. As soon as the Italian reply was received, the 
Foreign Office authorised the dispatch of the British n o te .5 3
Once this note had been sent, the British were left to play a waiting game.
Curzon recognised the limitations of his policy: “We cannot go on playing a
game of lawn tennis for ever with sharp relations across the net and occasional
smashes into it.”54 However, as after the 2 May proposals, Curzon still
refused to give any further advice to the German Government. On 29 May,
Sthamer visited Curzon to ask for guidance in producing acceptable proposals.
Curzon immediately dismissed the Ambassador saying:
“I could not possibly discuss the matter with him, or indicate any 
views which might be held by His Majesty’s Government, without 
assuming a responsibility which I should be loath to accept, and 
which might be a source of serious embarrassment in the
f u t u r e .”55
49 See F. Costigliola, ‘The United States and the Reconstruction of Germany in the 1920s’, 
Business History Review . Vol. 50 (1976), pp. 477-502.
50 Feldman, Disorder, pp. 662. There were those in Britain who would have welcomed 
similar treatment for Lord D’Abemon. [See Gwynne’s comments to Baldwin below, pp. 143]
51 FO 371 8635, C8402/1/18: Communication from Italian Chargé d’Afraires, 10.5.23.
52 FO 371 8636, C8703/1/18: Tokugawa to Lampson, 14.5.23.
53 FO 371 8636 , C8402/1/18: Tel. 132 to Graham, 10.5.23.
54 Crewe Papers, C23: Curzon to Crewe, 11.5.23.
55 Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F.112/240: Curzon to D’Abemon, 29.5.23, disp. 802, 
C9451/1/18.
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The G erm an N ote o f 7 J u n e  1923.
3
On 7 June 1927 the new German proposals arrived.56 They can broadly be 
divided into four categories: the Germans agreed to submit the question of their 
capacity to pay to an impartial tribunal; they agreed to allow allied inspection 
of German industry and financial records; they offered to substitute a system  
of annuities for the previous requests for foreign loans; and they offered certain 
guarantees to ensure reparation payment. The guarantees comprised the sum 
of approximately 1 billion GM from railways and industry, and a pledge of 
duties on luxury goods of an estimated 200 million GM per annum. The note 
concluded by admitting German liability to pay reparation and calling for an 
international conference to discuss all details.^? When he handed the note to 
Curzon, the German Ambassador further added that his government did not 
regard the proposals as exhaustive but would be prepared to consider 
modifications.
This German offer was a great improvement on the 2 May plan. The Treasury 
were quick to point out that: “The offer of guarantees... is obviously a great 
step in advance, politically and p sych olog ica lly”58; while Bradbury encouraged 
Baldwin:
“The German memorandum cannot... be treated  as a 
comprehensive proposal for the settlem ent of the reparation 
question. It does, however, give a foundation on which a 
satisfactory general plan could be built if  the French were wilhng 
to cooperate, and I think, also, pretty clear indication of the 
willingness of the German Government to cooperate in such a
p lan .”59
As in May, the Foreign Office, while recognising the advances apparent in the
56 On the internal difficulties faced by the German government regarding the 7 June 
proposals, particularly their efforts to persuade industry to provide guarantees, see 
Feldman, Disorder, pp. 663-7.
57 FO 371 8638, C9926/1/18: Communication from German Ambassador, 7.6.23.
58 FO 371 8638, C10065/1/18: Niemeyer to FO, 9.6.23.
59 Baldwin Papers, Bx 125, pp. 107-14: memo (n.d.) by Bradbury on German note of 7.6.23.
139
German note, was more cautious in its optimism. Crowe emphasised that the 
German note made no reference to the crucial issue of passive resistance, and 
predicted trouble when - as undoubtedly they would - the French requested that 
Britain join with them in demanding the cessation of passive resistance as a 
precondition to any further consideration of the reparation problem. 60 Such a 
request by the French would pose great problems for the British as it would 
open the Pandora’s box of the legality of the Ruhr occupation, thus highlighting 
what was in effect the crux of the British dilemma. If the British requested the 
end of passive resistance, then it would indicate that the British government 
thought that passive resistance was illegal and was not justified by the French 
action. In other words it would imply that the British felt that the French 
action was legal - and that by resisting, the Germans were in effect making an 
entirely unjustified ‘act of war’. On the other hand, if  the British refused to join 
with the French in calling for the end of passive resistance then they would by 
default be sympathising with the Germans, be viewing their resistance as 
legitimate, and therefore be implying that they viewed the whole occupation as 
ülegal.
Crowe’s fears were soon justified. On 11 June Curzon met the French and 
Belgian ambassadors. Both called for Britain to join with them in appealing to 
Germany to end passive r e s is ta n c e . 6i Curzon tried to stall for time. On 13  
June he dispatched a note to the French Ambassador asking what exactly was 
meant by the demand for the end of passive resistance.62  Did i t  mean simply 
that the German government should withdraw their decrees, or did the French 
government expect the Ruhr population actively to cooperate with the
60 Minute by Crowe, 7.6.23 on FO 371 8638, C9827/1/18; Addison, tel. 221, 5.6.23.
61 CAB 23 45, Cabinet Minutes, 11.6.23.
62 In adopting this policy, Curzon was using a suggestion made by Crewe in a letter of 8  
June that it would be possible: “...to keep the ball rolling by asking exactly what is meant 
by the cessation of Passive Resistance. and what would be the next step which the French 
Government would take, if Passive Resistance were to come to an end.” [Curzon Papers, 
Mss Eur. F.112/201(a): Crewe to Curzon, 8.6.23. (Underlinings added by Curzon in pencil).]
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F r e n c h ? 6 3  The Belgian Ambassador was asked the same q u e s t io n s .6 4
Several weeks passed before, after a heated interview between Curzon and 
S a in t -A u la ir e ,6 5  the French reply arrived. This was predictably disappointing. 
Poincaré defined the cessation of passive resistance as involving the active 
collaboration of the Ruhr population and refused to give any assurances that 
modifications in the terms of occupation would follow the withdrawal of 
German government d e c r e e s .66 A Belgian rely was also received which, 
though more friendly in tone, in essence merely reiterated the French line. 67 
Poincaré was clearly more confident of his position, and thought that 
Germany’s growing weakness would mean a French victory regardless of 
British s u p p o r t .6 8
Thus, by the beginning of July little progress had been made since Curzon’s 
House of Lords speech of 20 April. The stalemate was as intractable as ever, 
and Anglo-French relations were increasingly strained. Yet while diplomatic 
progress was slow, important developments had been occurring within the 
British policy-making machine. At a domestic-political level, the latent 
differences which had remained uneasily dormant since the onset of the crisis, 
now began to surface as frustration with the inadequacy of Curzon’s policy 
crystallised. But at the very time when divisions in the Cabinet were growing, 
so the two key administrative departments - the Foreign Office and the 
Treasury - began to converge on a more actively Francophobie stance.
63 FO 371 8639, C10272/1/18: Communication to the French Ambassador in London,
13.6.23.
64 FO 371 8639, C10273/1/18: Disp. 638, to Grahame, 12.6.23.
65 Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F.112/240: tel. 2227 to Crewe, 3.7.23.
66FO 371 8642, C11803/1/18: Disp. 2267 to Crewe, 6.7.23.
67 FO 371 8642, C11638/1/18: Disp. 720 to Wingfield (Brussels), 3.7.23.
68 Foreign Office officials were aware of and worried by this trend. On 25 June Lampson 
commented: “The outlook is black... The inference to be drawn from the prolonged silence 
from France in replying to our note of June 13... is that France is playing for time, no doubt 
on the strength of the reports which are reaching him [Poincaré] to the effect that Germany 
is nearing the end of her tether.” [Minute by Lampson, 25.6.23 on FO 371 8640, 
C10983/1/18: Crewe, tel. 610, 24.6.23.]
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D om estic-P o litica l P ressu res.
As was shown in Chapter II, there is evidence that from the start of the
occupation Bonar Law’s position was compromised by considerable backbench
support for France. As tentative intervention stagnated, this faction became
increasingly dissatisfied with the government’s stance and this dissatisfaction
was expressed at the highest level by key politicians. For example, when
Curzon submitted to Cabinet his draft reply to the German May 2 note, both
Derby and Neville Chamberlain (the Minister for Health) wanted it to be more
stringent towards the Germans. As Derby wrote privately to Curzon: “I do feel
that this is one of the most important documents we have had to deal with and
it is very important that nothing should be said which would be construed as a
bias towards G e r m a n y .”69 On 17 July Baldwin received a letter from his
Secretary of State for Air, Samuel Hoare, arguing that:
“At every turn it seems to me that the breach with France, even 
though it maybe ultimately inevitable, is for the moment likely to 
delay and endanger the settlement of Europe. // If this is so I am 
inclined to think that a bad arrangem ent w ith France, 
unsatisfactory though it may seem to many of us, is better than 
a breach with F r a n c e .”70
Worthington Evans agreed:
“It seems to me we are in some danger because we disapprove of 
French action in the Ruhr, of going to the other extreme and 
shaping our policy on the footing that the French are wrong and 
the Germans are right. // Is it not the truth that the Germans are 
wrong...”7i
The editor of the Morning Post. H.A. Gwynne, bombarded Baldwin with yet 
more extreme a d v ic e .  72 Gwynne consistently advocated an alliance with
69 Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F, 112/229: Derby to Curzon, 7.5.23.
70 Baldwin Papers, Bx 126, pp. 81-8: Samuel Hoare to Baldwin, 17.7.23.
71 Baldwin Papers, Bx 126, pp. 102 -110: Worthington Evans to Baldwin, 17.7.23.
72 For more information on the machinations of Gwynne, see K.M. Wilson, A Study in the 
History and Politics of the Morning Post. 1905-26. (New York, 1990), pp. 193-215; and 
Keiger, Poincaré, pp. 299.
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France and was extremely critical of Curzon. On 13 June he wrote:
“In the present case, your delegates are, first of all Curzon, then 
Crewe, then D’Abernon. I went to see Bonar the other day and 
you will not be surprised to hear that he said that Curzon was a 
bad foreign secretary... As for D’Abernon he is a crook... Now 
these are the instruments with which you have to work. You are 
bound to fail if you use them.^'^ a
Such pro-French views - extreme in Gwynne’s case, but far more reasoned and 
deliberate within the ranks of the Conservative Party itself, were an important 
consideration for the Prime Minister. But at the same time as facing mounting 
support for a more Francophile stance, Baldwin also had to contend with 
pressure from those who wanted to submit the whole Ruhr question to the 
League of Nations. This lobby was not, perhaps, as influential as the 
Francophiles, as many of the most influential supporters of the League did not 
sit on the government benches. It did however now have a vociferous advocate 
in the form of Lord Robert Cecil, the Lord Privy Seal, who was in effect the 
‘League Minister’. Cecil’s desire to submit the whole question of the Ruhr crisis 
to the new, post-war method of arbitration by the League of Nations brought 
him into conflict with both the Foreign Office and the Foreign Secretary.
Curzon’s suspicions of Cecil were aroused as soon as he realised that Cecil was
to have responsibility for League affairs. On 2 June he wrote to Cecil:
“I do not wish there to be any misunderstanding about the 
fundamentals ;... the League of Nations business is now under the 
Foreign Office and I am not prepared to delegate my responsibility 
to anybody. ”74
The following day Curzon was incensed to hear that Cecil had been interfering 
in diplomacy at Paris. Apparently Cecil had hinted unofficially to the French 
that unless progress towards negotiations was made, the British government
73 Baldwin Papers, Bx 114, pp28-30: Gwynne to Baldwin, 13.6.23,
74 Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F. 112/229: Curzon to Cecil, 2.6.23.
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might bring the question of the Ruhr before the L e a g u e .  75 Curzon’s anger was 
clear. On 14 June he wrote to Baldwin:
“I am afraid he [Cecil] is out to make trouble. I will endeavour to 
keep the peace to the best of my ability. But I have no intention 
of admitting a second even if  a subordinate Foreign Secretary nor 
of allowing the responsibility for League work to be taken away 
from the FQ. ’^^ e
The quarrel quickly escalated. On 20 June, Cecil wrote to Baldwin:
“He [Curzon] thinks the old arrangement for dealing with the 
League of Nations affairs was satisfactory by which Balfour or 
Fisher took no interest in and had no knowledge of anything 
connected with the League of Nations policy of the country except 
what they could gain from the Foreign Office telegrams... I on the 
contrary think it a most unsatisfactory one... It is very little too 
much to say that the great mass of Foreign Office work goes on 
precisely in a prewar fashion and the amount of attention given to 
the League is very small.”77
Baldwin, anxious to maintain Cabinet unity, tried to calm both sides. Both
Curzon and Cecil remained to u c h y 7 8  and as late as 7 August Curzon wrote:
“I must also ask your protection against the altogether mistimed 
and intolerable intervention of Boh Cecil at Paris. If he is to be at 
liberty to go over there and without any reference to you or me or 
the Cabinet to \the text here is uncertain^ a pohcy of his own (with 
which I may say I wholly disagree) it renders my position quite 
impossible, and I shall have no alternative but to ask to be 
relieved of i t . ”79
This incident between Curzon and Cecil demonstrates the growing potential for 
conflict over foreign pohcy which existed in the Cabinet and the problems which 
such divisions could pose for Baldwin. Furthermore, Baldwin, like Bonar Law, 
had to take into account continued pressure from the Dominions, and 
particularly from Greneral Smuts. On 7 July Smuts wrote to Baldwin: “British 
Government will soon have to choose between maintenance of Entente on the
75 Baldwin Papers, Bx 114, pp. 132-3: Cecil to Curzon, 3.6.23. See also: T194/277: Cedi to 
Bradbury, 6.6.23.
76 Baldwin Papers, Bx 114, pp. 136-8: Curzon to Baldwin, 14.6.23.
77 Baldwin Papers, Bx 114, pp. 150-2: Cecil to Baldwin, 20.6.23.
78 For Crowe’s commentary see Phipps Papers II, Bx 2/1, p ll:  Crowe to Phipps, 8.8.23.
79 Baldwin Papers, Bx 114, pp. 157-160: Curzon to Baldwin, 7.8.23. See also Cecil’s 
message to Baldwin, 8.8.23 [Baldwin Papers, Bx 127, pp. 100: Phipps disp. 740, 7.8.23].
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one hand and maintenance of British self-respect and honour and Empire 
prestige as a first class Power on the other.” He then advised that Baldwin 
should: “solemnly renounce the Entente in a formal d o c u m e n t . . .”80
Sm uts’ view s were in sharp contrast w ith the increasingly restive  
Francophiles. These issues, coupled with the League disagreement, highlight 
the political difficulties Baldwin faced. While it seemed everyone was unhappy 
with the impotence of British policy, the prospect of united Cabinet support for 
an alternative was small. This was particularly unfortunate for Baldwin as 
public and commercial opinion was becoming yet more critical of the situation 
and was tending (apart from those elements of the press, such as the Morning 
Post, controlled by the Francophiles) to swing against France. For example, 
the Manchester Guardian openly supported the Germans’ June proposals 8i 
while at the end of June the Times advocated action against France: “...if joint 
action is impossible, then the British Government must face the responsibility 
of making an effort on its own to arrest the destructive process before it is too 
late.”82 John Maynard Keynes commented on the British press reactions to 
the 7 June note: “The note has done all it was capable of doing and has ranged 
virtually the whole of British public opinion on its side. I don’t know when the 
press has been more unanimous in quiet approval.”83
The Italian Ambassador felt that commercial and financial opinion was also 
hardening against France. On 3 July he reported to Mussolini:
“The delay of the French Government in answering the British
Questionnaire [Curzon’s enquiry about the nature of passive
80 CAB 24 161, CP 418: tel, from Governor General of the Union of South Africa to Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, 7,7.23. At this stage the Foreign Office fobbed off Smuts hy writing 
that the questions raised by Smuts were: “...of such magnitude that they can hardly be 
dealt with now by an exchange of telegrams, but call for detailed discussion at the British 
empire Conference.” [CO 532/129: FO reply to Smuts, 17.7.23].
81 Manchester Guardian. 8.6.23, pp. 6.
82 The Times. 28.6.23, pp. 15.
83 Keynes to Max Warburg (a German businessman), 21.6.23, cited in Rupieper, Cuno. pp. 
163.
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resistance] is keenly resented by pubic opinion here. The press 
adopts a sharp tone, demanding an immediate written reply from 
the French Gk)vernment. To the difficulties due to the situation 
created hy French action in the Ruhr, there is consequently now 
indignation at the (?tactics) of POINCARE, which are here 
considered far from courteous towards England. Commercial and 
financial circles are putting great pressure upon the government 
to secure energetic action with a view to a speedy solution of the 
present crisis, from which these circles are suffering severely. In 
diplomatic circles the feeling is that the critical moment in 
Franco-British relations has arrived, and that the general 
European situation has never heen more dangerous since the
arm istice .”84
Certainly the Bank of England sympathised with Germany’s plight. On 20 
June its Governor, Montagu Norman, wrote to the President of the 
Reichshank: “As you know, we are anxious to assist you at any time to the 
extent that lies in our power to do so ...”85 and hy the end of July the Bank of 
England had advanced the Reichshank over £7.5 million (secured against the 
Reich shank’s London gold deposits) to prop up the m ark. 86
The government also faced continuous questioning in Parliament from the 
opposition about the situation in the R uhr. 87 By the end of June these  
questions were becoming more aggressive. For example, on 14 June Baldwin 
was asked whether: ”...he is aware of the widespread objection felt in this 
country to any declaration... which would imply approval of the Franco-Belgian 
occupation ...”88; while on 27 June a comment on German collapse was: “What 
do the Government propose to do... Are they going to let the matter drift on?”89
84 HW 12/48: Torretta (London) to Rome, tel. 564, 3.7.23. Both Rupieper and Feldman 
argue that these pro-German trends in Britain encouraged the Germans to prolong passive 
resistance in the hope that Britain would intervene [Rupieper, Cuno. pp. 172-3 and 
Feldman, Disorder, pp. 668-9].
85 Bank of England archives, OV34/71: Norman to President of Reichshank, 20.6.23.
86 Bank of England archives, OV34/71: Norman to President of Reichshank, 21.7.23.
87 For example, see Hansard 164 HC deb 5s, col.398 (16.5.23) and col. 1262 (30.5.23).
88 Hansard 165 HC deb 5s, col.721 (14.6.23), question by Charles Buxton (MP for 
Accrington).
89 Hansard 165 HC deb 5s, col.2314 (27.6.23), question by Joseph Kenworthy (MP for Hull).
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As the Ruhr crisis progressed British public and political opinion was becoming 
more polarised. While the general trend was in a pro-German direction, 
Baldwin was handicapped by the pro-French opinion of his own backbenches. 
To further compound Baldwin’s and Curzon’s problems, at the very time when 
the Conservative Francophiles were becoming more vocal, so the Foreign 
Office and Treasury were adopting a more actively Francophobie stance.
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A d m in istrative P ressu res.
As was shown in the previous chapter, the majority of Foreign Office officials 
and British diplomats already sympathised with the Germans and blamed the 
crisis on the French. Their sympathies were strengthened as reports of French 
brutality and German weakness flooded into the Foreign Office.
On 30 March 1923 the Allied High Command (under French and Belgian 
control) ordered the dismissal and expulsion of all railwaymen who refused to 
return to work. By 15 May these penalties were being enforced. According to 
Kilmarnock as many as 500 000 people were involved, and it is hardly 
surprising that the Foreign Office frequently received detailed protests from 
the German Amhassador.90 Wigram described the French action as 
“disgraceful... [as]... the offence of these railwaymen is...merely that they 
refused to work for what amounts to a hostile occupying authority.”9i
Reports of French “justice” also provoked anger. After a disturbance at Essen, 
in which French soldiers shot 14 workmen, the French authorities court- 
martiailed the managers of the works involved, and convicted them of 
instigating the disturbance. The managers were each sentenced to 10 years’ 
imprisonment and fined 100 million m a r k s .92 Curzon commented: “The 
sentences were absolutely h a r b a r o u s .”93
These and similar reports convinced the Foreign Office that the French had
90 For example see: FO 371 8731, C8782/313/18: communication from the German 
ambassador, 15.5.23.
91 Minute by Wigram, 17.5.23 on FO 371 8731, C8782/313/18: Communication from 
German Ambassador, 15.5.23.
92 FO 371 8730, C8436/313/18: Communication from German Ambassador, 10.5.23.
93 Minute by Curzon, 15.5.23 on FO 371 8730, C8436/313/18: Communication from 
German Ambassador, 10.5.23.
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pushed Germany to the hrink of collapse. As Sterndale Bennett summarised: 
“...German resistance is about to break... The result, however, may not be the 
capitulation of Germany to France, but internal disintegration and disorder.”94 
On June 18 Joseph Addison (Counsellor at the Berlin Embassy) wrote to 
Lampson that:
“...the French will have the German carcass at their mercy by 
about October next. This, I fear, is exactly what Poincare knows 
and what makes a reasonable settlement so difficult. We don’t 
want Germany to be a carcass. France does not mind very much 
if  she becomes one and if decomposition supervenes, as she sees 
compensatory advantages.”95
This letter prompted Lampson to act. He decided to gather as much
information as possible on the impact of a German crash. He sent telegrams
to other Whitehall departments and to British diplomats in Brussels, Paris,
Italy, the Hague and Moscow asking for their views. In this communication he
actually laid down his own opinion. He thought a Grerman collapse would cause
immediate chaos to all of Europe, including France; but what is interesting is
that he saw German weakness as a short term phenomenon. He simply
assumed that Germany would recover - and that she would take over France’s
position as the dominant power on the Continent:
“Of course Germany will ultimately recover: several million odd 
thrifty and industrious souls cannot be indefinitely submerged - 
and in due course Germany will get her own back out of France, 
with interest; - hut in the meantime if there is to be a smash it 
will be a nasty one and i t  will affect us all m a t e r i a l l y .”96
Thus key British officials were resigned to a fundamental shift in the balance of 
power in Europe in Germany’s favour.
Replies to Lampson’s telegram soon began to filter into the Foreign Office. 
They were even more pessimistic than Lampson had expected. Rather than
94 Minute by Sterndale Bennett, 19.5.23 on FO 371 8731, C8890/313/18: Kilmarnock, disp. 
292, 16.5.23.
95 FO 371 8640, C10791/1/18: Addison to Lampson, 18.6.23.
96 FO 371 8640, C10791/1/18: Communication from Lampson, 26.6.23.
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view ing German collapse as a short-term phenomenon, they predicted 
complete German disintegration, European chaos, and a fundamental shift in 
the balance of power towards France. Of particular interest was Addison’s 
reply. He emphasised the political disintegration which he saw as the natural 
result of economic collapse: “I have always been of the opinion... that the 
present form of government in Germany is not generally popular.”97 He argued 
that hyper-inflation was already discrediting the existing capitalist system and 
could pave the way for chaotic communist uprisings. Although the  
communists might not he successful,98 food riots would erupt across 
Germany. The army would have to be called in, and would probably act with 
great vigour in some areas (eg Bavaria) hut much less so in others (eg Saxony). 
Each state would act separately, resulting in the dismemberment of 
(Germany.99 By August the Foreign Office accepted this worst-case scenario. 
Lampson forwarded Addison’s letter to the War Council saying that it “is the 
most authoritative expression of opinion in the Foreign Office” and that Curzon 
“sees no reason to differ from the conclusions contained therein.”ioo
Foreign Office fears of the seriousness of the European situation were
reinforced when the reports from Grahame and Hugh Knatchbull-Hugesson (at
the Paris Embassy) arrived. These suggested that the irresponsible Belgians
and French had no conception of the impending catastrophe. From Belgium,
Grahame commented:
“I should like to point out as a preface that there is astonishingly 
little apprehension, either in government circles or among the 
public generally, of a collapse of the kind of which you seem to be
97 FO 371 8641, C11392/1/18: Addison to Lampson, 26.6.23.
98 Information reaching the FO suggested that reactionary groups (for example. Hitler’s in 
Bavaria) were gaining ground at the expense of the communists. On 14 July Cadogan 
commented: "... the nationalists in Germany are gaining ground at the expense of the 
communists.” [Minute by Cadogan, 14.7.23 on FO 371 8795, C12097/2719/18: Ryan disp. 
493, 10.7.23.] On 13 August Tyrrell remarked: “Success of communist movement [in 
Saxony] unlikely.” [Minute by Tyrrell, 13.8.23 on FO 3718795, C13325/2719/18: WO, 
MI3/5514, 1.8.23.]
99 FO 371 8641, C l1392/1/18: Addison to Lampson, 26.6.23.
100 WO 190/14: Lampson to Secretary of Army Council, 17.8.23.
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thinking. The prevailing idea is that a surrender of the Grerman 
Government is what is to be expected, and not a collapse of the 
German political and economic system.”ioi
The report from Paris was more alarming. Although Knatchbull-Hugesson
pointed out that: “If a collapse occurs, the chances of any economic result [ie
reparation] for France are practically nonexistent...”; 102 he concluded on an
ominous note, emphasising that the French would consider that any serious
economic results of a German collapse would he more than offset by the
advantageous effects of her political disintegration - which would guarantee
French security. He then commented:
“The collapse of Germany would so increase the strength of the 
French position on the continent that it is unlikely that His 
Majesty’s Government will he very closely consulted by France as 
to the future, or that any great attention will be paid to our views 
unless they are very vigorously stated.”i03
Only the War Office approached the question from a different perspective. 
Their reply concluded that while a German collapse would precipitate 
widespread rioting and looting, the “forces on the side of order are strong enough 
and sufficiently organised...to deal with the situation...” Although the whole 
picture could be changed if  France intervened and sent in reinforcements to 
keep order, the War Office did not think such French action likely. Rather, a 
collapse would result in a nationalist regime in Germany which France would 
object to as a “military dictatorship”, hut which the War Office felt would he, at 
least at first, essentially unthreatening: “... the Germans in power would be 
prepared to do anything reasonable on the demand of the Allies... [and] would 
know that they were not yet sufficiently powerful, either in armament or 
organisation, to engage F r a n c e . ”i0 4  In the long term the War Office, in 
contrast to the Foreign Office, viewed Germany, not France as the threat to 
the European Balance of Power. In the short term they saw the impending
101 FO 371 8642, C l1698/1/18: Grahame to Lampson, 3.7.23.
102 FO 371 8642, Cl 1799/1/18: Mr. Knatchbull-Hugesson to Lampson, 5.7.23.
103 ibid
104 WO 190/12: A.T. McGrath to Lampson, 2.7.23.
1 5 1
German collapse as precipitating this enhanced German threat. They 
therefore agreed from a practical perspective with the Foreign Office 
assessment of the dangers inherent in the existing European situation. The 
War Office were not asked for, and did not provide, an opinion on what British 
policy should now he.
All the answers which Lampson received underlined the immediate gravity of 
the situation in the Ruhr. Moreover, leaving aside the War Office view (which 
was vigorously advocated in Cabinet hy Derby hut which had scant influence 
on the overall administration, dominated as it was by the Foreign Office and 
Treasury) it can be seen that, in general, British official and diplomatic opinion 
rested on the assumption that the longterm security, peace and stability of 
Europe depended on a strong hut content and responsible Germany. French 
attempts to shackle Germany’s strength by permanent controls on her 
sovereignty were counterproductive and would resu lt in the saga of 
dismemberment and chaos so lucidly described by Addison. They would also 
contravene British interests hy tilting the European balance of power in 
France’s favour.
In the light of all this information, the Foreign Office began to consider ways of
restraining the French. As early as 14 May, Crowe minuted that:
“I venture to submit that it is a matter for serious consideration 
whether we should not, by some such means, endeavour to place 
ourselves in a position to exert real pressure on France in 
connection with the now almost inevitable differences between 
the policies of our two governments regarding reparations and 
inter-allied indebtedness. Sooner or later it wiU become necessary 
for us to try and force an issue. We can hardly allow ourselves to 
be simply squeezed out by a purely Franco-Belgian combination, 
and see the whole economic situation in Europe brought to ruin 
through French obstinacy and entire disregard of the interests of 
this country. The only lever which we hold is our power of finance.
But we do nothing even to prepare to use it... I should like to see a 
state of things created in which the French, when they come over 
here to raise money for their own purposes, found practical 
difficulties in discovering lenders. Naturally this should not
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appear as anything due to government interference... If such a 
policy were adopted we should soon find the French money 
interests turning against their own government for following a 
policy which made English capital reluctant to come forward in 
support of French enterprise.”i05
Curzon, although cautious, did not dismiss the idea of using such methods to 
put pressure on France. He commented that Crowe’s suggestion was 
“valuable^iofi and authorised him to pursue enquiries.
On 31 May, Crowe sounded Montagu Norman, the Grovemor of the Bank of 
England, about his plan, lo? Norman argued lucidly against the suggestion. 
France, he said was in a very different situation now from a year ago. She had 
already achieved postwar reconstruction and no longer needed to borrow vast 
sums of money. Should she need to do so then she could easily look to places 
other than L o n d o n , lo s
Norman’s arguments were sufficiently strong to doom this initial Foreign Office
suggestion. But Crowe was not the only senior official who was trying to think
of ways of breaking the deadlock. Lampson was engaged in a similar pursuit
and it was he who suggested that Britain threaten France with the possibility
of independent British action to secure a reparation settlement unless she
agreed to negotiations. ‘The thought suggests itself,” he commented,
“that the moment may fast be approaching when, in the interests 
of the social order of the world..., we may have to take a firmer fine 
with France. My personal belief is that if we told her point blank 
that, in order to have done with this insufferable Reparation 
question, to were prepared to go ahead if necessary alone with an
105 Minute by Crowe, 14,5.23 on FO 371 8636, C8895/1/18: Communication from 
Niemeyer, 12,5.23.
106 Minute on ibid by Curzon, 15.5.23.
107 FO 371 8638, C9678/1/18: Memo by Crowe, 31.5.23.
108 Norman did, however, suggest an alternative way of putting financial pressure on 
France - through her debt to Britain. He advocated announcing that, as France could afford 
to waste vast amounts of money on the Ruhr, there was no reason why she should not be 
able to pay the debt she owed Britain - in full and with interest. Norman said that if this 
announcement were made at the right moment it would result in a fall in the value of the 
franc. This would alarm French finance and so might well induce the French government to 
assume a more reasonable approach to British views.
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impartial assessm ent of Germany’s capacity to pay and to 
accept the 22% ( ie the Spa percentage) of that assessm ent as 
the share due to the British Empire even if  France did not come 
with us, we should then find that France came along behind pretty 
quickly. We should then be done with the Reparation Commission 
and all its attendant evils. The French would no doubt scream: 
hut sooner than be isolated and see us get our monev they would 
follow our lead.”i09
As yet this was only a suggestion, but it was soon to become a major policy
alternative - primarily because it met with the support of the Treasury.
Lampson concluded: “The idea is at least worth consideration: and I gather
that the Treasury think there is something in it.”no Indeed the Treasury had
long since lost patience with the French.m  Bradbury told Niemeyer:
“Lampson’s suggestion is on the same general lines as the advice 
I myself gave to the Prime Minister when I was last in London.//
The technical juridical position as regards our escaping from the 
fetters of the Reparation Chapter of the Treaty of Versailles is, I 
fear, not very cheerful.// On the other hand, if I had the political 
responsibihty for dealing with the matter, I should not be disposed 
to worry very much about the juridical technicalities.”ii2
Lampson began to follow up his suggestion. On 9 June he asked Hurst for a
legal view. On 12 June Hurst replied that, in his opinion, the Reparation
Commission could not actually cancel any part of Germany’s capacity without
specific authority from each of the governments represented on the
Commission. Any independent action by one power on this question would be a
departure from the Treaty and “would in fact break up the Entente altogether
on the subject of reparations.”H4 H urst explained:
“Any such scheme as that which Mr. Lampson adumbrates must 
entail a complete break away on the part of this Government 
fi'om the reparation machinery provided for in the treaty... // So 
long a period has elapsed since the French marched into the Ruhr 
that we should not at the present stage be able to justify a break
109 Minute by Lampson, 25.5.23 on FO 371 8637, C9217/1/18; D’Abernon tel. 210,
23.5.23. (Lampson’s underlinings).
110 Ibid.
111 See for example Baldwin Papers, Bx 125, pp. 165-7: Warren Fisher to Baldwin, 12.6.23 
and Baldwin Papers: pp. 214, Bradbury to Baldwin, 14.6.23.
112 Baldwin Papers, Bx 125, pp. 246: Bradbury to Niemeyer, 27.6.23.
113 FO 371 8639, C10291/1/18: Minute by Lampson, 9.6.23.
114 FO 371 8639, C10291/1/18: Minute by Hurst, 12.6.23.
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away on the reparations question as the result of the French and 
Belgian hreak away implied by their independent action.
From the legal standpoint, then, to pursue a course of independent action would
be far from easy. But by this stage frustrations with French procrastination
were increasing. For example, Lampson exploded:
“No-one save France wants to see Germany in fragments and a 
danger to Europe for years to come. It takes a Frenchman to 
ignore the after-effects of what is going on in the Ruhr and the 
Rhineland at this moment. It takes a Frenchman to perpetuate 
the tradition of national hatred hy perpetrating acts in those 
regions which are little short of what the Germans did in time of
war...”116
So angry was Lampson that he was undeterred hy Hurst’s objections: “I admit 
that the idea suggested in my minute entails all the legal difficulties pointed out 
by Sir C. Hurst. But it occurs to me as possible that the moment is fast 
approaching when we may he forced to seek a practical solution regardless of 
legal difficulties.”ii7 Crowe agreed: “The question raised hy Mr. Lampson is one 
deserving every consideration.” H8 By this stage even Curzon was prepared to 
see further discussions: “I think the suggestion is worth pursuing.”H9
As a result, Lampson began discussions with Hurst, Niemeyer and Sir John 
Fischer W illiams (the British Legal Representative on the Reparation 
Commission). By 30 June the verdict was swinging towards action against 
France. Lampson reported that a consensus had been reached that it was 
possible for Britain to hold an independent enquiry into Germany’s capacity to 
pay, although for Britain actually to obtain money from Germany other than 
through the machinery of the Reparation Commission would he in breach of 
the Treaty. Despite the difficulties entailed in this action the Foreign Office hy
115 ibid
116 FO 371 8639, C10291/1/18: Minute by Lampson, 22.6.23.
117 ibid
118 Minute on ibid by Crowe, 22.6.23.
119 Minute on ibid by Curzon, 23.6.23.
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now favoured it. Lampson concluded: “...that the idea is at least worth 
pursuing and that it may well contain the germ of a real solution of the 
Reparation question.”i20 Crowe agreed: “Although it is impossible to forecast 
now what would be the ultimate effect on France of the result of such an 
enquiry - especially if  the US took part in it - it may be said that it will 
certainly be worthwhile to set it on foot.”i2i
But Curzon, although he had sanctioned the enquiry, was aware of the Cabinet 
opposition such a departure would meet. At the beginning of July he still 
hoped that the French reply to his questions on the nature of passive 
resistance might provide the opening for a solution to the Ruhr crisis without 
necessitating a breach with France. He therefore decided not to instigate an 
independent enquiry, saying: “Let us first await the French and Belgian
rep lie s .”i22
On 6 July the uncompromising French reply arrived. Over-ruling the Foreign 
Office/Treasury view, Baldwin and Curzon tried one last time to nudge 
negotiations forward without “taking sides” from either an international or a 
domestic-political perspective. As Torretta told M ussolini on 1 6  July: 
“...Curzon has been obliged to assume toward France a less (?rigid) attitude 
than his programme originally allowed, in view of the necessity  of 
accommodating his views to those of certain other members of the Cabinet 
who desire to follow a more moderate p o lic y .”123 On 12 July Baldwin and 
Curzon made identical statements to both Houses of Parliament calling for a 
collective reply to the German p r o p o s a l s . i 2 4  According to Neville Chamberlain,
120 Minute by Lampson, 30.6.23, on FO 371 8641, C11456/1/18: Central Department 
minute, 29.6.23.
121 Minute on ibid by Crowe, 30.6.23.
122 Minute on ibid by Curzon, 1.7.23.
123 HW 12/48: Torretta to Mussolini, tel. 607, 16.7.23.
124 CAB 23 46: Appendix to Cabinet on 12.7.23.
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the Minister for Health, Curzon had been influenced by the Francophobes and 
had originally wanted the Cabinet to approve a harsher statement: the tone
was distinctly ‘nasty towards France. It seemed to me that it would produce 
the worst impression there and among those of our people who are very pro- 
F r e n c h .”i2 5  Baldwin had toned it down, explaining that “he thought Curzon’s 
draft too long for the H. of C. and that we m ust have something more 
calculated to carry with us our Francophile party and p r e s s .”i26
On 20 July Curzon submitted to the allies a draft British version of the 
collective allied reply to the German proposals. This passed Cabinet more 
easily, w ith most of the discussion relating to small points of detail. 
Chamberlain commented: “Curzon bore all the criticism with remarkable 
patience and good t e m p e r .”127 The reply stated that Britain was prepared to 
join with the French and Belgians in calling for the end of passive resistance, 
but only if  first, Germany’s capacity to pay were submitted to some kind of 
impartial international expert enquiry, and second, that if the Germans agreed 
to end passive resistance, there should be “swift and immediate” changes to 
the character of the occupation. In other words, that there should he a 
progressive evacuation of the R u h r . 128
Neutrality may have been maintained, but one has to stop and consider 
whether Curzon seriously thought anything more than good publicity could be 
achieved by this draft reply. This was certainly Crowe’s reasoning: “...it  ought 
to be possible so to draft a note... that, when it was published, world opinion 
would recognise that we had made a reasonable and generous effort for a
125 Neville Chamberlain Papers, NC2/21:Neville Chamberlain’s diary, 15,7,23.
126 ibid,
127 Neville Chamberlain Papers, NC2/21: Neville Chamberlain’s diary, 20.7.23.
128 FO 371 8644, C12540/1/18: Communication to French Ambassador, London, 20.7.23.
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settlement.”i29 i t  also explains Curzon’s comment to Cabinet on 19  July: 
“Someone having asked a question as to the reception [of the note] by the 
French, he [Curzon] said Oh the French will receive this ‘with a gasp of 
dehcious surprise.”’i30 Given that the French had consistently said that the 
Germans must abandon passive resistance unconditionally as a precondition 
to any form of progress, it was hard to imagine that Poincaré would voluntarily 
make any concessions to Germany in order to encourage them to do this. This 
was especially the case as by this stage Germany looked to be on the point of 
capitulation anyway.
The French and Belgian replies to the 2 0  July British draft reply were not long 
in coming, and naturally their response was cold. On 21 July, Poincaré told 
Phipps that France would not negotiate with Germany until passive resistance 
had s to p p ed . 131 Jaspar agreed - saying on 2 5  July that neither France nor 
Belgium could make the cessation of passive resistance the subject of a 
b arga in . 132 On 30  July the unmitigated failure of Curzon’s attempt to open 
negotiations was confirmed when lengthy and official communications were 
received from both the French and Belgians. Lampson angrily commented on 
Poincaré’s reply:
“The general gist of the note may be summed up as a determined 
opposition to any practical move towards settlement. It insists 
upon the continued occupation of the Ruhr, clearly aims at the 
collapse of Germany, and gives no indication of any sort as to 
what is proposed when that collapse actually occurs...”133
Crowe expostulated: “It looks as if  those were right who believe that M. 
Poincaré does not really desire a settlement, preferring to remain in the Ruhr
129 FO 800/243, Crowe Papers: Memorandum by Crowe on proposed reply to German Note,
18.7.23.
130 Neville Chamberlain Papers, NC2/21: Neville Chamberlain’s diary, 20.7.23.
131 FO 371 8644, C12613/1/18: Phipps, tel. 696, 22.7.23.
132 FO 371 8644, C12836/1/18: Grahame, tel. 176, 25.7.23.
133 FO 371 8646, C13519/1/18: FO minute by Lampson (undated).
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and to see Grermany reduced to impotence, as ends valuable in themselves;” 134 
while Curzon told Cabinet that: “the French note indicated a determined 
opposition hy the French Government to any immediate move in the direction 
of a settlem ent and an intention to prolong negotiations until Germany
collapsed. ”135
All this was bound to provide ammunition for the already active anti-French 
lohhy. The immediate question for the future, therefore, was whether patience 
with the French was finally exhausted, and whether Baldwin and Curzon, 
prompted hy the Foreign Office and Treasury, would at last take a firmer 
stance.
134 Minute by Crowe, 23.7.23, on FO 371 8644, C12619/1/18: Phipps, dispatch 1728,
22.7.23.
135 CAB 23 46: Minutes of Cabinet Meeting on 1.8.23.
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C onclusion
Both Rupieper and Feldman, in their detailed works on the German collapse, 
criticise British policy, particularly in June and July 1923, for misleading the 
Germans and giving them false hope. Rosenberg’s main foreign policy aim was 
to involve Britain against France, and so the encouraging signals from London 
persuaded him to prolong passive resistance - ultimately with devastating 
consequences. 136
This criticism of Britain has not so far been addressed in the British  
historiography. The tendency has been to place full blame for the German 
collapse on the French. Maisel passes over the early summer of 1923 with a 
brief chronology of the exchange of n o t e s ,  137 while Sharp dismisses it as a 
period of “fruitless c o r r e s p o n d e n c e ,”i38  Williamson and Bennett also avoid 
analysis of the dynamics behind British foreign policy, stating simply that the 
British became consistently more forceful in their attem pts to force 
negotiations on the obstinate and unreasonable F r e n c h .  139
As this chapter has demonstrated, the reality was much more complex. 
Immense problems and constraints behind the British position remained, and 
as the weeks passed and tentative intervention failed to prompt negotiations, 
these latent problems became more clearly reflected at a high policy level. 
With compromise between France and Germany more difficult than ever, 
disagreements over the Ruhr within and between the British administration. 
Cabinet, Parliament and public opinion grew. These differences increasingly 
affected Britain’s policy as, despite the fact that the Cabinet remained
136 Feldman, Disorder, pp. 668-9; Rupieper, Cuno. pp. 172-3.
137 Maisel, Foreign, pp. 125.
138 Sharp, ‘Lord Curzon’, pp. 87.
139 Bennett, British, pp. 36-7; Williamson, ‘Great Britain’, pp. 81-2.
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seriously divided, the Francophobes gained the ascendancy in the  
administration. Tragically, one result of this was to be, as Feldman and 
Rupieper contend, the false optimism and justifiable misinterpretation of the 
situation by the Cuno Cabinet. The other result - as will be described in 
Chapter IV - was to be the ultimate fragmentation of Britain’s Ruhr policy 
when, faced with the continuation of the struggle on the Continent, the 
government finally tried to make the choice between France and Germany.
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Chapter IV
T he 11 A ugust N ote and  its  A fterm ath,
A ugust - Septem b er 1923
By the beginning of August the international situation was no further forward 
than it had been at the onset of the crisis in January. Britain still found herself 
trapped in the middle ground between a France and a Germany each 
irreconcilable with the other. Meanwhile, the Ruhr crisis had continued to 
escalate and was now extremely serious.
In this chapter the developments during August and September 1923 will he 
examined. On 11 August the British government effectively abandoned its 
previous policy of benevolent passivity towards France when it sent a strongly 
worded note to the French government, sharply criticising French policy, 
declaring the occupation of the Ruhr to he illegal, and vaguely threatening 
some kind of unilateral “separate action” to hasten a settlement. However, 
when it became clear that Poincaré would not be moved by these threats the 
British made no move to act on them. On the contrary, they retreated from 
this position and instead, hy September, were pursuing a policy of increased 
friendship with France. On 19 September Baldwin had a private meeting with 
Poincaré in which the Entente was reaffirmed. Seven days later the German 
government announced the unconditional cessation of passive resistance.
Historians of France and Germany are unanimous in condemning British 
policy at this time. Feldman, Rupieper, Kent, Trachtenberg, McDougall and 
Keiger all agree that Britain’s refusal to intervene on Germany’s behalf after
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the 11 August note was the final straw for Germany. i Disillusioned with his 
Anglophile policy, the new German Chancellor, Gustav Stresemann, turned to 
France. When Poincaré refused to negotiate Stresemann eventually called off 
passive resistance on 26 September. Britain was therefore guilty at least of 
causing additional confusion in German policy, and at worst of betraying 
Germany by offering her false hope and encouraging her government to hold 
out for longer, thus exacerbating her eventual collapse. Why Britain acted in 
this way, however, is not explained.
This mystery has not been solved by the existing historiography on British 
policy. The most accurate works are those by Bennett and Uxbridge. 
Bennett's commentary is extrem ely brief, but he does recognise the 
contentious nature of the 11 August note and mentions that Cabinet 
differences prevented its being acted on.2 Uxbridge too finds significant 
Cabinet differences at this time and suggests that they may have influenced 
policy.3 Sharp hints at the contradictions in British policy, saying that 
Baldwin miscalculated by agreeing to meet Poincaré in September. 4 On the 
other hand, Williamson glosses over the 11 August note as a “reasoned 
summary of British policy", criticises France for her continued intransigence 
and then briefly narrates the Baldwin-Poincaré meeting, without commenting 
on the obvious inconsistency of British policy.5 Maisel, too, ignores the
significance of the 11 August note and fails to identify any retreat on Britain’s 
part. 6
Crowe and Corp’s account is yet more contentious. For them the 11 August
1 Feldman, Disorder, pp. 736; Rupieper, Cuno. pp. 232; Kent, Spoils, pp. 224; 
Trachtenberg, Reparation, pp. 310; McDougall, France's, pp. 292; Keiger, Poincare, pp. 302.
2 Bennett, British, pp. 37-8.
3 Uxbridge, ‘British Political’, pp. 332-36 &365.
4 Sharp, Tord Curzon’, pp. 87.
5 Williamson, ‘Great Britain’, pp. 82.
3 Maisel, Foreign, pp. 126.
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note (”Crowe’s celebrated note of 11th August”) marked the final triumph of 
Crowe’s long and consistently held view that the Franco-Belgian action was 
illegal. That the occupation was illegal is accepted hy Crowe and Corp as 
irrefutable, a fact proved hy the ‘magical effect’ of the note both in Germany 
(where law and order returned) and on Poincaré (who began to reconsider his 
demands for the unconditional cessation of passive resistance). The note 
should immediately have been followed up hy action, hut was not because of 
differences between Curzon and Baldwin. ? As will he shown, Crowe and Corp’s 
analysis has many weaknesses. Crowe had not consistently advocated 
declaring the Ruhr occupation illegal, and even when the 11 August note was 
sanctioned the Foreign Office were aware that their arguments were shaky 
and had not decided what ‘separate action’ meant. The note’s effects on both 
France and Germany were had: in Germany chaos mounted and the Cuno 
Cabinet collapsed, while in France Poincaré remained unmoved. Key Cabinet 
ministers had always been unhappy with the note and therefore separate 
action after it was never really on the agenda anyway. Moreover, Crowe and 
Corp’s account, in common with those hy Bennett, Williams, Uxbridge and 
Maisel, fails to address two key issues. First, why, if they were not going to act, 
did the British make the threats of 11 August? Second, why, rather than 
simply not act, did the British then compound their problems by trying to move 
towards France?
This chapter addresses these issues. It will be shown how the domestic- 
political and administrative divisions which had remained just below the 
surface before the French reply of 30 July now came to the fore and seriously 
disrupted British policy. The result was that the British reply to Poincaré’s 
note - given on 11 August - was an inadequate compromise. To some extent 
embracing the views of the Francophobes, who had by this time gained
7 Crowe & Corp, Ablest, pp. 436-9.
164
ascendancy in the administration, it was intended to jolt the French into 
submission. But as the Cabinet did not support the idea of separate measures 
against France, real action was never intended. Such a policy entailed a large 
element of risk, and when Poincaré refused to he moved, the risk did not pay 
off. The implications for British policy were far-reaching. The attempt to 
assume the role of mediator had categorically failed. The Francophobes were 
discredited, the Francophiles in uproar. To silence these vocal critics, Baldwin 
tried to undo the 11 August mistake hy approaching Poincaré.
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T he 11 A u gu st N ote.
By the end of July it was clear that tentative intervention had failed. Twice 
the Germans had been persuaded to make proposals, but on neither occasion 
had Britain been able to come near to breaking the stalemate, which was hy 
now centred around the complex issue of passive resistance. On 30 July, notes 
from the French and Belgians simply emphasised their view that passive 
resistance must cease unconditionally before any advance could be made. For 
the British the immediate questions for consideration were those of what 
should be done with regard to these French and Belgian notes, as well as the 
original German note of June 7. On 1 August these questions were discussed in 
Cabinet. No clear policy was agreed upon, with the Cabinet preferring to 
concentrate on matters of immediate expediency rather than on any long term 
strategy. It was decided that Curzon would draft a reply to the French and 
Belgian notes which should include: “...a statement of British policy in regard 
to Reparations...”.8 What this statem ent should say however was not 
specified, other than that it should be: “...in the nature of an appeal to the 
public opinion of the world”.9
The Cabinet thus left the responsibility for the contents of the draft note very 
much in the hands of Curzon and the Foreign Office. The Foreign Secretary did 
not give a strong lead. As late as 6 August he minuted on one of the many 
revised drafts which had been prepared: “...I am not clear whether our present 
reply is to consist merely of a summing-up of the situation and correspondence 
up to date... or whether we are to go ahead with our independent policy.”io In 
these circumstances, with the Foreign Secretary undecided and the Cabinet
8 CAB 23 24; Cabinet minutes, 1,8.23.
9 ibid
10 Minute by Curzon, 6.8.23 on: FO 371 8647, C135688/1/18: Draft reply by Crowe, 7.8.23.
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brief vague, it was natural for the suggestions and advice of Foreign Office 
officials to be of crucial influence. In the last chapter it was shown how, as the 
Ruhr crisis progressed and the British pohcy of tentative intervention failed, 
key figures in the Foreign Office - including Lampson and Crowe - began to 
advocate taking a more active policy against France. Their views were now 
translated into the government’s policy, as the evidence shows that it was the 
Foreign Office which was primarily responsible for the inclusion of one of the 
most crucial sections of the note: that concerning the legality of the French 
occupation.
The legal question had heen raised on several occasions since the occupation 
began, but before August it had generally been thought too complex and 
controversial to merit contesting with the French. The hasic debate was over 
the question of whether international law (as embodied in this matter hy the 
Treaty of Versailles) allowed the French and Belgians, without British  
agreement, to occupy the Ruhr valley as a justifiable sanction resulting from 
German default. This question was examined in the Spring of 1923 and was 
shelved because of its controversial and ambiguous implications, n  After 
reading a report by the Law Officers at this time, Curzon concluded: "... it is 
clear that we shall do no good by raising the legal question and I certainly have 
no intention of doing it.” 12 But hy the summer the legal question was again 
raised by Foreign Office officials who were aware of the problems, but who 
chose to ignore or gloss over them in an attempt to coerce France. In other 
words, the raising of the legal question in August represents another symptom 
of the ascendancy of the Treasury view within the Foreign Office and is an 
example of its disruptive influence on policy.
11 See above, Chapter II, pp. 112-4. On 11 April the Law Officers reported that the legal 
question depended on the interpretation of the words ‘economic and financial prohibitions 
and reprisals’ and that as HMG had previously occupied three Rhineland towns in 1921, for 
them now to object to the French measures would render them open to charges of hypocrisy.
12 See above. Chapter II, pp. 113-4.
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In the previous chapter it was shown how Lampson, angry at French 
intransigence and alarmed by reports of imminent German collapse, began to 
examine the possibility of separate action by Britain to break the stalemate 
and force negotiations. Despite legal objections from Hurst, Lampson, 
encouraged by the Treasury, did not abandon the idea. By the end of June both 
he and Crowe were advocating the establishment of some form of independent
enquiry. 13
At the same time, the Foreign Office was reexamining even more fundamental 
issues. In particular, British officials were angry at the French practice of 
using Rhineland High Commission Ordinances (forced through with Kilmarnock 
abstaining) to coerce the Ruhr and Rhineland populations. On 12 July  
Cadogan wrote to the Law Officers concerning ordinances 153 and 154, which 
allowed the French and Belgians to seize any form of property they liked for the 
purpose of reparations.i4 Once more the Law Officers were dubious, 
reiterating the views expressed by Hurst on a previous occasion when he said: 
“I am not clear that they [HMG] would derive any advantage from it 
[protesting about the legality of ordinances] unless a change of attitude in the 
part of HMG is contemplated and the era of benevolent neutrality is coming to 
an end.”i5 Cadogan concluded gloomily: “It follows, then, that we cannot make 
our proposed protest to the French Government on this point...”16
But Lampson was no longer content to let matters rest. By now a clear leader 
of the Foreign Office Francophobe camp, he seized on the fact that the Law 
Officers had only been commenting on the occupation of the Rhineland, not the
13 See above, Chapter III, pp. 152-6.
14 Minute by Cadogan, 2.8.23 on FO 371 8736, C13098/313/18: Report from Law Officers, 
30/7/23.
15 Minute by Hurst, 17.5.23 on FO 371 8732, C9456/313/18: FO Minute, 8.5.23.




“...the French and Belgian Governments are within their rights in 
applying within the occupied Rhineland such m easures of 
financial and economic coercion as are authorised by the 
treaty...// Of course there has never been any question as to 
measures taken outside the occupied territory (ie the Ruhr) being 
legal. ”17
In adopting this line of argument Lampson was influenced by the Treasury,
with whom he was already in consultation concerning the possibility of
separate action, and whose Francophobia was becoming more strident than
ever. Sir Norman Warren Fisber (Permanent Secretary of the Treasury and
Head of the Civil Service) described the French note of 30 July as a direct
assault on Britain:
“In short the French require the English as a condition of co­
operation to accept French dictation and to sink their own 
views...// The British Government is to abdicate and - in common 
with Germany - Great Britain is to accept a French hegemony of 
Europe in the (imagined) interests of France. I submit tbat tbe 
French attitude leaves us only one alternative viz: in the light of 
our own responsibilities to tbe world and to ourselves to enter, if  
possible jointly with the Italians, into direct conference with 
Germany.”i8
On 2 August Niemeyer submitted to the Foreign Office the Treasury's version 
of the British reply. This suggested taking an independent line by declaring the 
occupation to be illegal and inviting the Permanent Court of Justice at the 
Hague to decide the matter. 19
Though not as extreme as the Treasury, the Foreign Office, already susceptible
to the Francophobe view, now advocated taking a definite line on the legal
question. On 1 August a Central Department minute concluded that even if
the British had actively cooperated with the French:
“... neither the German Government nor the German population 
would ever have acquiesced in the occupation of the Ruhr. They 
regard that measure as illegal: they regard the attempted coercion
17 Minute on ibid by Lampson, 2,8.23.
18 Baldwin Papers, Box 126, pp. 246-7: Warren Fisher to Baldwin, 31.7.23.
19 FO 371 8647, C13592/1/18: Niemeyer to Lampson, 2.8.23.
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of the inhabitants as directly contrary to international law - a point 
upon which we do not differ from them.”^ ^
Another minute on the following day went to great lengths to absolve Britain
from charges of hypocrisy if she chose to raise the legal question:
“The occupation threatened in 1920 and 1921 was joint action 
and was external to the treaty, the action taken in 1923 was 
separate action and is claimed to have heen taken under a 
particular clause of the treaty. HM Government have never 
assented to the view that German territory might justifiably by 
occupied under para. 18 of annex II as a separate measure by one 
or two of the allied powers acting alone. ”2i
These opinions were being expressed at precisely the time when government 
policy was at its most malleable. Tentative intervention had failed and 
indecision reigned as to the best way to reply to the French note of July 30. It 
is more than mere coincidence that it was these exact legal arguments which 
were incorporated in the final draft of the British reply, which having met with 
Treasury approval,22 went before Cabinet on 9 August.
Although much of the earlier part of the note was concerned with rallying 
public opinion by making Britain’s financial position appear reasonable and 
realistic, there were, even in this part, strongly worded criticisms of French 
policy. For example, the French note of 30 July was described as: “...a series of 
argumentative passages, enquiries on points of detail... whilst fundamental 
principles are only mentioned in order to declare that they do not admit of
d iscu ssion .”23
The note soon moved into more controversial territory: “...His Majesty’s 
Government have never concealed their view that the Franco-Belgian action in
20 FO 371 8737, C13593/313/18: Foreign Office minute, 1.8.23. [My italics].
21 FO 371 8737, C13594/313/18: Foreign Office Minute, 2.8.23. [My italics].
22 Minute by Phipps, 9.8.23 on T160/155/F6066/3: FO draft reply to French and Belgian 
notes of 30.7.23, 8.8.23.
23 CAB 24 161, CP 390 (23), C13659/1/18: Curzon to Saint-Aulaire, 11.8.23.
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occupying the Ruhr, quite apart from the question of expediency, was not a
sanction authorised by the Treaty itself”. It then argued that there was “no
inconsistency” between the British government’s position over sanctions in
1921 and in 1923, as on the first occasion:
“The A llies jointly decided to threaten Germany with the  
occupation of further territory ju st as they m ight have 
threatened her with a renewal of war, for her failure to perform 
her Treaty obligations some of which had no connection whatever 
with Reparations.”
It concluded with the concealed yet unmistakable threat: “They [HMG] are 
reluctant to contemplate the possibility that separate action may be required 
in order to hasten a settlement which cannot he much longer delayed without 




Curzon’s  M otives.
Although the Francophobie Foreign Office faction in collusion with the 
Treasury influenced the drafting of the note, the ultimate responsibility for 
authorising the reply lay with the Foreign Secretary. Had Curzon blocked 
these Foreign Office tendencies, the illegality paragraphs and the hint of 
separate action would have been omitted. Despite his apparent confusion on 6 
August over the contents of the note, by 9 August Curzon must have decided 
that it should take the form of a strongly worded rebuff to France.
The most convincing explanation for Curzon’s actions is that he had still not 
entirely abandoned his aim of fostering negotiations between France and 
Germany, although he was finally beginning to recognise that in order to do this 
Britain would have to exert much greater pressure for compromise on either 
one or the other. In his opinion the Germans had made large concessions in 
their June 7 note. It was now France’s turn. Panic-stricken reports from 
Grermany spurred Curzon on.
The communists were gaining ground alarmingly and controlled the states of 
Saxony and Thuringia. In Dresden workers were organising themselves into 
control commissions to confiscate food from farmers. Meanwhile the extreme 
Right was growing rapidly, particularly in Bavaria. But perhaps most serious 
was the situation in the Ruhr and Rhineland, where continuing and increasing 
hardship was producing demoralisation, violence and unrest and - most 
dangerous - indifference towards or even support for separatism. On top of all 
these regional disturbances the Cuno government also faced a national food 
crisis and serious currency collapse. The depth and extent of the crisis finally 
forced the interest groups - which had previously been handicapping Cuno’s
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efforts - to sink their differences in an attempt to save the very fabric of 
German society. The Reichstag parties at last agreed to a common 
programme of taxation, and industry and banking agreed to a 500 million gold 
mark loan. But the effort was too late to prevent political crisis. On 8 August 
the KPD (Communists) demanded Cuno's resignation, and the next day it was 
clear that the SPD (Social Democrats) were divided over whether to support
him. 25
The British were aware of these developments. On 9 August Kilmarnock 
reported that: “...the situation is rapidly growing worse, and the machinery for 
supplying the dense population of the Basin appears to be on the verge of 
breaking down altogether.”26 D’Abernon reported that Rosenberg thought the 
German government was on the verge of collapse and facing a “desperate 
Communist attack”. Rosenberg appealed for immediate “moral help” from 
Britain, claiming this would make all the difference to the government’s 
chances of maintaining order. 27
These considerations, coupled with the internal pressure Curzon was under 
from the Foreign Office and Treasury caused him to authorise the drafting of a 
firm, almost threatening reply to the French note of 30 July. Curzon’s attitude 
provided the Francophobes with the perfect opportunity to begin to put into 
motion the policy of separate action. Yet Curzon’s intentions at this stage 
were not so strong. He hoped that the mere words of the note would have such 
an effect on French opinion that Poincaré would agree to negotiations, without 
them having to he followed up with actions. The overall views of his Cabinet 
colleagues meant that action was never realistically on the government’s 
agenda at this stage. The Foreign Secretary, caught in the middle ground both
25 Feldman, Disorder, pp. 698-705; Rupieper, Cuno. pp. 174-216.
26 FO 371 8738, C13889/313/18: Kilmarnock, disp. 630, 9.8.23.
27 FO 371 8699, C13794/203/18: D’Abernon, tel. 270, 11.8.23.
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in domestic terms between pro- and anti-French factions, as well as in
international terms between France and Germany, opted for a classic
Curzonian compromise in a vague attempt to pacify all parties. He tried to
bluster his way out of the impasse, hoping that the mere words of the note
would he enough to move Poincare, without them having to he hacked up in
practice. As Derby subsequently commented:
“... we have bluffed - and assuredly our bluff will he called - and we 
shall stand convicted to the world as a government which 
threatens something which it cannot perform. I feel despair at 
the present moment. We have alienated our allies - we have 
strengthened our e n e m y .”2S
Derby summarised the risks of the policy perfectly. To try to move Poincaré 
hy hlufiF risked having that bluff called. If Poincaré refused to he intimidated, 
British policy would he revealed to all to consist of mere empty threats. The 
implications would he extremely serious: British prestige would he severely 
damaged - perhaps, in view of her disastrous track record as mediator since 
April, beyond repair - while Poincaré’s position would he correspondingly 
strengthened. With Britain obviously not going to act Poincaré would he free to 
do as he wished in the Ruhr. The short-term dangers of this strategy were also 
serious. First, any further prolongation of the diplomatic exchange 
automatically strengthened Poincaré’s position (and therefore made him more 
likely to resist Curzonian threats) hy giving him more time to weaken  
Germany in the R u h r .  29 Second, Curzon was attempting a delicate balancing 
act within a potentially polarised government. Not only did he need cunningly 
to exploit the arguments of the Francophobes without entirely capitulating to 
their programme, hut he also needed to obtain the overall support of the 
Cabinet. It was hy no means certain that such support would he forthcoming - 
and, should he fail, he risked precipitating a serious Cabinet divide.
28 w o  137/1: Derby to Baldwin, 15.8.23 (not sent).
29 A FO minute by Lampson recognised that it was in France’s interest to prolong the 
diplomatic exchange in order to give her time to exhaust Germany and defeat passive 
resistance. [FO 371 8646, C13519/1/18: FO minute by Lampson, undated, received 7.8.23.]
174
O pposition  from  th e  C abinet.
The difficult passage of the note through Cabinet on 9 August emphasises the 
lack of united government support for the course it adopted and demonstrates 
the potentially explosive effect which Curzon’s policy could have. After much 
discussion the Cabinet did accept the note, but only because they felt that its 
opening paragraphs provided a reasoned presentation of the British position. 
Thus the Cabinet agreed: “That it was necessary to publish to the world a full 
statement of the British case which would remove the misunderstandings that 
had grown up both in this country and abroad in regard to the British  
p o s i t io n .”30 The Cabinet was not, however, happy with the policy of putting 
pressure on France and only agreed to it when Curzon emphasised that actual 
action would not be necessary, as the tone of the note itself should he enough to 
influence France. Edward Wood, the future Lord Halifax, later regretted having 
been convinced by this argument. He subsequently wrote to Baldwin: “...I 
encouraged myself (and I think was encouraged by the Foreign Secretary!) to 
build greater hopes upon the educative effects of our Note upon public opinion 
than events have warranted.”3i Even at the time the Cabinet only accepted 
the note on condition: “that the Prime Minister and Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs should carefully examine the draft in the light of the discussion, 
with a view to softening some passages which it was thought might he badly 
received by public opinion in F r a n c e . . .”32
The Cabinet were certainly not prepared to sanction definite action against 
France and basically opted for a policy of procrastination rather than decision, 
resolving:
“In view of the difficulty in the present conditions of determining a
30 CAB 23 46: Cabinet minutes, 9.8.23.
31 Baldwin Papers, Box 127, pp. 349-52: E. Wood to Baldwin, 30.8.23.
32 CAB 23 46: Cabinet minutes, 9.8.23.
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policy more than a few weeks ahead, to reserve the question of 
the next step to be taken, and more particularly as to the possible 
‘separate action' referred to in the last paragraph of the Draft 
Note, until a reply had been received from the French and Belgian 
Governments and the general effect of the publication of the Note 
was known.”33
In fact the note was not “softened” but was sent in its existing form. It is also 
interesting that although there was no unanimous agreement for the policy 
advocated in the note, there was also not agreement upon any alternative 
course. Indeed, alternatives had been suggested to the Cabinet. As early as 4 
August Cecil had circulated his own version of the reply, which politely called 
for a cessation of German passive resistance to be m et by a French 
termination of the military nature of the occupation and the submission of the 
whole question to a conference held under League auspices with the Americans 
in attendance.34 This suggestion had been raised at the Cabinet meeting on 9 
August, but did not meet with wholehearted support. Wood explained: “I was 
deterred from assenting to this view at the Cabinet by a doubt as to its 
wisdom... What has happened since has rather led me to modify my judgment, 
and I am anxious as to where our policy may take us.”35 When his plan was 
rejected Cecil made no secret of his opposition to Curzon’s approach. He told 
Baldwin:
“I was extremely depressed by the decision of the Cabinet 
because I do not think that there is any issue to the path which 
they are provisionally engaged except a humiliating diplomatic 
defeat for this country...// We must agree with France if we 
possibly can, even at very considerable sacrifice. I am certain 
that that is what it will come to ultimately and to begin a course 
of that kind by a note such as the Cabinet sanctioned this 
morning seems to me little short of madness. I am afraid I do not 
even hold a very high opinion of its a r g u m e n t s .”36
Derby, too, was vocal in his opposition to the policy of taking a firmer line with
33 ibid
34 CAB 24 161, CP 376 (23): Memo by Cecil, 4.8.23.
35 Baldwin Papers, Box 127, pp. 349-52: E. Wood to Baldwin, 30.8.23.
36 Baldwin Papers, Box 127, pp. 105-7: Cecil to Baldwin, 9.8.23.
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France. As early as 1 August Derby had made it clear that he wanted to take
a more conciliatory line towards France,and was alarmed at the prospect of
Curzon being in control of the note. On 1 August he wrote to Lloyd-Graeme: “If
the answer was to he given hy the PM I should feel quite happy hut a certain
other influence, although it is very intelligent, is also very apt to do the right
thing in the wrong w a y . ”37 He also wrote a detailed letter to Baldwin
emphasising the dangers of a hard line policy towards France. He hoped the
British reply would: “...he conciliatory and not a closing of the d o o r ”;38 adding: “I
hope too much stress will not he laid upon the illegality of the entry of the
Ruhr”, and arguing: “I see great force in Poincaré’s argument that even if the
Ruhr did resume its normal condition, it would he impossible to settle now once
and for aU the total reparation capacity of Germany.” He concluded forcefully:
“What I don’t feel the Cabinet realises is that France has got the 
whip hand on us - We can’t turn her out of the Ruhr. We can only 
try to persuade her to make the occupation as little onerous as 
possible. GC can’t dictate to her - much as he would like to, and I 
don’t want to see the Government put itse lf into an impossible 
position, and to demand something which it cannot e n f o r c e .”39
The following day Derby left for France, and was away for three weeks. He 
was therefore not at the eventful Cabinet meeting of 9 August. He was, 
however, kept up to date about events hy Leo Amery, who sympathised with 
his a r g u m e n t s .40 After the Cabinet meeting, on 10 August, Derby warned 
Baldwin that he and Amery thought that: “...it would he a fatal blunder to send 
the note with a threat of separate action - when such separate action has not 
been considered in all its [illegible] “.4i
At the same time, Baldwin was also being lobbied Gwynne of the Morning Post.
37 Baldwin Papers, Box 127, pp. 22: Derby to Lloyd Graeme, 1.8.23,
38 Baldwin Papers, Box 127, pp. 19-21: Derby to Baldwin, 1.8.23.
39 ibid
40 On 10 August, Amery himself wrote to Baldwin expressing alarm at the last sentence of 
the note, with its threat of separate action. [Baldwin Papers, Box 127, pp. 111-5, Amery to 
Baldwin, 10.8.23.]
41 Baldwin Papers, Box 127, pp. 108-9: Derby to Baldwin, 10.8.23.
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On 1 August he wrote:
“Make no mistake. Today or within the next week or so we shall 
be settling our foreign policy in Europe for the next twenty years 
or more. The issue before us is whether we are to pursue a course 
which will lead to isolation or whether we are going to work 
through the troublous times that lie in front of us hand in hand 
with France. You know that I have never been afraid to advocate 
to their logical conclusion the arguments in favour of a close 
alliance with France as I have been willing to see a British  
battalion on the R u h r . . .”42
The Treasury on the other hand remained adamantly opposed to any 
reconciliation with the French. For example, as late as 5 September Bradbury 
commented:
“I am convinced that a Germano-British Entente founded on a 
Grerman conviction that we wül fight hke lions for fair-dealing, but 
never support even an ally in what we believe to be wickedness, 
would be the best guarantee for the future peace of Europe. But 
if  we have ultimately to go to Germany with hands soiled through 
pandering to France, Germany will be able to exploit us in future 
as France has done in the past, and we shall never see the end of 
the see saw of alternate Teutonic and Gallic bullying of a weaker
neighbour.”43
In view of reactions such as these from important Conservative Cabinet 
ministers and other influential figures, as well as the conditions which the 
Cabinet attached when it authorised the note, it is clear that even when the 
note was written and sanctioned, the government did not intend having to 
follow it up with actual action against France. As a result the note was - in its 
very nature - fundamentally flawed. In order for it to have any influence on 
France its contents were made contentious and threatening. Its drafting was 
therefore influenced by the Francophobe lobby, who composed it with the 
intention of it being followed through with separate action hy Britain. The 
problem was that as Britain had so clearly laid her cards on the table, she 
risked completely losing face if it became apparent that she was not - after all - 
prepared to act on her threats.
42 Baldwin Papers, Box 127, pp. 24: Gwynne to Baldwin, 1,8.23.
43 Baldwin Papers, Box 128, pp. 18-19: Bradbury to Baldwin, 5.9.23.
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R eaction s to  th e 11 A u gust N ote and th e S h ift o f B ritish  P o licy .
It was soon clear that Curzon’s gamble had not paid off. On 11 August the 
note was handed to Saint-Aulaire and it was quickly published in the 
newspapers. An outraged response ensued from both British and French 
opinion. Neither response was what the British wanted. Although those 
newspapers such as The Times, the Manchester Guardian and Westminster 
Gazette, which had been expressing unease at the French occupation since the 
spring, praised the n o t e ,44 influential British figures publicly criticised the 
government’s policy. Moreover, Poincaré, rather than being intimidated into 
submission, was provoked into opposition. Yet given the circumstances it is 
hard to be surprised by the note’s reception. After maintaining a religious 
silence for seven months the British Government were declaring not simply 
that they now viewed the occupation as illegal, but that they always had done 
so! But if this had always been their attitude, why had they not voiced it in 
January, when by doing so they might have restrained the French, instead of 
waiting until August? On 14 August, Sir John Simon (MP for Spen Valley) 
wrote to The Times complaining that the government had waited until 7 
months into the occupation before declaring that it was illegal, especially in 
view of the importance of the legality of the occupation to the French c a s e .  45 
Lord Parmoor reiterated these views in a letter to the Manchester Guardian on 
the following day, and went even further - declaring that Germany was entitled
44 See Uxbridge, ‘British Political’, pp. 113. On 12 August the Westminster Gazette 
declared: “No other course is consistent with the dignity and interests of this country, and 
we do not regret a word of the justifiable resentment which is beneath the earlier sentences 
of the British reply.” The Times declared: “The Note is strong, but, in our opinion not too 
strong. It was high time that such a clear statement of the British case was made.” IThe 
Times. 13.8.23, pp. 9.]
45 FO 371 8739, C14360/313/18:The Times , 14.8.23. Interestingly, Austen Chamberlain, 
the prominent ex-Coalitionist who understandably held a grudge against Baldwin, shared 
these views. He wrote privately to his sister: “...they [the Government] sit silent for six 
months and then burst out with a public communication... How could they think it possible 
that France should give way when by their own action they had converted any such yielding 
into an open humiliation for her?” [Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC5/1/286: Austen to 
Hilda, 18.8.231.
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to compensation from France and B e l g i u m ! 4 6
Only D’Abernon and Bradbury seemed to think that the Note would have a
helpful effect in facilitating a European compromise. On 16 August D’Ahemon
noted in his diary:
“On the Continent the effect of the English Note of August 11 has 
been magical. In Germany it has contributed most powerfully to 
restore order and to inspire the ruling classes with some courage 
and determination to save themselves. It has had a not less 
powerful effect on the French attitude towards G e r m a n y .”4V
On 15 August Bradbury wrote to Niemeyer: “The note is admirable and I hope 
HMG will he able to see it through. The reaction up to the present has been 
milder than I e x p e c t e d .  ”48
This optimism was misplaced. Rosenberg and Cuno had continued passive 
resistance in the hope that some form of help would arrive from Britain. The 
11 August note was not sufficient to salvage Cuno’s credibility and forestall the 
political crisis he was facing. On 1 2  August the Cabinet r e s ig n e d .4 9  On 14 
August D’Abernon wrote: “There have been labour riots all over Germany and 
in Berlin. Killed and wounded must be over 200 but general strike called by 
Communists has failed and was today withdrawn by t h e m .”50 British policy 
had added to Germany’s problems and exacerbated her political crisis. 
Fortunately the Cuno Cabinet was in fact replaced by a stronger government - 
a Grand Coalition, led by Gustav Stresemann and supported by the SPD and 
committed to im plem enting the emergency taxation and stabilisation
46 FO 371 8739, C14358/313/18: Extract from Manchester Guardian. 15,8.23.
47 Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F. 112/205: D’Abemon’s Diary, 16.8.23.
48 T160/155/F6066/4: Bradbury to Niemeyer, 15.8.23.
49 FO 371 8699, C13800/203/28: D’Abernon, tel. 271, 12.8.23. This view of the 
inadequacy of the 11 August note from the German perspective follows Feldman’s 
interpretation: “...Cuno may bave been moving towards a stabilisation programme of bis 
own, but it was too late because bis entire effort bad been subject to Rosenberg’s 
expectation that England would save Germany from France.” [Feldman, Disorder, pp. 216.]
50 FO 371 8649, C13991/1/18: D’Abemon, tel. 278, 14.8.23.
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measures passed by Cuno in his final days. This development took place 
despite, not because of, the British note.
Moreover, the note did not move the French. On 20 August, an official French 
reply arrived. This was a vast document, running to 78 pages in translation, 
and divided into two parts. The first part was basically a general survey of the 
reparation question since the signature of the peace treaty. The second was a 
point hy point, and very tenacious, criticism of the British note of 11 August.5i 
Its effect was to reinforce the stalemate with a vengeance. Poincaré reiterated 
his refusal to withdraw from the Ruhr as payment was made; he rejected the 
idea of an impartial enquiry into Germany’s capacity to pay on the ground 
that it would he a direct assault on the Reparation Commission; and he 
attacked the British note’s legal arguments.
Typically, the Treasury was unrepentant in its condemnation of this French 
communication. Lampson commented: “The Treasury takes the line that the 
Note is not only unhelpful hut that it is the negation of common s e n s e . . . ”52 In a 
memo written on 24 August, Fischer Williams advocated dism issing the 
French note out of hand, legal arguments included, and pushing ahead with 
separate action in the form of seeking a r h itr a t io n .5 3
But at this stage the Foreign Office, despite their views prior to the dispatch of 
the 11 August note, were no longer so willing to he convinced hy the Treasury’s 
waiving of the legal aspect. Poincaré had argued his case well, in particular 
emphasising Britain’s inconsistency in being prepared to occupy German 
territory in 1921 hut not in 1923. The Foreign Office recognised that the
51 FO 371 8650, C14380/1/18: Phipps, dis. 1940, 21.8.23 (enclosing Poincaré’s reply of
20.8.23 and a translation of this),
52 Minute by Lampson, 22.8.23, on: FO 371 8650, C14380/1/18: Phipps, dis. 1940,
21.8.23.
53 FO 371 8739, C14705/313/18: Fischer Williams to Lampson, 24.8.23.
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French reply did pose them serious problems: “On the whole there is little 
grounds for optimism as a result of perusal of this note: France does not 
propose to hudge, and it is not evident how we can do so. The impasse is thus, 
for the moment, complete.”54 Lampson brooded pessimistically: “This is not 
hopefid, and we are really where we were in Paris in January last.”55 Hurst 
was also cautious: “In the face of M. Poincare's categorical statements, the 
British explanations - even though sound - would look obscure, and the public 
at large would become doubtful”56
Matters were not helped by the arrival of a Belgian reply on 27 A u g u s t .5 7  This
was not so harsh and unfriendly as the French one,58 but its content was
disappointing. The Belgian government did say that once passive resistance
had ceased they would take steps to modify the occupation, but they still
refused to leave the Ruhr except in proportion to payments received. The
Foreign Office commented:
“The note, therefore, does not bring a solution appreciably nearer.
Yet for all the wide differences which separate Belgian and British 
ideas, the Belgians are clearly nearer to our point of view than are 
the French, and would come nearer still were it not for the fact 
that whenever they desire to go forward they have to keep looking 
nervously backward to see what the French are doing."59
But as with the French note, the Treasury reaction was much harsher: “The 
Note, which is couched in very friendly terms is long and diffuse with dreary 
wastes of ancient history, shaky statistics and bad r e a s o n i n g ."so
Clearly the French and Belgians were playing for time so that the situation in
54 FO 371 8652, C14733/1/18: FO memo, 25.8.23.
55 Minute by Lampson, 22.8.23, on: FO 371 8650, C14380/1/18: Phipps, dis. 1940,
21.8.23.
56 Minute by Hurst, 22.8.23 on ibid.
57 CAB 24 161, CP 393: Belgian reply, 27.8.23.
58 FO 371 8653, C14855/1/18: Wingfield to Lampson, letter, 27.8.23.
59 FO 371 8653, C14857/1/18: FO memo, 30.8.23.
60 FO 371 8653, C14856/1/18: Treasury memo, 28.8.23.
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the Ruhr would swing in their favour. In these circumstances the British  
should have made a choice. Either they should have acted on the 11 August 
note and pushed ahead with some form of enquiry - either into the legal 
question or into Glerman/s capacity to pay. Although this would have risked 
breaking with France and dividing the Cabinet, it at least offered a chance of 
saving Germany from collapse and showing international opinion that Britain 
had the courage to hack her words of 11 August with action. Alternatively, the 
British should have done nothing, thus maintaining their neutrality and 
retaining the option of intervention at the conference table at a later date once 
the conflict on the ground was over, to reassert their international position and 
safeguard their finances. But as Britain had already issued the 11 August note 
for her now to do nothing would damage her prestige. It also risked allowing 
France the opportunity to dictate the peace hy achieving an unequivocal 
victory on the ground over Germany.
Despite the risks involved in this second alternative, and although the Foreign
Office had pushed for independent action prior to 11 August, this was the
approach it now favoured. Recognising that independent action would involve a
protracted debate over legal technicalities (a debate which it was hy no means
clear Britain would win) the Foreign Office resorted to delaying tactics. T hou^
previously a vociferous Francophobe, Crowe now wrote:
“...whilst I see no difficulty whatever in answering the note 
controversially, I remain as doubtful as ever as to what action or 
general line of policy is open to us. I confess my inclination would 
be to defer any decision until the question of general policy has 
been thoroughly discussed not only in the Cabinet, hut with the 
Dominions. They will have their representatives in London before 
long. Why not avail ourselves of this fact in order to give us 
breathing s p a c e . . .?”6i
Baldwin was quick to take advantage of Crowe’s suggestion of delay. Lampson 
commented on 28 August: “Sir E. Crowe’s letter has been seen hy the Prime
61 FO 371 8651, C14678/1/18: Crowe to Lampson, letter, 23.8.23.
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Minister who is understood to favour the general idea that no decisive step 
should be taken until the Imperial Conference has met and considered the 
attitude to be adopted by the British E m p i r e .”62 Curzon was more cautious, 
remarking that if  the issue was left to the Imperial Conference then none of 
the delegates would know anything about the subject except Smuts - who 
would then be free to push his Francophobie views onto everyone else. Curzon 
concluded: “I foresee prolonged discussions - indefinite delay - and a doubtful 
r e s u l t .  ”63 Despite his criticism the Foreign Secretary was - as ever - unable to 
suggest an alternative.
The Prime Minister left for his annual holiday to Aix in France only a few days 
after the French note was r e c e iv e d 6 4  , writing to Curzon that no immediate 
Cabinet action was necessary and that he wanted time to r e f l e c t .  65 Baldwin, 
however, did not simply opt for a policy of procrastination. He also began 
tentatively to explore the possibility of moving closer to France. Only a few 
weeks after the 11 August note had made Britain’s opposition to French action 
clear, Baldwin was postponing a definite policy decision regarding the action to 
be taken subsequent to the French 20 August note, while at the same time 
considering a policy of trying to cement relations with France by means of 
personal diplomacy and private meetings between himself and Poincaré.
Baldwin’s actions may partly have resulted from his preoccupation at this 
time with another political decision - that of adopting protection as the 
Conservative Party’s policy of the future. He made this complex and 
ultimately crucial party political decision during his 1923 holiday at Aix - the
62 Minute by Lampson, 28.8.23, on C14678/1/18, Crowe to Lampson, letter, 23.8.23, 
enclosed in FO 371 8650, C14380/1/18: Phipps, disp. 1940, 21.8.23.
63 Minute by Curzon, 29.8.23, on; C14678/1/18: Crowe to Lampson, letter, 23.8.23, 
enclosed in FO 371 8650, C14380/1/18: Phipps, disp. 1940, 21.8.23.
64 Minute by Tyrrell, 22.8.23.on FO 371 8650, C14380/1/18: Phipps, dispatch 1940,
21.8.23.
65 Baldwin Papers, Box 114, pp. 171: Baldwin to Curzon, 25.8.23.
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very time when he would also have been contemplating Ruhr policy. As he 
subsequently commented: spent a lot of my holiday in 1923 walking in the
hills around Aix and thought it all out by m y s e l f .”66 in  the main, however, this 
U-turn in foreign policy from threats to friendship towards France, happening 
in the space of only a couple of weeks, signals the final eruption of the 
conflicting opinions which had been developing below the surface of Britain’s 
Ruhr policy since the onset of the crisis. When Poincaré refused to he 
intimidated by the 11 August note the inconsistencies behind the British  
position were obvious to all. The Foreign Office retreated from its previously 
strident stance, now cautious regarding the legal question and unwilling to 
advocate a definite line. Meanwhile Cabinet differences exploded. Key 
members of the Cabinet, who had been extremely restive before the 11 August 
note was sent, could now only he pacified hy promises from Baldwin that he 
would seek to salvage relations with France.
On 10 August Derby had already advocated such a policy: “I am quite certain 
that if the dispatch of the note could coincide with a private talk between vou 
and Poincaré - much good could result, and I hope you will consider the 
possibility of such a m eetin g .”67 Once the French reply of 20 August was 
received he was incensed. He met Baldwin on 25 August and threatened to 
resign unless Baldwin met Poincaré. Baldwin wrote to Curzon: “Derby came to 
tender his resignation yesterday! But withdrew it on learning that I was willing 
to meet Poincaré!”68 Other Francophiles were also pressing the Prime 
Minister. Edward Wood wrote: “In spite of its obvious risks, I think for vou to 
meet Poincaré is a far better chance than a continuance of this long range 
literary bom hardm ent.”69
66 Quoted by Jenkins, Baldwin, pp. 72.
67 Baldwin Papers, Box 127, pp. 108-9: Derby to Baldwin, 10.8.23.
68 Baldwin Papers, Box 114, pp. 171: Baldwin to Curzon, 25.8.23.
69 Baldwin Papers, Box 127, pp. 349-52: E. Wood to Baldwin, 30.8.23.
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The idea of a meeting between Baldwin and Poincaré had in fact been raised 
two months previously. The suggestion apparently came from Poincaré, who 
told Crewe on 25 June that he would be happy to meet Baldwin after the 
French Parliament rose in m id - J u l y .  70 i t  may well, however, have been 
prompted hy interference from Gwynne, who wrote on 17 June to Poincaré’s 
private secretary that: “We have in Mr. Baldwin a Prime Minister determined 
to find a solution to the difficulties which beset both our countries. He is a 
friend of France... What is needed now immediatelv is a little informal 
conversation between Monsieur Poincaré and Mr. Baldw in...”7i
The idea was raised again during a conversation between the French
Ambassador and Crowe less than a week before the 11 August note. Saint
Aulaire suggested that as Curzon was to pass through Paris the following week
(on his way to Bagnoles on holiday) he should meet Poincaré. This: “could...
easily he arranged, and would undoubtedly do good. Such a meeting might
even, he suggested, form a preliminary to a more exhaustive exchange of views
which might possibly hereafter be arranged between M. Poincaré and Mr.
B a ld w in .”72 At this point, with the government just preparing the 11 August
note, Crowe was quite adamant in his condemnation of the plan:
“I confessed that if the views expressed in such uncompromising 
way in M. Poincaré’s notes and speeches represented, as M. 
Poincaré was never tired of asserting, France’s last word on the 
matter of reparations, I found it difficult to believe that any way 
could he found by personal discussions to harmonise with the 
British v i e w .”73
However, by the third week of August, with British policy at stalemate and the 
Cabinet in uproar, Baldwin’s position changed. After his stormy interview with 
Derby on 25 August, he wrote to Curzon: “The time for a personal interview [ie
70 Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F. 1127201b: Crewe to Curzon, 25.8,23.
71 Wilson, Morning Post, pp. 204-5.




between him self and Poincaré] is rapidly approaching. If that happens I would 
report immediately to the C a b in e t .”'74
The tendency in historiography has been to view British policy as divided 
between Baldwin and Curzon at this point. 75 This, however, was not the case. 
Baldwin kept Curzon fully informed of the possibility of a meeting between 
him self and Poincaré, and Curzon did not just acquiesce in but actively 
cooperated in the overtures to Poincaré. There is no evidence (until afterwards 
when he spoke with hindsight) that he d is a p p r o v e d .7 6
Curzon’s desire to cooperate with Baldwin’s plans is evident from his account of
his actions when he passed through Paris on his way home from holiday in
Bagnoles on 1 September:
“Poincaré, whom I had hoped to elude, was in Paris! Crowds of 
newsmen were dogging me about. I felt sure that if I did not even 
leave a card on him that every paper in Paris would denounce 
me... and produce the final rupture of the Entente.// So I thought 
I must take the risk, and down I went to the Quai d’Orsay to leave 
my card. But confound it! He was in. So in I went - and sat and 
talked to him for twenty minutes about... anything but the Ruhr.
Then I escaped. No harm done.// If as I understand you propose 
to see him on your return, can you give me an idea of the proposed 
starting point or [illeg] point of your conversations. For on the 
basis of the Notes I [illeg] do not see how we are to c o n v e r g e .”77
Curzon’s meeting apparently did no harm and indeed, it was glowingly reported 
in the French p r e s s .7 8  Moreover, Poincaré, keen to neutralise the effects of the 
11 August note by revealing Britain’s policy to be fundamentally inconsistent, 
was by now increasing his pressure for a personal meeting. At the end of 
August Phipps reported that several French newspapers were expressing the
74 Baldwin Papers, Box 114, pp. 171: Baldwin to Curzon, 25.8.23.
75 See Bennett, British, pp. 37-8; Crowe & Corp. Ablest, pp. 439.
76 Crowe commented on the relationship between the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary 
: “Baldwin and Curzon in particular work very well together.” [Phipps Papers: Phipps II, 
Box 2/1, pp ll: Crowe to Phipps, 8.8.23.]
77 Baldwin Papers, Box 114, pp. 174-7, Curzon (Paris) to Baldwin, 1.9.23.
78 FO 371 8654, C15038/1/18: Phipps, tel. 811, 2.9.23.
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hope that a meeting between Baldwin and Poincaré would soon be arranged, 79 
while on 1 September he told Tyrrell that he had heard that: “M. Poincaré was 
very anxious to see Mr. Baldwin, but seemed to fear that Lord Curzon would 
object to such a m e e t i n g .”80
At the same time Britain was also being approached by the Stresemann
Cabinet, which was trying one final time to stabilise the domestic situation by
resolving the Ruhr crisis without total capitulation. On 30 August the German
Acting Secretary of State, von Schubert, met D’Abernon. He said that the
German government was prepared to accept the British proposals previously
put to the French on 20 July in their entirety and asked Britain to help them
formulate suitable guarantees.si On 2 September Stresemann made a speech
at Stuttgart in which he said that the Germans were ready to make material
sacrifices if  a solution to the Ruhr conflict could be obtained on the basis of
German productive p le d g e s .8 2  But by this stage the Cabinet Francophiles
were effectively calling Britain’s shots. The fiasco of 11 August had discredited
the Francophobes and silenced the Foreign Office. Baldwin was now trying to
appease Derby by pacifying Poincaré. The German appeals were therefore
rebuffed. On 3 September, Tyrrell remarked: “The Germans know as well as
we do that unless they can make the first move as regards passive resistance
the French toes will remain dug in: the key is in B e r l i n .”83 The British also
refused to give Germany any form of direct financial aid:
“Not only have the French made it abundantly clear that passive 
resistance must cease before any general settlem ent can be 
obtained, but it m ust also be made obvious to the German 
Government that HMG cannot as a government advance money 
to them to support passive r e s i s t a n c e . . . ”84
79 FO 371 8654, C14872/1/18; Phipps, tel. 801, 30.8.23.
80 Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F.112/231b: Phipps to Tyrrell, 1.9.23.
81 FO 371 8740, 014921/313/18: D’Abernon, tel. 292, 30.8.23.
82 FO 371 8740, 015528/313/18: FO memo, 7.9.23.
83 Minute by Tyrrell, 3.9.23, on FO 371 8654, 015052/1/18: D’Abemon, tel. 296, 1.9.23.
84 Minute by Stemdale Bennett, 7.9.23, on: FO 371 8654, 015459/1/18: D’Abemon, tel.
306, 6.9.23.
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This change of emphasis in British policy very nearly had disastrous 
consequences. The Germans finally abandoned their Anglophile policy and 
began to approach the French.85 On 4 September D’Abemon reported that a 
friendly discussion had taken place between Stresemann and the French 
ambassador in B erlin . 86 This report was substantiated by the French Chargé 
d’Afiaires in a conversation with Tyrrell on 8 Septem ber.87
At first the British were quite happy to see Germany approach the French. On
5 September Lampson commented: “...it is quite clear that France and
Germany are drawing appreciably closer together. So much the b e tte r .”88
They were also unmoved by reports of Franco-German industrial negotiations.
Rumours of such talks had surfaced sporadically for some time and had not
been regarded as especially worrying. For example, at the end of July,
D’Ahemon reported that it had been proposed by “private feelers from Paris”
that mine magnates from France and Germany should meet for n eg o tia tio n s.89
By September there was more serious evidence to suggest Franco-German
industrial cooperation. On 3 September, Colonel Ryan reported that:
“Workmen in Rheinstahl factory near Düsseldorf have agreed 
among themselves to work under French under condition that (1) 
all political prisoners will be released (2) all deportees will be 
allowed to return.// This is of some interest as up to now there 
has been little sign of workmen giving way.// Feeling generally 
amongst workmen in northern portion of British area is also 
running on these lines and they together with industrialists in 
that area wish to come to some arrangement with the French.//
The French High Commissioner informed me today that both he 
and General Dégoutté have been approached recently by certain 
leading industrialists who wished to discuss basis of a reparations 
p lan .”90
85 Feldman, Disorder, pp. 720; Rupieper, Cuno. pp. 232; McDougall, France’s, pp. 292; 
Trachtenberg, Reparation, pp. 310; Keiger, Poincare, pp. 301-2.
86 FO 371 8654, C15335/1/18: D’Abernon, disp. 302, 4.9.23.
87 T194/11: Memo by Tyrrell, 8.9.23.
88 Minute by Lampson, 5.9,23, on FO 371 8654, C15335/1/18: D’Abemon, tel. 302, 4.9.23.
89 FO 371 8646, C13373/1/18; D’Abemon, dispatch 486, 30.7.23.
90 FO 371 8740, 015243/313/18: Ryan (Coblenz), tel. 353, 3.9.23.
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On 13 September, Kilmarnock reported that a meeting had taken place 
between French and German industrialists (including Stinnes) a fortnight 
previously,91 and an SIS report on 14 September confirmed th is .9 2
The British refused to take such reports seriously, viewing them as empty
threats hy Grermany. On 7 September, Cadogan,after a conversation with the
German Chargé d’Afiaires, remarked:
“In speaking of the alternative of Germany: ‘throwing herself into 
the arms of France’, he evoked the old bogey of a Franco-German 
industrial alliance from which we should he excluded, and while 
urging the disadvantages for us of such a combination he 
emphasised that it was the last thing in the world that Germany 
wanted hut that she might he forced into it.”93
The Treasury agreed. As late as 28 September, Bradbury wrote to Niemeyer:
“The Franco-German coal-iron combine is an old bogey which was 
originally trotted out to make our flesh creep shortly after the 
armistice, and which we may rely on having set up again every 
time either a French or a German thinks the moment opportune 
for trying to put the fear of God into us.// It leaves me quite 
unperturhed.”94
The British chose to ignore these indications that serious negotiations were 
about to take place between France and Germany. They consistently refused 
German appeals for help, and instead were pushing for a meeting with 
Poincaré. In adopting this attitude the British were patently disregarding the 
plight of Germany and abandoning her to collapse - an eventuality which they 
had consistently professed to oppose.
By the time the British realised what was happening it was too late to 
intervene. By 10 September it was clear that Britain might he excluded from a 
European settlement. The Germans had made a definite offer of pledges to the
91 FO 371 8655, C15910/1/18: Kilmarnock, tel. 359, 13.9.23.
92 FO 371 8655, C16111/1/18: SIS Intelligence report, 14.9.23.
93 Minute by Cadogan, 7.9.23, on FO 371 8654, C15459/1/18: D’Abemon, tel. 306, 6.9.23.
94 Baldwin Papers, Box 128, pp. 94-6: Bradbury to Niemeyer, 28.9.23.
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French. Although it was unlikely that at this stage a solution would be found
on the basis of a bilateral bargain, there was a real fear that as diplomatic
links had already been established between the French and Germans, they
would simply be continued once passive resistance had ceased, and Britain
would be excluded from having any real influence in the ultimate settlement.
On 12 September the German Chargé d’Affaires read Cadogan two letters
from von Schubert, reprimanding the British:
“the burden of which was that the stance and inaction of England 
was stu ltify ing the policy which he, von Schubert, had 
consistently pursued, that those in Germany who had always 
maintained that nothing was to be expected from us was being 
proved right, and that in fact it was evident that in placing any 
hope in us he had %acked the wrong horse”’.95
The possibility of British exclusion was reinforced by the fact that, by 17 
September, even the Belgians - usually so eager to act as mediators between 
the Entente partners, were this time disregarding the British. On 17 
September Grahame reported that Jaspar had said that: “His Majesty’s 
Government gave the Belgian government no encouragement and indeed 
showed a contemptuous indifference to any attempts which the latter made to
help matters.”96
At the same time the possibility of Britain using Italy to counteract the other 
European powers was ruled out by the Corfu affair. On 31 August Mussolini 
had occupied Corfu after the murder of the Italian General TeUini on Greek soil. 
Greece, with British support, immediately appealed to the League of Nations, 
but on 5 September the appeal was blocked by France, who did not want to set 
a precedent for a negotiated solution to the Ruhr crisis. The question therefore 
went before the Conference of Ambassadors. Though France, no longer worried 
by League involvement, subsequently supported Britain, the final settlement
95 FO 371 8699, C16056/203/18: Conversation between Cadogan and German Chargé 
d’Affaires, 12.9.23.
96 FO 371 8655, C16145/1/18: Grahame, tel. 206,17.9.23.
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was only a qualified success. Mussolini withdrew from Corfu on 27 September, 
but Greece bad been forced to accept responsibility for the initial murder and 
pay a large fine. Mussolini presented this as a huge propaganda victory. The 
League bad been undermined, but most significant for the British from the 
perspective of the Ruhr was that the events revealed Britain’s dependence on 
French support in such international conflicts. 9?
In this international context, and in the light of mounting reports of Franco- 
German communication, the Foreign Office by the second week of September 
at last began to reconsider the wisdom of remaining aloof from developments in 
the Ruhr. On 10 September a Foreign Office memo on the issue concluded: 
“We should be in a stronger position to try to influence the French government 
if the German offer, like the offer of June 7, were addressed to all the allied 
governments and not as in this case to France and Belgium a l o n e .”98 The 
Treasury, however, displayed their usual scornful arrogance. Niemeyer wrote 
to McFadyean:
“It seems to me that reparation is now completely insoluble. I 
think, in the Summer, resolute and continuous action by the 
British Government might have produced some effect. As the 
moment has been allowed to pass, I see nothing now for it but to 
let French policy in Grermany run to its inevitable end in about 6 
weeks or 2 months, and then say to the French ITou have rejected 
all our proposals, you have created this mess, bow do you now 
propose to proceed to get out of it?”99
Bradbury wrote to Baldwin:
“I hope we shall keep out of all Franco-German discussions at this 
stage// If Dr. Stresemann is able to provoke a 3 cornered 
discussion, be has a good chance of bringing about a quarrel 
between us and the French...// I would leave P & S to come to an 
agreement if they can about “guarantees’. When the machine is 
built - and it will be a fearful and wonderful contraption - it wül not 
be able to start without petrol - ie British or American credits.
97 For more information on Corfu, see: Cassels, Mussolini’s, pp. 95-126; P.J, Yearwood, 
“‘Consistently with honour’: Great Britain, the League of Nations and the Corfu Crisis of 
1923”, Journal of Contemporary History. 21(1986), pp. 559-579.
98 FO 371 8655, C15855/1/18: FO Memo, 10.9.23.
99 McFadyean Papers, “Treasury Business 1919-1923”: Niemeyer to McFadyean, 18.9.23.
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and American credits will not be forthcoming without British.”ioo
The Foreign Office were no longer so amenable to the Treasury line as they had
heen in June/July. Tyrrell commented;
“...Mr. Bradbury’s views betray to say the least of this his usual 
ignorance of the mechanics of diplomatic dealings. // It is 
preposterous to [illeg] that we could remain aloof if invited by the 
parties to take part in their conversations.”ioi
Cadogan agreed: “We cannot but welcome in principle any Franco-German 
conversations likely to lead to a settlement of the Ruhr question...// It seems 
that if  we are invited by M. Poincaré to join in these conversations, we cannot 
refuse to do so...” 102 Tyrrell told Baldwin even more explicitly that Britain 
should participate in discussions: “...if only with the object of preventing a 
Franco-German scheme being drawn up almost entirely at our expense.”i03
It was at this point that Baldwin finally held his private meeting with Poincaré. 
British policy was in disarray. France was poised on the brink of victory, while 
Germany, staring defeat and all its attendant evils in the face, had been 
consistently refused British support despite the words of the 11 August note. 
Within the British policy making machine divisions were still rife over the best 
course to pursue. Differences between the Foreign Office and the Treasury had 
surfaced, with the Foreign Office advocating participation in any European 
negotiations while the Treasury remained adamantly isolationist.
It is impossible to know for certain why Baldwin made the misjudged decision 
to meet Poincaré. However, as we have seen, its origins are to be found in the 
Cabinet reaction to the British 11 August note. In particular. Lord Derby’s 
threatened resignation unless relations with France were improved may well
100 Baldwin Papers, Box 128, pp. 41-3: Bradbury to Baldwin, 11,9.23,
101 Minute by Tyrrell, 13.9.23 on FO 371 8655, C16201/1/18: memo by Cadogan, 13.9.23.
102 FO 371 8655, C16201/1/18: Memo by Cadogan, 13.9.23.
103 Baldwin Papers, Box 128, pp. 48-9: Tyrrell to Baldwin, 13.9.23.
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have played a part. Certainly the Italians thought that these were the 
reasons: “Mr Baldwin (has had?) to adopt this attitude since it carries out the 
wishes of the Conservative Party... and because, moreover, in the English 
Cabinet there has asserted itself latterly with great force the recognition of the 
necessity in which England finds herself of not detaching herself from 
F r a n c e . . .”104 It seems that, preoccupied with the issue of Protection and 
spurred on by the need to appease the Cabinet, Baldwin overestimated his 
ability to influence Poincaré by personal diplomacy.
Baldwin wrote to Curzon on 14 September that his: “...chief desire in seeing 
this singularly difficult President of the Council is to get into his head that our 
government speaks the truth and can be trusted and that the Prime Minister 
and the FO speak with one voice”; and that: “In short, my object is to work for 
the Entente and for a prompt settlement, by every means that may occur to 
me. If I cannot move him, we shall have a difficult course to s t e e r . . . ” 105 
Curzon replied in encouraging tones on 17 September that a conversation on 
the lines Baldwin had indicated could: “...do nothing but good”, and concluded 
that Poincaré: “... will never have a more friendly British government to deal 
with than o u r s .”i06  Given the circumstances of the British position at this 
time, however, it is hard to see how anything significant could have been 
achieved.
On the afternoon of 19 September Baldwin had a two hour private 
conversation with Poincaré at the British Embassy in Paris. Baldwin 
emphasised the importance for Poincaré to trust him “as implicitly as France 
had trusted England in the time of Sir Edward Grey”, and explained how 
worried British public opinion was by the situation in the Ruhr. He also asked
104 HW12 50: Sandicchi (Rome) to London Embassy, 3309, 22.9.23. 
405 Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F. 112/229: Baldwin to Curzon, 14.9.23. 
106 Baldwin Papers, Box 114, pp. 180: Curzon to Baldwin, 17.9.23.
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Poincaré what would happen to the occupation once passive resistance had 
ended. The meeting was polite and friendly. Poincaré stressed the importance 
he attached to personal conversations, hut he evaded the issue of what he 
would do once passive resistance had ceased - merely saying that “there could 
he no question of a practical solution before Germany had shown herself 
prepared to discourage passive r e s i s t a n c e . . . ”107
A closer examination of this meeting reveals that, rather than being a success
for Britain, it was on the contrary a coup for Poincaré. The French Premier
had stuck to his guns over passive resistance and had conceded nothing.
Moreover, the press communiqué issued after the meeting stated that a
“common agreement of views” had heen established and that “on no question is
there any difference of purpose or divergence of principle which could impair
the cooperation of the two c o u n t r i e s . This implied that Britain had
accepted French poHcy. As Crewe cautiously warned Curzon:
“... the wording of the communiqué may conceivably cause some 
French people in England to think that a closer approach to the 
French policy was made than is really the case, almost 
amounting to acceptance of the Ruhr occupation. Everybody 
may not have observed that there was no arrangement with the 
French methods, but only on the principle of getting as much as 
possible out of G e r m a n y .”i09
On discovering the contents of the communiqué, Curzon reacted angrily to the 
talks. Returning to London from Kedleston on 24 September, he met Allen 
keeper, his Assistant Private Secretary, at St. Paneras, keeper commented 
on how “scornful” Curzon was of the meeting.no it  was unfortunate that 
Curzon had not predicted the outcome of the conversations earlier, when his
107 Baldwin Papers, Box 108, pp. 3-38, Note on conversation between Baldwin and 
Poincare on 19.9.23, undated.
108 The Times. 20.9.23. Curzon blamed Tyrrell for this communiqué and the two were not 
subsequently on speaking terms. [See H. Nicolson, Curzon: the Last Phase. 1919-1925. 
(London, 1934), pp. 372-3.
109 Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F. 112/201b: Crewe to Curzon, 21.9.23.
110 Leeper Papers, Box 1/6: Diary, 24.9.23.
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intervention might well have been able to stop them. As it was, Poincaré had
succeeded in obtaining an important advantage over Britain. Exploiting the
confusion within the British policy-making machine, he had succeeded in
wooing Baldwin with the possibility of closer Anglo-French relations, while in
reality he had conceded nothing. On the contrary, he had combated the 11
August note and had made British policy appear hopelessly inconsistent.
When a few days later passive resistance collapsed and Germany was forced
to capitulate, Poincaré held all the cards. He had side-stepped the British and
had secured an unequivocal victory over Germany in the confrontational stage.
In this Poincaré had certainly been aided by the degeneration in British policy.
Domestic-political constraints had paralysed the British position. During the
crucial summer months of 1923 it had proved impossible to agree on a definite
line of support for either France or Germany. The vacillations between the two
had discredited Britain in the eyes of both Germany and her allies. As Austen
Chamberlain wrote:
“It seems to me that we are becoming the scold of Europe. We 
run about shaking our fists in people’s faces, ascertaining that 
this must he altered and that that must stop. We get ourselves 
disliked and distrusted and misunderstood, and in the end we 
achieve nothing and relapse into humiliated silence or laboriously 
explain how pleased we are.”111
Poincaré’s prospects when entering the concluding stage of the Ruhr struggle 
certainly appeared strong. It would remain to be seen whether he would 
capitalise on the advantage he had so painstakingly achieved.
I l l  Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC5/1/290: Austen to Ida, 22.9.23.
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C onclusion
Two questions remain to be answered. First, should Britain have acted 
differently and if so, how? Second, if Britain had pursued a viable alternative 
course, would it have materially influenced events in Europe? Clearly it is 
impossible to answer either question categorically, hut some observations can 
be made.
For Britain to have acted on the 11 August note was, as has been shown, 
never on the agenda. Domestic-political factors prevented it, the practical 
difficulties of such separate action were immense, and it was impossible for 
Britain to break completely with France completely. At the same time, given 
the prevailing atmosphere of sympathy for German reconstruction, action on 
behalf of France was never seriously considered and at no time was the Foreign 
Office asked to draw up such a plan. In the final analysis it was impossible for 
Britain to choose between France and Germany. But, rather than vacillating 
as she did, she could have striven to continue the policy of strict neutrality. 
That she did not do this owed much to the influence of domestic-pohtical factors 
on foreign policy. Britain need not have swung towards France after 11 
August, and indeed, need not have compromised her position initially by 
wording the 11 August note so strongly. In particularly, the threat of separate 
action could have been omitted. Although to have continued to steer a middle 
course would have been immensely difficult and would have left Britain open to 
huge criticisms, both domestically and internationally, it could perhaps have 
been possible if  strong political leadership had contained disruptive internal 
factions.
Would the maintenance of strict neutrality and an obvious refusal by Britain
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to become involved in any way have made any difference to the Ruhr crisis? 
Perhaps Germany would have called off passive resistance sooner and 
therefore not have experienced so traumatic and devastating a crash, but this 
is by no means certain. It could equally be argued that Germany had to go 
through the experience of collapse before all sections of her society were willing 
to accept major internal restructuring and, ultimately, the cessation of passive 
resistance. Furthermore, it is by no means clear that Poincaré would have 
relented before Germany had entirely capitulated, and therefore the ultimate 
scenario might not have heen much changed anyway.
Thus an alternative British course of strict neutrality might not have made 
much material difference to the situation in Europe. It would, however, have 
made a difference to Britain’s own position. Had Britain’s policy since August 
not been so inconsistent, Britain’s position at the end of September would have 
been stronger and clearer. As it was, when passive resistance finally ended, 
Britain was in a weak position from which to reenter the field of European 
diplomacy. Poincaré held all the cards and had a real chance to form an 
agreement with Germany on his own terms. The British were left hoping that 




B rita in  and th e  G erm an C ollapse,
S ep tem ber - D ecem ber 1923.
As the next two chapters hoth deal with events during the autumn of 1923, 
their analysis is interlinked. This chapter examines British policy and the 
German collapse, while Chapter VI exam ines B ritain’s role in the  
establishment of the committees of experts in December 1923. It will be 
shown that, in contrast to the policy vacillations during the summer months, 
the British adopted a much more consistent strategy throughout this period. 
British politicians and officials felt that a true solution to the Ruhr crisis could 
be reached only through an internationally agreed settlement of the reparation 
dispute. It was on this goal, examined in Chapter VI, that they concentrated 
their attention, and therefore, as this chapter demonstrates, they sought to 
maintain their distance from events on the ground in Germany and the Ruhr.
This chapter explores Britain’s evaluation of the German collapse and shows 
how, although anxious not to become directly involved, the^British carefully 
monitored the situation on the spot, whenever necessary trying to encourage 
the continuation of the central German government and administration by 
warning off the French from intervention. Four areas will he examined: French 
efforts to use their Interallied Mission of Control for the Mines and Factories 
(MICUM)i to conclude agreements with the Ruhr industriahsts direct; French 
involvement w ith the separatists; the R henish bank of issue; and 
developments in the British zone of occupation in the Rhineland. Table II 
provides a chronological framework for both this chapter and for Chapter VI.
1 Mission interalliée de contrôle des usines et des mines originated as the committee of 
engineers sent into the Ruhr in January 1923 to work the mines and extract reparation.
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Table II:
C hronology o f In tern ation a l D iplom acy and E vents in  
th e  R uhr and  R h in elan d , Septem ber - D ecem ber 1923
Events in Ruhr/Rhineland International Diplomacy
26.9.23 End of passive resistance.
27.9.23 Baldwin makes friendly speech
towards France at Northampton.
30.9.23 Separatists hold mass meeting at 
Düsseldorf.
1.10.23 French produce scheme for Baldwin makes friendly speech
transferring all railways in towards France at Imperial
Rhineland, including British zone, Conference.
to French control.
4.10.23 HMG refuse French or Belgian 
interference in administration of 
railways in British zone.
5.10.23 Curzon calls for French initiative in
a speech to Imperial Conference.
7.10.23 Agreement between Otto Wolff and 
MICUM.
8.10.23 Poincaré complains to Baldwin
about Curzon’s speech of 5.10.23.
9.10.23 Coolidge declares that US
government still adheres to New 
Haven declaration.
12.10.23 FO telegraph Washington for
clarification of US stance.
14.10.23 German government declare that 
Régie is to be recognised throughout 
occupied territory (excluding British 
zone) as a temporary 
administration.
15.10.23 Aide mémoire received from Hughes
encouraging unanimous 
communication from European
16.10.23 French begin aggressive tactics nations,
towards British zone with aim of 
establishing Régie control there.
17.10.23 Baldwin replies to Poincaré’s letter
of 8.10.23 by supporting Curzon.
19.10.23 FO sends telegram to Paris, Rome
and Brussels recommending joint 
invitation to US for either (1) 
general economic conference or (2) 
enquiry under Reparations
21.10.23 Separatists take over Aix-la- Commission.
Chapelle and proclaim Rhineland
Republic. Belgian troops remain 
neutral.
22.10.23 Separatists take over Ems, Mayen 
and Saarburg in French zone.
FO decides to delay railway 
question by instructing officials on 
spot to find local solution.
2 0 0
23.10.23 Separatists occupy Wiesbaden,
Trier, Duren and Duisberg in 
French zone. In Belgian zone 
nationalists counter-attack at Aix- 
la-Chapelle and München 
Gladbach.
FO decide that separatist 
government will not be permitted 
unless constitutionally brought 
ahout by German Government.
24.10.23 Germans submit note to
Reparation Commission requesting 
moratorium. Bradbury delays 
consideration of note.
Baldwin’s Plymouth speech warns Baldwin’s Plymouth speech 
of dangers of break-up of Germany, announces policy of Protection and
precipitates December general 
Sudden French support for election,
separatists. Tirard say French
have recognised separatists as de Belgians agree to second proposal of 
facto authority in their zone. Under 19.10.23.
French and Belgians support 
separatists occupy Coblenz and set 
up provisional government.
French favour second proposal of
19.10.23, but only on condition that 












Italians favour second proposal of 
19.10.23.
17% of coal owners in Ruhr have 
formed agreements with MICUM.
Kilmarnock tells Tirard that 
separatist actions infringe 
Rhineland agreement.
Crewe warns Poincaré that success FO submit text of draft invitation 
of separatists would destroy Treaty to US (calling for enquiry under 
of Versailles. reparation commission) to France,
Belgium and Italy for approval.
Poincaré says he will only agree to 
draft invitation with major 
alterations.
Belgians agree to draft invitation 
with minor alterations.
Poincaré denies any involvement 
with separatists.
Belgians withdraw support 
separatists and escort them out of 
Aix.
Italians agree with Belgians 
concerning draft invitation.
FO appeals to Washington, 
Brussels and Rome to join in a joint 
appeal to Poincaré for him to drop 
his conditions.
Hughes refuses to participate in 
joint communication to France, but 
does agree to apply separate 
pressure to Poincaré.
Belgium refuses to join in joint note 
to Poincaré.
2 0 1
8 . 1 1 . 2 3
9 . 1 1 .2 3
1 3 .1 1 .2 3
1 4 .1 1 .2 3
1 5 .1 1 .2 3
2 4 . 1 1 . 2 3
2 7 . 1 1 . 2 3
2 9 . 1 1 . 2 3
3 0 . 1 1 . 2 3
1 .1 2 .2 3
2 . 1 2 .2 3
1 1 .1 2 .2 3
1 3 .1 2 .2 3
1 4 .1 2 .2 3
1 5 .1 2 .2 3
2 6 . 1 2 . 2 3
Bradbury reports that French 
attitude in Reparation Commission 
has softened.
Separatists leave Crefeld and Belgians agree to apply separate 
Urdingen. Belgian zone is now free pressure on Poincaré, 
from Separatists.
Barthou proposes in Reparation 
Commission that committee of 
experts should be estabUshed to 
estimate Germany’s present 
capacity to pay.
Negotiations between Tirard and 
separatists begin for formation of 
autonomous Rhineland State 
within framework of Reich.
Kilmarnock refuses to enter into 
local negotiations between French 
and Separatists.
Agreement formed between MICUM 
and Commission of Six.
FO decide to delay all questions 
connected to “exploitation” by 
seeking local arrangements.
Separatists movement wracked by 
internal differences.
Separatists leave Bonn, Beuel, 
Konigswinter, Godesberg.
Bradbury suggests strategy of 
delaying the MICUM agreements in 
the Reparation Commission.
Agreement reached between British 
officials and Régie.
Separatist movement in Rhineland 
has failed.
Bradbury reports that he has for 
some time been negotiating in the 
Reparation Commission and has 
arrived at idea of two committees. 
Other delegates seem ready to 
accept this solution.
Reparation Commission passes 
resolution to establish two 
committees.
FO contact Washington to ask if 
Americans will participate on 
committees
Americans announce willingness to 
participate in committees.
Reparation Commission announce 
that Committees have been 
appointed.
2 0 2
The existing literature on British policy does not deal with these months in any 
detail. Crowe and Corp and Maisel content themselves with brief narratives, 
while Bennett barely mentions the establishment of the experts’ committees.2 
Williams briefly covers the establishment of the experts’ committees and 
mentions the practical difficulties facing the British and their unease at French 
involvement in the MICUM agreements. 3 Interestingly it is Rupieper who 
provides the most detailed account to date of Britain’s role at this stage.4 
Clearly a fuller appraisal of Britain’s role during these crucial months is needed. 
However, any attempt to analyse British foreign policy at this time is rendered 
extremely difficult by the immense problems involved in interpreting French 
policy. Despite extensive work, a whole range of unanswered questions remain 
regarding the actions and motives of Poincaré during the autumn of 1923.5
Trachtenberg argues that Poincaré opposed intervention by or cooperation 
with Britain. Rather he sought to enhance French security by exacerbating 
Gormanys crisis - by discreetly supporting the separatists, by pushing for an 
industrial agreement and by supporting a Rhenish bank of issue. But Poincaré 
failed to pursue his aims consistently on the spot in the Ruhr and so lost 
control. Increasingly overwhelmed by the complexities of the situation, he 
impulsively broke with his aims and accepted expert inquiries. Trachtenberg 
concludes that at this most crucial time French policy was “working at cross- 
purposes” and that “Poincaré had no firm conception of where he wanted to go 
and what it would take to get there...”6
2 Crowe & Corp, Ablest, pp. 439-442; Maisel, Foreign, pp. 126-9; Bennett, British, pp. 38.
3 Williamson, ‘Great Britain’, pp. 83-5.
4 Rupieper, Cuno. pp. 229-234.
5 For an interesting discussion of French motives, see J. Jacobson, ‘Strategies of French 
Foreign Policy after World War I’, Journal of Modem History. Vol. 55, No. 1 (1983), pp. 78- 
95.
3 Trachtenberg. Reparation, pp. 311-334.
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McDougall, on the other hand, interprets French foreign policy as much more 
consistent. When passive resistance ceased Poincaré refused to negotiate with 
Grermany because he always wanted an international settlement of reparation, 
including Britain and the United States. Thus Poincaré awaited a sign from 
Britain, and in the meantime tried to strengthen France’s position regarding 
Germany (by means of MICUM, the separatists, and by seeking to maintain 
French control over the Rhine-Ruhr railways ) so that he would be in a position 
to achieve an eventual international settlement on lines favourable to France - 
a European integration of Germany on terms of parity and partnership, but 
with permanent controls on German sovereignty. The problem was that 
Poincaré lost control of the situation on the spot and so forfeited his bargaining 
cards. 7
Finally, Keiger also sees Poincaré as aiming for an international settlement 
including the Anglo-Saxons. But, in contrast to McDougall, Keiger argues that 
Poincaré was therefore opposed to any measures (such as a Franco-Grerman 
industrial agreement or an independent Rhenish state) which could alienate 
Britain. That France became drawn into such projects owed more to wayward 
officials than to Poincaré’s own wishes. Moreover, Poincaré was also influenced 
by domestic-political factors - in particular a desire not to become too 
dependent on the Right before the 1924 elections. Hence he courted the 
Radicals by agreeing to a collective solution to reparation and the Ruhr.8
The purpose of this thesis is not to enter the debate on Poincaré’s motives, but 
to deal with the British side of the equation. As will be shown in this chapter 
and in Chapter VI, the British essentially adhered to the Trachtenberg 
approach. They saw Poincaré as increasingly confused and inconsistent, 
hostile to British and United States intervention, and vaguely pushing to
7 McDougall, France’s, pp. 293-345.
8 Keiger, Poincaré, pp. 303-5.
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secure French supremacy over a crumpling Grermany. Given the information 
and signals they received from Paris and the occupied territories, this British 
evaluation was entirely understandable. None of the evidence they received 
suggested that Poincaré had any desires for an international settlement along 
the lines suggested by McDougall. The fact that Britain, despite being closely 
informed ahout the situation, was totally oblivious to such purported aims by 
Poincaré raises doubts hoth as to Poincaré’s consistency in pursuing them, and 
indeed, to their very existence.
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T he C risis o f W eim ar
The French and Belgians will have on their hands a ‘'corpse like form agitated by
convulsive movements”. 9
As soon as the end of passive resistance was declared on 26 September, the
Weimar Republic faced grave threats to its very existence. Problems began in
Bavaria, a state always unsympathetic to Weimar. Violently anti-French and
strongly reactionary in their sympathies, Bavarians regarded the cessation of
passive resistance as capitulation and seized on the opportunity of widespread
disruption to try to increase their own power within the German Reich. Citing
the necessity of preempting reactionary Right-wing disturbances as his
reason, the Bavarian Prime Minister, Eugen von Knilling, appointed the Right-
wing nationalist, Ritter von Kahr, as dictator of Bavaria. Knilhng’s assurances
that he had acted to suppress mass meetings planned by Hitler lo sounded
somewhat hollow when it was reported that, despite orders from BerUn, Hitler’s
paper was still appearing and he was still holding his meetings.n A more hkely
explanation, as it seemed to the British, was that Bavaria was trying to break
free from its federal c h a i n s .  12 John Thelwall (the Commercial Secretary in
Berlin) wrote to Wigram on 12 October:
“Among the chaotic political and financial conditions which have 
now obtained in Germany for some weeks, one definite result has 
clearly emerged, and that is the separation of Bavaria from the 
Reich. It is true that no official pronouncement has been made to 
this effect, but for practical purposes severance is c o m p le t e .”i3
These developments in Bavaria had the overall effect of pushing Germany to 
the Right. Stresemann interpreted the appointment of von Kahr as a move
9 Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F 112/230; Grahame to Curzon, 21.9.23.
10 FO 371 8754, C16865/347/18: Robert Clive, Consul General for Bavaria (Munich), tel. 
12, 28.9.23.
11 FO 371 8755, C17178/347/18: Clive ( Munich), tel. 13, 3.10.23.
12 FO 371 8754, C16789/347/18: Clive (Munich), tel. 11, 27.9.23.
13 FO 371 8745, C l7887/313/18: Thelwall to Wigram, 12.10.23.
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against his authority and replied by appointing the Minister for War, Otto 
Gessler, as dictator for the entire Reich. A protracted crisis between the 
Bavarians and the central government ensued, particularly regarding the 
loyalty and control of the R e ic h s w e h r . i4
The appointment of dossier as Reich dictator also precipitated a political crisis 
in Berlin. As a result of Gessler’s appointment, Stresemann’s constitutional 
supporters abandoned him, leaving him unable to obtain Reichstag support for 
an extension of his existing emergency powers by means of an Enabling Act 15. 
On 4 October Stresemann’s government fell. Six days of political chaos 
followed before a new government formed. The new government was basically 
composed on the same lines as the old one and so was also in danger of falling 
unless the Enabling Act was passed. President Ebert therefore announced 
that if  Stresemann could not get the two-thirds majority necessary to pass 
this act, he could dissolve the R e ic h s ta g .I n  other words, the Reichstag must 
pass the act or be dissolved - throwing Grermany into yet more confusion by 
precipitating elections.
Meanwhile the Gorman government also faced problems from the Left. While 
reactionary activities were concentrated in Bavaria, the Communists were 
strongest in Saxony and Thuringia. On 9 October it was reported that the 
Communists had struck a deal with the precariously balanced provincial 
Socialist Government in Saxony whereby, in return for their support, they  
would be rewarded with some Cabinet posts. The same thing was expected to 
h a p p e n  i n  T h u r in g ia .  18 The Gorman govornment, moro cautious when dealing
14 FO 371 8755, 018827/347/18: Clive ( Munich), tel. 20, 31.10.23.
15 Limited emergency powers covering the appointment of Gessler had already been 
introduced on 26.9.23.
16 FO 371 8817, 017320/16779/18: Addison, tel. 357, 6.10.23.
17 FO 371 8817, 017607/16779/18: Addison, tel. 362, 11.10.23.
18 FO 371 8699, 017690/203/18: Addison disp. 710, 9.10.23.
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with the reactionary Bavaria, was in contrast much more severe when dealing 
w ith this threat from the Left. On 20 October D’Abernon reported: 
“Disintegration is proceeding at an alarming rate... The government are 
sending considerable reinforcem ents to Saxony - several battalions 
accompanied by artillery.”i9 On 28 October D’Abernon continued: “German 
Government have sent an ultimatum to Saxon Government... They demand 
resignation of Saxon government and request an immediate answer failing 
which certain measures will be taken.”20
The background to all this political chaos was economic chaos. A brief glance 
at the exchange rate of the mark amply demonstrates Weimar’s financial 
collapse during the autumn of 1923.
On 9.10.23 £1 = 7,000 miUion m a r k s ^ i
On 10.10.23 £1 = 18, 000 million m a r k s 2 2
On 18.10.23 £1 = 24,000 million m a r k s 2 3
On 21.10.23 £1 = 80,000 million m a r k s 2 4
On 23.10.23 £1 = 250,000 million m a r k s 2 5
In the face of these frightening inflation rates, the German government at last 
took some action. Acting under the limited emergency powers already 
operational, on 21 October a new mortgage currency was introduced, based on 
agricultural, industrial and commercial assets. Nevertheless, in the short 
term, the situation continued to deteriorate. On 3 November, Edward 
Thurstan, the Consul General at Cologne, warned of the “menace threatening 
Europe from the paralysation of the great Ruhr industrial machine”, and 
continued:
19 FO 371 8817, C18052/16779/18: D’Abemon, te l 377, 20.10.23.
20 FO 371 8699, C18533/203/18: D’Abemon te l 393, 28.10.23.
21 FO 371 8667, C17565/8/18: Addison, te l 360, 10.10.23.
22 FO 371 8667, C17565/8/18: Addison, tel. 360, 10.10.23.
23 FO 371 8668, C18055/8/18: D’Abemon, tel. 378, 21.10.23.
24 FO 371 8668, C18055/8/18: D’Abemon, tel. 378, 21.10.23.
25 FO 371 8668, C18658/8/18: D’Abemon, tel. 394, 29.10.23.
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“The measure of impending disaster is so stupendous that it 
would he idle for me to mince my words or to attempt to gloss 
over facts. Unless the French recoil in fear at the eleventh hour 
from their reparation demands, unless a stable currency can be 
found, unless railway transportation can he speedily restored, 
nothing hut a miracle can prevent millions of people in the Ruhr 
and Rhineland hterally fighting for their lives in a short space of
t im e”.26
On 12 November D’Ahernon reported: “A complete breakdown of financial 
system appears possible and moment when government will have no means of 
paying officials or maintaining order may not be far off.” So alarmed was 
D’Abernon that he suggested sending the female staff of the Embassy home 
fi'om Berhn.27
Meanwhile the central government was facing increasing criticism from its 
own political supporters. In particular, the fact that Stresemann seemed to be 
dealing more emphatically with the Communists than with the Bavarian 
reactionaries precipitated opposition from the Socialists. On 2 November the 
government was plunged into yet another crisis when the Socialists left the 
Stresemann coalition. When Stresemann decided to remain in office, filling up 
his Cabinet with ministers from other parties, he was also attacked by the 
Nationalists, who had hoped for his fall and a dictatorship of the Right. The 
new government was therefore very precarious, facing political threats from 
both Left and Right. It also faced huge economic problems as it had to decide 
whether to continue credits (unemployment doles and subsidies to employers) 
to the Ruhr. The possibility of financial support to the workers of the Ruhr 
being cut off brought yet more loud protests from the Socialists, who 
threatened actively to oppose the government in consequence. 28
26 Curzon Papers, Mss Eur, F 112/205: Letter from Thurstan (Consul General at Cologne) 
to D’Abemon, 3.11.23.
27 FO 371 8818, C19571/16779/18: D’Abemon, tel. 428, 12.11.23.
28 Minute by Sterndale Bennett, 21.11.23, on FO 371 8689, C20136/129/18: D’Abernon 
disp. 837, 14.11.23.
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At this point, political events were overtaken by Hitler’s attempted coup in 
Bavaria on 9 November.29 The putsch quickly failed but the central 
government still took rapid precautionary measures. In doing this it moved 
still further to the Right. After the coup President Ebert gave von Seeckt, as 
head of Reichswehr, huge powers, and the military presence in Berlin was 
greatly increased.30
The economic situation continued to deteriorate and by 23 November, the 
Stresemann government was desperate. Facing increasing pressures from 
anarchist extremes, von Seeckt banned the Deutschvolkische, the NSDAP, 
and the Communists. As a result the government lost any remaining 
support from the Communists and Nationalists. Stresemann was already 
opposed by the Socialists because of his action in Saxony and Thuringia. He 
lost a vote of confidence by 80 votes and was forced to r e s ig n .3 2  His hundred 
days as Chancellor were over. Describing Stresemann’s legacy, D’Abernon 
commented:
“The confusion in the political world here is indescribable - not only 
are there five or six parties with widely divergent views, but in 
each party there are at least three sections who differ profoundly 
fi"om one another. It appears more and more doubtful whether it 
will he possible to form a ministerial majority based upon votes of
the Reichstag.”33
After prolonged and complex negotiations a new Cabinet was formed under
29 For interesting British views of the coup and its failure, see Clive’s reports of 13 
November [FO 371 8756, C19732/347/18: Clive, tel. 25, 13.11.23.] and 14 November [FO 
371 8756, C20352/347/18: Clive to Lampson, 14.11.23.], when Clive commented: “I can 
only believe that Ludendorff has lost his reason and is no longer sane. He seems to have 
imagined that such was the awe that he inspired that at the mere sight of him the 
Reichswehr and the police would fall in behind him and obey his orders. Hitler, a half­
educated demagogue, fired by the success of his oratory with women and young men, most 
of whom had not been to the war, thought he had merely to say the word and the country 
would flock to his standard. They did not even take such military precautions as would 
have been obvious to a schoolboy volunteer.”
30 FO 371 8818, C19379/16779/18: D’Abemon, tel. 419A, 9.11.23.
31 FO 371 8818, C20368/16779/18: D’Abemon, tel. 455, 23.11.23.
32 FO 371 8818, C20372/16779/18: D’Abemon, tel. 459, 23.11.23.
33 Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F 112/205: D’Ahemon’s diary, 25.11.23.
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Wilhelm Marx, with Stresemann as foreign minister. D’Ahernon remarked 
that “Broadly speaking it is a reincarnation of Stresemann regime”, and 
stressed that it was still basically in limho as it needed an emergency powers 
act.34 On 8 December the Reichstag finally granted the new government the 
necessary emergency powers. Sterndale Bennett concluded: “This appears to 
mark the close of the German Cabinet crisis which has heen going on ever 
since the end of September, when passive resistance in the occupied territories 
was ahandoned.”35
Thus the Weimar crisis was severe indeed. The Reich faced a combined threat 
from both Communists in Saxony and Thuringia and from Right-wing 
reactionaries in Bavaria. Moreover, in the face of such structural challenges 
and economic chaos the irresponsible tendencies of the Weimar political 
parties became more pronounced. Weak and fi'equently changing governments 
paralysed the government machine, leaving Stresemann forced to shift to the 
Right and to rely on military emergency powers to guide the Republic through
the crisis.36
In the light of this information, all of which is fi’om the British archives and so 
was, in principle, available to British politicians and officials at the time, the 
British attitude is extremely interesting.37 The documentary evidence reveals 
the British to have been singularly unsympathetic towards the German 
collapse. The Treasury viewed the entire Ruhr crisis as the direct result of 
hoth French and German stupidity, and therefore thought that they should be 
left to sort out this latest German collapse between themselves. With any
34 FO 371 8818, C20829/16779/18: D’Abemon, tel. 481, 1.12.23.
35 Minute by Sterndale Bennett, 10.12.23, on FO 371 8818, 021233/16779/18: D’Abernon, 
tel. 490, 8.12.23.
36 For a more detailed analysis of the situation in Germany during autumn 1923, see 
Feldman, Disorder. Chapter 16.
37 Docket notes and initials on FO information on the German collapse show that most 
documents were seen by Lampson and Crowe, and often by Curzon.
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luck the pair would entirely exhaust themselves in their attempts to do this
and the French would finally learn their lesson. The British would then be left
in by far the superior position and would he able to dictate the terms of the
ultim ate reparation settlem ent according to their own w ishes. On 18
September, Bradbury wrote to Baldwin that:
“...If there is going to be a political and social debacle in Germany, 
there is nothing we can do to stave it off until either the French 
become alarmed at the results of their own handiwork, or third 
parties are forced to intervene in the interest of common 
humanity - that is to say, it is necessary to let things get worse 
before they can he made better... I think that it is most 
important from the political point of view that German chaos (if 
there is to be chaos), or the financial breakdown of the occupation 
(if unoccupied Germany can keep going), should take place in time 
to have its maximum influence on the French elections next 
spring, and I am all for letting things come to a head as quickly as
p ossih le .”38
Niemeyer agreed with Bradbury. On 19 September he wrote to the Chancellor,
Neville Chamberlain:
“... the real difficulties of the French are just about to begin, as in 
any event Germany will not be able to go on financing the Ruhr 
much longer. The burden of so doing will then fall on France and 
Belgium, who must either nav for coal in order to enable the Ruhr 
collieries to pay wages, or, if the miners still won’t work, will have 
to pay to feed them unless they are prepared to face disorder from 
a starving population... The collapse of “passive resistance” 
doesn’t settle the problem: it only makes it more acute for the
F rench”.39
The Treasury continued to support this view. Bradhuiy wrote to Niemeyer on 
1 October:
“Germany will sooner or later have to leave the occupied 
territories - old and new - round the necks of the French. The 
result will be the strangulation of the French, whether occupied 
and unoccupied Germany perishes in the process or not.// The 
main hope is that the process of strangulation will proceed rapidly 
enough to make the French release their hold before any of the 
deaths have taken place... It is difficult politically for unoccupied 
 Germany to leave occupied Germany to its fate, but it seems to
38 T194/11, p56: Bradbury to Baldwin, letter, 18.9.23.
39 T194/277, pp. 81a: Niemeyer to Chamberlain, 19.9.23. Baldwin had appointed Neville 
Chamberlain as Chancellor in August. Previously he had held the post himself, along with 
the position of Prime Minister.
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me to be essential that France should have the full financial 
hurden of keeping the occupied territories going on her shoulders 
before complete exhaustion and chaos supervenes in unoccupied
Germany. ”40
To some extent, this Treasury attitude also ruhhed off on the Foreign Office. 
Although (as we shall see when British policy regarding the French separatists 
and MICUM agreements is examined) the Foreign Office was not prepared to 
witness a complete German disintegration and French ascendancy, it was 
extremely reluctant to become involved unless it was absolutely necessary. 
Anxious to remain aloof, Foreign Office officials tended not to interpret reports 
of impending German disintegration too pessimistically. For example, the 
Foreign Office was never particularly worried that there would be a 
Communist uprising, as it saw the Germans to he moving to the Right in order 
to preempt such an eventuahty. On 1 October, Addison remarked : '... opinion 
is moving towards a strong government and... it is not impossible that counter 
revolution will occur before there is any revolution to repress.”41
Believing the government to he safe from Communist attacks, and noting
Stresemann’s quick action in the face of the Bavarian situation, the Foreign
Office also chose to rem ain skeptical ahout im m inent German
dismemberment. On 30 October Lampson minuted:
“All these agitations for independence of the Reich by individual 
states, eg Bavaria, Saxony etc., need not he taken too seriously.
After all, they are well aware that economicallv all the component 
parts of Germany are interdependent. All this blowing of 
trumpets is no doubt excellent for local consumption: hut when it 
gets down to hard business it is permissible to doubt whether very 
much will come of it a l l . ”42
Accordingly, both the Treasury and the Foreign Office refused to send any aid 
to Germany. On 11 September Addison requested that Britain give financial
40 T194/11, p78: Bradbury to Niemeyer, 1.10.23.
41 FO 371 8816, C16988/16779/18: Addison, tel. 347, 1.10.23.
42 Minute by Lampson, 30.10.23 on FO 371 8747, C18508/313/18: D’Abernon disp. 750,
24.10.23.
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support to Germany. Wigram dismissed such suggestions: “Personally, if  the
catastrophe is as near as Mr. Addison suggests, I should think it would need a
very charitable person to lend Germany a n y t h in g .^ 4 3  Even in November,
D’Abernon blamed the food shortages in Berlin on the Germans for failing to
distribute the food properly rather than on an overall lack of food.44 On 30
November, Wigram commented:
“The position then seems to he this. The feeding of Germany by 
foreign nations will presumably help to tide Germany over the 
present winter. Unless the Grerman and French governments see 
reason, however, it will only prolong the agony, since it is the 
Grerman currency policy and the French Ruhr policy which are 
together responsible for the difficulty of getting food from the 
country to the town. The one makes the farmers unwilling to 
deliver their  food, the other has destroyed railw ay  
communications in the Ruhr at least.// It does not seem clear that 
in these circumstances it is really to the interest of His Majesty’s 
Gk)vemment actively to encourage it. Foreign food, it would seem, 
will in fact only subsidise each of the two parties to the recent 
struggle and enable them to continue a little longer in their 
present methods.”45
The Treasury were even more forceful in their refusal to send aid. On 24
November Niemeyer wrote:
“Palliatives such as food grants or foreign groups of currency 
loans only put off the day of real reform...// What is needed is not 
props for rottenness: but that the crisis should come to a head, so 
that the real reconstruction can start as soon as possible. Not till 
France, realising her responsibility for the starvation of Grermany 
before the world, makes it possible for there to be effective Budget 
reform in Germany will foreign aid in any large sums be either 
forthcoming or really effective.”46
It is interesting to note, however, that despite the Treasury’s hard hne, private 
British firms were taking an interest in helping Germany. Of particular 
interest was the involvement of Messrs. Baldwins, Limited (of which Robert
43 Minute by Wigram, 18,9.23, on FO 371 8667, C16440/8/18: Addison to Lampson,
11.9.23.
44 FO 371 8817, 019209/16779/18: D’Abernon, tel. 410, 6.11.23.
45 Minute by Wigram, 30.11.23, on: FO 371 8818, 020585/16779/18: D’Abemon disp. 878,
23.11.23.
46 FO 371 8668, 020649/8/18: Treasury communication, 24.11.23.
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Home was managing director). On 28 November, in answer to a Foreign Office 
enquiry regarding the provision of British credit for financing the supply of 
British coal to Grermany the Board of Trade wrote that they had:
no official information respecting this private commercial 
transaction with which, of course. His Majesty's Government are 
not concerned. The Board understand, however, from unofficial 
sources that negotiations with this object have heen proceeding 
for some time and it is believed that they have now heen 
satisfactorily concluded. It is understood that the business has 
heen entrusted to Messrs. Baldwins, Limited...// Large quantities 
of coal have heen exported from this country to Germany for 
some time past and the significance of the negotiations in 
question is that German importers are no longer able to pay 
promptly in sterling for imported c o a l .”47
D’Ahernon also hinted that London was providing financial help for the 
Germans. In his diary of 18 November he stated that in a conversation with 
Stresemann, the German Chancellor remarked that he had received an offer of 
a loan of £25 million sterling from London. Although he would not name those 
involved, Stresemann said that they were “in the first rank of f in a n c ie r s ”.48
Thus the official British attitude forcefully trumpeted by the Treasury was to 
maintain as much distance as possible from Germany’s collapse, even when 
such a distance meant the risk of famine and starvation in Germany. In 
practice, however, it was to prove virtually impossible for the Foreign Office to 
implement a blanket policy of non-intervention. As had happened when 
Britain had attempted to maintain ‘benevolent neutrality’ during the onset of 
passive resistance, so too upon its collapse did Britain find herself more and 
more a part of an increasingly complicated situation. And once more it was 
French activities and Britain’s perceptions of French strategy on the spot in 
the Ruhr and Rhineland which forced Britain to become involved.
47 FO 371 8668, C20621/8/18: Board of Trade - CRT 5725/23: 28.11.23.
48 Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F. 112/205: D’Abemon’s Diary, 18.11.23.
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B ritish  P ercep tion s o f F rench  S tra tegy
'‘The whole game as played by France is sickening and revolting. But we ought to
be gradually getting accustomed to i t ”^ ^
The basic British attitude towards France upon the culmination of passive 
resistance was to be critical, but not to over-estimate the strength of her 
position. We have already seen how hoth the Treasury and the Foreign Office 
thought the best strategy was to allow France to he tried by the test of 
exploitation, and that they therefore sought to m aintain a considerable 
distance from the central German financial and political crisis. In principle 
they continued this policy in more direct dealings with the French regarding the 
Ruhr and Rhineland. Partly this was through a desire to see France’s 
reparation policy crushed by the burden of a collapsing Germany, but it was 
also because they did not think they needed to become involved as they did not 
think that France had any consistently thought out plan to put into action 
once passive resistance had stopped.
There was, however, always a limit to this policy of non-intervention against 
French measures. The Foreign Office, never quite so hard-line as the 
Treasury, was constantly alive to the political dangers entailed in a total 
German collapse. While the financial burden of such an occurrence might 
prove unbearable for France, they were aware that hoth the political and 
strategic benefits that France might reap were great. The Foreign Office were 
adamant that the British government should not stand aside to such an extent 
that Germany entirely disintegrated and the Rhine/Ruhr area became little  
more than a French colony. Once the Foreign Ofiice began to see a consistent 
and, in their eyes, ominously sinister French plan emerging in the form of the
49 Phipps Papers, Box 2/3, pp. 13; Crowe to Phipps, 24,11.23.
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MICUM agreements, the separatist movement in the Rhineland and the 
Palatinate, the proposed Rhineland bank of issue, and French moves in the 
British zone of occupation, the British finally rallied and began to pursue a 
much more consistent and clear policy of opposition to France.
This change in British pohcy was by no means a swift transformation and in 
many ways it stemmed merely from reactions to French moves. Yet as the 
French found themselves emhroüed increasingly in confusion and difficulties, so 
the position of the British strengthened and a clear policy crystallised. By late 
October, determined not to he pushed around by an increasingly desperate 
France, the British adopted a silent indifference to the MICUM agreements, 
playing for time in the belief that they would he short-lived and unworkable. 
Similarly they refused to be drawn into the separatist activities or to succumb 
to French pressure for a separate Rhineland bank of issue. They simply 
monitored the situation, and when they felt the French were overreaching 
themselves and threatening the very unity of Germany, they warned them off*. 
Thus British policy towards the close of 1923 makes a sharp contrast to 
previous months. Britain adopted delaying tactics towards the situation on the 
spot, allowing France to become embroiled, while concentrating on what really 
did matter - inter-govemmental negotiations regarding reparation.
In view of this, it seems that Poincaré missed the brief but golden opportunity 
which he had before British policy recovered. Having worked so hard for the 
advantage he had won by mid-September, Poincaré threw it all away by not 
having a proper plan upon the end of passive resistance.50 Poincaré simply 
continued his hardline pohcy towards Germany, refusing to negotiate until the 
German government produced evidence that it would resume reparation
50 Most modern historians tend to agree that Poincaré missed an opportunity at this point 
to capitalise on his victory in the Ruhr. See Trachtenberg, Reparation, pp. 311; Rupieper, 
Cuno. pp. 234; McDougall, France’s, pp. 293; and Keiger, Poincaré, pp. 305.
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payments. On both 10 and 17 October5i , Poincaré met the German chargé 
d’affaires. On each occasion he refused the German entreaties to find an 
agreement. In doing this he missed his chance of trumping the British and 
Americans with a fait accompli. Had Poincaré presented the Anglo-Saxons 
with a Ruhr and reparation agreement, world opinion would prohahly have 
made it very hard for them to refuse to accept. He could then have 
transformed an initial, bilateral agreement into an essentially international 
settlement on French terms and with France in the driving seat. In refusing to 
come to an arrangement with the Germans Poincaré left him self with the 
unenviable task of trying to vindicate his entire Ruhr policy by making his 
“pledge” productive now that passive resistance had ceased.
As soon as the British were aware of Poincaré’s refusal to enter into any
negotiations with the Germans, they realised the minefield of difficulties
awaiting him in the Ruhr. Kilmarnock remarked of the French stance:
“Present French attitude is puzzling. They have so far refused to 
“negotiate” with anybody and seem to think that the wheels of 
industry will start revolving again spontaneously. Consequence is 
that official abandonment of passive resistance has so far had 
little e f f e c t .  ”52
Tyrrell commented: “When it comes to tackling this question of exploitation
seriously, I think we shall find that the French have no workable p l a n . ”53
Baldwin agreed. After his 19 September meeting with Poincaré he told Neville
Chamberlain that Poincaré had declared that:
“as to plans for the future it would he time enough to talk ahout 
these when Stresemann had surrendered. From which Baldwin 
concluded he [Poincaré] had no plan. He [Baldwin] thought him 
quite honest but absolutely ignorant of finance and prophesied 
that he would get a shock when he found that he would get no 
reparation out of the Ruhr o c c u p a t io n .”54
51 See FO 371 8745, C17714/313/18: Addison tel. 363, 12.10.23 and FO 371 8746, 
018149/313/18: Conversation between Crowe and the German Ambassador, 20.10.23.
52 FO 371 8744, C17323/313/18: Kilmarnock tel. 377, 7.10.23.
53 Minute by Tyrrell, 27.9.23 on FO 371 8744, C l7255/313/18: FO memo, 27.9.23.
54 Neville Chamberlain Papers, NC2/21: Neville Chamberlain’s diary, 24.9.23.
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The British appraisal was to prove correct. Poincaré’s pause was his undoing. 
He became entirely preoccupied with immense practical difficulties in the 
Ruhr. The result was that his overall control over foreign pohcy was loosened 
and his domestic-political situation weakened. My interpretation follows 
Trachtenberg’s analysis of Poincaré as confused and inconsistent at this point 
and contravenes McDougall’s view of Poincaré as consistent and farsighted in 
his aims for an international settlement of reparation. An examination of four 
topics - the MICUM agreements, the separatists; the Rhineland bank and the 
British zone of occupation - shows how the tide turned against the French and 
in favour of the British position.
T he MICUM A greem ents.
From the time when the first rumours began to reach the Foreign Office that 
the French were negotiating with German industrialists while at the same time 
shunning the Stresemann government, to the stage - several months later - 
when the full extent of the MICUM agreements was known, the British were 
never really worried by agreements concluded between individual German 
industries and either the French High Commission or the Control Commission 
(MICUM). The British remained confident that such agreements were 
unworkable and could only ever be temporary. They were right. That Poincaré 
apparently became convinced that these chaotic, ad hoc arrangements, which 
grew out of the necessity of getting the occupied territories hack to work, could 
he used as a basis of a reparation settlement on French terms, was one of his 
major m istakes. His distraction with this scheme, coupled w ith his 
involvement with the separatists, cost him victory in the negotiation stage of
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the Ruhr crisis.55
The French had begun to try to take over and work mines and factories by 
means of the MICUM as early as the end of August. Right from the start, 
British commentators were decidedly scathing regarding the success of such 
efforts. One of the first collieries to be taken over was the “Victor”. On 20 
September, Kilmarnock emphasised the difficulties which the French had 
encountered when trying to run this mine. The local population had refused to 
cooperate with the French, despite the very tempting offers made to them. In 
the Ruhr as a whole, only 200 Germans had been recruited out of a total 
mining population of 600,000, and these had been: “shady and undesirable 
elements comprising deserters, thieves and other criminals [who] have 
accepted employment under these bodies either to obtain protection from the 
German police or to escape being sued before a German c o u r t .” 56 In 
consequence the French had not been able to extend their programme and 
work more mines.
Once passive resistance ended, the situation changed. The Germans were no 
longer boycotting their industries, and so it was essential for the French to try 
to get the Ruhr economy operating again, with a view both to minimising the 
effects of the occupation and obtaining reparation. It was natural for the 
French, as the occupying power, to try to form agreements with the Germans 
to start production. The Foreign Office did become a little concerned at this 
stage, and asked D’Abernon about the likelihood of Franco-German industrial
55 Historians of France at this time agree that Poincaré became distracted and even 
overwhelmed by the MICUM agreements, but disagree over why Poincaré pursued them. My 
thesis supports Trachtenberg’s argument that they were a confused attempt to aggravate 
the German collapse and increase French security; rather than McDougall’s, that they were 
an attempt by Poincaré to consolidate France’s victory and enhance Poincaré’s position at 
the international conference table; or Keiger’s, that whatever the zeal of certain French 
officials, Poincaré was never enthusiastic for the industrial agreements. [Trachtenberg, 
Reparation, pp. 321; McDougall, France’s, pp. 294; Keiger, Poincaré, pp. 303-4.]
56 FO 371 8742, 016564/313/18: Kilmarnock, Coblenz, disp. 845, 20.9.23.
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agreements being c o n c lu d e d .5 7  On 27 September D’Abemon reassured the 
Foreign Office that:
“So far no private arrangements between French and German 
industrials have been come to, one of main reasons being 
Monsieur Poincaré’s refusal to countenance them.// There is no 
theoretical or practical objection on the part of German 
industrials to making trade agreements with French hut in  
practice they will ask for such terms and such control that 
agreement may not he e a s y . ”58
Captain Georgi, one of Lord Kilmarnock’s advisors on the Rhineland High 
Commission, also assured the Foreign Office that there was nothing to worry 
ahout. On 4 October the Foreign Office received a minute telling them that a 
Franco-German industrial combination over the Ruhr and Lorraine was 
unworkable in post war circumstances, as Ruhr coke was no longer cheap and 
therefore it was not now profitable for the Lorraine iron industry to use it. 59
Despite these assurances, reports continued that negotiations were taking 
place between the French and German industrialists. On 7 October, the 
German industrialist Otto Wolff made an arrangement with the Control 
Commission on behalf of the Phoenix and Rheinstahl w orks.G O  The situation 
was far from clear cut. Apparently Poincaré had not invested Dégoutté with 
the power to actually sign an agreement with the German industrialists but 
only to negotiate with them, and when Dégoutté did sign Poincaré was very 
angry and had to apologise to the Reparation Commission6i . The fact that 
Dégoutté disobeyed Poincaré’s instructions regarding French policy is 
indicative of a wavering in Poincaré’s control over the French machine. In the 
end Poincaré did go along with Degoutte’s agreement, and despite Poincaré’s 
initial reluctance, by the end of October, the MICUM agreements had become
57 FO 371 17453/313/18: Private telegram to D’Abemon, 26.9.23.
58 FO 371 8744, 017454/313/18: D’Abemon, tel. unnumb., 27.9.23.
59 FO 371 8744, 017190/313/18: Minute by Oaptain Georgi, undated, received 4.10.23.
60 FO 371 8745, 017887/313/18: Thelwall to Wigram, 12.10.23.
61 FO 371 8745, 017887/313/18: Thelwall to Wigram, 12.10.23.
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a major force in French policy. On 27 October, Kilmarnock reported: “General 
Dégoutté in his daily communique of yesterday states that 17% of coal owners 
in Ruhr have hy now come to terms with MICUM and are under an obligation 
to resume deliveries of reparation coal, and negotiations are in progress with
the r e s t . ”62
The first three weeks of November also saw agreements between the French 
High Commission and the dye factories, the Solingen Chamber of Commerce, 
the chemical industries, the shoe Industry, the wine merchants, the leather 
industry, the jewellery industry and the paper and textile i n d u s t r i e s .  63 
Basically all these agreements provided for a resumption of work and payment 
of reparation in kind as well as fines. It is significant, however, that these 
agreements were valid for a few months only.
Poincare's strategy was not a wise one. It relied on too many factors which 
were beyond his control. Predictably, both the German government and the 
German industrialists stalled for time. Therefore the most important 
agreement - with the ‘Commission of Six’ major German industrialists led by 
Hugo Stinnes - was not formed until the 24 N o v e m b e r .  64 The agreement was 
to he in force until 15 April, 1924, and had 5 main clauses: (1) the mines would 
pay $15 million for the period 1.1.23 - 1.11.23; (2) in future the mines would 
pay 10 francs in tax per ton coal sold; (3) the mines would give the allies 18% of 
their net production; (4) stocks situated in the Ruhr on 1.10.23 were to remain 
the property of the allies; and (5) the existing regulations for export licenses 
would remain in fo rce .6 5
62 FO 371 8747, 018534/313/18: Kilmarnock tel. 430, 27.10.23.
63 FO 371 8752, 021575/313/18: FO minute, undated, received 14.12.23.
64 FO 371 8749, 020419/313/18: D’Abernon, tel. 460, 24.11.23.
65 FO 371 8749, 020439/313/18: Orewe disp 2672, 24.11.23.
222
Throughout the formation of the MICUM agreements, the British were never 
unduly worried, although as Poincaré stepped up his efforts, British officials did 
voice suspicions. For example, on 12 October Bradbury wrote to Chamberlain 
that:
“On the whole, I regard the Wolff* agreement as a very clever 
move on the French side. It will be difffcult for other groups not to 
follow suit, and if similar arrangements are concluded aU round, M. 
Poincaré will have secured a considerable, if  purely temporary, 
success, on the basis of which he would be in a very favourable 
position to negotiate if  he sees fit to do so.”66
On 2 November Kilmarnock commented: “...there is no doubt in my mind that
the French policy is directed towards the conclusion of Franco-German
industrial arrangements... The French miss no opportunity of getting into
touch with manufacturers and negotiating with them”67  ^while on 5 November
Finlayson wrote:
“I believe that it is M. Poincaré’s intention to place the projected 
Conference before a “fait accompli”. If he has got what he wants 
from the Industrialists he can snap his fingers at the Conference 
and he has further this advantage that he will be able to say that 
the Conference was not torpedoed by him but by the Germans
themselves.”68
The consensus opinion, however, as that - even after the most important 
agreement of 24 November between MICUM and the Commission of Six - the 
agreements would ultimately come to nothing. On 26 October, Chapman, of 
the Board of Trade declared: “So long as such arrangements are confined to 
questions regarding the delivery of coal, they do not appear to give rise to any
66 T194/261, pp. 105: Bradbury to Chamberlain, 12.10.23.
67 FO 371 8748, C19025/313/18: Kilmarnock, disp. 1014, 2.11.23.
68 Memo by Finlayson,5.11.23, enclosed in FO 371 8748, C19300/313/18: D’Abemon, disp. 
799, 5.11.23. Finlayson reiterated these views a few days later [see FO 371 8748, 
C19259/313/18: D’Abemon, tel. 412, 7.11.23. enclosing information from Finlayson].
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serious objection from the point of view of British i n t e r e s t s . ”69 Thurstan 
remarked of the Stinnes agreement: “It remains to he seen whether this 
agreement will prove to he in any way workable in view of the transportation 
and currency difficulties, quite apart from those inherent to the agreement 
i t s e l f ’70 ; while on 2 January 1924 Lampson minuted: “General opinion [is] that 
the recent Franco-German industrial agreements are u n w o r k a b l e ”, and 
Crowe added: “This opinion has always been held in expert circles h e r e .”72
Convinced that they were impracticable, the British kept their distance form
the whole affair, hy default allowing Poincaré to become embroiled. On 17
November Lampson commented:
“1 should, prima facie, he strongly averse to our being drawn in  
between the German industrialists (or German Government) and 
the French Government, in any shape or form. We have 
dissociated ourselves from the whole policy of “productive 
pledges” and it would he a mistake now to get drawn into a 
wrangle between the Germans and F r e n c h . . .”73
British policy was simply to wait for the MICUM agreements to play 
themselves out, and if possible to help ensure this outcome. Bradbury wanted 
actively to oppose the French over MICUM hy forcing the Reparation 
Commission to say that accepting MICUM payments raised the issue of the 
legality of the R u h r .7 4  The Foreign Office did not want to precipitate a
69 FO 371 8747, 018388/313/18: Board of Trade, CRT 4896, 26.10.23. Chapman, 
however, added in his report that British interests could be threatened if a Franco-German 
heavy industrial combine was formed. Therefore the Board of Trade sent Sir William Larke 
(of the National Federation of Iron and Steel Manufacturers) to the Ruhr to ascertain exactly 
what was happening. He reported to Curzon on 4 December, concluding that although there 
was some evidence of a desire for an Franco-German combine, he thought progress unlikely. 
[T160/174/F6731/1: Minute by Lampson, 13.12.23.].
70 FO 371 8750. C21014/313/18: D’Abernon disp. 907, 30.11.23, enclosing disp. from 
Thurstan, 27.11.23.
71 Minute by Lampson, 2.1.24 on FO 371 8752, C21992/313/18: D’Abemon dispatch 969,
14.12.23.
72 Minute by Crowe, 2.1.24, on FO 371 8752, C21992/313/18: D’Abemon dispatch 969,
14.12.23.
73 Minute by Lampson, 17.11.23, on FO 371 8749, C19948/313/18: D’Abemon, tel. 437,
16.11.23.
74 FO 371 8752, C21870/313/18: Bradbury, communication, 13.12.23.
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showdown with the French, and instead opted to use the Reparation
Commission more subtly as a delaying tactic to thwart French policy.
Lampson suggested:
“There is, however, another and less heroic line of approach.
Might not the Reparation Commission inform the German 
government that they have received the copies of the agreements 
etc., just communicated to them, that they note the request of the 
German government to be credited on reparation account with 
the deliveries in kind etc., made under these agreements, that the 
matter will be not lost sight of etc, but that being of a particularly 
complex character no immediate decision need be looked for.”75
Hurst agreed: “There seems to me a great deal to be said in favour of Mr. 
Lampson’s proposal for a less heroic course of action than that proposed in Sir 
J. Bradbury’s memorandum.”76
As a result, the British decided to leave matters to the Reparation Commission 
surreptitiously to delay for as long as possible. By 9 January 1924 they were 
still awaiting the Commission’s verdict on the validity of the agreem ents.77
The S ep aratists.
The British approach to the separatist movement in the Rhineland and Ruhr 
during the autumn of 1923 was more pro-active than it was concerning the 
MICUM agreements. It was, however, based on the same broad principles. 
Once more the British preferred not to become involved, but merely to follow 
events. But whereas the British were able to maintain an essentially passive 
role regarding MICUM, with the separatists they had to do more, employing 
limited intervention to prevent matters from going too far. The policy was 
successful. The French overreached themselves and did great damage to their
75 Minute by Lampson, 20.12.23 on FO 371 8752, C21870/313/18; Bradbury, 
communication, 13.12.23.
76 Minute by Hurst, 21.12.23, on FO 371 8752, 021870/313/18: Bradbury, communication,
13.12.23.




Even before the end of passive resistance was declared, the British were aware 
that separatist activity in support of an independent Rhineland state was 
increasing.79 They also appreciated that the fostering of such a movement 
would he in French interests. As soon as passive resistance ceased, separatist 
activity increased dramatically. On 30 September a mass meeting was held at 
Düsseldorf. When it ended in rioting and bloodshed, with 17 killed and around 
400 wounded, the British immediately blamed the French. Kilmarnock 
reported:
“...every effort appears to have been made by the French 
authorities to encourage the Separatists in their efforts to make 
this meeting a success. Facilities were granted by the “Régie” ... 
in the supply of trains... Separatists who were arrested were 
found to be in possession of French revolvers and ammunition... It 
is practically certain that, if the French authorities had provided 
patrols and posts, very little - if  any - trouble would have 
occurred, but after having encouraged the organisers of the 
meeting by every means in their power, at the last moment they 
(the French) seem to have retired from the proceedings.”80
Throughout October, the separatist movement continued to gather pace, 
particularly in the Belgian zone of occupation. This put the Belgian  
government in a difficult position. It was not in their interests to see an 
independent Rhineland under French control, as this would leave them  
strategically encircled by France. At 2 am on 21 October separatists took 
over the government offices, town hall, post office and telegraph offices at Aix- 
la-Chapelle (situated in the Belgian zone of occupation) and proclaimed a 
Rhineland Republic.81 The Belgians ordered their troops to remain neutral.
78 For more information on Rhenish separatism, see, H.E. Nadler, The Rhenish Separatist 
Movements During the Early Weimar Republic. 1918-1924 ,(London, 1987), pp. 303-378.
79 On 13 September, there was a separatist meeting at Aix-la- Chapelle which was 
attended by about 15,000 [FO 371 8684, C16617/129/18: Lord D’Abemon, disp. 649, 
19.9.23].
80 FO 371 8684, C17592/313/18: Kilmarnock, disp. 899, 9.10.23.
81 FO 371 8685, 018051/129/18: Ryan, Coblenz, tel. 405, 21.10.23.
226
Britain’s principal source of information on the subject, Lieutenant- Colonel
Rupert Ryan, the Deputy High Commissioner on the Rhineland high
Commission, commented:
“I am of the opinion that the Belgians now find themselves in a 
dilemma. They have for a long time past been coquetting with 
Smeets and Dorten groups [ie the Separatists] without approving 
their aims. They are now faced with the success of a party whose 
aims are the creation of an independent Rhineland state. This 
state and probability of its coming under French control are 
considered by them a d a n g e r .”82
Reports of activity in the French zone soon followed. By 22 October some
smaller towns, including Ems and Saarburg, were in the hands of the
s e p a r a t i s t s 8 3  and on 23 October the separatists occupied the public buildings
in Wiesbaden, Trier, Duren and D u is b u r g .  84 But Ryan now reported that the
tide might have turned against the separatists, especially in the Belgian zone:
“In Aix-la-Chapelle and München Gladbach nationalists counter 
attacked with sticks and drove Separatists out of some public 
buildings. There are some signs of collapse of movement in this 
a r e a .”85
By 24 October a small hand of separatists clung to one remaining public
building at Aix, while at Coblenz the separatist movement had failed.86 Ryan
reported that the Belgian commissioner:
“regards movement as dead there [ie in Belgian zone] for the 
present hut fears that it might break out again if Separatists 
consolidate themselves in French zone.// Belgian Government 
was entirely opposed to establishment of an independent republic 
but they were in favour of formation of Rhineland into a federal 
state within the R e ic h .”87
The British zone had throughout remained a haven of comparative normality 
and calm. On 23 October, Greneral Godley had reported: “... I do not consider 
there is any cause for anxiety in the situation as regards Cologne, nor do I at
82 FO 371 8685, C18086/129/18: Ryan, tel. 406, 21.10.23.
83 FO 371 8685, C18210/129/18: Ryan, tel. 412, 22.10.23.
84 FO 371 8685, 018252/129/18: Ryan, tel. 415, 23.10.23.
85 FO 371 8685, 018253/129/18: Ryan, tel. 416, 23.10.23.
86 FO 371 8685, 018315/129/18: Ryan, tel. 420, 24.10.23.
87 FO 371 8685, 018367/129/18: Ryan, tel. 422, 24.10.23.
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present see reason why clash between civil population and troops should
occur.”88
On 23 October Ryan had made his first real appraisal of the situation:
“While it is difficult as yet to predict outcome of Separatist action, 
following observations may serve to throw light on situation  
existing at the moment. // Separatist successes have been won 
by comparatively small bodies of men, majority of which belong to 
the lowest classes of the population. In Coblenz for instance 
whole action has been undertaken hy at the m ost 400
Separatists.”89
Ryan thought that the successes had been possible because of the apathy of
the population, their dissatisfaction with Berlin and their belief that it was
useless to struggle against the separatists as they were supported by the
French. He continued:
“Up to now I have no direct evidence that French have intervened 
directly in any way to help Separatists to power but their 
sympathies as might be expected are on that side and neutrality 
as interpreted by them has operated throughout in favour of 
Separatists and against authorities in power.”90
The situation, however, suddenly changed. Rather than describing the decline 
of the Separatist movement, at the end of October reports began to emphasise 
French involvement in and encouragement of the movement. In fact, it soon 
transpired that the French, forcing the Belgians to go along with them, were to 
recognise a de facto separatist government in their zone. As with the MICUM 
agreements, Poincaré foimd himself drawn into an ad hoc poHcy by the force of 
circumstance and by the actions of others. This time the policy was of a much 
more sinister nature. Trachtenberg, McDougaU and Keiger all emphasise the 
problems Poincaré encountered regarding the more violent separatist groups. 
Facing pressure from unruly officials, domestic pressure, and pressure fi'om 
the separatists themselves, Poincaré became heavily involved in separatist
88 FO 371 8685, 018318/129/18: Gk)dley to WO, tel. 50004, 23.10.23.
89 FO 371 8685, 018303/129/18: Ryan, tel. 418, 23.10.23.
90 FO 371 8685, 018303/129/18: Ryan, tel. 418, 23.10.23.
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activities against his better judgment.9i
On 25 October the French High Commissioner told Ryan that:
“recent events bad produced a wave of enthusiasm in France 
which could not be disregarded... The Separatists were now de 
facto authority in French zone and there was no alternative hut 
to recognise them as su ch .”92
Thurstan also reported a sudden increase in French and Belgian support for
the movement, saying that at Aix-la-Chapelle, Bonn, Duisburg, Düsseldorf and
other towns the separatists were receiving help:
“The Separatist insurrections, which everywhere show signs of 
being speedily suppressed through opposition of local inhabitants, 
are now clearly being supported by force by Belgian and French 
authorities and, seeing that latter adopted a more or less neutral 
attitude at the outset, there are grounds for suspecting that, 
when the movement appeared to he about to collapse, they  
received instructions from their respective governments to give it 
their active support and m aintain it hy all means at their
disposal.”93
On 25 October the separatists, under French protection, occupied all the public 
buildings in Coblenz and claimed that they were the legitimate government of 
the Rhineland.94 Thurstan reported that trains run hy the Franco Belgian 
railway organisation (the Régie) had brought hundreds of armed separatists to 
Aix-la-Chapelle on the evening of 1 November, and that the townspeople were
being terrorised. 95
All the British informants were now highly critical of the French action. On 25
October Thurstan commented:
“It should clearly be understood that Separatist forces, who 
French and Belgians have armed, are in general drawn from 
lowest depths of population. They are conveyed from one town to
91 Trachtenberg, Reparation, pp. 321; McDougaU, Frances' ,pp. 305; Keiger, Poincaré, pp. 
305.
92 FO 371 8685, C18378/129/18: Ryan, tel. 425, 25.10.23.
93 FO 371 8685, C18430/129/18: Thurstan, Cologne, tel. 31, 25.10.23.
94 FO 371 8685, C18431/129/18: Kilmarnock, Coblenz, tel. 427, 26.10.23.
95 FO 371 8686, C18932/129/18: Thurstan tel. 32, 2.11.23.
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another by regie trains or lorries and general public, whatever 
Separatist sympathy they may have, will never willingly endure 
them. As they are utterly incompetent their advent to power 
under allied bayonets could only serve to aggravate already 
desperate economic situation.”96
D’Abernon went even further in his criticism of the French and accused them
of plotting to dismember Germany:
“Evidence is accumulating that separatist risings are result of 
preconceived plan on the part of French and would long ago have 
been suppressed by local police and inhabitants had it not been 
for direct French and Belgian support. In these circumstances 
French will probably succeed in establishing a so called separatist 
administration in all principal Rhineland towns against will of 
practically entire population.”97
Thurstan agreed: “...the French and Belgians have deliberately chosen this 
moment to put their Rhineland Republic scheme into operation...// ... [G]angs 
of desperadoes have been deliberately armed and let loose on the Rhineland 
population ...”98
In the light of these new and more serious reports of French actions, the 
British attitude and approach had to be defined. It seem ed that 
dismemberment of Germany was definitely the French aim. The limits to the 
British policy of non-involvement had been reached and swift measures were 
necessary. On the morning of 23 October an important meeting took place in 
Crowe’s room. Here it was decided that any change of regime brought about in 
accordance with the German constitution could not be objected to or interfered 
with.99 As there was no way that the German government would ever agree 
to a completely independent Rhineland, this decision basically meant 
supporting the German government against the separatists if  it proved
96 FO 371 8685, C18430/129/18: Thurstan, Cologne, tel. 31, 25.10.23.
97 FO 371 8685, C18531/129/18: D’Abemon, tel. 391, 28.10.23.
98 Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F. 112/205: Thurstan to D’Abemon, 3.11.23.
99 Minute hy Cadogan, 24.10.23 on FO 371 8685, C18312: Rhine Army, Cologne, to WO, 
50005, 23.10.23.
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necessary to do so. It was also agreed that, in the interests of the 
maintenance of public order in the British zone, British troops would suppress 
any acts of violence.lOO In other words, the British would refuse to allow the 
separatists to gain ascendancy in the British zone - an occurrence which would 
be essential for the formation of any kind of viable independent repuhhc.
The British also issued a stern warning to their allies. This was not made by 
Curzon, but, to prevent Poincaré from ignoring it in the hope that it did not 
represent Britain’s true policy, it was given by the Prime Minister in a public 
speech at Plymouth on 25 October. Britain, Baldwin declared “cannot 
contemplate with any satisfaction the disintegration or disruption [of 
Germany], which must put back for years her powers of reparation. Nor can 
we contemplate the breaking-off of any part of Germany into a separate state, 
which would at once break the Treaty of Versailles.”ioi
This speech was quickly followed by diplomatic measures. On 29 October,
Kilmarnock protested to the Rhineland High C o m m is s io n i0 2  and on 30
October Crewe was instructed to issue Poincaré with an official warning that:
“In view of the situation created hy the Separatist movement in 
the Rhineland and other parts of Germany, His M ajesty’s 
Government feel it incumbent upon them, as signatories of the 
treaty of Versailles, to call the serious attention of their allies to 
the grave consequences which would follow from the setting up of 
independent sovereign states carved out of territories within the 
existing frontiers of Germany. // Such a disruption of the Reich 
would materially affect the status of Germany as a contracting 
party to the treaty, so much so that in certain important 
respects the latter would automatically cease to operate, and 
would require complete r e v is io n .  ”103
On 2 November the French replied by denying any involvement with the
100 Minute by Cadogan, 24.10.23 on FO 371 8685, C18312: Rhine Army, Cologne, to WO, 
50005, 23.10.23.
101 The Times. 26.10.23, pp. 17.
102 FO 371 8685, C18657/129/18: Kilmarnock, tel. 440, 29.10.23.
103 FO 371 8686, C18733/129/18: Tel.361 to Crewe, 30.10.23.
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separatists and adding that in any case the spontaneous constitution of
independent states in Germany did not necessitate a revision of the Treaty of
V e r s a i l l e s .  104 The Foreign Office was alarmed. On 5 November Crewe again
approached Poincareios and on 14 November Poincaré again denied any
French in v o lv e m e n t .  106 On 16 November Crowe had a heated exchange with
the French ambassador. 107 Saint-Aulaire again denied any French
involvement with the separatists and added that British information “was
derived from lying reports of German agents provocateurs...” Crowe was
incensed and repUed that:
“It was Lord Kilmarnock and his officers who had furnished us 
with the particulars which had been brought to M. Poincaré’s 
notice... Even M. Poincaré would probably not class Lord 
Kilmarnock among German agents provocateurs. I said that I 
would take note of the fact that M. Poincaré opposed a fiat denial 
to the facts for which our officials had v o u c h e d .”i08
While the French pushed still harder for a separatist state, the Belgians began
to submit to the British threats and to withdraw their support from the
separatists. This Belgian support had in any case always been tenuous as
they never wanted to see a French controlled satellite state in the Rhineland
a n d  R u h r . 109 On 2 November Belgian troops escorted the separatists out of
Aix.110 Kilmarnock commented:
“My impression is that Belgian authorities have tried to maintain 
an attitude of neutrality throughout and that in those cases 
where Separatists have received Belgian support, that support
104 FO 371 8686, C18935/129/18: Crewe, tel. 972, 2.11.23
105 FO 371 8687, C19135/129/18: Crewe, tel. 981, 5.11.23. Lampson minuted on this on 
6.11.23: “The essential fact is that whatever they may say the French have no intention 
whatever of taking action against the Separatists in their zone. This, in practice works out 
much the same as supporting them.”
106 FO 371 8688, C19855/129/18: Crewe, disp. 2596, 15.11.23.
107 Minute by Crowe, 16.11.23 on FO 371 8688, C19855/129/18: Crewe, disp. 2596,
15.11.23.
108 Minute by Crowe, 16.11.23 on FO 371 8688, C19855/129/18: Crewe, disp. 2596,
15.11.23.
109 Both Nadler and McDougaU agree that it was Britain’s opposition to the separatists 
which gave the Belgians the confidence to oppose the movement and argue that this Belgian 
weakening, coupled with British pressure, influenced Poincaré. [Nadler, Rhenish, pp. 342-3; 
McDougaU. France’s, pp. 314-5.]
110 FO 371 8686, C18933/129/18: Thurstan tel. 33, 2.11.23.
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has resulted from action of irresponsible subordinates and not 
from orders emanating from higher authority...// Though it is at 
present early to express definite opinion the events of today may 
well prove to be the beginning of the collapse of the Separatist 
movements.”111
By 9 November the Belgian zone was free from Separatists. 112 Kilmarnock 
observed: “I learn from a confidential source that evacuation... is due to Belgian 
pressure.”ii3
By mid November French tactics also seemed to change. It seemed that 
British pressure was having some effect. Facing opposition from both the 
British and now the Belgians, the French began to encourage the formation of 
a federal Rhineland state within the German Reich instead of a completely 
independent Rhineland. The Foreign Office was adamant that even this should 
not he allowed and Kilmarnock was instructed not to enter into any discussions 
with local politicians. 114 The German government, however, in the face of 
mounting internal chaos coupled with pressure from the French, began to show 
signs of weakening.115 On 14 November Berlin agreed to allow unofficial 
negotiations between the French High Commissioner and more responsible 
Rhineland political parties regarding the establishment of some kind of 
autonomous Rhenish state within Germany. H6
At these negotiations it was suggested that a solution could he found if France
111 FO 371 8686, C18987/129/18; Kilmarnock, tel. 453, 2.11.23.
112 FO 371 8687, 019452/129/18, Kilmarnock, tel. 470, 10.11.23.
113 FO 371 8687, 019384/129/18: Kilmarnock, tel. 468, 9.11.23.
114 Minute by Lampson, 15.11.23 on FO 371 8688, 019747/129/18: D’Abemon, tel. 433,
14.11.23.
115 At first the German government had been absolute in its opposition to any form of 
separatist pressure. On 14 November the German government published the following 
communique: “Regarding mmours current abroad to the effect that an autonomous 
Rhineland republic is about to be established with the approval of German government it 
must be stated that government will in no circumstances enter into any discussion regarding 
a possible alteration of status of Rhineland and the Ruhr vis-à-vis Reich. Government will 
never take a step in this direction or authorise proclamation of a Rhineland republic.” [FO 
371 8688, C19747/129/18: D’Abemon, tel. 433, 14.11.23.]
113 Minute by Stemdale Bennett, 23.11.23 on FO 371 8689, C20334/129/18: Kilmamock, 
tel. 488, 22.11.23.
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and England guaranteed the maintenance of the Rhineland as a state separate 
from both France and Prussia, and on 15 November the French High 
Commissioner approached Kilmamock. Kilmamock replied that he could not 
enter into any negotiations. Lampson commented: “The slower we go in all
this the better - otherwise we may find ourselves in the position of repenting at
leisure.”! 18
By 22 November an agreement between the Rhineland parties and the French 
seemed more possible. Apparently the separatists had come up with another 
plan, giving hmited autonomy to the occupied territories, which they wanted to 
submit to the French High Commissioner. This time they had already 
consulted the German government. Kilmarnock was not optimistic of the 
plan’s success:
“I am informed that German govemment is prepared to give its 
consent to this proposal... // I shall be more than surprised if this 
proposal meets with approval of French... The present proposal is 
in my opinion a hybrid which will satisfy no one and which if  
accepted will on account of its provisional and ambiguous nature 
only serve to encourage further French intrigue.”H9
Walford Selby, a First Secretary in the Central Department, was more 
concerned: “According to this telegram the German Government are ready to 
cede autonomous rights in the R h i n e l a n d .”i20  Crowe however refused to be 
alarmed by the possibility of an agreement between the French and Germans 
at this stage, merely noting: “We must await developments.”i2i
Crowe’s evaluation proved correct. The possibility of an agreement quickly 
aborted. The French continued their hardline approach, refusing to negotiate
117 FO 371 8688, C19864/129/18: Kilmamock, tel. 477, 15.11.23.
118 Minute by Lampson, 17,11.23 on FO 371 8688, 019864/129/18: Kilmamock, tel. 477,
15.11.23.
119 FO 371 8689, 020334/129/18: Kilmamock, tel. 488, 22.11.23.
120 Minute by Selby, 23.11.23 on FO 371 8689, 020334/129/18: Kilmamock, tel. 488,
22.11.23.
121 Minute by Orowe, 23.11.23 on FO 371 8689, 020334/129/18: Kilmamock, tel. 488,
22.11.23.
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further unless the terms of the plan were entirely favourable to them. 122 The 
result was that the French ran out of time. Before the negotiations could get 
anywhere, the separatist movement, always ad hoc and disjointed, began to 
collapse spontaneously owing to internal differences. On 29 November Ryan 
reported: “Internal dissension has all hut terminated existence of Separatist 
Provisional Government at Coblenz.”i23
On 29 November the separatists at Duisburg were disarmed by the 
B e lg ia n s  124 and an attempt by the separatists to hold a mass meeting at 
Essen on 26 November was a complete failure - the separatists actually had 
to be protected by the French military police. 125 On 2 December, the 
separatists hauled down their flag from the town halls at Bonn, Beuel, 
Konigswinter, Godesberg and other Rhine towns. 126 By 15 December the 
separatist movement in the Rhineland and Ruhr had entirely failed. 127
With evidence mounting that the separatists were now a spent force, the 
British felt there was no point in taking further issue with France. On 10 
December Lampson minuted: “On the whole we might leave matters as they 
a re .”i28 This was particularly the case as hy this stage the British had 
succeeded in their principal goal of involving the Americans in a negotiated 
settlement to the entire reparations question.
But the separatist episode was not yet over. While the attempt in the 
Rhineland and Ruhr had failed, the French foolishly concentrated their support
122 FO 371 8690, C20504/129/18: Colonel Ryan, Coblenz, tel. 495, 26.11.23.
123 FO 371 8690, C20699/129/18: Ryan, tel. 498, 29.11.23.
124 FO 371 8690, C20761/129/18: Kilmamock, tel. 500, 30.11.23.
125 FO 371 8690, C21012/129/18: D’Abemon, disp. 905, 30.11.23.
126 FO 371 8691, C21219/129/18: D’Abemon, disp. 932, 6.12.23.
127 FO 371 8691, C21786/129/18: Kilmamock, disp. 1220, 15.12.23.
128 Minute by Lampson, 10.12.23 on FO 371 8690, C20972/129/18: Crewe, disp. 2735,
3.12.23.
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on the Palatinate - an area about which the British had little information. The 
Foreign Office were shocked when on 27 December the French Rhineland High 
Commissioner suddenly announced that France had recognised a de facto 
government in the Palatinate, based at Speyer. 129 Lampson expostulated: 
“The French action is really preposterous.” 130 Crowe commented: “I do not 
think we should sit down under this French attempt to bully us out of our 
perfectly good position. If we give way in this instance we shall seriously suffer 
in prestige and in practical influence.”i3i
Anxious to find out precisely what was going on, the Foreign Office sent the 
British consul-general at Munich to investigate. Relations with the French 
were strained still fiuther when the French repUed hy trying to limit the consul- 
general’s investigations by attaching their own official to him. The situation 
also came to a head in the Rhineland High Commission, when the French and 
Belgian Commissioners wished to register the decrees issued by the 
separatists against Kilmarnock’s objections.i32
So upset were the Cabinet by the French actions that they actually considered
taking stringent financial measures against the French:
“... in view of the large loans which France is making to 
Czechoslovakia and other countries in central and Eastern  
Europe, the Cabinet welcomed the suggestion made by the  
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with the concurrence of the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer - that the Chancellor of the  
Exchequer should circulate to the Cabinet the reply which he had 
sent to the Foreign Office to an enquiry as to the practicability 
and desirability of raising the question of the payment of interest 
by the French Government on their war debt to this c o u n t r y .”133
129 FO 371 8691, C22363/129/18: Kilmamock, disp. 1273, 27.12.23.
130 Minute by Lampson, 3.1.24 on FO 371 8691, C22363/129/18: Kilmamock, disp. 1273,
27.12.23. It must be remembered that throughout the Rhenish separatist saga, the French 
had denied officially helping the movement.
131 Minute hy Crowe, 9.1.24 on FO 371 9771, C399/91/18: Phipps, disp. 49, 8.1.24.
132 CAB 23 46, Minutes of Cabinet, 17.1.24. For more information on the collapse of the 
separatist movement in 1924, see below, Chapter VII, pp. 294-295.
133 CAB 23 46, Minutes of Cabinet, 17.1.24.
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But external factors militated against taking further action. By this stage the
Committees of Experts had been appointed, and it seemed foolish to risk
jeopardising this possibility of a solution by breaking with France. Political
circumstances in Britain also did not favour action - the whole govemment was
in limbo after the December 1923 elections. Moreover, the French now found
themselves in financial crisis anyway. As Crewe reported:
“Public interest here has been so completely monopolised by the 
eccentricities of the franc that there has been little room for 
anything else, and even the Palatinate question has hy no means 
aroused the excitement which might have been expected, either 
at the Quai d’Orsay or in the P ress .”i34
Thus while this last twist in the tale of the separatist fortunes may have been 
unfortunate for the British, it came too late to alter the realities of the 
situation. The British had helped to block the separatists at the time when 
they could have precipitated German disintegration. Britain’s opposition to 
Poincaré from late October hindered the most dangerous separatist schemes 
and left the French Premier desperately trying to restrain his officials to the 
constitutional formation of a federal Rhineland. The corollary of this was that 
Poincaré found himself once more distracted and preoccupied with the situation 
on the spot. By January 1924 the Committees of Experts had been 
established and Germany was recovering. The Palatinate episode was thus 
more indicative of French than of German weakness at this time.
The B ank  o f Issu e.
The question of the proposed Rhineland bank of issue provides the third 
example of British poHcy towards the French at this time. 135 Once more the 
British tried not to become directly involved, but when necessary they did give 
encouragement to the central German government and opposed French
134 Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F.112/201(b): Crewe to Curzon, 18.1.24.
135 See also McDougaU, France’s, pp. 323-328; Trachtenberg, Reparation, pp. 321-2
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endeavours to precipitate German disintegration. Although to a great extent 
the question of a separate Rhineland bank of issue represents another element 
of French involvement in schemes to separate the Rhineland from Germany, it 
also involves British poHcy toward the entire German financial situation and so 
deserves to he treated separately.
The German government reacted to the hyper-inflation that gripped Germany 
in October 1923 hy introducing, under emergency powers, a new currency (the 
Rentenmark) on October 21. The British, though cautious, approved this 
scheme as it was a central govemment initiative and therefore represented a 
force against any imminent German b r e a k - u p . 136 For these same reasons, the 
French were not happy with it. Anxious to increase French control over the 
German economy, and by now hopelessly entangled in separatist activities, it 
is hardly surprising that the idea of a separate Rhineland bank of issue  
appeared far more appealing to them than these central government 
initiatives. They tried to pressure the German govemment into establishing a 
Rhenish bank, with the result that on 31 October the German Ambassador 
informed Britain that the formation of such a hank was indeed i m m i n e n t .  137
At this stage the British were not worried. Selby commented: “It is a bad 
scheme and nothing will come of i t . ”i38  The Treasury felt that the scheme was 
unworkable, and emphasised that British money should not be involved. 
Niemeyer wrote to Lampson: “There is certainly not the remotest chance of 
any British bank taking any share in such a s c h e m e .”139 This letter from 
Niemeyer was also sent on to Kilmamock, with instructions that should he be 
approached by the Germans he should say that British banks would almost
136 FO 371 8668, C17895/8/18: D’Abemon, tel. 371, 16.10.23.
137 FO 371 8686, C18765/129/18: Letter from German Ambassador, 31.10.23.
138 Minute by Selby, 1.11.23, on FO 371 8686, C18765/129/18; Letter from German 
Ambassador, 31.10.23.
139 FO 371 8686, 018766/129/18: Niemeyer to Lampson, 29.10.23.
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certainly not participate. i40
Even when Kilmamock on 17 November telegraphed that there was a very 
strong likehhood that a Rhineland bank would be constituted, and that it would 
apply to the High Commission for recognition, the Foreign Office was 
unmoved. Sterndale Bennett argued that under the Rhineland Agreement, 
the Rhineland High Commission could only recognise such a bank if  it was 
instituted by a German government law or decree. Therefore, if the bank itself 
applied for recognition by the High Commission, Kümaraock would be justified 
in abstaining. 142 in  the meantime the British tried to delay and disrupt the 
formation of the bank by indirectly preventing vital British capital from 
becoming involved.
Throughout November Niemeyer privately made it clear to any independent 
interests who inquired that the government did not wish the formation of a 
hank to he encouraged in London, and did not want British capital to 
participate. 143 Certainly British capital would have been interested in 
participating. A minute of 24 November shows that important financial 
interests in the City (most notably Mr. Richard Guinness) wanted to 
participate in the scheme. 144 That no British capital was ultimately involved 
was a direct result of government intervention. As Montagu Norman 
explained:
“The questions which have been put to me fi*om several quarters 
are whether it is the wish of the Treasury and of the Foreign 
Office - (1) That the establishment of such a Bank shall be 
encouraged in London, and (2) That British capital shall 
participate.// I have answered both questions in the negative, 
believing it to be our view that the establishment of such a Bank
140 FO 371 8686, C18766/129/18: FO tel. 1032, to Kilmamock, 31.10.23.
141 FO 371 8689, C19954/129/18 Kilmamock, tel. 480, 17.11.23.
142 Minute by Stemdale Bennett, 17.11.23 on FO 371 8689, C19954/129/18 Kilmamock, 
tel. 480, 17.11.23.
143 FO 371 8689, C199979/129/18: Niemeyer to Crowe, 16.11.23.
144 FO 371 8750, 020513/313/18: FO minute, 24.11.23.
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(with capital perhaps suhscrihed in Germany, France, Great 
Britain and other countries) would lead to the entanglement of 
this country in the pohcy which is now being pursued hy France in 
the Rhineland, and towards the economic separation of the
Rhineland.”i45
At the same time as discouraging the Rhineland bank, the Treasury also 
wanted to encourage the German government’s policy of introducing a uniform 
currency throughout the whole of Germany. As early as 16 November the 
German government had submitted to the Rhineland High Commission a law 
allowing the Rentenmark to he issued in the occupied territories. Predictably, 
the French and Belgians had wanted to delay this law’s implementation, and so 
on 19 November the High Commission had decided to defer its consideration. 
The Treasury now advised that Kilmarnock should be instructed to push for a 
majority decision allowing the law to be implemented. 146
The result of all this British disruption was that Poincaré had a great deal of 
trouble finding the necessary capital on which to found the hank. Delays 
resulted, and only in early December did Poincaré manage to coerce the Belgian 
government into virtually forcing Belgian banks to become involved. 147 
British intransigence had succeeded in postponing the formation of the bank 
until the critical period had passed and the Committees of Experts had been 
established. It was not until 10 December that the French Ambassador was 
able to tell Crowe that the negotiations for the formation of the Rhenish bank 
were almost complete and that if  British banks wanted to participate they 
should communicate with the Banque de Paris hy 13 December. Despite the 
policy Britain had so actively been pursuing throughout, on 12 December the
145 Norman to Niemeyer, 14.11.23 [DBFP 1st Series, vol. xxi, note 2, p688. I have been 
unable to trace the original document in the PRO].
146 FO 371 8690, C21193/129/18: Niemeyer to Lampson, 5.12.23.
147 On 5 December Grahame reported that a leading Belgian banker had said that Poincare 
was determined that the Rhenish bank should be created and therefore Theunis had 
assented and Belgian bankers were being told that it was their patriotic duty to assist it. 
[FO 371 8690, 021107/129/18: Grahame disp. 981, 5.12.23.]
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Foreign Office merely replied that:
“...it  would be contrary to the settled  policy of B ritish  
Governments to take any active steps to ensure either the 
participation or non-participation of British  banks in an 
undertaking of this nature. The question is one which m ust 
necessarily be settled by the banks t h e m s e l v e s . . ”148
As Chapter VII shows, the British were to continue the policy of delaying the 
French schemes in the opening months of 1924, when, aided by the collapse of 
the franc, by the intervention of the Bank of England, and by the expectation 
that the Committee of Experts’ reports would inaugurate a new phase in the 
reconstruction of Grermany, the British were able effectively to block the bank 
of issue.
The B ritish  Zone o f O ccupation .
The fourth issue over which British policy decisions had to be made during the 
autumn of 1923 concerned the British zone of occupation in the Rhineland. 
Once passive resistance had ended, the French faced the task of getting the 
Ruhr and Rhineland back to normal economic conditions of operation in order 
to extract reparation and so vindicate the whole “productive pledge” policy. As 
with the implementation of occupation measures in the spring of 1923, so the 
dismantling of French controls was once again to have implications for 
Britain’s zone of occupation around Cologne.
Much of the problem stemmed from the extremely ambiguous position which 
the British had adopted in their zone since January 1923. In particular. Lord 
Kilmarnock’s abstention from Rhineland Commission ordinances and Britain’s 
fundamental reliance on both French and German goodwill to prevent its 
position from being squeezed too much made the British vulnerable. Now that 
German opposition to the occupation had ended, German officials were willing
148 FO 371 8691, C21364/129/18: Communication to French Ambassador, London,
12.12.23.
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to implement the majority decisions of the Rhineland Commission throughout 
the occupied territories. Would the French therefore seek to increase their 
sphere of influence hy encouraging the Germans to im plem ent these  
ordinances in the British zone also? In this event, what would the British 
attitude be to French efforts and to the whole policy of “exploitation”? Would 
Britain maintain her distance, and risk being accused of hampering the 
collection of reparation, or would she risk some kind of hmited association with 
the measures?
As in the Spring, problems with the French again crystaUised over the question 
of operating railways in the British zone. As economic, political and social 
chaos descended on Germany, so stability in the occupied territories 
disintegrated. If the British were to restore their zone to anything like 
normality, cooperation of some form with the French was necessary to provide 
an operational infra s t r u c t u r e .  149 Of particular importance was the  
establishment of an adequate railway freight service. Now that the French 
hoped to be able to move more coal and coke from the Ruhr and Rhineland, the 
existing Godley/Payot agreement, based on a limited number of trains, was no 
longer applicable. The French were quick to take advantage of the potential 
this situation afforded them to seek to increase their influence. As early as 1 
October they proposed transferring all the railways in the Rhineland - including 
those in the British zone - to French control. The British were horrified. Once 
more Poincaré had pushed the British too far.
The situation was difficult. Should Britain refuse to have anything to do with 
the Régie railway system then they might lose control of the French schemes 
and find the position in their zone becoming virtually impossible anyway. 
Cadogan explained:
149 FO 371 8748, C19520/313/18: D’Abemon dispatch 808, 7.11.23, enclosing dispatch 
from Thurstan, 6.11.23.
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we are faced with the alternative of either participating in this 
“productive pledge” or of continuing our attitude of neutrality.
But it must be pointed out that “neutrality” in this instance will 
be rather a different thing from the neutrality which we have 
hitherto observed... If it is decided that we cannot participate in 
“productive pledges” of any kind, we have to choose between 
allowing the French into our zone to run the railways, or refusing 
to do so and maintaining our “neutrality”, which in this case will 
bring us to an issue with the F r e n c h .”150
Cadogan’s reservations were over-ruled hy the general conviction that it would 
be disastrous to concede any influence or control in the British zone to the 
French. The Foreign Office decided to use what power it did have to obstruct 
French plans. Kilmarnock, Godley and Wigram were all convinced that the 
British position was greatly strengthened hy the fact that Cologne, the nodal 
point of the entire Rhineland railway system, was located in the British  
z o n e .  151 The British determined to use Cologne as a tool in their overall policy 
of delaying French schemes on the spot, and allowing the French to become 
distracted and confused, while the British concentrated on the wider issues of 
an overall reparation settlement. Wigram commented: “Cologne is a big pawn 
and we ought not to throw it away by itself without trying to get in addition to 
the settlement of the question of the exploitation of the pledges a settlement of 
the reparation q u e s t i o n .”152 Curzon agreed: “...I think we have the whip 
hand. ”153
Accordingly, on 4 October a telegram was sent to Kilmamock telUng him that 
Britain could not allow French or Belgian interference in the administration of 
the railways in the British zone. 154 The French, however, refused to let the
150 Minute by Cadogan, 1.10.23 on FO 371 8743, 016883/313/18: Kilmamock, disp. 861,
25.9.23.
151 FO 371 8743, 016883/313/18: Kilmamock, disp. 861, 25.9.23.
152 Minute by Wigram, 1.10.23, on: FO 371 8743, 016883/313/18: Kilmamock, disp. 861,
25.9.23.
153 Minute by Ourzon, 2.10.23 on FO 371 8743, 016883/313/18: Kilmamock, disp. 861,
25.9.23.
154 FO 371 8743, 016883/313/18: tel. 199 to Kilmamock, 4.10.23.
243
matter rest, and began negotiations between the Régie and the German 
Ministry of Railways for the taking over by the Régie of railways in the British 
z o n e .  155 The British now became alarmed that they might not be able to 
control the French after all and that the Germans were so weak that they 
would agree to any French demands. iS6 It was decided to hint to the German 
government that Britain strongly opposed such an arrangement. 157 This had 
some effect. On 14 October, Kilmarnock reported that the German 
government had given instructions to the German railway direction at Cologne 
that the Régie was to be recognised throughout the occupied territory as a 
“temporary administration” from October 17 and that all railwaymen were to 
obey its o r d e r s .158 However, alm ost certainly as a resu lt of British  
representations, the British zone was not to be included in these Régie 
arrangements. 159
By now the French were entirely committed to their schemes on the spot in the 
Ruhr and Rhineland, regardless of the effects they might have on Anglo-French 
relations. On 16 October Kilmarnock reported that the French director of the 
Régie had told the Germans that he wanted the British zone to be included in 
the Régie, and that if necessary he would: “adopt certain aggressive tactics, 
having isolation of our zone as objective...” to achieve this. Kilmarnock added: 
“This policy so I am informed has already received a commencement of 
execution and there has been delay and bad management of our troop trains 
taking reliefs to and from England. ”160
155 FO 371 8745, C17608/313/18; Kilmamock, tel. 386, 11.10.23.
156 Minute by Crowe, 12.10.23 on FO 371 8745, C17608/313/18: Kilmamock, tel. 386,
11.10.23.
157 Minute by Curzon, 13.10.23 on FO 371 8745, C17608/313/18: Kilmamock, tel. 386,
11.10.23.
158 FO 371 8745, C17705/313/18: Kilmamock, tel. 395, 14.10.23.
159 FO 371 8745, C17810/313/18: Kilmarnock, tel. 397, 15.10.23.
160 FO 371 8745, C17824/313/18: Kilmamock, tel.401, 16.10.23.
244
The situation was clearly coming to a head. Disruption of services in the 
British zone could easily affect the overall wellbeing of the population. Even so, 
the British continued to adhere to their established policy. On 20 October 
Kilmarnock suggested three possible courses of action: (1) that the British  
should use their position in the British zone to obstruct the French and so force 
a discussion of the general reparation question; (2) that the British should 
participate in the policy of “productive pledges”; and (3) that the British should 
continue for as long as possible with some kind of provisional scheme. The 
Foreign Office discussed these alternatives. Cadogan concluded that the 
British position in the occupied territories was not strong enough for sustained 
obstruction, as the French and Belgians would retaliate hy blockading the 
British zone; but that Britain could not participate in the productive pledges as 
she had already made her opposition to that policy known, and anyway it was 
pointless to participate in this policy as it would not work. He concluded: 
“There remains the third alternative, which is certainly not very satisfactory, 
and amounts to little more than marking time - never a very dignified 
movement. But if  it is practicable, there seems to be something to be said for 
i t .”162
On 22 October an inter-departmental meeting was held to consider the entire 
situation which had been created in the Rhineland by the abandonment of 
German passive resistance. Many officials returned to London specially to 
attend. Present were Crowe, Kilmarnock, Bradbury, Niemeyer, Ernest 
Troughton (Lord Kilmarnock’s economic adviser) and Cadogan. 163 The first 
issue on the agenda was the railway question. Crowe began by outlining the 
course of events to date. After some discussion, Bradbury suggested some 
kind of local arrangement whereby the Cologne railways were to remain under
161 FO 371 8746, C18170/313/18: Minute by Kilmamock, 20.10.23.
162 Minute by Cadogan, 20.10.23 on FO 371 8746, C18170/313/18: Minute by Kilmamock,
20.10.23.
163 FO 371 8746, C18249/313/18: FO minute by Cadogan, 22.10.23.
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German management tempered by British control. in  other words, as had
happened in the spring, a working solution which safeguarded British interests 
was to he negotiated on the spot. It was agreed that this was the best 
alternative and instructions were sent to the relevant officials. Negotiations 
were soon initiated, hut it was not until 14 December that an agreement was 
reached between British officials and the Régie hy which the administration of 
the railways in the British zone would remain independent of the R é g ie .  165
Meanwhile, complexities continued for the British regarding their zone, as 
Britain’s entire policy towards the French exploitation policy still had to he 
decided. Decisions were needed regarding the payment of customs duties, 
payment of coal tax and resumption of reparation coal deliveries in the British 
z o n e . 166 On 27 November another inter-departmental meeting was held to 
discuss the continuing question of the railways, as well as customs and the 
Franco-German industrial agreements. Once again it was a large gathering. 167 
As with the 22 October meeting it was agreed in each case to allow the men on 
the spot to try to come to some kind of working arrangement. Regarding the 
railways it was agreed that negotiations on the spot should he allowed to 
continue to try to find some kind of workable compromise. Regarding the 
customs, it was agreed that if individual German factories specifically asked 
for French customs officials to he allowed in, then Kilmarnock would have the
164 FO 371 8746, C18249/313/18: FO minute by Cadogan, 22.10.23.
165 FO 371 8752, 021641/313/18: Kilmamock, tel. 510, 15.12,23. In fact, though the 14 
December conditions were retained, negotiations with the French continued throughout 
December. [See FO 371 8753, 022109/313/18: Kilmarnock, disp. 1269, 22.12.23; & 
022110/313/18: Kilmamock, disp. 1270, 23.12.23]. Indeed, as Chapter VII demonstrates, 
the railway question remained contentious until the London Conference in July-August 
1924.
166 Minute hy Wigram, 6.11.23 on:FO 371 8748, 019028/313/18: Bradbury to Treasury,
3.11.23.
167 Present were Orowe, Tyrrell, Lampson, Malkin, Selby and Wigram (all from the FO); 
Niemeyer and Waley (from the Treasury); Chapman and Fountain (from the Board of 
Trade), Waterlow (Department of Overseas Trade); Bradbury and Leith Ross (Reparation 
Commission); Kilmamock, Troughton and Georgi (Rhineland High Commission); Colonel 
MacLachlan and Lieutenant-Colonel Manton (GHQ Rhine Army) and Kavanagh (Commercial 
Secretary, Cologne).
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ability to grant this. Regarding the Franco-German industrial agreements, it 
was decided to wait and see what the Reparation Commission did. 168
By thus playing for time and refusing to he drawn too far into local complexities 
the British were able to avoid both controversy and involvement on the spot. 
At the same time the local negotiations had the advantage of keeping the 
French occupied and prevented a complete showdown over thee issue of 
exploitation throughout the critical period from the end of September to the 
middle of December. This was fortunate for the British, as - whether or not 
they intended it - the consequence was that Poincaré became increasingly  
submerged by practical difficulties. With Poincaré distracted, the British were 
free to concentrate on what really counted - the overall settlem ent of 
reparation.
168 FO 371 8750, 020574/313/18: FO minute, 27.11.23.
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C onclusion.
The cessation of passive resistance precipitated total chaos in Germany. The 
combination of economic dislocation, extremist uprisings, regional discontent 
and irresponsible parliamentary behaviour threatened to reduce the fledgling 
Republic to a state of virtual anarchy. Despite the seriousness of the situation 
the Treasury had no desire to mitigate the effects of this German collapse. It 
was highly unsympathetic and wanted to abandon Germany so that France 
would he tried by the test of exploitation. The Foreign Office were not quite so 
detached. Unlike the Treasury, they were not prepared to run the risk of 
permitting a German collapse which would result in increased French 
domination. Furthermore, the actual practicalities of the situation in the Ruhr 
also made it unfeasible for the Foreign Office to implement the Treasury’s 
philosophy in its purest form. The Foreign Office therefore sUghtly softened the 
Treasury’s view in the strategy it employed: it would seek to maintain a 
distance from the situation but would be prepared to react to French activities 
by disrupting and delaying Poincaré when it was deemed necessary. This 
strategy was to have huge benefits. With Poincaré increasingly embroiled by 
the situation on the spot in the Ruhr, his position weakened and he accordingly 
became more amenable to pressure in other directions. As Chapter VI will 
demonstrate, the British were therefore able to concentrate on what they saw 
as the really important area: securing an international settlem ent of the 
reparation question involving the United States.
The British evaluation of Poincaré’s position at this time is significant. Their 
policy was premised on the assumption that Poincaré did not have a definite 
plan and so would gradually get into more difficulties as the complexities of the 
German situation developed. The British were not even unduly worried about
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possible Franco-Grennan industrial cooperation, though they recognised that if  
ever it materialised it would be damaging for Britain. Their position regarding 
the MICUM agreements was dictated more by fear of an attempt by France to 
score a short-term victory over Germany and abort an international 
conference than by fear of a permanent and workable industrial combine. 169
In view of the ongoing historiographical debate regarding Poincaré’s aims and 
motives during the autumn of 1923, this British conviction that Poincaré had 
no workable plan and that he was becoming increasingly overwhelmed by 
practicalities is of particular interest. As Chapter VI will show, this confusion 
on the part of Poincaré, coupled with a greater consistency and farsightedness 
by Britain, was also of crucial importance to international diplomatic 
developments at this time.
169 This conflicts with Rupieper’s interpretation of the British as motivated by fear of such a 
combine. [Rupieper, Cuno. pp. 230],
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Chapter VI
T he E stab lish m en t o f  th e  C om m ittees o f  E xperts, 
Septem ber - D ecem ber 1923.
The British systematically strove to remain aloof from Poincaré’s actions in  
the Ruhr, Rhineland and Berlin once passive resistance had ceased. Partly 
this was a result of their natural and constant desire on the part of the British 
not to become involved in the controversy. But it was also because the British 
did not want the kind of settlement which Poincaré seemed to he lurching 
towards - a settlem ent which appeared to he based on ad hoc, disjointed 
measures and increased French control. On the contrary, the British wanted 
an international settlem ent of the entire “German” question, given  
permanency by the involvement of the United States. As Poincaré lost control 
of his policy, becoming involved in dangerous and discrediting episodes, so 
Britain’s overall position - so confused and contradictory at the end of 
September 1923 - had time to recover. Poincaré threw away the advantage he 
had so painstakingly achieved and gave the British the upper hand. Indeed, as 
we shall see, the transformation of British policy in this area was by no means 
either swift or total. Although a vague agenda of aims was soon established 
(negotiation to end the reparation dispute, involving the United States and 
probably going through the Reparation Commission), the methods to he used 
were much more uncertain. British diplomacy remained in many ways 
confused and did not have the full support of the government. Yet as France 
became increasingly preoccupied on the spot, so Poincaré’s ability to resist the 
general increase of diplomatic pressure wavered. The result was that his 
victory in the confrontation stage of the crisis was to become a mere paper 
success - being countered by his inability to retain control of the negotiation
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phase.
The diplomatie process during the autumn of 1923 was extremely complex. 
When the end of passive resistance was declared, the British reaffirmed their 
fiiendship with France, while at the same time calling for a French initiative to 
end the crisis. Though Poincare was unwilling to respond, the Americans at 
last reacted to the European situation. On 9 October President Coolidge 
declared that the United States still stood by Harding’s New Haven declaration 
of December 1922. The British immediately became more purposeful, and on 
19 October appealed to their allies for a joint invitation to the United States. 
The French reaction was unpromising. Eventually they agreed to invite Untied 
States involvement in an inquiry under the Reparation Commission, but they 
then backtracked by seeking to impose considerable lim itations to the 
enquiry’s terms of reference. The British now tried to enlist international 
support to put pressure on Poincaré. Although they failed to coordinate an 
official multilateral effort, they did persuade both the Belgians and the United 
States to apply private, unilateral pressure to France. This had an effect. On 
13 November, in a last attempt to retain French control over developments, 
the French proposed to the Reparation Commission that an enquiry he 
established to estimate Germany present capacity. Poincaré however was no 
longer in the driving seat. Detailed negotiations ensued behind the closed doors 
of the Reparation Commission, with Bradbury playing a key role. The result 
was the announcement by the Reparation Commission on 30 November that 
two committees, with wide terms of reference, would he established.!
1 For a chronology of diplomatic events, see Chapter V, Table H, pp. 200-202.
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B rita in ’s P o sitio n  up on  th e  C essation  o f P a ssiv e  R esistan ce.
Upon the immediate cessation of passive resistance, the British position was 
still ambiguous. At one level, the British were anxious to maintain the facade 
of the Entente, and at least to give the appearance of unity of purpose with the 
French. However, in reality they at the same time wanted to manipulate the 
French and obtain the type of settlem ent that Britain and not necessarily 
France desired. Hence, while the Foreign Office, encouraged by the Treasury, 
tried to push matters ahead and adopt a firmer line towards France, the Prime 
Minister was busy making conciliatory speeches. The result was to confuse 
the French still more, as they assumed that there was a split between Curzon 
and Baldwin. This was not the case. British pohcy at this time was in the 
process of becoming more unified and consistent than at any point since the 
crisis began, and the simultaneous use of cajoling and pressure was designed to 
serve British purposes.
As soon as passive resistance ended, Baldwin publicly reaffirmed Britain’s 
friendship w ith France. On both 27 September when he spoke at 
Northampton^, and on 1 October which he opened the Imperial Conference in 
LondonS , Baldwin emphasised the importance of building on his recently 
formed friendship with Poincaré to reach a settlem ent of the reparation 
question through the Entente. Both these speeches were well received in 
France.
However, at the same time Baldwin was also busy plotting with Crowe to use 
the Imperial Conference, which was to sit in London from 1 October to 9 
November, to apply pressure to his Entente partner. On 2 October Crowe and
2 FO 371 8656, C16964/1/18: The Times. 28.9.23.
3 FO 371 8656, C17096/1/18: Crewe, tel. 920, 2.10.23.
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Baldwin met to discuss how they might persuade Poincaré to: “come out into 
the open and pronounce himself on what were his real plans and intentions.”  ^
Crowe suggested using another public speech to say that now passive 
resistance had ceased the British government were awaiting an announcement 
of intent from France. Crowe explained: “Some such puhHc statement, would, I 
thought, compel M. Poincaré to make a reply, although possibly it would prove 
an evasive one. But the hall would he set rolling in this way...”5 Baldwin 
strongly favoured this suggestion and asked Crowe to put it to Curzon, urging 
that a passage could he inserted into Curzon’s speech before the Imperial 
Conference on 5 October.6
Curzon accordingly made this speech calling for French proposals on 5 
October, having first warned the French Ambassador of what he was to do.7 
Predictably, it was badly received in Paris, being interpreted as another 
attempt by Curzon to bully France. Poincaré was particularly upset. Coming 
so soon as it did after his friendly meeting with Baldwin on 19 September, he 
concluded that Curzon’s speech did not represent the policy of the British 
Prime Minister. Therefore, Poincaré did not take up Curzon’s hints hut rather 
reaffirmed his demand for actual payments from the Germans to prove that 
they were genuine in their capitulation.9 Poincaré also wrote to Baldwin on 8 
October complaining about Curzon’s speech, lo
4 FO 371 8659, C18675/1/18: FO minute by Crowe, 2,10.23.
5 FO 371 8659, C18675/1/18: FO minute by Crowe, 2.10.23.
6 FO 371 8659, C18675/1/18: FO minute by Crowe, 2.10.23.
7 FO 371 8743, C17141/313/18: Conversation between Curzon and French Ambassador,
3.10.23.
8 Minute by Wigram, 10.10.23 on: FO 371 8744, C17499/313/18: Kilmarnock tel. 379,
9.10.23.
9 FO 371 8657, C17328/1/18: Crewe, tel. 927, 7.10.23.
10 Baldwin Papers, Box 108, Poincaré to Baldwin, letter, 8.10.23.
253
By now Curzon, too, was upset, n  On 6 October, he wrote to Baldwin that the 
French press:
“...are taking the line that there is a difference of policy between 
you and me, and that both the note of August 11 and my speech 
of Friday represented not your views, but mine alone. // This is a 
very serious misrepresentation...// My position is inherently 
weakened if  these tactics of assuming a difference between us 
pass unnoticed and unheeded. . .”12
Baldwin, anxious to avoid any trouble within his government, sent a reply to 
Poincaré on 17 October, and gave a copy of this to Curzon. Although couched 
in friendly terms, its content clearly supported his Foreign Secretary and 
approved the content of Curzon’s speech. 13
On the surface, then, this first British diplomatic initiative had not achieved 
anything, but rather had led to further difficulties between Curzon and 
Poincaré. However, it had two other effects which were probably unintentional 
at this stage but which were to prove very fortunate for Britain in the future. 
First, it increased Poincaré’s uncertainty regarding the entire situation and 
gave him more time in which to lose his grip on policy. Second, the clear and 
now publicly declared British desire to reopen negotiations and Poincaré’s 
obvious refusal to do so, despite Germany’s capitulation, may finally have 
swayed the attitude of the United States government.
Curzon actually thought that the French were plotting to undermine his position and 
secure his dismissal. See Keiger, Poincaré, pp. 300, Wilson, Mominer Post, pp. 200-211.
12 Baldwin Papers, Box, 114: Curzon to Baldwin, letter, 6.10.23.
13 Curzon papers. Mss Eur. F. 112/248: Baldwin to Poincaré, 17.10.23.
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The R ole o f th e  U n ited  S ta tes.
Traditionally, the Foreign Office was always somewhat in the dark regarding 
the attitude of the United States. While officials believed that the American 
government might he sympathetic to their cause, they understood its hands to 
he tied by a pro-French puhHc opinion. This explained Hughes' rather belated 
and inadequate New Haven declaration of 29 December 192214 and the United 
States’ subsequent silence and distance towards the occupation, tinged with 
disapproval (signalled by the withdrawal of United States troops from the 
Rhineland in January 1923). Although the United States continued to 
maintain friendly contact with Britainis , the Foreign Office appreciated that 
the prevalent mood in America was against intervention. 16 This attitude 
appeared justified when in May and June Hughes kept the pro-German 
American Ambassador, Houghton, away from Berlin, and urged France and 
Germany to find a bilateral solution without United States intervention, i? In 
early August America was preoccupied with internal affairs when President 
Harding died and was replaced by Calvin Coolidge.
By October, however, with Coolidge established in the White House, the 
American attitude finally experienced a change. Public opinion at last swung 
against France. There are various explanations for this. First, France 
undoubtedly damaged her image by refusing to negotiate with Germany once 
passive resistance ceased. This French intransigence was highlighted before 
the world by British appeals to her from the Imperial Conference. Lloyd 
George may also have helped matters. On 5 October he began a much 
puhhcised tour of the United States during which he constantly emphasised
14 See above, Chapter I, pp. 56.
15 For example, see above, Chapter II, pp. 103-4 & pp. 115-6.
16 See above. Chapter III, pp. 137-8.
17 Chapter III, pp.137.
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the perilous condition of Europe and the urgent need for American 
intervention. 18 Some American commercial groups also began to push their 
government towards intervention in European affairs, as the degenerating 
conditions there taught them to appreciate their long term stake in European 
prosperity. Finally, Germany's own valiant efforts to stave off collapse won 
her sympathy from a previously hostile public. 19
The combination of all these factors at last freed the American government
from its previous paralysis. On 9 October President Coolidge made a very
important speech in which he said that America still stood by the New Haven
declaration of December 1922:
“...as the American Government had presented a proposal to the 
European nations that an international commission should be 
formed to ascertain Germany’s ability to pay reparations, it will 
rest on that proposition..”20
The British were in fact already considering the possibility of American 
involvement, but had not yet acted, probably because of uncertainty about 
how such a move would be received. At the end of September Bradbury had 
suggested getting France to agree to a joint request for the United States to 
send a full member to the Reparation Commission, arguing that Poincaré 
would find it difficult to refuse this as he had publicly expressed regret at the 
lack of United States involvem ent.21 Curzon actually raised this possibility in 
Cabinet, but commented that: “In the present state of American politics, 
however, he was not very hopeful of a favourable reply, and he was even more 
doubtful as to whether France would agree to approach the American
18 Chilton reported: Mr. Lloyd Greorge’s recent advocacy in his speeches ... of the Hughes’
scheme for the calling of an international non-political commission of experts to determine 
Germany’s capacity to pay has excited a good deal of attention in official circles here and the 
views of President Coolidge on this question have been awaited with much interest.” [FO 
115/2853: Chilton disp. 1230. 10.10.23].
19 For a discussion of American motives, see Kent, Spoils, pp. 229.
20 FO 371 8657, C17662/1/18: Times Extract, 11.10.23.
21 Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. F. 112/201 (b): Crewe to Curzon, 27.9.23.
256
Government on th e subject.”22
There is no reference to any decision having been made on this matter, and the 
American issue was not mentioned in Cabinet again until 15 October.23 It  
seems therefore, that Curzon did not push the American initiative at the end of 
September, preferring to try to put pressure on France by means of his speech 
to the Imperial Conference. Yet when the American government themselves, 
possibly swayed by the recent speeches by Baldwin and Curzon, made the hint 
of involvement, the ground had already been prepared.
The Foreign Office immediately seized the opportunity and were galvanised 
into action. First they needed clarification of the United States position. On 12 
October Curzon sent a telegram to Henry Chilton, the Chargé d’Affaires in 
Washington. This emphasised the importance to the European settlement of 
American co-operation, explained that the British government was already 
busy formulating an enquiry to the United States government when they read 
of President Coolidge’s speech, and said that if such an enquiry would meet a 
favourable reception in the US the British would immediately invite the 
cooperation of the European allies in an official approach to Washington. The 
telegram concluded forcefully that it was the British government’s “firm behef 
that the American government have it in their power to render a great service 
to the security and peace of the world... ”24
On 15 October an encouraging reply was received from Hughes, saying that 
any unanimous communication from the European nations would receive most 
careful and sympathetic consideration by the United States governm ent. 25
22 CAB 23 46, Cabinet meeting on 26.9.23.
23 CAB 23 46, Cabinet meeting on 15.10.23
24 FO 371 8657, C17662/1/18: tel. No. 299 to Chilton (Washington), 12.10.23. See also 
FRUS, 1923, vol. II, p68-70: Chilton to Hughes, 13.10.23.
25 FO 371 8657, C17706/1/18: Chilton, tel. 403, 15.10.23. See also, FRUS, 1923, vol. II, 
p70-73: Hughes to Chilton, 15.10.23.
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The Foreign Office now debated what to do next. Once again it was Crowe’s 
input which was decisive, and once again he wanted to make use of the 
Imperial Conference to give additional weight to the British position. Crowe 
suggested making a sim ultaneous communication from the Imperial 
Conference to France, Italy and Belgium suggesting either a general economic 
conference or an advisory body under the Reparation Commission with an 
American citizen sitting on it. The communication could make it clear that 
Britain preferred the first a l t e r n a t i v e .26 This plan was soon put into action 
and on 19 October a telegram calling for a joint invitation to America was sent 
to Crewe, Graham and Charles Wingfield (the Chargé d’Affaires in Brussels) for 
them to communicate to their respective g o v e m m e n t s .2 7
26 Minute by Crowe, 17.10.23 on: FO 371 8658, 017930/1/18: Chilton, tel. 407, 16.10.23 
(encloses Hughes’ Aide Mémoire, 15.10.23).
27 FO 371 8658, C17931/1/18: Tel. 356 to Paris; 265 to Rome; 112 to Brussels, 19.10.23.
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D om estic-P o litica l P roblem s.
Yet as had happened on previous occasions (for example, over the 11 August
note) this active policy initiative by Curzon received a barrage of criticism
from within the government itself. Once more Derby was the rebel leader, with
Samuel Hoare, Leo Amery and Lloyd Graeme also involved. After a private
meeting between the conspirators over breakfast on 20 O c t o b e r ,28 Derby sent
a letter to Baldwin complaining that communications had been made to
Washington in the name of the Imperial Conference, but with neither the
Cabinet’s nor the Conference’s authorisation:
“...the Cabinet must be consulted before the Foreign Secretary 
takes action of so important a character instead of being faced 
with a fait accompli, and I trust you will give the Foreign 
Secretary to understand that he has no right to speak in the 
name of the Imperial Conference or the Cabinet unless and until 
he has received definite authority for so d o in g .  ”29
Amery reinforced Derby’s criticisms: “I have not written to Curzon myself, 
though sorely tempted to do so. But I think you ought to let him know 
something of what his colleagues feel about his performance. All those who I 
have met are, from their various points of view, equally a n n o y e d .”30
But according to Hankey, Baldwin was as responsible as Curzon for events, 
and therefore it was scarcely surprising that Derby’s criticisms were not acted 
on. Always critical of the Baldwin governmental, and highly scathing about 
B a ld w in  h i m s e l f  32  ^Hankey was aghast at the Imperial Conference episode:
28 See WO 137/12: Derby to Samuel Hoare, 19.10.23; Derby to Leo Amery, 19.10.23; and 
Derby to Lloyd Graeme, 19.10.23.
29 Derby Papers, 920 DER (17), 29/2: Derby to Baldwin, 22.10.23.
30 Baldwin Papers, Box 128, pp. 136-40: Amery to Baldwin, 20.10.23.
31 For example on 11 November Hankey wrote: “I have ... a very low opinion of their ability, 
I regret to say. Curzon is the only first class man, except for Bob Cecil, who is unfortunately 
a crank...” [Hankey Papers: 1/7 (Diaries): 11.11.23]
32 On 9 December, Hankey wrote: “Baldwin, though a nice fellow, is not of the stuff of which 
British Prime Ministers are made, and generally speaking his Government was entirely 
Government by Civil Servants.” [Hankey Papers: 1/7 (Diaries): 9.12.23.]
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“Baldwin has nerve but scant capacity, and, I feel, will not last 
long. He is astonishingly maladroit with his Cabinet... Baldwin 
and Curzon sent the telegraph responding to President Coohdge’s 
hint that he would take part in a Reparations Conference without 
a word to the Dominion’s Prime M i n i s t e r s .”33
However, in view of the huge difficulties which consultation within the Cabinet
on the Ruhr situation had provoked on previous occasions, Baldwin and Curzon
probably acted far more wisely than Hankey accredited them in this time
seeking to railroad their government. Indeed, one of the reasons why British
policy initiatives were on this occasion to have more success was that they
were largely kept away from delay and disagreement in the Cabinet. Certainly
Baldwin and Curzon were successful in pushing through their policy. The
Imperial Conference was not too much of an obstacle. Although its delegates
protested at the lack of consultation they reluctantly went along with the
policy, even though it meant in their view yet more involvement in the
dangerous field of European politics. The Cabinet was barely consulted.
Before 25 October there was some policy d is c u s s io n 3 4  , but even this aroused
the indignation of Crowe. On 25 October he wrote to Bradbury:
“I suppose you heard of the deplorable fiasco of the Cabinet 
discussion on the subject of our recent suggestions regarding the 
Rhineland? It was quite impossible to obtain any decision or to 
get the Cabinet to accept any clear line of p o l i c y . . .”35
After 25 October, and once Amery and Derby’s initial anger at the course of 
events had died down, the Cabinet was merely informed of diplomatic events 
and kept up to date with the exchange of telegrams. It was given little scope to 
really influence the course of e v e n t s . 36 This was largely a result of domestic 
political developments. Baldwin’s speech at Plymouth on 25 October had not 
only been significant in the warning it contained for French involvement with
33 Hankey Papers: 1/7 (Diaries): 11.11.23
34 For example, on 23 October the content of those sections of Baldwin’s speech at Plymouth 
on 25 October which covered Foreign Policy were discussed. [CAB 23 46, Cabinet meeting,
23.10.23.]
35 T194/11, pp. 99: Crowe to Bradbury, 25.10.23.
36 For example, see CAB 23 46: minutes of cabinet meetings on 29.10.23 and 30.10.23.
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the separatists. Baldwin also used it to outline his conversion from Free Trade 
to Protection, a policy change which meant obtaining a new mandate from the 
British public before the next budget. An election was called for December, and 
politicians were therefore im m ediately preoccupied w ith  party and 
constituency politics.
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B rita in ’s D ip lom atic E fforts to  S ecure F rench  Su pp ort for U n ited  
S ta tes In volvem ent, 19 O ctober - 8 N ovem ber 1923.
Safe from the fundamental disagreements over policy which had divided the 
Cabinet and so hampered their efforts in August, the Foreign Office were now 
free to concentrate on their plans with little interference from the politicians. 
Even Curzon began to take a back seat once electioneering was really under 
way. However, at least for the time being, he was busily engaged in trying to 
secure a favourable response to the communication of 19 October.
First he tried to bully the Belgians. On 24 October he warned the Belgian 
Ambassador of the dangers if they “banged the door in the face of possible 
American cooperation” and emphasised the need for a “general bona fide 
conference of representatives of the Great P o w e r s .”37 He concluded with the 
threat: “...what was there to prevent the British Government from summoning 
a conference itself...? Would it be possible... for any Power... to r e f u s e ? ”38
Although this time both Baldwin and Curzon did want to press for a settlement 
with aU the force at their disposal, Curzon’s threats were useless. No doubt his 
allies were immune to them by now, particularly after the fiasco of the 11 
August note. On 25 October, the Belgian Ambassador once more saw Curzon 
and told him that his words on 24 October had been too late. Poincaré had 
entirely refused to countenance a general conference, and it was only as a 
result of great Belgian pressure that he was going to agree to an enquiry by 
experts under the Reparation C o m m is s io n .3 9
37 FO 371 8658, C18389/1/18: Conversation between Curzon and Belgian Ambassador,
24.10.23.
38 FO 371 8658, C18389/1/18: Conversation between Curzon and Belgian Ambassador,
24.10.23.
39 Postscript on FO 371 8658, C18389/1/18: Conversation between Curzon and Belgian 
Ambassador, 24.10.23.
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This was confirmed in the French reply, received on 26 October. Poincaré 
agreed in principle to the setting up of an advisory committee of experts by the 
Reparation C o m m is s io n .4 0  Trachtenberg argues that Poincaré’s sudden 
decision to accept an international committee of experts marked “an 
important break with existing pohcy”. Previously he had resented British 
efforts to “pose as mediators” and had been increasingly reluctant to accept 
British intrusion into the Ruhr a f fa ir .  42 That he agreed to the principle of an 
experts’ enquiry at the end of October resulted partly from the overall pressure 
he was under - particularly fi'om the practicahties of the situation in the Ruhr - 
and partly because he himself was confused and had no real plan. Certainly 
this was the conclusion the British drew from the information they received. 
They found no evidence that Poincaré was, in McDougall’s interpretation, 
awaiting a “sign” from Britain; that “Poincaré was sacrificing an opportunity to 
crush the concentrations of power represented by the Ruhr and the Reich in 
favour of an international stabifisation he knew to be in France’s, as well as the 
world’s, best interest”; or that “France and Britain now pursued compatible 
reparations p o l i c i e s .”43 Rather, having accepted the principle of an experts’ 
enquiry, Poincaré now backtracked in confusion, and sought to limit the scope 
of any such enquiry. On 29 October the French Chargé d’Afifaires told Cadogan 
that it must be conducted under the auspices of the Reparation Commission, 
and without any derogation of that Commission’s rights under the Treaty, that 
the committee of experts should not include a German, though the German 
case would be heard; that the committee should be of a purely consultative 
capacity; and that Poincaré was determined to hold to the Schedule of
40 FO 371 8658, C18460/1/18: FO minute by Crowe, 26.10.23.
41 Trachtenberg, Reparation, pp. 331.
42 Trachtenberg, Reparation, pp. 330.
43 McDougall, France's, pp. 294-5.
263
Payments of May 1 9 2 1 .4 4  Crowe was made very angry by these conditions 
and minuted:
“M. Poincaré has no right to stipulate for the exclusion of a 
German expert from the Advisory Committee. Nor has he any 
authority for declaring that the Reparations Commission m ust 
not alter the État de Paiements of May 1921... M. Poincaré by 
his claim is interfering with the Reparations Commission and 
thereby doing the very thing which he falsely accuses HMG of 
advocating, namely infringing the t r e a t y .  ”45
The Italian reply was still outstanding. Apparently Mussolini intended to 
withhold it until after the French answer had been received. Graham 
remarked: “It is evidently Italian idea that if  French reply shows wide 
divergence from British opinion, Italians may be able to frame formula 
reconciling the two points of v ie w .”46
On 27 October the Italian reply arrived. This welcomed the possibility of 
American participation, and suggested that a common invitation to the United 
States government should be issued. But it went on to stress the importance 
of the integrity of the Reparation Commission, and it was clear that the 
Italians, like the Belgians, had come down on the French s i d e . 47 Wigram 
commented that the reply: “seems to be a very successful piece o f ‘h e d g i n g ’.”48 
Crowe was more annoyed: “I informed Signor Preziosi today that M. Mussolini’s 
answer came as a decided d i s a p p o in t m e n t .”49
Despite all their efforts, the British had not managed to secure the support of
44 FO 371 8659, C18704/1/18; Conversation between French Chargé d’Affaires and 
Cadogan, 29.10.23,
45 Minute by Crowe, 29,10.23 on C18704/1/18: Conversation between French Chargé 
d’Affaires and Cadogan, 29.10.23. [This minute is enclosed in FO 371 8658, C18543/1/18: 
Graham tel. 266, 27.10.23.]
46 FO 371 8658, C18463/1/18: Graham, tel. 265, 26.10.23.
47 FO 371 8658, C18543/1/18: Graham, tel. 266, 27.10.23.
48 Minute by Wigram, 29.10.23, on: FO 371 8658, C18543/1/18: Graham, tel. 26,
27.10.23.
49 Minute by Crowe, 29.10.23, on : FO 371 8658, C18543/1/18: Graham, tel. 26, 27.10.23.
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any of the Europeans for their preferred course of an international conference 
to discuss reparations. But the setback was not as great as it appears at first 
glance. According to Crowe, the British had never heen particularly confident 
of enlisting support for a conference a n y w a y .5 0  Although the British favoured 
a conference they were by no means averse to an enquiry under the 
Reparation Commission as long as it was an enquiry on terms which they 
approved. By presenting the allies with the two alternatives, they made it 
virtually impossible for the French to reject both without entirely losing face. 
Indeed, Britain’s continuous diplomatic pressure, coupled with her refusal in 
any way to mitigate Poincaré’s increasing difficulties on the spot, was by now 
having a direct effect on Poincaré’s position. Poincaré was finding him self 
increasingly squeezed. According to the Belgians, Poincaré had really wanted 
to reject both the British proposals, but was forced to accept the second 
against his will:
“M. Jaspar said that M. Poincaré had shown marked ill-humour 
with the Belgian Government for having ‘forced his hand’ by 
deciding on a course of action without previously concerting with 
him. It appeared that M. Poincaré first intended to negative both 
alternatives put forward by His Majesty’s Government...”5i
The British had, by rather clever diplomacy, achieved an important 
development. They had secured the support - at least in theory - of the French, 
Italians, Belgians and Americans for some form of enquiry into the situation 
through the Reparation Commission. Even this som ewhat lim ited  
development had an effect on the Germans. On 28 October, D’Abernon 
reported: “The correspondence w ith W ashington and speech of Prime 
Minister... have made a great impression h e r e .”52
50 On 26 October Crowe commented: “I remain convinced however that France would in no 
case at this stage have agreed to a conference.” [Minute by Crowe, 27.10.23 on: FO 371 
8658, C18463/1/18: Graham, tel. 265, 26.10.23.]
51 FO 371 8659, C18853/1/18: Grahame, tel. 235, 30.10.23.
52 FO 371 8658, C18532/1/18: D’Abemon, tel. 392, 28.10.23.
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The German government tried to encourage progress by submitting to the 
Reparation Commission tbeir own request for a moratorium now that passive 
resistance bad c e a s e d .5 3  This note was on the Reparation Commission’s 
agenda for 30 October. Once more the weakening of Poincaré’s position was 
apparent: under pressure from Léon Delacroix (the Belgian representative on 
the Reparation Commission) Poincaré and Louis Bartbou (the French 
representative on the Reparation Commission) bad agreed to grant the 
Germans a bearing. Bradbury, however, did not want the Reparation 
Commission to become distracted from its primary task - the American 
enquiry - and so opted for delaying tactics over the German i n i t i a t i v e . 54 He 
intimated to Bartbou that: “it seemed to me to be quite impossible to have the 
Germans before us without getting the question of the interpretation of para. 
18 of Annex II brought u p ,”55 and managed to persuade him to adjourn 
consideration of the German appeal on the grounds that “delicate negotiations 
between the Allied Governments are still in c o m p le t e .”56
The German initiative was thus conveniently stalled, leaving it necessary for 
all to concentrate on the British plan of involving the United States in an 
enquiry of experts under the Reparation Commission.57
The Foreign Office now tried to ensure allied support for United States 
involvement. On 30 October, Crewe, Grahame and Graham were instructed to
53 Minute By Wigram on 29.10.23 on: FO 371 8658, C18443/181/18: Communication from 
German Ambassador. [This minute is enclosed in C18543/1/18: Graham tel. 266,
27.10.23.]
54 FO 371 8659, C18785/1/18: Treasury communication, 29.10.23, enclosing letter from 
Bradbury to Chamberlain, 29.10.23.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Bradbury employed exactly the same delaying tactics when the Belgians also presented 
their “Études” proposals, based on their previous memo of 11 June, to the Reparation 
Commission. [FO 371 8657, C17340/1/18: Communication from Belgian ambassador, 
6.10.23]. On 17 October it was agreed between the Treasury, FO and Bradhury that if the 
Belgian proposals were raised in the Reparation Commission they should be sent to the 
Finance Section for detailed study, and, of course, delay. [FO 371 8658, C18047/1/18: FO 
minute by Cadogan, 17.10.23.]
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submit a draft invitation to the United States to France, Belgium and Italy for 
a p p r o v a l.5 8  This telegram emphasised the unanimity of the allies in inviting 
American participation in an enquiry set up by the Reparation Commission 
both to consider Germany's capacity to pay and to recommend a plan to 
secure payments.
Poincaré’s reply soon arrived. Forced against his will to agree to an enquiry, he 
was now exercising his legal mind to try to lim it its terms and conditions. On 
31 October Crewe reported that Poincaré wanted the text of the invitation to 
invite United States participation in an enquiry within the scope o f the 
Reparation Commission to consider Germany’s present capacity (capacité 
actuelle) to p a y .  59 This went even further than the conditions outlined to 
Cadogan on 29 October.
The British were disappointed. Bradbury commented: “If the French
suggestion is accepted by us and the United States, and the enquiry set up on 
terms of reference so hmited, I personally am convinced that it can lead to no 
practical result beyond a further waste of t i m e . . .”60
Crewe tried to explain the French position:
“The second of French conditions may perhaps be prompted by a 
conviction that if the Ruhr occupation came under review result 
would be to show that German inability to pay is direct result of 
French policy. // If this view is correct French government must 
be in a dilemma, either they agree to expert committee and risk 
enquiry into real effects of occupation or they refuse committee in 
order to avoid this risk. Latter course would look rather like a 
confession of failxire.”6i
58 FO 371 8659, C18741/1/18: Tel. 362 to Crewe, tel. 270 to Graham, tel. 115 to Grahame,
30.10.23.
59 FO 371 8659, C18778/1/18: Crewe, tel. 967, 31.10.23. [Italics (mine) indicate the 
passages altered by the French.]
50 FO 371 8659, C18978/1/18: Treasury, communication, 1.11.23, enclosing letter from 
Bradbury to Chamberlain, 1.11.23.
61 FO 371 8659, C19002/1/18: Crewe, tel. 977, 4.11.23.
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W hatever the m otivations behind Poincaré’s actions, he was clearly  
determined to obstruct the type of wide-ranging enquiry which the British and 
Americans thought was essential.
On 1 November the Belgian reply arrived, agreeing to the joint invitation, 
subject to a very minor alteration in phraseology. On 3 November a positive 
Italian reply was also received.62 Reports from America were also 
encouraging and it seemed that the Americans were themselves tentatively 
beginning to apply pressure to France. The American documents show that 
the United States government was becoming alarmed by the prospect of 
German disintegration. On 24 October Paul Logan, the American unofficial 
observer on the Reparation Commission, wrote to Hughes: "... I feel that the 
whole situation hangs in such a fine balance that some mild expression of 
opinion from Washington might sway it...”63 Hughes therefore instructed  
Whitehouse (the American Chargé d’Affaires in Paris) and Logan to object 
strongly, hut informally, to the French government about the present situation 
and to call for action - perhaps an enquiry under the Reparation Commission. 64 
Hughes also saw the French Chargé in Washington on 22 October 65 and on 31 
October.66 On both occasions he emphasised that if  Poincaré insisted on 
placing limits on the scope of a possible enquiry, then it would he abortive. 6V 
The American government was also trying to keep the momentum going 
through press statements. On 31 October Chilton commented:
“Press today states that it was announced yesterday at the
White House that the administration is entirely satisfied with the
progress which has been made since the reparations tangle
62 FO 371 8660, C19007/1/18: Graham, tel. 273, 3.11.23.
63 FRUS, 1923, vol. II, pp. 76-8: Whitehouse (the American Chargé d’Affaires in France) to 
Hughes, tel. , 24.10.23.
64 FRUS, 1923, vol. II, pp. 83-4: Hughes to Whitehouse, 24.10.23. The British heard of this 
objection. [FO 371 8748, C19315/313/18: Mendl, Paris, to Tyrrell, letter, 6.11.23.]
65 FRUS, 1923, vol. II, pp. 79-83: Hughes to Whitehouse, 25.10.23.
66 FRUS, 1923, vol. II, pp. 87-9: Memo by Hughes on Conversation with French Chargé,
31.10.23.
67 The British knew about this last meeting. [FO 371 8659, C18851/1/18: Chilton, tel. 429,
1.11.23.]
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assumed its new phase and it is confident that an investigation 
by the commission of experts will be attended by real results. It 
is stated that the President entertains no doubt that the 
sentiment of the country is in favour of the government doing 
everything possible to bring about a solution of reparations
diificidty.”68
In private, however, the Americans were becoming anxious that the European 
initiative would fail and were pushing Britain for more progress. On 1 
November Chilton reported: “Secretary of State told me this morning he was 
still somewhat in the dark as to what was going on with regard to reparations 
question and reiterated his anxiety to see text of French reply to His M ajestés
Govemment.”69
The British therefore again contacted the French. At this point their tone was
friendly. Crewe was to tell Poincaré that the British, Italians and Belgians had
all agreed on the invitation, but that they could not accept Poincaré’s
alterations and therefore Britain hoped that Poincaré would accept the Belgian
draft.70 Poincaré, however, would not be moved. On 3 November he reiterated
his conditions to C r e w e . The friendly approach having failed, the British
attempted more overt pressure. It was decided to try to make a joint
communication to Poincaré from the United States, Britain, Italy and Belgium
asking him to accept the text of the joint invitation to the United States. On 6
November Chilton, Grahame and Graham were instructed to approach their
respective governments with the proposed text of such a communication to
Poincaré. This communication was quite strongly worded:
“The governments are convinced that the proposed restrictions 
would entirely frustrate the very object which such a committee 
is to serve. To limit the proposed inquiry to Germany’s present 
capacity would be to arrest the committee’s activity on the 
threshold of their labours. Nor is it understood how such 
restriction can be reconciled with the power conferred upon the
68 FO 371 8659, C18828/1/18: Chilton, tel. 427, 31.10.23. See also, FO 115/2854: tel. 433 
from Chilton 3.11.23.
69 FO 371 8659, C18851/1/18: Chilton, tel. 429, 1.11.23.
70 FO 371 8659, C18778/1/18: tel. 363 to Crewe, 1.11.23.
71 FO 371 8659, C19000/1/18: Crewe, tel. 973, 3.11.23.
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Reparation Commission by the treaty of Versailles itself...”72
It is difficult to imagine that the British really expected the allied governments 
to agree to this telegram. On 7 November, Chilton reported that Hughes would 
not associate himself with a joint communication which dealt with the wording 
of a note to the United S t a t e s .7 3  Moreover, when it came to the crunch, the 
Belgians once more deserted the British. Despite the fact that on 6 November 
the Belgian Ambassador in Paris, Baron Gaiffier, told Crewe that “such 
attempts as M. Poincaré was making to limit the scope of the committee’s 
operations would be f u t i l e . . .”74 ; the next day Grahame reported that the 
Belgians would not join in the proposed note to F r a n c e .7 5
The Foreign Office were not happy. Crowe minuted: “This renewed instance of 
Belgian collapse is not perhaps a surprise but it is disappointing. I think we 
must definitely give up all hope of co-operating with B e l g i u m .”76 Wigram 
commented: “The Belgians have evidently let us down thoroughly. Mr. Hughes’ 
press statement is now on the ropes... It looks as if the Enquiry were d e a d .”77
Not until 10 November, when the views of everyone else were known and it
was obvious that no joint communication to Poincare would be made, was the
Italian reply to the British proposed communication to the French received.
Graham reported:
“President of the Council entirely shares your view and is 
prepared to participate in joint representation at Paris... He 
would be prepared to join in a dual representation i f  you thought 
that would be any good. He would also be ready to join in any 
representation at Washington that you might consider u s e f i i l . ”78
72 FO 371 8660, C19027/1/18: tel. 286 to Graham, tel. 127 to Grahame, tel. 337 to Crewe,
6.11.23.
73 FO 371 8660, C19307/1/18: Chilton, tel. 446, 7.11.23.
74 FO 371 8660, C19201/1/18: Crewe, tel. 990, 6.11.23.
75 FO 371 8660, C19251/1/18: Grahame, tel. 241, 7.11.23.
76 Minute by Crowe, 7.11.23 on FO 371 8660, C19251/1/18: Grahame, tel. 241, 7.11.23.
77 Minute by Wigram, 10.11.23, enclosed in FO 371 8818, C19407/16779/18: D’Abemon,
tel. 421, 9.11.23.
78 FO 371 8661, C19472/1/18: Graham tel. 277, 10.11.23.
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Lampson commented on this: “I do not imagine that we are prepared to hank 
upon the wholehearted support which he professes to offer. I should prefer to 
see the text of his message to Paris first!”79
At first sight it appeared that the British attempt to secure a joint invitation
to the Americans had entirely failed. However, as with the choice between the
conference and enquiry, the Foreign Office had once again asked for more in the
hope that, rather than refusing the British request outright, the allies might
concede something. Desperate to avoid a renewed stalemate, the British set
about trying to persuade their allies to pressurise the French separately. This
approach had more success. On 9 November, Grahame saw Jaspar:
“I reproached Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning with his 
negative attitude, saying that he was leaving us in the lurch... //
After considerable argument Minister for Foreign Affairs said I 
might add to the information contained in his aide-mémoire, that 
B elgian  governm ent were exerting them selves without 
intermission in Paris to obtain an agreed and satisfactory form of 
invitation to Washington. ”80
The American reaction was even more encouraging as Hughes agreed that: 
“the United States ambassador might make a separate communication to 
French g o v e r n m e n t . . .”8 i  Reports soon suggested that Hughes was in fact 
putting strong pressure on the French . On 6 November, Hughes met the 
French Ambassador in Washington, Jules Jusserand, and strongly urged him 
to persuade his obstinate premier to relent. 82 Hughes then told Chilton about 
the interview, but said that he was not hopeful of the prospects of moving 
P o in c a r é .8 3  The following day, Hughes’ pessim ism  was justified when 
Jusserand returned to the Secretary and m erely reiterated Poincaré’s
79 Minute by Lampson, 12.11.23 on FO 371 8661, C19472/1/18: Graham tel. 277,
10.11.23.
80 FO 371 8660, C19381/1/18: Grahame, tel. 247, 9.11.23.
81 FO 371 8660, C19307/1/18: Chilton, tel. 446, 7.11.23.
82 FRUS 1923, vol. II, pp. 90-1: Hughes to Herrick (ambassador in France), 6.11.23.
83 FO 371 8660, C19345/1/18: Chilton, tel. 448, 8.11.23.
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conditions. Hughes and Jusserand then had a quite heated interview, ending 
with Hughes saying he “thought the restrictions would make the inquiry
fu tile ”. 84
The Foreign Office were also considering trying to sway Poincaré hy using  
stronger unilateral British measures. On 14 November a letter was sent to 
the Treasury:
“Before contemplating any line of policy which may bring His 
Majesty’s Government face to face with decided French opposition 
on an important issue, it hehoves His Majesty’s Government to 
examine the question of the form of pressure which it might be 
possible to bring to bear upon the French Gk)vernment to induce 
them to adopt an attitude more in harmony with the interests of 
Great Britain. ”85
In other words, was it possible for Britain to use the “financial lever”? 86 It was
not until 3 December that Niemeyer replied to Crowe concerning this. His
report concluded that: “the existence of short term French debts could be made
a very potent lever...” and that in the event of this lever heing used: “It would
be essential that the French government should helieve that G.B. really meant
b u s i n e s s ”87 . This report was deemed important enough to be revised into a full
Cabinet Paper, and circulated to all the ministers. Lampson commented:
“The Treasury make out an overwhelming case and I devoutly 
trust we shall be authorised to take it up. It is abominable that 
the British tax payer should be called upon to find no less than 
£30 million a year for the service of these French loans whilst 
France not only refuses to pay a penny but even goes so far as to 
advance large sums to her satellites.”88
But such unilateral pressure by Britain was to prove unnecessary. It soon 
transpired that the combined effect of the separate Belgian, British, and
84 FRUS 1923, vol. II pp. 91-4; Memo by Hughes on conversation with Jusserand, 7.11.23. 
For the British version, see, FO 371, C19453/1/18: Chilton, tel. 453, 9.11.23.
85 FO 371 8661, C19472/1/18: FO to Treasury, 14.11.23.
86 FO 371 8661, C19472/1/18: FO to Treasury, 14.11.23.
87 FO 371 8662, C22023/1/18: Niemeyer to Crowe, 3.12.23. For the progress of this 
memorandum through the Treasury, see T160/185, file F7029.
88 Minute by Lampson, 20.12.23 on: FO 371 8662, C22023/1/18: Niemeyer to Crowe,
3.12.23.
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particularly American pressure on Poincaré had had some effect. On 8 
November, Bradbury reported to Chamberlain that he thought that the 
French attitude had softened som ewhat aifter the Jusserand-H ughes
meeting. 89
89 FO 371 8661, C19742/1/18; Bradbury to Chancellor of the Exchequer, 8.11.23.
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B radbury’s R ole and D evelop m ents w ith in  th e  R eparation
C om m ission,
8 N ovem ber - 26 D ecem ber 1923.
On 13 November, Bradbury reported that the Reparation Commission had 
considered Germany’s note to the Commission of 24 October, which had 
previously been stalled, and that the Commission had unanimously decided to 
hear the Germans. The date for the hearing had been provisionally set for 23 
November.90 At the same time Barthou^i officially proposed that a 
committee of experts should be set up to estimate Germany’s present capacity 
to pay. Clearly Poincaré was by now desperate. Unable to avoid some kind of 
expert enquiry, his last chance was to try to force through one on his own 
terms. In doing this he had taken a huge risk, as he had put the proposal for 
some kind of enquiry officially before the Reparation Commission. Bradbury 
reserved his vote on this Barthou proposal until after the hearing of the 
German delegates which was to take place on Friday November 23.92
Both the Treasury and the Foreign Office were initially extremely dubious
about this development. On 16 November, Niemeyer wrote to Bradbury
“The enquiry - in so far as it may be intended to masquerade as 
that of “independent and impartial experts” seems to me wholly 
futile... In view of the Une that His Majesty’s Government and the 
United States of America have taken that a Umited enquiry is 
useless I imagine that neither you nor Logan will assent to this 
enquiry or take any part in any such proceedings. I suppose the 
Italians might take the same line.”93
90 FO 371 8661, 020098/1/18: Bradbury to Treasury, 13.11.23.
91 For more information on Barthou, see R.J. Young, Power and Pleasure: Louis Barthou 
and the Third French Republic. (Montreal. 1991), particularly pp. 175-6.
92 Minute by Sterndale Bennett, 21.11.23 on FO 371 8661, 020094/1/18: Treasury 
Oommunication, 16.11.23. [This minute is filed at FO 371 8661, 020098/1/18: Bradbury to 
Treasury, 13.11.23.]
93 FO 371 8661, 020094/1/18: Niemeyer to Bradbury, letter, 16.11.23.
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Discussing the Barthou proposal with the Italian Chargé d’Affaires on 26
November, Lampson said:
“I personally was very doubtful whether we should find it possible 
to agree to the setting up of such a committee. After all, the 
much bigger suggestion of a formal commission of enquiry had 
quite recently miscarried owing to the lim itations which the 
French had sought to impose upon the scope of its activities; I 
could not see that this much smaller body of which he now spoke 
would be of much use to any one.”94
However, while the original Barthou proposal was unacceptable, Bradbury - in 
collusion with Crowe - was busy with delicate negotiations to try to get a 
compromise which would render a solution possible. It is significant that 
ultimately it was when the officials were left to themselves, in the closed forum 
of the Reparation Commission, and without the distraction of the politicians 
(who were in any case preoccupied at this time with the general election) that a 
working solution was finally found. It is also significant that Bradbury finally 
managed to get Barthou to agree to a compromise of two committees and that 
Barthou forced this agreement on Poincaré, Clearly Poincaré was by this 
stage no longer in control of the situation.
As soon as it had become clear that the battle was to be fought in the
Reparation Commission, Bradbury had been trying to ensure a British victory.
At the end of October he wrote to Crowe: “I believe that if you leave me to my
own resources I shall be able either to get an enquiry which will result in real
progress or to kill the project altogether very quickly..,”95 Once Barthou
proposed an enquiry into Germany's present capacity, Bradbury increased his
efforts and began working to try to amend it. He was aided by his belief that
Poincaré’s own position was degenerating:
“Six weeks ago, nine Frenchmen out of ten had for Poincaré the 
enthusiasm which a soldier has for a general whom he believes to 
be leading him to victory; now they have merely the devotion 
which a soldier has to a general whom he believes to be the only
94 FO 371 8662, C20560/1/18: Minute by Lampson, 26.11.23.
95 T194/11, pp. 105: Bradbury to Crowe, 26.10.23.
275
man who can get him out of a tight place. Things have only to 
look a little blacker to shake his confidence and provide a 
discussion of the desirability of a change in the c o m m a n d .”96
By the end of November Bradbury had at last made some progress w ith
Barthou. He explained to Crowe that he had for some time been engaged in
confidential negotiations with all the other representatives on the Reparation
Commission - including the American unofficial representative, to try to get a
viable committee established. In the course of these discussions, Bradbury:
"... hit upon the plan of suggesting the appointment of two 
committees, one of which would be charged with the investigation 
of German balances abroad, whilst the other would attack the 
main questions at issue. This suggestion has met with a 
favourable reception, and, although as yet not definitely  
approved, has apparently every chance of being accepted by the 
members of the Reparation C o m m is s io n . . .”97
The plan was that the second committee, dealing with the German balances 
abroad, would soon discover that it could not arrive at any satisfactory  
conclusions, and so would not in fact do anything. However, its existence would 
save the face of the French and make it possible for them to accept the first 
committee, which would have very wide terms of reference and so would be 
compelled to go into the whole question of German reparation, capacity to p ay, 
moratorium, administration of the Ruhr, and so on. In return for these huge 
concessions from the French, Bradbury consented to drop the proposal for a 
German being a member of the c o m m i t t e e .98 Even before Crowe informed 
Curzon of this development, Bradbury had submitted the entire scheme to 
Baldwin. Baldwin entirely approved, and said that the Foreign Secretary 
should he consulted, "in the hope that it wiU win his assent a l s o .”99
Thus the crucial developments in the whole negotiation stage had happened
96 T160/175/F46858: Bradbury to Niemeyer, 17.11.23.
97 FO 371 8662, C20619/1/18: Memo by Crowe, 27.11.23.
98 FO 371 8662, C20619/1/18: Memo by Crowe, 27.11.23.
99 FO 371 8662, C20619/1/18: Memo by Crowe, 27.11.23.
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with very little input from the poHticians. In all cases they were presented 
with a virtual fait accompli by their officials. Crowe told Curzon: “I think we 
may unhesitatingly express approval and authorise Sir John Bradbury to 
proceed on the lines he has indicated” lOO ; while Bradbury explained of the 
Belgians that he: “thought it was unnecessary for us to speak to the Belgians, 
as M. Delacroix was apparently prepared to take on himself the responsibility 
of agreeing rather than bringing in his Grovemment.”ioi Bradbury did think  
that diplomatic channels should be used to en list the Italians, and so, 
obediently, Crowe saw Signor Preziosi to solicit support. 102
On 30 November the decisive meeting in the Reparation Commission was 
held. 103 Bradbury’s efforts paid off. The resolution to set up two committees 
was accepted u n a n im o u s ly .  104 The first committee would enquire into how to 
balance the German budget and to restore the currency; and the second would 
consider what measures could be adopted to ascertain the amount and secure 
the repatriation of exported German capital.
Attention now focussed on getting rapid and decisive American support and 
influence. Bradbury sent a telegram to Crowe on 30 November advising the 
government to approach Washington c o n f i d e n t i a l l y , los and accordingly, on 1 
December Curzon sent a telegram to Chilton for him to communicate to 
Hughes. The telegram explained the continuation of negotiations within the 
Reparation Commission; outlined the proposal to establish two committees of 
enquiry instead of the previous suggestion of one; and asked whether American
100 FO 371 8662, C20619/1/18: Memo by Crowe, 27.11.23.
101 FO 371 8662, C20619/1/18: Memo by Crowe, 27.11.23.
102 Minute by Crowe, 28.11.23 on: FO 371 8662, C20560/1/18: Minute by Lampson,
26.11.23.
103 FO 801/10: Minutes of the Reparation Commission, Meeting 407, Decisions 2719a and 
2720, 30.11.23.
104 FO 371 8662, C20802/1/18: Bradbury to Treasury, 30.11.23.
105 FO 371 8662, C20912/1/18: Crewe tel. unnumbered, 30.11.23, enclosing message for 
Crowe, from Bradbury.
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experts would in these circumstances be encouraged to participate.
Understandably the Americans were rather wary of believing that Poincare
bad suddenly agreed to accept the enquiry, lo? Complicated negotiations within
the Reparation Commission ensued, with Logan trying to get a letter from
Barthou which would satisfy Hughes that the French had genuinely hacked
d o w n . 108 Barthou was clearly desperately trying to ensure American
participation. Bradbury commented:
“As regards Barthou’s own attitude, I remain convinced that he is 
anxious to go as far as he dare in the direction of agreement with 
ourselves and America. He will do his best to take Poincaré along 
with him, and will even be prepared to fight Poincaré when, hut 
not until, he thinks it politically safe to do s o .”i09
Barthou was apparently successful. On 5 December Bradbury reported that
Logan, Barthou and Delacroix had concocted a letter to Logan, from Barthou,
which Logan could show to Hughes. While Bradbury expressed concern that
this letter’s: “whole tone is far more appropriate to a French newspaper article
designed to cover M. Poincaré’s retreat than to a demonstration for the
satisfaction of the U nited States Government that he has, in fact,
retreated”iio - he was hopeful that the United States government would
appreciate this and would agree to participate, m
On 11 December the Americans announced that they felt the proposed 
committees would be useful, and as the proposal had been made hy the French 
delegate and president of the Reparation Commission, and had been supported
106 FO 371 8662, C20912/1/18; Chilton, tel. 370, 1.12.23, This official telegram was 
needed from HMG to the US government as, until this point, Logan had been acting in a 
strictly unofficial capacity in his negotiations within the Reparation Commission.
107 FRUS 1923, vol. II, pp. 101-2: Phillips (Acting Secretary of State) to Herrick, 30.11.23.
108 FO 371 8662, C21068/1/18: Bradbury to Crowe, 3.12.23.
109 FO 371 8662, C21156/1/18: Bradbury to Tyrrell, 5.12.23.
110 Ibid.
111 For Logan’s communication to the US government enclosing this letter, see FRUS, 1923, 
vol. II, pp. 102-4, Herrick to Hughes, 6.12.23.
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by all the other nations’ members, they would agree to the participation of 
American e x p e r t s .  112
Now all that remained was for the actual committees to he set up. The
experts were to he appointed hy the Reparation Commission, hut to he
nominated hy the various governments c o n c e r n e d . T h i s  procedure could
have provided Poincaré with yet more opportunity for delay and difficulty, hut
the French were suddenly perturbed hy the British election results and hy
fears that a change in government might bring with it a completely new and
unknown foreign poHcy. On 14 December Crewe reported:
“...since the results of the General Elections in the United  
Kingdom have been known public and official opinion in this 
country has been distinctly perturbed with regard to the effect on 
Anglo-French relations. A feeling prevails that the French 
government has allowed to slip an opportunity which may never 
recur of improving the chances of co-operation between the two 
countries. A natural result of this state of affairs has been a 
desire to avoid taking any step here which would he likely to 
complicate a delicate and somewhat uncertain situation. This 
may he said to some extent to have brought about an 
atmosphere of accommodation due to the realisation hy the 
French government of the danger of doing anything at present 
directly contrary to the views of His Majesty’s Government.
On 13 December Bradbury reported that the French were surprised at the 
election results as they had expected Baldwin to get a majority: “I think, 
therefore, that between now and the 8th January, the French Government will 
he at some pains to avoid any acute c o l l i s i o n . . .”H 5
With the French anxious to avoid any further controversies, and the British 
politicians entirely preoccupied with the fluid political situation, the 
nominations, invitations and appointments of the committees of experts
112F0 371 8662, C21403/1/18: Chilton, tel. 499, 11.12.23.
113 Minute by Lampson, 13.12.23 on: FO 371 8662, C21507/1/18: Treasury
communication, 12.12.23.
114 FO 371 8752, C21607/313/18: Crewe, disp. 2835, 14.12.23.
115 FO 371 8662, C21553/1/18: Bradbury to Tyrrell, 13.12.23. Also see FO 371 8662,
C21156/1/18: Bradbury to Tyrrell, 5.12.23.
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passed off remarkably smoothly. Only Curzon was unhappy with events. In 
an undated minute enclosed in a dispatch from Graham of 20 December he 
commented:
“...Sir J. Bradbury claiming the power of a dictator goes against 
my will, in spite of my earnestly expressed wish to him, consults 
the head of other parties, as though he were Prime Minister, and 
openly appoints a politician in the person of Mr. McKenna. And 
all this seems to be thought right. I regard it as in d e f e n s i b l e . . .”H 6
Curzon’s uncharitable outburst probably owed more to his resentment at 
having been sidelined in the ultim ate settlem ent, and to his anger that 
Bradbury’s successes had enabled him to assume such an important role in 
the whole affair. Certainly it seemed that a solution had at last been found. 
On 26 December the Reparation Commission transmitted a communiqué 
giving the names of the representatives on the two committees. The First 
Committee was to meet on 14 January, and the Second on 21 January 1924. 
The committees were established as follows:
F irst C om m ittee;!!?
US: General Charles G. Dawes y Chairman of the Board of the
Central Trust Co., Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
Mr. Owen D. Young, Chairman of the Board of the General 
Electric Co.
Britain: Sir Robert MolesworthKindersley,G.^.Yt., Chairman of Lazard
Brothers, Ltd., Director of the Bank of England; Governor of the 
Hudson Bay Company; Chairman of the National Savings 
Committee.
SirJosiah Charles Stamp, KB.E., D.S.O., F.C.I.S., Secretary to 
the Nobel Industries ,Ltd., and formerly Assistant Secretary to 
the Board of Inland Revenue.
France: M. Parmentier, formerly Director of the Mouvement Général des
fonds in the Finance Ministry; Administrator of the Crédit foncier 
de France.
M. Alix, Professor in the Faculty of Law of Paris.
116 Minute by Curzon, undated, on: FO 371 8662, C22017/1/18: Graham tel. 301,
20.12.23.
117 FO 371 8663, C22416/1/18: Communication from Reparation Commission, 26.12.23.
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Italy: Dr. Alberto Pirelli, Industrialist.
Professor Federico Flora, Professor of the Science of Finance at 
the University of Bologna.
Belgium : Baron Maurice Houtart, Member of the Chambre des
Représentants.
M. Emile Francqui, Ministre d"État; Vice-Governor of the Société 
générale de Belgique.
Second  C om m ittee:ii8
US: Mr. Henry M. Robinson, Chairman of the First National Bank of
Los Angeles.
B ritain: The Rt. Hon. Reginald McKenna, P.C., Chairman of the Midland
Bank, formerly Chancellor of the Exchequer.
F rance: M. Laurent Atthalin, Director of the Banque de Paris et des Pays-
Bas.
Italy: Dr. Mario Alberti, Vice-General Director of the Credito Italiano.
Belgium : M. Albert Edouard Janssen, Director of the Banque nationale de
Belgique.
118 FO 371 8663, C22416/1/18: Communication from Reparation Commission, 26.12.23.
281
C onclusion
Recent historians tend to agree that at the end of September Poincaré failed to 
capitalise on the opportunity he had secured. It does seem likely that 
Poincaré could have avoided involvement with the separatists and MICUM 
agreements and could have secured a bilateral agreement with Grermany once 
passive resistance ceased. Although the terms of such an agreement might 
not have been entirely to his liking, Poincaré would have been able to maintain 
the initiative and retain a dominant position for France at the negotiating 
table. He could have presented the agreement to the Allies as a virtual fait 
accompli. As my research has shown, it would have been very difficult for 
Britain and the United States entirely to block such a course of events, 
especially if in pursuing it Poincaré had avoided the separatists charade and 
the loss of face he in fact suffered by refusing to negotiate with a prostrate and 
apparently supplicant Germany. The chaotic and confused state of British 
policy by the end of the sununer 1923 must also not be underestimated.
The question remains: why did Poincaré act as he did? While the purpose of 
this thesis is not to become embroiled in the complex and much debated field of 
French foreign policy, an intensive examination of Britain’s position has 
provided some insights. Both McDougall and Keiger suggest that Poincaré 
procrastinated because he wanted support from Britain. Yet if  this was the 
case, why were the British so entirely unaware of it? Similarly, if  “Poincaré 
never deintemationalised r e p a r a t i o n s ”i20   ^ then why did the British identify 
such reluctance and inconsistency in his behaviour regarding an expert 
enquiry: refusing to negotiate, then agreeing to an enquiry, then backtracking
119 Trachtenberg, Reparation, pp. 311; Rupieper, Cuno. pp. 234; McDougall, France’s, pp. 
293; Keiger, Poincaré, pp. 305.
120 McDougall, France’s, pp. 298.
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and imposing conditions so harsh as to make it fiitile, then allowing Barthou to 
table a separate motion for a lim ited enquiry, and so on? Rather, as 
Trachtenberg argues, the conclusion seems to be that Poincaré him self was 
confused, and having secured a victory over Germany in the Ruhr, was unsure 
what to do with it. Partly this confusion may have resulted from the  
increasingly overwhelming nature of the situation on the spot in the Ruhr. 121 
It may also have owed something to domestic-pohtical considerations. Keiger 
emphasises Poincare's desire to maintain the moderate middle-ground in the 
French Chamber. Anxious that he was relying too much on the Right, 
Poincaré sought to use foreign policy moderation and cooperation with the 
United States and Britain to reoccupy the centreground by appeasing the 
Radicals. 122 Whatever the reasons, the results were the conflicting and 
confused signals and general poUcy degeneration in France that the British 
identified.
This degeneration in the consistency and fbrcefulness of French policy, coupled 
with the fact that the United States was at last more responsive to the idea of 
intervention - however informal - in European affairs, was certainly fortunate 
for the British. Aided by these factors, the British were at last able to recover 
from their foreign policy low of the summer of 1923. Moreover, once passive 
resistance ended the European situation was at last more fluid. France and 
Germany were no longer so polarised, and compromise seemed a possibihty, 
however remote. At last the British had a viable role. An agenda of aims was 
established and the British gradually tried to push the French and United 
States towards them.
The B ritish  policy-making process also recovered from its previous 
fragmentation. At the highest level a clearer direction was given to policy than
121 See above, Chapter V, pp. 219-247,
122 Keiger, Poincaré, pp. 305.
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during the summer. Baldwin played a crucial role. For example, Crowe liaised 
directly with him over the Imperial Conference speech on 5 October; while 
Bradbury submitted the final Reparation Commission solution to Baldwin 
before Curzon had seen it. Moreover, Baldwin also no longer allowed Cabinet 
differences to compromise policy. Unlike in August, in October Derby's 
criticisms had little impact. However, while Baldwin played a leading role, it 
would he wrong to dismiss Curzon at this stage as being on the sidelines. On 
the contrary, the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary worked together. For 
example, Baldwin supported Curzon and shielded him from Poincaré’s October 
complaints, while Curzon always tried to cooperate with Baldwin’s wishes and 
so, for instance, made the 5 October speech. Furthermore, Curzon worked 
hard to obtain success for the policy of involving the United States, supporting 
it and pushing it ahead whenever possible hy diplomatic means.
Certainly as important as the relationship at the top was the smooth-running 
teamwork of the administration when compared to previous months. This was 
particularly the case once the election campaign got underway and politicians 
were preoccupied w ith constituency and party politics. Lines of 
communication between the three key figures - Crowe, Niemeyer and 
Bradbury - were excellent regarding international reparation developments. All 
three were in complete accord over the course of action to be taken and 
gradually pushed matters forward from behind the scenes. It is certainly 
significant that it was Bradbury who, with Niemeyer and Crowe’s support, was 
ultimately so influential in finding an acceptable compromise.
Thus the British position at the end of December was entirely different from 
the middle of September. The shift had been gradual. For example, problems 
and differences within the Cabinet had continued, at least during October; the 
Treasury had wanted a more forceful policy towards France than did the
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Foreign Office; and on several occasions the attempt to involve the United 
States had almost foundered. But at last the British had been able to play a 
more positive and consistent part. Partly the responsibility for this lies with 
circumstances - the more fluid nature of the Ruhr Crisis, the change of attitude 
in Washington and the degeneration of French policy. Yet British policy itself 
had also recovered. Throughout the autumn it developed a clarity of overall 
purpose and a depth and consistency in coordination and implementation 
which had been lacking during the summer. On 26 December - exactly one 
year to the day after the initial declaration of voluntary Gurman default had 
been made - the Reparation Commission officially announced the composition 
of the committees of experts. It remained to be seen how their investigations 
would conclude, and whether the conclusions would be acted upon.
285
Chapter VII.
R eso lu tion  at Last, Jan u ary  - A ugust, 1924.
At the turn of the New Year the British political scene was thrown into 
confusion. In November 1923 Baldwin dropped his protectionist bombshell and 
scheduled an election for 6 December. The results of the poll left the 
Conservatives without an overall majority; while the Labour Party gained the 
second largest number of seats (Conservatives 259; Labour 191; Liberals 
159). The situation was extremely volatile, and much depended on the attitude 
of the Liberal Party. On 18 December Asquith declared that his party would 
not keep the Conservatives in power and would not combine against a Labour 
government. It seems that Asquith hoped to discredit the Labour Party by 
allowing it to assume office in circumstances where it had little real power or 
room for manoeuvre. At the same time, the Liberal ploy provided Labour with 
a golden opportunity, and the party’s leader seized it.
On 22 January Baldwin left office and MacDonald was sworn in. He soon 
appointed his Cabinet, keeping the key position of Foreign Secretary for 
himself. This preoccupation of the Prime Minister with foreign policy was 
crucial. Partly it stemmed simply from his own interest in it and from his belief 
that if normal international conditions were resumed, domestic problems (such 
as unemployment) would automatically diminish. But, crucially, it was also 
because of MacDonald’s own party-political objectives. MacDonald’s primary 
objective was to prove that Labour was fit to govern. This would establish the 
Labour Party as the main left-wing force, irrevocably marginalise the Liberals 
and secure the reestablishment of a two-party system. To do this the Labour 
ministers had to appear totally respectable and responsible in the eyes of both
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the British public and the world. i What better area to achieve this than in the 
field of foreign affairs, especially as the Parliamentary party balance meant 
that it would be extremely difficult to do anything significant on domestic 
issues anyway?
Anxious to achieve this respectability, MacDonald decided to follow the path
laid out by his predecessors: he would wait for the experts reports and then
push for their adoption. Crewe summed up MacDonald’s strategy. “Speaking
generally, the programme is to do nothing marked or conspicuous at any rate
until the expert committees have issued their reports, and possibly not t h e n . ” 2
MacDonald himself noted in his diary on 3 February
“Have made up my mind as to policy. France must have another 
chance. I offer co-operation but she must be reasonable and 
cease her policy of selfish  security. That is my first job. 
Armaments and such problems that are really consequences 
must wait. The “weather” must be improved. Seriously, I see it 
is to take years of steady consistent work, and my official life 
may only be one of months.”^
In opting for this course MacDonald was, like his predecessors, guided by the 
fundamental principle of avoiding potentially dangerous commitments. 
Rather, MacDonald hoped to take a small step towards a peaceful world order 
and genuine community of nations - based on the League - by first solving the
1 David Marquand explains MacDonald’s predicament clearly, saying that MacDonald’s 
number one objective was to destroy the Liberals and establish Labour as the main 
opposition: “To do this, they had to trump the Liberals’ cards. They had to show that the 
jibes of the Liberal press were without foundation, that working men could hold the highest 
offices of state with dignity and authority, that although they might lack experience they 
were neither wild nor incompetent...” [D. Marquand, Ramsav MacDonald. (London, 1977), 
pp. 312. Marquand’s biography provides much interesting detail and analysis of 
MacDonald’s foreign pohcy. See especially pp. 333-351.
2 Phipps Papers, Box 2/2, pp. 6: Crewe to Phipps, 5.2.24.
3 McDonald Papers, PRO/30/69/1753, part 1: Diaries, pp. 181, 3.2.24. [My underlining]
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damaging and divisive reparation is s u e . 4 In practice, this meant, as Hankey 
summarised, that MacDonald “dislikes all schemes for a British guarantee to 
F r a n c e ”5 and that British policy was effectively “one of helping Europe as 
much as we can without undertaking c o m m it m e n t s . ’’^
In adopting this course, MacDonald may also have been influenced hy the 
inability of his administration to offer him any practical alternatives. 
Interestingly, both the Foreign Office and the War Office - for entirely different 
reasons- impressed on MacDonald the need for Britain somehow to solve 
France’s security dilemma. But at the same time, both departments also 
recognised Britain’s inability to assume additional military commitments, and 
so had no practical solutions to offer.
The Foreign Office was fundamentally Francophobie:
“...a glance at the map wiU show that by possessing the Rhineland 
the French would almost encircle Belgium, and would be in a 
position to drive a wedge through the centre of Holland. French 
military possession of the Rhineland would seem, therefore, to 
be... an indirect menace to this country. In fact, the question of 
the Rhineland is not merely a question of French security; it 
involves British security also...// The crux of the matter then is 
the problem of security. The present French domination in the 
Rhineland arises immediately out of the lapse of the guarantee 
treaty with Great Britain and America. Some arrangement 
must, therefore be sought which will be a substitute for these  
treaties and in return for which France m ust undertake to 
renounce her control over the Rhineland. At the same time that 
arrangement must be one which does not compromise essential 
British mihtary and economic interests.”7
4 These plans of MacDonald’s are clear from the letter he wrote to Poincaré on 21 February 
(see FO 371 9812, C2942/1288/18; MacDonald to Poincare, letter, 21.2.24), in which 
MacDonald said: “To my mind the problem of security is not merely a French problem; it is a 
European problem... Our task... must be to establish confidence... It is a matter, I believe, 
in which the League of Nations, both by discussion and eventual action, might play an 
important part. It is a policy in support of which the assent and goodwill of every European 
country would have to be enlisted...”.
5 Hankey papers, 4/16: Hankey to Smuts, 1.4.24.
6 Hankey papers, 4/16: Hankey to Smuts, 22.5.24.
7 MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/115: 02028/1346/18: Memo by Sterndale Bennett on 
British policy in the Rhineland, 5.2.24.
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On the other hand, the War Office saw Germany, not France as the problem:
“The French possession of the Rhineland does not affect the 
security of England at the hands of France in any degree 
whatever. Germany is bound to require room for expansion at a 
later date and France will not be able to resist that need when it
comes.”8
The War Office emphasised that Germany had a much higher manpower
potential than France, and therefore France:
“...must be always on the look out for her own preservation. She 
knows where a war with us would lead her; she knows the 
advantages that Germany would take out of it; and, even if she 
wished to fight us, she would not dare do it. Great Britain can 
therefore rest assured that France, whatever her actual 
territorial position on the continent is no danger to England. On 
the contrary, it is clear fi o^m these same figures [ie manpower] 
that in course of time Germany will again clash with Great 
Britain. This clash is inevitable, and, fundamentally, it will be 
simply a repetition of the conditions which brought us into the 
late war...// The conclusion, therefore is that not only is France, 
however extravagant a search for security she may indulge, no 
danger to us, but that her security is ours. France is a nation 
bent only on self-preservation. France and Great Britain are 
military necessities to each other - France to us as a buffer 
between ourselves and Germany, and we to France as covering 
her on all fronts except the German one.”9
The War Office, therefore, like the Foreign Office agreed that the fundamental 
necessity was to ensure French security. How this could be done, however, 
was not satisfactorily decided. Like the Foreign Office, the War Office was 
adamant that the solution should “entail no military commitments for us on 
the Continent! !!”io and that Britain could not accept “what would amount to 
an obligation to maintain our mihtary strength at a standard dictated either by 
growing French weakness or growing German strength.”!! In fact all the War 
Office could in practice suggest was the vague hope that the development of 
‘world opinion’ would help:
“The only effective expression of world opinion is an actual and
8 MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/115: C5185/1346/18: WO to FO, 28.3.24.
9 MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/115: 05185/1346/18: WO to FO, 28.3.24. 
!0 WO 190/23: Memo (unsigned), 29.2.24,
!!  WO 190/23: Memo (unsigned), 29.2.24.
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active combination of influential supporters of world opinion 
against any nation that shows signs of ignoring it. That is an 
alliance and the value of the League will be in the opportunities it 
aflbrds of creating alliances ad hoc in such situations as the one 
we visualise of Germany running amok. // It is to such a 
development, in my opinion that France m ust look for her 
ultimate v ic t o r y .”i2
This essentially  was the approach MacDonald adopted - hoping that hy 
removing points of issue the “weather” could be improved and then, eventually, 
the League strengthened.
Before exam ining MacDonald’s attempts to achieve these aims, some 
background is needed: first, contextually by a brief examination of the French 
and German situations; and second, by sketching in developments on the 
ground in the Ruhr and Rhineland.
12 w o  190/23: Memo (unsigned), 29.2.24.
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The E uropean C ontext
The first months of 1924 were a time of crisis for France. The cost of the Ruhr 
occupation, coupled with France’s inadequate taxation system, finally took 
their toll and in January the franc collapsed. Believing the only way to restore 
confidence and stability to be by reforming taxation, Poincaré tried to introduce 
fiscal reform. He met huge domestic opposition. Not until 22-3 February was 
the fiscal package finally passed by the French Chamber, and it still had to be 
cleared hy the Senate. Poincare was exhausted, and the situation remained 
chaotic. At the end of February speculation again hit the franc. 13 France now 
lacked sufficient financial reserves to save the currency, and so Poincaré had 
to look further afield for help. He turned to JP Morgan. The American banker 
offered to lend France $100 million on condition that the fiscal package was 
passed by the French Senate. After yet more pohtical turmoil within France, 
Morgan’s terms were accepted. On 12 March the rout of the speculators 
began, and by 24 March the battle for the franc had been won.i4
Although the immediate crisis was over, the ramifications remained great. The 
fact that France was now dependent on international financial aid entailed 
diplomatic constraints, making it virtually impossible for Poincaré seriously to 
object to any of the provisions of the experts’ reports. As Bradbury explained to 
Snowden on 12 March: “They have... to swallow anything on which the
13 The French government, perhaps understandably, suspected international involvement to 
try to decrease French strength. After all, a weaker France would be much easier to deal 
with over the Ruhr than a strong one. Stephen SchukeFs research shows that these 
suspicions were unfounded. The run on the franc was precipitated by unease and 
speculation within France, and even when foreign holders began to sell it was for legitimate 
reasons, such as the French government’s inability to pass the financial reforms. Indeed, 
Schuker finds that even though the British did consider using the financial weapon, they 
decided against it. [S. Schuker, The End of French Predominance in Europe: the Financial 
Crisis of 1924 and die Adoption of the Dawes Plan. (Chapel HiU, 1976), pp. 98-104].
14 For more on the French financial situation see P. Bernard and H. Dubief, The Decline of 
the Third Republic. 1914-1938 (Cambridge, 1985); Keiger, Poincaré, and especially Schuker, 
End. Chapters 2, 3 and 4.
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Americans choose to insist...”is This argument is emphasised by Stephen  
Schuker in his authoritative work on The end of French Predominance in 
Europeis . However, while the financial collapse might have affected France’s 
diplomatic independence, it was not necessarily decisive. Even had France 
been economically secure it would have been exceptionally difficult to have 
objected substantially to a report produced by an international body of highly  
respected experts - a report which Poincaré had him self agreed to sanction in 
December 1923, before the collapse of the franc had taken place, and at a time 
when he should have been operating from a position of strength. Rather, the 
more tangible impact of the currency collapse and its attendant political chaos 
was on the French domestic-political scene. They were major factors in 
Poincaré’s defeat in the general elections of May 1924. His replacement by the 
more Leftwing and pro-Anglo-American Edouard Harriot was a significant gain 
for the British position, and cooperation between MacDonald and Herriot was 
vital for the success of the London Conference in the summer of 1924.
At the very time when the financial situation in France reached crisis 
proportions, the position in Germany strengthened. The critical period 
immediately subsequent to the cessation of passive resistance had passed. 
The establishment of the committees of experts and gradual dismantling of the 
more extreme aspects of Franco-Belgian control, coupled with the financial and 
currency measures taken by the Stresemann and Marx Cabinets, were at last 
paying dividends. Germany’s budget deficit for January 1924 was only 2 
million German Marks, as compared with 33 million in December 1923,17 and 
by March the Reich finances revealed a modest surplus, is The British were 
aware of the implications of German recovery. D’Abemon commented on 17
15 FO 371 9739, 04525/70/18: Bradbury to Snowden, 12.3.24.
16 Schuker, End. This is an excellent work, meticulously researched and making extensive 
use of British as well as French, German and American archival material,
17 FO 371 9792, C2108/371/18: D’Abemon, tel. 51, 6.2.24.
18 FO 371 9793, C5854/371/18: D’Abemon, tel. 132, 7.4.24.
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January.
“France had a great opportunity to negotiate some arrangement 
with Germany during the first months of the Stresemann  
Government... Now it is thought that negotiations will be more 
difhcult: The Germans have become stiffer - partly on account of 
the stabilisation of their own currency, but still more on account 
of the instability of the French franc...
Politically the Gorman situation remained problematic. Reichstag elections in 
May resulted in gains by extremes on both Right and Left at the expense of the 
middle parties. With the German nationals holding around 100 seats and the 
communists over 60, it was extremely difficult to form a government. In June 
the Marx-Stresemann Coalition at last returned, comprising the Democrats, 
Centre and Volkspartei. The Nationalists refused to join and remained hostile 
to any attempt to compromise with France by forming an agreement over 
reparation. This was particularly worrying for the Allies, as in order for 
Germany to implement the experts’ report a two-thirds majority in the 
Reichstag was necessary to modify the c o n s t i t u t i o n .20
19 T160/185/F7027, C1201/51/18: D’Abemon, tel. 46, 17.1.24.
20 FO 371 9803, C11432/737/18: FO memo on general situation in Germany, 5.7.24. For 
more detail on the German political scene and the divisions within the nationalist vote, see 
Kent, Spoils, pp. 253-256.
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The S itu a tio n  o n  the Spot.
Ju st as throughout 1923 events on the spot in the Rhineland and Ruhr 
provided a continuous backdrop to high political developments, so too did they 
in 1924. Several topics need to be mentioned: the separatists, the MICUM 
agreements, the bank of issue and the railways. In all these cases the 
weakening of France’s position and general stabilisation of the Ruhr crisis 
rendered MacDonald’s task easier than Curzon’s had been.
The D isin tegration  o f th e S ep a ra tist M ovem ent.
It will be recalled from Chapter V that the British had been incensed when at
the end of December the French recognised a de facto separatist government
in the Palatinate. 21 Curzon had immediately launched a strong protest to the
F r e n c h 2 2  and, despite French objections, had sent Consul-General Clive to the
Palatinate to i n v e s t i g a t e . 23 On 19 January Clive reported th at the
overwhelming mass of the Palatinate population opposed the s e p a r a t i s t s , 24
and it was soon clear that the movement was weakening. On 25 January
Lampson remarked:
“Quite apart from our firm action, Mr. Clive’s v isit to the 
Palatinate has had an instantaneous effect. I think we may take 
it that the ‘autonomous’ movement is now definitely on the wane.
If this prophecy should prove correct, it will be entirely due to the 
consistent attitude which Great Britain has m a i n t a i n e d .”25
By the time MacDonald was established in office the French were in retreat.
21 See Chapter V, pp. 235-237.
22 FO 371 9770, C91/91/18: Tel. 4 to Crewe, 4.1.24.
23 FO 371 9771, C410/91/18: Tel. 20 to Phipps, 9.1.24.
Crewe was instructed to warn the French ambassador concerning any attempt to impede 
Clive.[FO 371 9771, C496/91/18: tel. 28 to Crewe, 12.1.24.]
24 FO 371 9772, C988/91/18: Kilmarnock, tel. 40, 19.1.24.
25 Minute by Lampson, 25.1.24 on FO 371 9771, C1286/91/18: Kilmarnock, tel. 54,
23.1.24.
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On 30 January Poincaré denied that he supported the movement26, and on 4 
February he suggested that normal conditions in the Palatinate could be 
restored by the Palatinate Kreistag (provisional assembly). The British agreed 
and the High Commission therefore appointed an Interallied Delegation of 
three members which went to Speyer. On 15 February the delegation met the 
Kreistag committee, which agreed to collaborate.^? By this time the separatist 
attempt, like that staged in the Rhineland and Ruhr only two months before, 
was spontaneously collapsing. Disturbances at Pirmasens resulted in the 
death of a number of separatists and on 18 February Kilmarnock reported 
that most of the Palatinate had been evacuated.28
Thus only weeks after MacDonald assumed office the separatist movement 
unequivocally failed. The brunt of the crisis had been borne by Curzon, while 
the benefits were now reaped hy the new Labour government. Whether or not 
Poincaré had intended to become embroiled in the issue is unclear. Yet 
whatever his intentions the whole episode undoubtedly discredited France in 
the eyes of international opinion. The French climb-down and the collapse of 
the movement also provided further evidence of the general weakening of 
France’s position.
The MICUM A greem ents.
As was discussed in Chapter V 29 , the British had from the outset disapproved 
of the MICUM agreements, tolerating them only in the belief that they were 
short term expedients. The majority of the agreements were due to expire on 
15 April. Naturally the French - anxious to maintain their leverage over the 
Germans and to extract what payment they could - wanted them to he
26 FO 371 9773, C1701/91/18: Crewe, tel. 64, 30.1.24.
27 MacDonald Papers, PRO/30/69/114: FO memo on position in the Palatinate, 18.2.24.
28 FO 371 9775, 02798/91/18: Kilmarnock, tel. 93, 18.2.24.
29 See Chapter V, pp. 219-225.
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renewed.30 The Grerman government, however, was now in a stronger position, 
and so was less amenable. Whereas the original agreements were made on the 
basis that the German government would reimburse the industrialists at a 
future date, the Germans now said that nothing could be decided until after the 
experts’ reports.3i The British were in a difficult position. They were 
suspicious of both the French and the Germans, and convinced that the 
MICUM agreements were financially unworkahle.32 However, in view of the 
impending experts’ reports, they decided to adopt a pragmatic approach. 
Lampson, Crowe and MacDonald all agreed that Britain should take no 
immediate action, secretly hoping that the German government would at the 
last minute give way and prolong the agreements until the experts’ reports had 
been received and could be acted upon.33 The Germans obliged. On 15 April 
the MICUM agreements were renewed for a further two months.34
The problem, however, had not been solved but merely shelved, and as 15 June
drew near it arose again when the Germans once more claimed they were
unable to renew the a g r e e m e n t s .  35 Once more the Foreign Office hoped that
the Germans would at the last minute fall in line. As Lampson commented;
“I have a strong... impression that there is a large element of bluff 
in all this... It would be crass folly for the German government to 
jeopardise the success of the whole scheme hy making an undue 
cry over the extension for a few weeks of these MICUM 
agreements - perilous though they are to our way of t h in k in g .  ”36
This approach was formalised on 6 June at an interdepartmental meeting 
between the Treasury and the Foreign Office, when “it was agreed that there
30 FO 371 9764, 05510/79/18: D’Aberaon, tel. 119, 2.4.24.
31 FO 371 9764, 05851/79/18: Minute by Sterndale Bennett, 8.4.24.
32 T160/185/F7027, 01201/51/18: D’Abemon, tel. 46, 17.1.24.
33 Minutes by Lampson, 8.4.24, Orowe, 8.4.24 and MacDonald, 9.4.24 on FO 371 9764, 
05851/79/18: Minute by Sterndale Bennett, 8.4.24. Also see FO 115 294, 05935/79/18: 
MacDonald to D’Aberaon, disp. 691, 8.4.24.
34 FO 371 9765, 06455/79/18: Kilmarnock, tel. 160, 17.4.24.
35 FO 371 9765, 08292/79/18: FO minute, 22.5.24.
36 Minute by Lampson, 25.5.24, on FO 371 9765, 08292/79/18: FO minute, 22.5.24.
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was no alternative to the temporary prolongation of the MICUM agreements 
on their present hasis... Any advice given to the Germans will accordingly be 
not to stop dehveries...”37
This pragmatic British policy of clandestine support for MICUM was not 
without its difficulties. Lampson suspected both the Treasury and the 
Governor of the Bank of England of secretly opposing the agreements and of 
encouraging German resistance: “...I feel it is pity that he [Norman] should 
egg the Germans on as he certainly is doing not to continue these MICUM 
agreements. ... I should like to say something to the Treasury - who are not 
altogether innocent themselves as to the line taken by Germany.”38
It is unclear to what extent Lampson’s fears were justified, as whatever his 
private feelings, the Bank of England archives show Norman to have taken the 
official line with the Germans. On 11 June Norman wrote to the President of 
the Reichsbank: “...I only hope it may he possible for your Industrialists by one 
means or anther, if required, to carry on the agreements for one or two weeks 
in order to give time for conversations between Paris and L o n d o n .”39 This may 
have been decisive. On 15 June the MICUM agreements were again 
r e n e w e d .4 0  This scenario of renewal of the agreements for a hmited period only 
was repeated until the Dawes plan was implemented,^! and it was not until 1 
January 1925 that all trace of the MICUM finally  left the occupied
territories.42
37 Minute by Stemdale Bennett, 6.6.24 on FO 371 9747, C9012/70/18: D’Aberaon disp. 
416, 31.5.24.
38 Minute by Lampson, 15.5.24 on FO 371 9765, C7788/79/18: Geoffrey Knox (First 
Secretary at the Berlin Embassy), disp. 365, 13.5.24.
39 Bank of England archives, OV34/72; Norman to Dr. H.Schacht, 11.6.24.
40 T160/47/F1437/03/7: Kilmarnock, tel. 194, 16.6.24.
41 See T160/47/F1437/03/9: Ryan (Coblenz) tel. 212, 3.7.24; and Ryan, tel. 232, 31.7.24.
42 T160/47/F1437/03/10, Cl 130/628/18: Kilmarnock, disp. 27, 22.1.25.
297
The B an k  o f Issu e
Britain’s initial efforts to impede the establishment by France and Belgium of a 
separate hank of issue in the Rhineland were discussed in Chapter V .4 3  The 
British had been successful in delaying matters until the appointment of the 
committees of experts, but the matter was by no means settled. In early 1924 
the French continued to object, via the Rhineland High Commission, to the 
central German government scheme of introducing the Rentenmark  
throughout the occupied territories, preferring instead to support a separate 
bank of issue.44
By mid-February the British were losing patience. Lampson commented:
"The French and Belgians are behaving very badly over this.
They are (quite without legal power) holding up the apphcation of 
a perfectly legitimate German financial law within the occupied 
territories with a view to exercising pressure on the German 
government in the matter of the proposed Rhineland Bank of 
Issue. It is in short a policy of the purest b la c k m a i l .”45
To counter French efforts the Treasury and the Governor of the Bank of
England stepped up their support for the Berlin initiative. On 5 January
Norman suggested to Bradbury that “foreign support” should be given to the
central German scheme of a uniform Gold Bank, adding: “I know... from
conversation that the Chancellor is favourable to the idea.”46 Bradbury
agreed ,4V  and so Norman contacted other national banks, including South
Africa, Norway, Ireland, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and J a p a n .4 8
The responses were generally favourable, especially once the Bank of England 
itself took the initiative and loaned the Reichsbank £5 million at 1% interest
43 See Chapter V, pp. 237-241.
44 FO 371 9811, 01125/1125/18: Kilmarnock disp. 85, 17.1.24.
45 Minute by Lampson, 19.2.24 on FO 371 9811, 02671/1125/18: Kilmarnock disp. 269,
14.2.24.
46 Bank of England archives, OV 34/117: Norman to Bradbury, 5.1.24.
47 Bank of England archives, OV 34/117: Bradbury to Norman, 8.1.24.
48 See Bank of England archives, OV 34/117 and OV 34/118.
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On 19 March the Reichstag passed the necessary legislation for the  
establishment of the German Gold Discount B a n k .so This initiative effectively 
trumped the separate Rhineland bank of issue. The British continued to object 
to the French regarding this (for example protesting on both 31 March and 16 
April),51 but once a central gold hank had been estabhshed, and especially after 
the Dawes report was published, the issue of the separate bank faded. 
Attention instead focussed on achieving a general settlement of all i s s u e s . 52
T he R ailw ays
The one outstanding issue remained the question of the railways. It will be 
recalled from Chapter V that on 14 December a working arrangement had 
been agreed between B ritish  officials and the Régie by which the  
adm inistration of the Railways in the British  zone would function  
independently of Régie c o n tr o l.5 3  In practice, however, the agreement did not 
function satisfactorily, as the Régie refused to ratify it. By April Httle progress 
had been made towards ordinary working. The British were concerned. 54 The 
Franco-Belgian Régie was viewed as a means by which the French could 
maintain a sinister influence over Germany. On 30 April, Crowe commented: 
“As regards the railways, we should not, I think, agree to any prolongation, 
revival or concealed continuance of the Franco-Belgian régie in any fo r m .”55 
Differences with the French over the railways were to cause considerable 
problems at the London Conference.
49 Bank of England archives, OV 34/117: Norman to Schacht, 23.2.24.
50 Bank of England archives, OV 34/117: Memorandum, 19.3.24.
51 FO 371 9811, 07337/1125/18: FO Minute, n.d. (received 6.5.24) on Introduction of 
Rentenbank into Occupied Territory.
52 On the question of a bank of issue see also Feldman, Disorder, pp. 831-2.
53 See above. Chapter V, pp. 246.
54 BT 196/24: Department of Overseas Trade Report for week ending 30.4.24.
55 Minute by Crowe, 30.4.24 on FO 371 9730, C6960/32/18: Crewe, tel. 282, 28.4.24.
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H igh P olicy
At a level of high policy, there was something of a lull in activity at the 
beginning of 1924. Essentially playing a waiting game until the experts’ 
reports were published, MacDonald meanwhile concentrated on laying  
foundations of goodwill, both within his administration and with his allies.
On 3 February he noted in his diary: “I think I have good men. Curzon
apparently treated them badly and the FO was on the edge of broken health
and revolution. Gentlemanly treatment will do much.”56 His efforts were to
pay off and he was quickly successful in securing the friendship and respect of
his staff. At the beginning of April Hankey wrote: “Everyone... likes him
personally, and for my part I have not had a better chief to work u n d e r .”57
Even by August Hankey was still impressed: “Whether Ramsay MacDonald
remains in office or not I shall always look back with pleasure on my
association with h im . . .”58 It was not only the Prime Minister who was well
liked. The Labour government as a whole quickly earned the recognition of
respectability which MacDonald so anxiously craved. Hankey commented:
“So far as the remainder are concerned, there are no very  
outstanding figures, but they are quite a competent lot of men 
and their teamwork is excellent... They are a very businesslike 
government. Even where I disagree with their policies I have no 
criticism of their m e t h o d s .”59
MacDonald also sought to improve relations with France. Only days after 
assuming office, he wrote a friendly letter to Poincare. Poincaré promptly 
replied in an equally fidendly t o n e .60 MacDonald was encouraged and on 21
56 MacDonald Papers, PRO/30/69/1573, part 1, diaries, pp. 180-181, 3.2.24.
57 Hankey Papers, 4/6, Correspondence file: Hankey to Smuts, 1.4.24.
58 Hankey Papers, 3/32: Hankey to Adeline, 11.8.24.
59 Hankey Papers, 4/6, Correspondence file: Hankey to Smuts, 1.4.24.
60 For MacDonald’s letter of 26 January and Poincare’s letter of 28 January see FO 
800/218.
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February addressed a more detailed letter to the French premier: “I desire in
my present letter to prepare the way for a more complete m utual
understanding...” He then went on to outline in general terms his view of the
problems between the two countries, giving much weight to the damaging role
of public opinion. He concluded by asking Poincaré to keep his sights on the
major issues, rather than becoming:
"... entangled in the mass of detail which has arisen around such 
situations and problems as the Ruhr, the Rhineland and the 
Palatinate... I repeat, my dear Premier, the condition of Europe 
can only, I feel convinced, he remedied by joint action between 
France and England undertaken with the fiill sympathy for their 
respective requirements and with wise regard for the interests of 
the world at large.”6i
Poincaré again replied promptly. His letter of 25 February reciprocated 
MacDonald’s desire to find solutions, and gave a brief survey of French policy
and interests.62
However, despite these superficial shows of goodwill the situation was not
miraculously transformed. The Foreign Office were openly skeptical of
Poincaré’s advances. As Sterndale Bennett commented:
“The reality of M. Poincaré’s change of attitude is open to doubt.
He has pushed the same aims consistently for six years and has 
really gone a long way towards their attainment. He is also a 
master of the art of finding another road to the same destination if 
he finds the direct road blocked. ”63
Indeed, MacDonald’s vague communications may to some extent have been
designed as a smokescreen. Crowe in particular was anxious to do nothing to
improve Poincaré’s domestic-political position:
“M. Poincaré finds him self in an exceedingly difficult position 
before his parliament and public opinion at this moment, and I 
th ink it is clear that his position would be im m ensely  
strengthened if he could announce that he had either settled, or 
was on the point of settling, the whole question of reparations by
6lpO 371 9812, C2942/1288/18: MacDonald to Poincare, letter, 21.2.24.
62 FO 371 9812, C3437/1288/18: Poincaré to MacDonald, letter, 25.2.24.
63 Minute by Stemdale Bennett 3.2.24, on FO 371 9730, C1852/32/18; Phipps, tel. 69,
3.2.24.
301
an amicable understanding with Great Britain. If he were in a 
position to do this, he might well count on securing a certain 
victory in the forthcoming general elections. It is for His 
Majesty’s Government to consider, among other things, how far it 
is to Britain’s interests to contribute to maintaining M. Poincaré 
in power. It is obvious that a good deal might he said in favour of 
waiting a little longer, before we committed ourselves to the 
proposed negotiations.’’64
On 13 March Poincaré further fuelled Foreign OfRce suspicions when he told 
the French Parliament that it was his firm determination not to leave the Ruhr 
until Germany had paid reparation in fu ll .6 5  Stemdale Bennett remarked: “M. 
Poincaré is a perfect leopard when it is a question of changing s p o t s .”66 Crowe 
too was angry: “M. Poincaré is again revealing the sUppery character which 
infects all his proceedings and p r o f e s s io n s .”67
Continued suspicion of France thus provided the backdrop to the puhhcation of 
the experts’ reports. This occurred on the 9 April, when the committees of 
experts at last presented their reports to the Reparation Commission. 
Attention immediately focussed on the Dawes report. This provided for the 
reconstruction of the German monetary system and provided a new scheme 
for reparation. It did not fix Germany’s total liahility hut instead proposed a 
schedule of essentially moderate annual payments - starting with 1 hilhon G.M. 
in 1925 and increasing to 2.5 billion by 1929. Moreover the entire scheme was 
premised on two fundamental principles. The first was that it assumed that 
economic and fiscal unity would be restored to Germany. This had obvious 
implications for the occupation of the Ruhr, though officially the military
64 FO 371 9825, C2900/2900/18; Minute by Crowe, 19.2.24. (My underlining). The 
‘proposed negotiations’ refer to a secret suggestion - allegedly from Poincare - communicated 
to the British via Senor de La Barra (the president of the Combined Arbitration 
Associations, based in Paris).
65 FO 371 9813, C4545/1288/18: Phipps, tel. 173, 17.3.24.
66 Minute by Sterndale Bennett 14.3.24 on FO 371 9730, C4266/32/18: Phipps, tel. 167,
13.3.24.
67 Minute by Crowe, 19.3.24 on FO 371 9825, C4760/2900/18: Crowe to Phipps, letter,
20.3.24.
302
question was outside the report’s domain. 68 The second was that an 
international loan of 8000 billion G.M. was to be given to Germany to support 
her reconstructed economy and decrease the im m ediate burden of
reparation. 69
The plan was, on balance, favourable to the British point of v ie w ,7 0  and as the
experts made it clear that the report m ust be accepted in its entirety, the
Treasury quickly pointed out that Britain had no alternative but to adopt this
course. On 14 April, Niemeyer wrote:
“In the view of the Treasury, the Experts’ Report would have had 
to be accepted even if it had been much less sound than it is. The 
British Government were foremost in pressing for an Expert 
Committee. The report is unanimous and carries with it the 
implication of American assistance in solving European financial 
problems. Moreover, the Report is the only constructive 
suggestion for escape from the present position which, if  left, 
must inevitably lead to war, open or concealed, between France 
and Germany. There can be no question that the Report must be 
accepted. // As a matter of fact, the Report, though not always 
w hat a purely British  Committee would have produced, 
establishes especially on the more vital points, a great many of 
the principles which British opinion has been maintaining. As an 
acute critic has said, “Though the language seems at times the 
language of a sane man who finds him self in a Madhouse and 
must accommodate him self to the inmates, it never loses its 
sanity.’”’71
MacDonald and the Foreign Office agreed. 72 As soon as the report was 
received the Prime Minister called an emergency Cabinet meeting. There it 
was agreed that Britain should take the lead and push for the adoption of the
68 Paragraph 3 of Dawes report, quoted in Memo, 9 July, in CAB 24 167, CP 396 (24), 
stated: “It is, however our duty to point out that our forecasts are based on the assumption 
that economic activity will be unhampered and unaffected by any foreign organisation other 
than the controls herein provided. Consequently, our plan is based upon the assumption 
that existing measures, in so far as they hamper that activity, will be withdrawn or 
sufficiently modified as soon as Germany has put into execution the plan recommended, and 
that they will not be reimposed except in the case of flagrant failure to fulfil the conditions 
accepted by common agreement.”
69 See Schuker, End, pp. 180-6 and Kent, Spoils, pp. 252-3.
70 For a Treasury summary of the Dawes report, see CAB 24 166, CP 257, 15.4.24.
71 MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/120: Note by Niemeyer, 14.4.24.
72 MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/96: C6073/70/18: Lampson to Treasury, 16.4.24.
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Dawes Plan in its entirety:
“His M ajestys Government feel that a report supported by such 
authority m ust command general assent... H is M ajesty’s 
G overnm ent attach  so m uch im portance to agreed  
recommendations which can be brought into immediate operation 
that they for their part will he prepared to support the scheme in 
its entirety, provided that all the other parties concerned are 
willing to take the same c o u r s e . . .”73
Privately, however, the Foreign Office was concerned about the procedure to be 
adopted regarding the report. Officials were adamant that in order for the plan 
to be a success, Germany would have to accept it voluntarily. As Crowe 
remarked on 9 April: “We do not want to continue the policy of forcing 
Germanys acceptance by an ultimatum...”74 The British were immediately 
worried lest France push them down this road. In particular, the fear was that, 
should the adoption and implementation of the report remain in the domain of 
the Reparation Commission, France would once more be able to exploit her 
advantage on that body to disastrous effect. 75 These suspicions were 
confirmed when on 11 April Poincaré informed the Foreign Office that it should 
be left to the Reparation Commission to decide whether or not the Dawes 
report was satisfactory.76
Great was the relief when the Reparation Commission itself announced that, 
subject to an assurance from Germany that she would collaborate, it approved 
the reports and would take steps to implement those sections which fell within 
its competence. The Allied governments should make proposals concerning the 
remaining areas. 77 Lampson was dehghted: “This is excellent news, and Sir J.
73 CAB 23 45, Cabinet meeting, 10.4,24, 9pm. Draft telegram to the British ambassadors 
in Rome, Brussels, Paris, Berlin, Washington and Tokyo.
74 Minute by Crowe, 9.4.24 on FO 371 9739, C5918/70/18: Minute by Mendl, 9.4.24.
75 Minute by Lampson, 8.4.24 on FO 371 9739, C5870/70/18: Paris Embassy 
Communication, 8.4.24.
76 FO 371 9740, C6160/70/18: Memo by Lampson on Conversation with French Counsellor,
11.4.24.
77 MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/117: Text of Reparation Commission decision on experts’ 
reports, 11.4.24.
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Bradbury deserves all praise for his s u c c e s s .”78
Attention immediately focussed on securing unequivocal German cooperation.
As Crowe commented:
“My fear is that, hy some precipitate and ill-considered move, the 
Germans may jeopardise our chances of getting the reparation 
experts’ report accepted as it stands hy all concerned. If the 
French can goad the German government into some premature 
declaration of policy, such for example as a declaration that the 
report is unacceptable, it would clearly make it easier for 
Poincaré to have the report turned down, or at least so tied up in 
mass of tangled discussion on matters of detail that the whole 
plan would he ruined.”79
To prevent such an eventuality urgent communications were sent to 
D’Ahernon that he work on the German g o v e r n m e n t .so D’Ahernon accordingly 
saw StresemannSi and hy 15 April was able to report that “after long and 
hitter struggle” the German Cabinet had agreed to accept the r e p o r t .82
Eager to capitalise on these initial successes and to push momentum forward, 
MacDonald now made a public declaration of the British position before 
Parliament. The British government, he stated, “will support the experts’ 
scheme in its entirety provided that all the other parties concerned are willing 
to take the same c o u r s e .”83 Reactions from the other powers followed. By 25 
April the Italians and - perhaps more significantly - the Belgians had written to 
the Reparation Commission supporting the scheme. 84 The American response 
was also encouraging. On 22 April President Coolidge declared that the report
'78 Minute by Lampson, 11.4.24 on FO 371 9740, C6081/70/18: Treasury Communication,
11.4.24.
79 FO 371 9740, C6104/70/18: Minute by Crowe, 11.4.24.
80 FO 371 9740, C6104/70/18: Unnumbered tel. to D’Abemon, 11.4.24; C6062/70/18: tel. 
110 to D’Abernon, 14.4.24.
81 FO 371 9740, C6159/70/18: D’Abemon, tel. 147, 13.4.24.
82 FO 371 9740, C6313/70/18: D’Abemon, tel. 152, 15.4.24.
83 FO 371 9741, C6676/70/18: FO Memo, 23.4.24.
84 MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/118: C6887/70/18: Mussolini to Reparation Commission, 
24.4.24; & MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/101: C6808/70/18: Crewe to MacDonald, disp. 
938, 25.4.24.
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offered the basis of a practical solution of the reparation problem and that he 
hoped private American capital would participate in providing the German loan 
which was a prerequisite for the operation for the p la n .8 5
By now MacDonald and the Foreign Office had decided precisely what he
wanted to achieve. Britain’s aims were neatly tabled in a Foreign Office
memorandum of 23 April, and were:
“1. To keep the initiative.// The French evidently want to work as 
much as possible through the Reparation Commission. We have 
been at some pains to get this matter away from the Reparation 
Commission, and we must continue to keep it as far away as 
possible.
2. To bring in Germany as a voluntary contracting party. // The 
French evidently want to avoid a new agreement between  
Germany and the Allies.
3. To secure the maximum of cooperation from America and from 
other States whose money is required for the experts’ scheme.
4. To introduce the League of Nations or the Permanent Court of 
International Justice as interpreter of any fresh agreement which 
may come u p .”86
The main obstacle envisaged to the attainment of these aims was France. 
Poincaré continued to be difficult. On 15 April he told Crewe that the 
Reparation Commission could act by majority to make modifications in the 
experts’ scheme without the unanimity of the allied governm ent s. 87 He also 
made a speech claiming that the experts’ reports proved that Germany had 
fictitiously impoverished herself, and declaring that France would remain in the 
Ruhr until payment had been m a d e .8 8  He reinforced this view in a letter to the 
Reparation Commission on 25 A p r il.8 9
85 FO 371 9741, C6649/70/18: Sir E, Howard (British ambassador in Washington from 
2.2,24), tel. 133, 22.4.24. Hughes wrote to Howard to this effect. [FO 115 2940, Hughes to 
Howard, letter, 1.5.24.]
86 FO 371 9741, C6671/70/18: unsigned FO memo, 23.4.24 on “The Objects of His 
Majesty’s Government”
87 FO 371 9740, C6316/70/18; Crewe, tel. 263, 15.4.24.
88 FO 371 9740, C6406/70/18: Crewe, tel. 264, 16.4.24.
89 MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/101: C6809/70/18: Crewe to MacDonald, disp 939,
25.4.24, enclosing letter from Poincaré to Reparation Commission, 25.5.24.
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Anxious to make progress despite the diplomatic difficulties he was 
experiencing with France, MacDonald now decided to try using personal 
contact and informal talks to speed up agreement. He first approached the 
Belgians. Invitations were issued and George Theunis (Prime Minister) and 
Paul Hymans (who had replaced Jaspar as Foreign M inister) came to 
Chequers for informal talks with MacDonald and Crowe on 2 and 3 May.
These talks are of great interest. While demonstrating MacDonald’s success 
at using his friendly personality to open lines of communication and to 
establish trust between statesmen, they at the same time emphasise the 
fundamental points of difference remaining between the Allies. Theunis and 
Hymans had met Poincaré only days before. Poincaré, they reported, did not 
want to effect an entire military evacuation of the Ruhr, was opposed to any 
kind of negotiations with the Germans and wanted the British to agree to 
substantial sanctions (including a naval blockade) in the event of Germany not 
fulfilling the experts’ scheme. All of these issues conflicted with principles 
embodied in the fundamental “Objects of His Majesty’s Government” which the 
Foreign Office had so recently prepared. MacDonald was determined not to 
give away any ground and was forceful in making his case.
The exchange was frank, informal and honest. While MacDonald refused to 
commit Britain to any concrete sanctions, especially if  the Reparation 
Commission was to be left with the power to decide hy majority vote if  
Germany was in default, he did agree to draft some kind of declaration that 
Britain would immediately concert with her allies in the event of a German 
default. Similarly, it was agreed that a general conference was necessary to 
coordinate the implementation of the Dawes report and that before this met 
MacDonald should meet Poincaré and discuss further the draft declaration on
90 FO 371 9742, 07016/70/18: Crewe, te l 285, 29.4.24.
307
sanctions and a skeleton programme or protocol of the agenda and aims of the 
conference.9i Thus the talks, while in some ways emphasising remaining 
difficulties, were on balance a step forward.
The Foreign Office now concentrated on preparing the draft protocol and
declaration over sanctions for the comparable m eeting with Poincaré.
Adopting a realistic approach, the Foreign Office recognised the validity of
France’s fears. On 29 April Lampson commented:
“As to sanctions I do not believe we shall really get France into 
line until some form of assurance is given her... [W]e must bear 
constantly in mind that it is only too probable that Germany wül 
default, and that coercion may eventually prove necessary. 
N eith er  France nor Germany are to be tru sted  over
Reparations.”92
The original 23 April statement of aims had also included some reference to the 
need for the provision of some sanctions. These, however, were to be “strictly 
defined and limited” and “should he such that the German Government can 
freely accept them without fear of serious German internal political
complications”93
In contrast the Treasury saw France, not Germany, as the main danger. 
Treasury comments regarding the draft protocol concentrated not on sanctions 
but on the immediate dismantling of all aspects of French control in the Ruhr 
and the restoration of the economic and fiscal unity of G e r m a n y .94 The 
Foreign Office was horrified. Sterndale B ennett remarked: “This 
document...would be admirable if we were in a position of a victorious power 
imposing terms on a beaten F r a n c e .”95 Lampson was yet more disgusted:
“I feel impelled to call attention to the psychological effect which I
91 FO 371 9743, C7427/70/18: Minute by MacDonald, 3.5.24.
92 Minute by Lampson, 29.4.24 on FO 37109742, 06851/70/18: Crewe, tel. 281, 26.4.24.
93 FO 371 9741, 06671/70/18: FO minute, 23.4.24.
94 FO 371 9743, 07168/70/18: Minute by Bradbury, 1.5.24.
95 Minute by Sterndale Bennett, 1.5.24 on FO 371 9743, 07168/70/18: Minute by 
Bradbury, 1.5.24.
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am personally convinced that the presentation of such a 
document would produce upon the minds of the French... It 
practically amounts to a pistol presented at the head of France...
I can hardly conceive of anything more likely to prejudice the 
prospects of getting what we w a n t .”96
Discussions within the administration continued and it was not until 20 May
that the British draft was agreed on. This embodied a general acceptance of
the Dawes plan and an undertaking by all signatories to its implementation.
As to sanctions, it stated:
“Sanctions affecting the fiscal or economic activity of the Reich 
shall not in future be imposed except in the circumstances 
contemplated in the Report and hy a unanimous decision of the 
Signatory Powers entitled to reparation. They shall be notified in 
advance to the Council of the League of Nations. // Any disputes 
arising between the parties to this agreem ent as to its 
interpretation or application shall be referred to the Permanent 
Court of Justice.''^?
A further, separate statement regarding sanctions was also prepared, with the
intention of being read in Parliament:
“...His Majesty’s Government are prepared to make a public 
declaration that if Germany,after voluntarily coming into the new 
arrangement, were found to be wilfully failing to carry out her 
obligations under it, this would immediately and automatically 
bring together the Allies to take effective common action in the 
defence of the arrangement and of the Treaty of Peace, and that 
in such circumstances the British Government would at once 
consult with their Allies as to the measures called for.”98
These clauses were unlikely to satisfy Poincaré. But, fortunately for 
MacDonald Poincaré was no longer a consideration. On 11 May the French 
general elections took place. Poincaré lost his majority. This was certainly 
fortuitous for the British. It gave them breathing space in order to draft the 
protocol - so much so, indeed, that MacDonald became impatient: “The French
96 Minute by Lampson, 2.5.24 on FO 371 9743, C7168/70/18: Minute by Bradbury, 1.5.24.
97 FO 371 9745, 08133/70/18: Draft Protocol, 20.5.24.
98 FO 371 9749, 010826/70/18: Draft declaration regarding sanctions, 5.7.24. In the event
this declaration was not made as events were overtaken by developments in Paris and the
joint Anglo-French memorandum of 9 July (see below, pp. 314-5).
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elections give us more time to work on this... So soon as we are able to move, 
move at once.”99 Moreover, when it became clear that Poincare was to be 
replaced by Herriot, the implications for the British position were manifold. 
Herriot quickly announced bis support for the Dawes plan and said be was 
willing to end the military occupation of the Ruhr as soon as new controls were 
in effective operation. Even Bradbury was encouraged: “If be can stick to this 
policy, most of the difficulties in the way of Franco-Britisb cooperation ought to
disappear.”ioo
Indeed, the British actually began to worry that Herriot might be too easy to 
deal with. Wickham Steed commented on 10 June: “Herriot is full of good will 
and is running over with the best intentions. But be is not a strong or a stable 
character.”101 Sir E. Drummond agreed, saying that be bad been informed 
that: “...Herriot is irresponsible and much inclined to agree to any proposal 
which may be made to him without thinking of the consequences.” 102 Hankey 
too was cautious, writing on 22 May that a Herriot ministry: “... does not look 
to me a very bright prospect. Poincaré bad many faults, but one knew that 
when be signed be signed for France as a whole. I feel some doubt as to 
whether the same is true of Herriot, though be will probably prove more 
reasonable than Poincaré.”i03 Even MacDonald echoed these doubts: 
“Herriot’s weakness combined with bis good heart may give me more trouble 
than Poincaré’s stifiness.”i04
MacDonald’s fears were borne out when, adhering to arrangements be bad 
previously made with Poincaré, be met Herriot at Chequers for informal talks
99 Minute by MacDonald, 18.5.24 on FO 371 9744, C7573/70/18: Central Department 
minute, 9.5.24.
100 T160/47/F1437/03/7: Bradbury to Chancellor, 3.6.24.
101 MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69 file 16: Wickham Steed to Waterhouse 10.6.24.
102 MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69 file 16, Sir E. Drummond to Waterhouse, 9.6.24.
103 Hankey papers, 4/16: Hankey to Smuts, 22.5.24.
104 MacDonald Papers, PRO/30/69/1753, Part 1, diaries, pp. 183, 5.5.24.
310
on 21 and 22 J u n e . i o s  The transcript of the conversations reveals a startling 
transformation in the atmosphere between Britain and France. The 
conversations were ftiendly and polite. Emphasis was on common ground - on 
implementing the Dawes plan and on establishing a peaceful order. Differences 
were glossed over by either agreeing to enlist experts or simply by shelving 
them for the greater good.
At Chequers MacDonald and Herriot were unanimous in their desire to act 
quickly and in such a way as to facilitate the task facing the German 
government, which was bound to have difficulties passing legislation related to 
the Dawes plan. They agreed that a conference should be held at London as 
soon as possible, and even approved the subdivision of this conference into 
various working committees. Even more significant, Herriot accepted 
MacDonald’s draft declaration regarding sanctions, said that he was prepared 
to set a date for the economic evacuation of the Ruhr and that he was 
prepared to evacuate m ilitarily in  proportion as Germany's debts were 
commercialised under the Dawes provisions. Herriot even proved quite 
amenable to MacDonald's suggestion that at the conference the Allies should 
agree among themselves first and should then negotiate with, rather than 
dictate to, Germany.
There were few points of real disagreement, and these were glossed over. First 
was the railways. Herriot wanted to retain a number of the Régie personnel in 
the Ruhr. MacDonald strongly objected, claiming that both the railways and 
the Ruhr questions would have to be settled before private individuals would 
subscribe to the Dawes loan. It was agreed to submit the railway question to 
consideration by experts. The second point of controversy was over the body 
to be empowered to declare a future German default. MacDonald wanted this
105 For more detail on Chequers, see Marquand, MacDonald, pp. 339-342.
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to be the Finance Committee of the League of Nations; Herriot the Reparation 
Commission. Although no agreement was reached, the issue was dropped 
when the compromise suggestion of referring future differences to the 
International Court and the Hague was made. Towards the end of the 
meetings Herriot raised the more fundamental issue of basic French security 
and the question of a pact of guarantee. MacDonald’s answer is interesting in 
the light of the initial foreign policy aims he had adopted when assuming office. 
Though sympathetic to France, he refused to he drawn, saying that neither the 
public. Parliament nor the Dominions could countenance such a commitment. 
Instead, MacDonald wanted to concentrate on the question at hand in the 
hehef that wider issues would follow: “Let us therefore settle first the question 
of the Dawes Report; then we wül go on to that of Inter-Allied dehts, then to the 
problem of security, and we will try to remove from Europe the risks of war 
which threaten it.”i06
Thus, at the Chequers meetings Herriot had, on several key issues, shown 
him self prepared to move towards Britain. On the last day of the meetings, 
MacDonald was actually afraid that Herriot, inexperienced and new to office, 
might have gone too far: “...I tremble to have to deal with such an excellent hut 
such a weak man. He seems unable to face opposition and apparently fights 
his opponent hy giving him all he wants... But such a likable man. I must not 
press him too far, hut shall draw the line at absolute fairness.” In a few 
days time, the reaction from Paris was to justify MacDonald’s fears. But in the 
meantime, flushed with success, MacDonald pushed ahead with arrangements 
for the conference which was to he held in London from 16 July. Invitations 
were promptly sent and hy 2 July all had been accepted.
106 FO 371 9749, C10810/70/18; Minutes of meetings at Chequers on 21-22 June, dated
7.7.24.
107 MacDonald Papers, PRO/30/69/1753, Part 1, diaries, pp. 185, 22.6.24.
108 CAB 23 48, Cabinet meeting, 2.7.24,
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MacDonald also sought to involve the United States. MacDonald had always 
been anxious to improve relations with America. On 10 April he noted: 
“Nothing gives me greater pleasure than the relations I am estabhshing with 
America. It is wise to keep out of our troubles, but we must create a co­
operating friendship.” 109 Preliminary signals had been encouraging. For 
example, on 5 May Frank Kellogg (the United States Ambassador in London) 
told MacDonald that Hughes had warned Belgium that “...if France and 
Belgium did not accept the Experts’ Report now, it was the last chance they 
would get of any assistance from the United S t a t e s . . . O n  16 June 
MacDonald asked for some kind of American representation at the forthcoming 
conferenceiii and immediately after Chequers this request was reiterated in a 
communication from Crowe. In reply, Coolidge quickly issued a press 
communiqué stating that the United States would be represented in an 
unofficial capacity by Kellogg. H2 Hughes also told Sir Esme Howard (who had 
replaced Geddes as Ambassador in Washington on 2 February) that while the 
United States viewed the conference with “sincere sympathy” and “earnestly 
wished to see the Dawes Reports put into execution with the least possible 
delay”, Kellogg would not be in a position to sign a protocol or convention. 
Similarly, though the United States government supported the Dawes loan, 
this would “have naturally to be negotiated with private American Banks and 
not with the government itself.
Meanwhile MacDonald’s preparations for the conference were disrupted by 
events in Paris. The British were always aware of the vulnerability of Herriot’s 
position: “We must always remember that a determined effort is being made in
109 Mac Donald Papers, PRO/30/69/1753, part 1, diaries, pp. 182, 10.4.24.
110 FO 371 9743, C7389/70/18: tel. 749 to Howard, 5.5.24.
111 MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/94: A3688/1082/26: MacDonald to Sir E. Howard 
(Washington) disp. 969, 16.6.24.
112 FO 115 2941, Howard, tel. 222, 26.6.24.
113 FO 115 2941, Howard, disp. 1089, 27.6.24.
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Paris to unseat M. H e r r i o t . . . T h e  French press seized on the wording of the 
invitations to the London Conference which the Foreign Office had issued, and 
used it to claim that Herriot had entirely capitulated to the British at 
Chequers.
In desperation the French premier turned to MacDonald for help. On 7 July  
Crewe telegraphed urgently that Herriot “begs most earnestly that you will 
come to Paris if  only for a few hours, believing that there is serious risk of 
defeat and consequent failure of conference plan unless French public opinion 
can be calmed.”H6 MacDonald rushed to the aid of his fellow statesman. 
Discussions took place at the Quai d’Orsay on 8 and 9 Julyii^ resulting in the 
publication of a joint memorandum on the application of the Dawes scheme. 
The note emphasised that both governments accepted, “so far as they are 
concerned”, the conclusions of the Dawes report, and stated that the proposed 
conference was intended only to “settle the method of putting into execution 
the experts’ scheme so far as concerns the questions the solution of which 
devolves upon the interested Governments...” It laid great stress on the fact 
that the proposed conference in no way jeopardised the Treaty of Versailles, 
emphasised the continued importance of the Reparation Commission, and 
stated that in the case of a wilful default by Germany being declared by the 
Reparation Commission, “the Governments concerned will undertake to confer 
at once on how to put into operation such measures as they shall agree to take 
in order to protect themselves and the investors.” The note concluded on an 
optimistic, if  generally vague, note:
“The two Governments have likewise proceeded to a preliminary
exchange of views on the question of security. They are aware
114 Minute by Lampson, 4.7,24 on FO 371 9749, C10650/70/18: D’Abernon, tel, 292,
2.7.24,
115 MacDonald Papers, PRO/30/69/1753, Part I: Diaries, pp. 186,
116 FO 371 9849, 010794/10794/18: Crewe, tel, 439, 7,7,24,
117 For the text of these discussions, see FO 371 9849, 012031/10794/18, 
011468/10794/18 & 011469/10794/18: Conversations at the Quai d’Orsay, 8,7,24 &
9.7.24.
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that public opinion requires pacification; they agree to co-operate 
in devising, through the League of Nations or otherwise, as 
opportunity presents itself, means of securing this,and to 
continue the consideration of the question until the problem of 
general security can be finally solved.”H8
This joint memorandum was, for the British, a tangible step back from the
gains achieved at Chequers - particularly regarding the Reparation
Commission. MacDonald’s apparent concession regarding this crucial issue
meant that the question remained unsettled. As Lampson commented:
“There is a tendency to contend in France that the Reparation 
Commission is competent to administer the Dawes scheme, to 
pronounce on questions of default under that scheme, and in short 
that our proposed protocol is an attack upon the prerogatives of 
that Commission.”119
Crowe agreed: “We shall have to make a determined stand on this.” 120 The
British were also alarmed by reports that Herriot wanted any conference
results to be approved by the Chamber before he approached the Germans:
“If the protocol is to be satisfied by the French Chamber before it 
is submitted to the Germans, it will of course be quite impossible 
to represent it to the latter as something to be taken or left... In 
fact this appears to me a point on which we cannot give way both 
for practical and for moral reasons.”121
Thus, despite the great efforts at friendship and cooperation, as well as the 
concessions, made by Herriot at Chequers and MacDonald at Paris, crucial 
differences between Britain and France remained unsolved. In particular, the 
Reparation Commission, the mechanism for declaring future German default, 
the continuation of the Régie and the principle of French the presence in the 
Ruhr were all left to the conference proper.
118 Parliamentary Papers, 1924, XXVII, Cmd. 2191: Franco-British Memorandum of July 9, 
1924, concerning the application of the Dawes scheme. This memorandum was used as a 
starting point for discussions at the London Conference instead of the protocol the FO had 
prepared. The comments about action in the case of German default eliminated the need for 
the British to make the declaration on sanctions which they had prepared.
119 Minute by Lampson, 7.7.24 on FO 371 9749, C10911/70/18: Fisher Williams to Crowe,
4.7.24.
120 Minute by Crowe, 7.7.24 on FO 371 9749, C10911/70/18: Fisher Williams to Crowe,
4.7.24.
121 Minute by Crowe, 7.7.24 on FO 371 9749, C10638/70/18: D’Abemon disp. 509, 1.7.24.
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Moreover, these continuing problems with the French in turn raised problems
with the Germans, particularly given the composition of the Reichstag after
the May elections. On 14 July, D’Abemon reported that:
“On basis of English proposals at Chequers... German 
Government would at once accept and could put through 
necessary legislation so that whole scheme could be in working 
order by August 15th...On basis of joint Paris communiqué 
attitude of German government is doubtful. .”122
The difficulties of MacDonald’s own domestic-political position must also he
remembered. Without an overall Parliamentary majority he was unable to
satisfy his own party on domestic issues, and therefore a foreign poUcy success
was becoming more and more necessary. As Hankey commented on 22 May:
“Of course there is always a risk that the present Government 
here may slip up. They are walking a tightrope daily. In their 
domestic policy they have failed to satisfy their extremists, as 
w ell, probably as the bulk of the rank and file. For 
Unemployment they have produced nothing new. Their Housing 
scheme is not yet ready and is very difficult to work out. They are 
consequently ofiFering an ever broadening target for attack. Their 
Imperial policy only extends the size of the target. Their best 
chance lies in a big success in Foreign P o l ic y .”i23
Even in foreign policy MacDonald faced some problems. His policy of 
“respectability” may have met with strong Parliamentary support from the 
majority of his own party as well as both Conservatives and Liberals on the 
eve of the London Conference 124  ^ but it did not satisfy the extreme Left 
Labour fHnge. For example, in July both the Preston and Patrick (Glasgow) 
branches of the Independent Labour Party passed resolutions protesting 
against the adoption of the Dawes plan on the grounds that any form of 
reparation was unjustifiable. 125 There is, however, no evidence that
122 FO 371 9751, C11340/70/18: D’Abemon, tel. 318, 14.7.24.
123 Hankey Papers, 4/16: Hankey to Smuts, 22.5.24.
124 The Times. 15.7.24, pp. 15.
125 FO 371 9751, C l 1474/70/18: Patrick branch of ILP to FO, 11.7.24 & FO 371 9751, 
Cl 1622/70/18: Preston ILP to FO, 17.7.24. See also The Times. 15.7.24, pp.15.
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MacDonald was influenced by such a minority view. He had essentially staked
the future of the Labour Party as a party of government on solving the
reparation dilemma. 126 He now faced the difficult task of finding a balance
between a France and Germany each of whose governments were themselves
insecure. Failure at the London Conference remained a real possibility. As
Hankey wrote on 17 July:
“At the moment it is too early to say whether we shall succeed, 
but I am not very optimistic. If Poincaré can allege that Herriot 
has given anything away the latter (who seems a rather poor 
creature) will (illeg.) down and all our work will be undone. If 
Herriot does not concede something agreement will be impossible.
So the problem on which we are all at work is to get a real 
concession but to save Herriot’s face. We shall do well if  we avoid
a break.”127
But while the difficulties MacDonald still faced must not be underestimated, 
nor must his achievements at this stage be ignored. It is true that, since 
coming to power, MacDonald had not embarked on a new course but had 
followed the path laid down by the preceding ministry. He was also helped by 
external factors, such as the collapse of the franc, the easing of tensions on the 
spot and the change of government in France. But at the same time 
MacDonald had done much. He had successfully courted the Belgians and 
ensured the moral support and help of the Americans. Moreover, he had 
arranged with the French for a broadbased conference to be held to discuss the 
implementation of the experts’ reports and so, by default, the entire questions 
of the Ruhr and reparations, with their implied ramifications for security. 
These achievements were certainly impressive for the prime minister of a 
party which had never before held office. The next weeks would determine 
whether or not MacDonald could capitalise on them.
126 For more on MacDonald’s foreign policy motives, see Marquand, MacDonald, pp. 330-3.
127 Hankey papers, 4/16: Hankey to Smuts, 17.7.24.
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The L ondon Conferenee.i28
The London Conference began on 16 July. Delegates arrived from France, 
Belgium, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Greece, Rumania, ‘the Serb-Croat-Slovene 
Kingdom’, and, in an unofficial capacity, the United States 129 . MacDonald 
occupied the Chair. He began his first international conference in high spirits: 
“One thing gives me confidence. Everyone assumes that an agreement must 
be reached. We are all most friendly and I got business through in an hour 
which would have taken a day in previous conferences. He quickly 
organised the delegates into three committees, each with the task of agreeing 
on an aspect of an overall protocol which would then he negotiated with the 
Germans. This in itself was a significant step forward for MacDonald, and is 
indicative of the general desire to progress which characterised the delegates.
Throughout the conference, MacDonald’s role was crucial. While the Foreign 
Office had been active in preparations and in establishing precisely what it was 
Britain needed to achieve, the organisation of the Conference into three 
experts’ committees left the traditional diplomatic activity of the Office to 
some extent sidelined, especially as it was Sir Maurice Hankey who was 
Conference S e c r e t a r y .  MacDonald faced a daunting task: how could an 
arrangement be found which would satisfy both France and Germany, and
128 For more on the London Conference, see Schuker, End. Chapter 8; Kent, Spoils, pp. 257- 
261; and for Britain’s role, see Marquand, MacDonald, pp. 342-351.
129 For full minutes of the London Conference, see Parliamentary Papers, 1924, vol. XXVII, 
Cmd. 2270.
130 MacDonald Papers, PRO/30/69/1753, Diaries, Part l,pp. 187-8, 17.7.24.
131 The Foreign Office was quite happy with this arrangement and congratulated Hankey on 
his contribution: “...I think we should note the loyalty with which Sir M. Hankey invariably 
passes on to this office... anything which he hears and which he thinks concerns us. He is 
most careful not to do anything which he might think was impinging upon our preserves.// 
Perhaps I might say to him how much we appreciate his attitude: and that he need never 
fear that we shall take umbrage at anything he may do or say. We are only most grateful 
for all that he has done and is doing to get the work of the Conference successfully through. 
His appointment as Secretary-General has meant success to the Conference.” [Minute by 
Lampson, 18.8.24, on FO 371 9857, C13130/11495/18: Hankey to FO, 13.8.24.]
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would prove a sound foundation for the necessary international loan?
Even at the committee stage problems quickly crystallised. Only the Third
Committee, chaired by Sir Robert Kindersley, proceeded relatively free of
controversy. This body dealt with the highly technical question of the
arrangements to be made for deliveries of reparation in kind. In contrast, the
First Committee, chaired by Philip Snowden, soon ran into difficulties. This
committee was to deal with the procedures to be followed by the Reparation
Commission in the event of a German default. In effect this meant producing a
set of guarantees which would secure subscriptions to the international loan
that was to underpin the Dawes scheme. Deadlock seemed inevitable when
Montagu Norman privately informed McDonald that the Bank of England and
J. P. Morgan could not begin negotiations for the loan until decisions were made
regarding the withdrawal of France fi'om the railways, the military evacuation
of the Ruhr, the future means of interpreting the treaty and the rights of one or
more allies separately to impose sanctions. To make matters worse,
Snowden agreed with N o r m a n i3 3   ^ and undoubtedly influenced by his
department, was also pushing for a reinterpretation of Part VIII of the Treaty
of Versailles to prevent a rerun of the Ruhr:
“What we ought to get, and I believe it to be of great importance 
both for the loan and for the future, is a provision for arbitration 
by the Hague Court or some similar body not only on the 
interpretation of the Dawes Report but also of the interpretation 
of the Reparation part of the Treaty, if  the Reparation 
Commission are unable to arrive at a unanimous decision.// The 
first step to securing this is a direction to the Jurists from the 
conference, or possibly from the Premiers, to consider this in 
connection with Paragraph 8.”i34
132 Bank of England archives, OV 34/104; Memo by Norman, 5,8.24. On 26 July, Crewe 
wrote: “So far as I can judge, the financial people have taken a too rigid position, for which 
Norman is generally held responsible. It is said that other opinion in the City is disposed to 
be more appreciative of the French position...” [Phipps Papers, Box 2/2, pp. 14: Crewe to 
Phipps (letter), 26.7.24.]
133 Bank of England archives, OV 34/104: Memo by Norman, 5.8.24.
134 Bank of England archives, OV 9/373: Snowden to MacDonald 31.7.24. [Snowden’s 
underlining]
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The deadlock remained until 2 August when - much to MacDonald’s relief - it 
was broken by a French suggestion that an American citizen should sit on the 
Reparation Commission when issues concerning the Dawes scheme were 
discussed, and that a default could only be declared unanimously. If the 
Commission could not make a unanimous decision on default or sanctions, 
then, as Snowden wanted, the Permanent Court of Justice should arbitrate. 135 
Effectively Herriot was agreeing to the Chequers arrangement as opposed to 
the Paris one - retaining the Reparation Commission, but neutralising its 
dangers by introducing arbitration. MacDonald and the Foreign Office 136 were 
satisfied with the compromise. It remained to be seen if  the bankers would be.
While the First Committee had found a compromise over the issues of default, 
arbitration and sanctions, the key issues of military evacuation and the Régie 
remained. Officially the military evacuation of the Ruhr was not on the 
agenda, as the Conference’s terms of reference related specifically to the 
application of the Dawes Plan. In practice an agreement on this had to be 
achieved before the Germans would accept the Dawes plan, and in any case it 
was raised hy default through the question of the Régie. The railway question 
came under the aegis of the Second Committee - chaired by the Colonial 
Secretary J. H. Thomas - which was to consider arrangements for the 
economic evacuation of the Ruhr and the restoration of German fiscal unity. 
Problems quickly arose when the French claimed they needed to retain 4000 - 
5000 railwaymen in the Ruhr even after the Dawes Report came into 
o p e r a t io n .  137 In an attempt to break the stalemate a subcommittee of experts 
was appointed (along the lines of the Chequers agreements) to examine the 
question. On 30 July this committee reported that, aside from military and 
political considerations, the employment of a certain number of foreign
135 The Times. 2.8.24, pp. 11.
136 FO 371 9751, C11924/70/18: Minute by Lampson 24.7.24, and minute on this by 
Crowe, 24.7.24.
137 CAB 23 48, Cabinet meeting, 22.7,24.
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personnel would not necessarily aifect the operations of the r a i l w a y s .  138
The Foreign Office were incensed. As a British Representative (Sir W. 
Ac worth) had sat on the subcommittee and had signed the report, they  
recognised the ammunition it gave to the French. At the same time - and 
especially in view of the ‘bankers’ conditions’ - they were alarmed at the 
implications of these findings for the wider question of restoring the economic 
unity of G e r m a n y . 139 Irritation was aimed both at the French for making such 
an issue of the railways, and at Acworth for agreeing to the Report. Lampson 
wrote: “We all realise, I think, that the Franco-Belgian claims on the Railways 
in the Rhineland is a pure try-on of the worst k i n d . ”i40  Crowe wrote to 
MacDonald:
“I regret the unsatisfactory nature of the report which is entirely 
due to the curious mental attitude of Sir W. Acworth. // The 
position really is that the French and Belgian experts are the 
wholehearted exponents of the wishes of their governments, 
whilst ours refuses to acknowledge any authority...”i4i
Although the question of the railways was not settled, the overwhelming desire 
for progress allowed it to be temporarily glossed over. On 2 August, the Allied 
heads of delegates agreed that they accepted the three committees’ r e p o r t s .  142 
MacDonald noted in this diary: “We have agreed and great is the r e l i e f .”i43  On 
5 August the German delegation arrived at the conference. For the Germans 
to meet the Allies on such an equal footing was a historic moment. MacDonald 
commented: “Moment of strain when I was introducing them to the other
138 FO 371 9852, C12204/11495/18: Second Joint Report on Retention of French and 
Belgian personnel on the Rhineland Railways.
139 Minute by Stemdale Bennett on FO 371 9852, C12204/11495/18: Second Joint Report 
on Retention of French and Belgian personnel on the Rhineland Railways.
140 Minute by Lampson, 31.7.24 on FO 371 9752, 012331/70/18: Minute by Troughton,
31.7.24.
141 Crowe to MacDonald, 30.7.24 enclosed in FO 371 9852, 012204/11495/18: Second 
Joint Report on Retention of French and Belgian personnel on the Rhineland Railways.
142 Parliamentary Papers, 1924, vol. XXVII, Omd. 2270, pp. 69: Meeting of Heads of 
Delegates, 2.8.24.
143 MacDonald Papers, PRO/30/69/1753, Diaries, Part l,pp. 189, 2.8.24.
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Premiers and delegates. Herriot looked as though he were having a tooth 
d r a w n .”i44  MacDonald kept the meeting short and to the point. Marx was 
presented with the official documents so far agreed by the Allies and asked to 
inform Hankey of any points he wished to raise.
The Gormans replied promptly on 6 August, saying that definite dates must he 
fixed for the evacuation of the Ruhr and that - unsurprisingly - the French 
intention of retaining 5000 Régie personnel in the Ruhr and Rhineland was not 
“compatible with the experts’ p l a n . ” i45  The British sympathised with the 
Germans on this. As Hankey wrote on 7 August: “The trouble now is with the 
French. If they will agree to evacuate the Ruhr within a reasonable time we 
shall get agreem ent. If they wont the Germans can’t agree to sign and the 
Conference breaks d o w n . . .”146
The French were particularly difficult to deal with as they were divided 
amongst themselves. While Herriot was willing to compromise, Nollet, the 
Minister for War, was not. 147 Herriot was unable to keep control of the 
different elements in his delegation, and declared that he had to return to Paris 
to consult with the Cabinet proper. In these circumstances, MacDonald 
decided to play “one of my big c a r d s”. 148 On 9 August he handed Herriot and 
Theunis an identical note on the railwaymen and Ruhr, saying that it was his 
opinion and that of his government that the continued presence of the French 
and Belgian railwaymen in the occupied territories would: “...destroy  
harmonious and unified working of the railways; and that with regard to the 
Occupation of the Ruhr, that now there was no longer an economic reason for
144 MacDonald Papers, PRO/30/69/1753, Diaries, Part l,pp. 190, 5.8.24,
145 Parliamentary Papers, 1924, vol. XXVII, Cmd. 2270, pp. 198: Marx to MacDonald, 
6.8.34.
146 Hankey Papers, 3/32: Hankey to Adeline, letter, 7.8.24.
147 MacDonald Papers, PRO/30/69/1753, Diaries, Part l,pp. 191, 7.8.24.
148 MacDonald Papers, PRO/30/69/1753, Diaries, Part l,pp. 193, 8.8.24.
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staying, the occupation must e n d .” 149 MacDonald’s strategy was clear. The 
note: “...ought to help H. in Paris if he is firm; it will hreak him if he is w e a k .”i50
MacDonald’s ploy was successful. On 11 August Herriot met MacDonald and
reported that he had persuaded his Cabinet to be reasonable regarding the
railwaymen and to lim it the occupation of the Ruhr to one year from the
signing of the agreem ent. i5i MacDonald had in fact always been willing to
negotiate over the exact dates of a withdrawal from the Ruhr. As early as 9
May Phipps had reported:
“To my intense relief, and contrary to what the Department 
thought likely, I found the Prime Minister would not insist, in the 
last resort, though this he wishes kept secret, on the total 
military evacuation of the Ruhr. I urged strongly that any such 
insistence would wreck all hope of a settlement.”i52
MacDonald now told Herriot that the one year compromise he suggested was 
acceptable and said that he was willing to allow Treasury experts to begin to 
exchange ideas about inter-alhed debts. 153
But just as a solution seemed within grasp problems again arose. Despite the 
first committee’s compromise over the Reparation Commission, Montagu 
Norman remained convinced that the Report of the First Committee was 
insufficient to satisfy loan subscribers. On 8 and 9 August Norman, Morgan, 
and T. W. Lamont (of the London branch of J. P. Morgan) informed the French 
and Belgians of the views of the banking world. 154 They probably hoped that if  
they told the French and Belgians of the dangers those countries would make a 
greater effort at concession. Snowden him self approved of Norman’s
149 MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/101: C12732/903/18: MacDonald to Herriot and 
Theunis, 9.8.24.
150 MacDonald Papers, PRO/30/69/1753, Diaries, Part l,pp. 193, 8.8.24.
151 MacDonald Papers, PRO/30/69/1753, Diaries, Part l,pp. 193-4, 11.8.24.
152 Phipps Papers, Box 2/2, pp. 8: Phipps to Crewe, letter, 9.5.24.
153 MacDonald Papers, PRO/30/69/1753, Diaries, Part l,pp. 193-4, 11.8.24.
154 Bank of England archives, OV 34/104: Note hy Norman, 13.8.24.
323
actionsi55 and on 13 August he too voiced his fears to the French delegation. 
Herriot - who had in all honesty been trying as hard as possible to compromise 
- immediately became suspicious that an anti-French plot was afoot and - to 
use MacDonald’s words - “close[d] up like an oyster.”i56 The Germans then  
heard of the French reaction and they too panicked. The agreements which 
were so near completion were now in danger of faihng.
MacDonald was incensed. He believed that the only possible way forward was
by forming a political agreement and that once this was achieved the loan
would follow. At 2am on 14 August he wrote angrily to Snowden:
“Your remarks yesterday have played havoc... and... ‘the 
atmosphere’ of the Conference has been destroyed... I fear the 
Conference may fail. It is a mistake for us to urge the bankers 
now. Nothing is more easily misunderstood. My view is that a 
political agreement will create conditions which will make a loan
possible...”157
Throughout that night MacDonald tried desperately to calm the situation and 
salvage an agreement between France and Germany. It is a tribute to his 
diplomatic skill that he was successful. He managed to mediate an agreement, 
formalised in an exchange of notes between Stresemann and Herriot, that the 
Ruhr should be progressively evacuated over a period of one year, with France 
accelerating her withdrawal if Germany fulfilled her obligations punctually. 158 
MacDonald hoped that the additional concession by France would pacify 
banking opinion. This bilateral agreement between France and Germany on 
the crucial outstanding issue of the Ruhr provided the necessary backdrop for 
the successful conclusion of the Conference.
155 Bank of England archives, OV 34/104: Note by Norman, 13.8.24.
156 MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/1753/4: MacDonald To Snowden, 14.8.24, 2am.
157 MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/1753/4: MacDonald To Snowden, 14.8.24, 2am.
158 See MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/1753/4: MacDonald To Snowden, 14.8.24, 2am; and 
MacDonald Papers, PRO/30/69/1753, Diaries, Part 1, 15.8.24.
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On 16 August the Allies and Germany met for the final session of the 
Conference. A protocol and four annexes were all initialled by the Allies and the 
Germans. They would he signed officially on 30 August, once Germany had 
passed the necessary legislation. The protocol was based on the Anglo-French 
memorandum of 9 July and registered the agreement of all parties present to 
the implementation of the Dawes plan. The first annex was an agreement 
between the Reparation Commission and Germany, whereby the Germans 
agreed to take the steps necessary to enact the scheme. The second annex 
was an agreement between the Allies and Germany defining the rights and 
obligations of the Transfer Committee with regard to reparation in kind, and 
laying down the forms of arbitration to be used in various cases. Annex 3 was 
another agreement between the Allies and Germany laying down a detailed 
programme of what must be done and when both hy the allies and by Germany 
under the plan. Finally, Annex 4 was an agreement between the Allies 
modifjdng Annex II to Part VII of the Treaty of Versailles to provide for the 
case of a default by Germany. An American citizen was to sit on the 
Reparation Commission whenever matters related to the Dawes plan were 
considered. Sanctions could only be applied in the case of flagrant default, and 
if  sanctions were imposed the Allies would safeguard the loan securities. 
Moreover, any dispute regarding sanctions could be submitted to the 
International Court. 159
Hidden within these bland clauses were compromises and agreements on all 
the areas of difficulty. The Dawes plan had been implemented in its entirety. 
The Ruhr was to he evacuated militarily and economically. The issues of the 
Reparation Commission, sanctions and the Régie were aU settled. The British 
had secured their 23 April aims of keeping the initiative, bringing in Germany 
as a “voluntary contracting party , securing the “maximum of cooperation
159 For the text of all these agreements, see Parhamentary Papers, 1924, vol. XXVII, Cmd. 
2270.
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from America” and introducing the Permanent Court of International Justice 
as “interpreter of any fresh agreement which may come up.”
Further, MacDonald had also achieved his most fundamental aim of improving
the atmosphere in Europe as the first step towards more tangible future
cooperation. Summing up at the Conference, MacDonald said:
“Again and again we met with difficulties and with differences, 
that seemed to be insoluble, but from the moment we came 
together, each one of us was inspired not only by a determination 
that the Conference should not fail, but by a resolve to be guided 
in our dehberations by g o o d w i l l .  ”160
Privately, MacDonald wrote:
“...the great success of the Conference has been that whereas... 
when the Germans arrived the atmosphere... was like a freezing 
Chamber..., our meetings now are of the most cordial nature, and 
it is difficult to see the last trace of the old spirit amongst us.
That is greater than everything else because it means that if the 
Dawes Report were to break down in its working, we have created 
a spirit which will enable the parties interested to come together 
and make reasonable amendments. Thus far have we justified 
ourselves and can say we have s u c c e e d e d .”i 6 i
MacDonald’s optimism was to be borne out. Snowden and Norman’s continued 
fears that the Dawes loan would not be forthcoming and that the German 
Reichstag would not pass the necessary legislation were ill-founded. 162 The 
London Conference was followed by the Locarno Agreements and the entry of 
Germany to the League of Nations and so did indeed inaugurate a new era of 
cooperation and stabihty which lasted until the end of the decade.
160 Parliamentary Papers, 1924, vol. XXVII, Cmd. 2270, p95: Meeting of Conference,
16.8.24.
161 MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/2: MacDonald to Massingham, 12.8.24.
162 Bank of England Archives, Norman to Lamont, 16.8.24. The German Reichstag passed 
the legislation on 29 August by the necessary 2/3 majority. The nationalist vote divided.
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C onclusion
The agreements formed at the London Conference were undoubtedly a triumph 
for the British position. MacDonald’s own contribution to this success was 
significant. As his biographer says: “It was the high point of his Government - 
perhaps of his c a r e e r .” 163 As the Prime Minister of a young party, anxiously 
craving respectability, MacDonald chose the very area where many of his 
predecessors had foundered - European policy - to try to achieve credibility. He 
met with considerable success. In particular his efforts to transform the 
“weather” and provide a forum of international cooperation using personal 
diplomacy (epitomised by the Chequers meetings) was a breakthrough. He 
was able to court the Belgians and French and encourage American 
involvement, whilst at the same time earning the respect and affection of his 
own staff. The success of the London Conference owed much to MacDonald’s 
diplomatic skill and to the careful preparations made by the administration 
over the previous six months.
However, while MacDonald’s contribution to the London agreements was great, 
it must not be forgotten that the foundations on which he built had been laid 
during Baldwin and Curzon’s ministry. The enquiries hy the committees of 
experts had been established, and, crucially, American participation had 
already been secured. MacDonald, in seeking to implement the experts’ reports 
was, in essence, simply following the path already laid down. Similarly, the 
British position in 1924 was also aided by events in France as well as by the 
relative easing of tensions on the spot. France had already agreed to the 
experts’ enquiries. In the opening months of 1924 the collapse of the franc 
distracted her government and weakened her independent bargaining position.
163 Marquand, MacDonald, pp. 351.
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The replacement of Poincaré by Herriot ensured that France would be easier to 
deal with than on previous occasions.
Yet even with Herriot in office, and despite MacDonald’s efforts at Chequers, 
the Foreign Office and the Treasury remained acutely aware that differences 
w ith the French remained on crucial issues such as the Reparation 
Commission and Régie. That these differences were ultimately overcome at 
the London Conference owed more to Herriot’s desire to compromise and his 
determination to force his country to accept concessions than to actions by the 
British. It is at least open to debate whether, had Poincaré still been at the 
helm, the London agreements would have been so entirely favourable to British 
wishes. In conclusion, the success at London cannot he explained purely as a 
triumph for the Labour government. Though MacDonald’s contribution was 
considerable, the triumph was in essence one for a longer term British  




On the eve of the Ruhr crisis British policy lacked purpose and direction, hut 
rather vacillated between procrastination (regarding the proposed interallied 
conference at Brussels), and misjudgment (epitomised hy the provocative 
Paris plan). The reactive nature of British pohcy reflected the constraints and 
influences upon it. Domestic-political fluidity following the collapse of the Lloyd 
George coalition was partly to blame. The successor government was weak 
and opposed by many political heavyweights. Curzon’s absence at the 
Lausanne Conference left the elderly and diplomatically inexperienced Bonar 
Law to cope as best he could with the worsening European situation. He was 
not helped by an indecisive and sometimes divided bureaucracy or by divisions 
in public opinion over reparation and Europe. Even without these internal 
constraints it is arguable whether Britain could hy this stage have done 
anything to avert the impending crisis. Reparation in both France and 
Germany was linked to fundamental domestic-political and economic 
considerations. As the two countries became polarised, compromise was no 
longer possible. Perhaps British support for the French position might have 
alleviated French security fears and forced Germany to make reparation 
payments, thus making the Ruhr occupation unnecessary. But there was no 
guarantee of such an outcome. If Britain had acted thus, she might well have 
found herself dragged by France into an unwelcome confrontation with  
Germany which London was convinced could bring only chaos and destruction 
to Europe.
Britain was unable to choose between the two antagonists and therefore 
drifted prior to the occupation, tabling the plan at Paris more to vindicate
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herself in the eyes of domestic and world opinion than out of any genuine belief 
that it would provide a solution. After the final schism at Paris, Britain was 
left trying to define a viable role for herself. The course adopted - ‘benevolent 
neutrality’ - was always an ambiguous and unsatisfactory compromise, and 
soon became virtually untenable in practice. In particular it entailed immense 
difficulties on the spot, where the zone of occupation held by Britain in the 
Rhineland provided the French and Germans with ample opportunity to 
discredit and embarrass her. Indeed, regarding for example the customs 
sanction and the use of railways in the British zone, the British were soon left 
dependent on French and German goodwill to prevent their position from 
becoming intolerable. At the same time they faced increased international 
diplomatic pressure to do something to end the deadlock, as well as mounting 
domestic-political dissatisfaction with the government’s impotence. These 
factors, coupled with the fact that by February Curzon was home from the 
Lausanne Conference and so able to concentrate on European affairs, 
precipitated a cautious policy reappraisal.
The result was the evolution of benevolent neutrality  into tentative  
intervention, inaugurated by Curzon’s speech to the House of Lords on 20 
April. The strategy was to encourage the Germans to make an offer and then 
to act as mediator to nudge negotiations forward. The intention was to utilise 
neutrality, making it both viable and positive. It was a forlorn hope. For both 
France and Germany the Ruhr occupation had snowballed into a life and death 
struggle. For Britain to expect to persuade the two to compromise was 
unrealistic. Tentative intervention marked only a superficial change, with all 
the pressures and ambiguities of benevolent neutrality remaining under the 
surface. The Germans did produce two notes, on 2 May and 7 June, but on 
neither occasion did the British have any success in prompting meaningful 
negotiation. Largely this was because of the attitude of France. By June
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Germany was facing mounting internal chaos, and so the second note did 
represent a decided advance. But rather than encouraging the French to 
compromise, the prospect of a wavering Germany tempted Poincaré to strive 
for absolute victory.
M eanwhile the apparent impotence of Britain in Europe was having  
repercussions at home. In the country at large, press criticism indicated a 
general dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of the government’s position. More 
significantly, divisions in the Cabinet opened up. Here a powerful Francophile 
lobby emerged, led by Lord Derby. At the same time, however, Whitehall was 
moving against France. The Treasury, convinced that impossible reparation 
demands would damage European recovery and the British economy, and 
suspicious of Paris’s ability to pour millions into the Ruhr occupation while at 
the same time failing to repay debts to Britain, had always been hostile to 
France. Now this view gained a temporary ascendancy in the Foreign Office. 
Despite the official “benevolence” of Britain’s position towards France, key 
officials - most notable Crowe and Lampson - lost patience with French 
intransigence and were alarmed by reports of the situation on the spot in the 
Ruhr and in Germany at large.
All these forces broke forth in the summer of 1923. The result was the 11 
August note, which seemed to mark the end of benevolent neutrality by 
criticising France, controversially declaring the occupation to be illegal and 
vaguely threatening unilateral British action. This note was a mistake. 
Curzon, him self impatient with France and angry with Poincaré, may have 
been swayed by the advice he received into taking a tougher line with his ally. 
But backing the threats up with action was never on the agenda. The note 
was a bluff, designed to salvage Britain’s middle-ground position by intimidating 
Poincaré into negotiation. The plan backfired. Poincaré refused to be
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intimidated, but stood firm and dispatched a strong reply. The Foreign Office 
now wavered. Always uncertain of the legal arguments, Crowe and Lampson 
admitted the force of Poincare's case. Moreover, the Cabinet Francophiles 
rebelled, and Derby actually threatened resignation. This m ust have 
influenced Baldwin, one of whose top political priorities was to restore unity and 
cohesion to the Conservative Party after its fragmentation when it broke with 
the Coalition in the previous autumn. Baldwin tried to restore relations with 
France by means of a personal meeting with Poincaré on 19 September. 
British policy, oscillating between threats and fi*iendship with France, was 
revealed as not just empty but also contradictory and inconsistent.
At the end of September the situation was transformed. The collapse of 
German passive resistance restored a degree of fluidity to the European 
situation. The acute pressure on Britain eased and her pohcy-makers at last 
recovered some room for manoeuvre. Even so, much of the recovery of the 
British position stemmed from mistakes made by Poincaré. Poincaré did not 
have a proper plan or strategy to secure a formal settlement with Germany 
once passive resistance was over. He refused to negotiate or to modify the 
occupation until the German government resumed reparation payments. The 
problem was that once passive resistance had ended the practical difficulties 
facing the French in the Ruhr intensified. Poincaré had on his hands an area in 
economic collapse and social and political chaos. He soon began to lose control 
of his policy and officials and became involved in dangerous and discrediting 
episodes, such as separatist insurrections. The British correctly concluded 
that Poincaré had no consistent strategy at this point, and predicted the 
problems awaiting him. The Treasury was forceful in its opinion that Britain 
should stand aside and allow Germany to collapse onto French shoulders, 
allowing France to be tried by the test of exploitation. Foreign Office officials 
were more pragmatic. They carefully followed events, maintaining their
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distance whenever possible, but intervening on occasions when France was in 
danger of doing too much damage to the very unity of Germany.
With Poincaré distracted by developments in the Ruhr and Rhineland, the 
British gradually managed to formulate their own approach. Although the 
transformation was gradual and Cabinet differences remained, a clear agenda 
was established at the very time when confusion in French policy and a shift in 
the position of the United States made its achievement more likely. At the 
same time the internal policymaking process recovered its effectiveness. 
Baldwin and Curzon gave more positive leadership, significantly keeping pohcy 
insulated from Cabinet disagreements. The Whitehall bureaucracy functioned 
like a well-oiled machine, particularly important when the politicians were 
preoccupied with electioneering. The Treasury and Foreign Office were united 
in their purpose, and the key officials, Crowe, Niemeyer and Bradbury, 
cooperated efficiently. The result was that the British nudged and prodded 
Poincaré until, at the end of November, he agreed to the establishment of two 
international committees of experts to examine the reparation question.
The new Labour government built on these achievements. MacDonald was 
determined to achieve respectability and a reputation for competence and 
chose foreign policy as the forum in which to do so. He continued the 
Conservatives’ approach, striving consistently for the adoption of the Dawes 
Plan. His fiiendly style, hard work and personal input were all very important. 
He was also aided by other factors - informal American involvement had been 
secured, the experts’ committees had already been appointed, and so the 
ministry had a clear direction and aim. At the same time the collapse of the 
fi^anc and Poincaré’s replacement by Herriot made France more amenable to 
compromise. All these factors aided the success of the London Conference, 
which effectively ended the Ruhr and reparation imbroglio.
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As well as evaluating the content and shape of Britain’s foreign pohcy during 
the Ruhr crisis, this study has analysed the process of policy-making. The 
importance of internal considerations on the overaU policy pursued has been 
demonstrated. For example, the fact that the Bonar Law Cabinet was new 
and inexperienced compounded Britain’s problems at the onset of the crisis, 
while mounting criticism from public and parliamentary opinion helped to push 
Curzon towards tentative intervention in April 1923. Perhaps the most 
obvious example of domestic-pohtical factors influencing foreign policy was the 
impact of Cabinet divisions on policy in the summer of 1923.
Relationships between different administrative departments also affected 
foreign policy. Fundamental differences existed regarding their perceptions of 
Europe with, for example, the War Office seeing Germany as the main threat. 
Crucial to the Ruhr and reparation questions was the Foreign Office/Treasury 
axis. The Treasury adopted a consistently hard-line attitude to France 
throughout the crisis - epitomised by the Paris plan, its support for the 11 
August note, and its indifference to the collapse of both France and Germany in 
the autumn of 1923. The Foreign Office was more flexible. For example, it was 
hesitant about opposing France by raising the issue of legality in the spring of 
1923, hut it advocated doing this in June and July. After the 11 August note it 
again backtracked. At times therefore the relationship between the two 
departments was antagonistic - for example the Foreign Office blamed the 
Treasury for the Paris plan. But when the two departments did unite in their 
efforts the results - as the autumn of 1923 demonstrates - were far-reaching.
One cannot discuss the role of departments without commenting briefly on the 
officials within them. The driving force behind the Treasury stance was Sir 
John Bradbury. Though based at Paris and strictly speaking no longer a
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Treasury official, his advice was always sought on key questions. Sir Otto 
Niem eyer relied on him heavily  and almost always agreed w ith his 
recommendations. On the other hand, Foreign Office officials did not have such 
firm views. Sir Eyre Crowe and Miles Lampson were more pragmatic and 
realistic in the their evaluation of the difficulties of the situation and so did not 
adopt a consistent view throughout (as is demonstrated by their attitudes 
towards the legal question). When they did have a clear agenda of aims they 
worked with purpose. Crowe, in particular, played a key role in the autumn of
1923.
Politicians had at least as much influence on events as did officials. Bonar 
Law, Curzon, Baldwin and MacDonald all stand out. Bonar Law’s age, ill- 
health and lack of diplomatic experience help explain Britain’s initial policy of 
drift. On the other hand, MacDonald’s enthusiasm and commitment and his 
conviction that improving the “weather” of relations between countries and 
statesmen could help progress, must be taken into account when dealing with
1924. More difficult to evaluate is the impact of Curzon’s and Baldwin’s 
personalities and of the relationship between them on policy. Certainly 
Curzon’s prickly and often unpleasant temperament upset Poincare. On the 
other hand, Baldwin must bear responsibility for letting Cabinet differences get 
out of control in the summer of 1923. Historians have suggested that a rift 
existed between Curzon and Baldwin and that this affected foreign policy, 
particularly in the summer of 1923. Such interpretations are exaggerated. 
Baldwin and Curzon worked together - both agreed to the 11 August note and 
the Baldwin/Poincare meeting. Although Curzon criticised Baldwin after the 
event for this the two continued to cooperate, for example regarding the 
Imperial Conference in October. Admittedly Baldwin did not reappoint Curzon 
as Foreign Secretary when he returned to office at the end of 1924, hut there is 
no evidence of a Baldwin/Curzon rift adversely affecting policy in 1923. The
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vacillations in Britain’s policy were due to other factors.
Internal factors are thus vital to a true understanding of the dimensions of 
Britain’s foreign policy regarding the Ruhr crisis. However, policy decisions 
were not governed purely by high political, “Cowlingite” considerations. For 
example, despite major domestic-political uncertainty and some Cabinet 
divisions in the autumn of 1923, foreign policy was in the process of becoming 
its most consistent and purposeful. Also, it is interesting that the inauguration 
of new ministries - Baldwin’s in May 1923 and, more significantly, MacDonald’s 
in January 1924 - did not herald new departures in European pohcy. Therefore, 
while internal considerations are important, they do not provide a complete 
explanation of Britain’s policy. Even more important were external factors. 
Internal and external factors interacted, combining to influence policy, but it 
was external factors which were the more significant. When the external 
situation was at its most intractable (for example, in the summer of 1923) this 
exacerbated dissensions over Britain’s policy at home. Similarly, when 
external pressures lessened, in October, so the disruptive impact of Cabinet 
and administrative disagreements diminished.
So what were these external factors which dictated Britain’s Ruhr policy? 
Crucial were the positions and actions of the other powers involved, and British 
perceptions of them. Both Belgium and Italy were viewed as unreliable. 
Therefore, while the British tried to enhst Italian and Belgian support when 
convenient, they - perhaps w ith justification - never relied on it  or 
overemphasised its importance. On the other hand, the United States had to 
be treated with great deference. British leaders were aware of how powerful 
the United States was. They appreciated the importance of good Anglo- 
American relations and the need for United States cooperation and 
involvement in Europe. The United States’ detached and unhelpful attitude
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throughout much of the crisis compounded Britain’s difficulties when dealing 
with Europe. Russia was another problem. She had the potential to subvert 
already unstable democracies from within hy exporting revolution. Though on 
balance the British do not appear to have been particularly afraid of Germany 
falling to communism in 1922-3 (at the most critical phase of the crisis in 
September and October 1923, the British saw Germany as moving to the 
Right in order to combat Left-wing threats), they were afraid of the disruption 
and anarchy which Left-wing uprisings could produce in the fragile Weimar 
repuhhc.
Belgium and Italy were unrehahle, Russia was menacingly bolshevik, and the 
United States isolationist. Relations with France and Germany were yet more 
problematic. As the reparation dispute worsened and Franco-German 
relations became more confrontational, Britain found herself caught between 
the two powers. Britain did not want to become involved in continental 
commitments by choosing between the two. There were many reasons for 
this. The legacy of the First World War must be remembered and the general 
suspicion of the alliance diplomacy that had preceded it. Even more important 
were the constraints placed on Britain by her global position in the postwar 
world - by the attitude of the Dominions and by fears of m ilitary over­
commitment. One must also remember Britain’s inability to decide where the 
external threat lay. Whitehall, the Cabinet, public opinion and the press were 
all divided in their perceptions of France and Germany.
The reality of Britain’s position regarding the Ruhr crisis as one of weakness 
and lack of room for manoeuvre, rather than one of strength, has significance 
for the historiographical debate outlined in the introduction. The revisionist 
school has been challenged here on two fronts. In the first place criticisms of 
Britain for avoiding her responsibilities and failing to prevent the occupation
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have been revealed as unjustified. During the first part of the crisis the French 
held the initiative and there was little Britain could have done to prevent a 
confi'ontation. This is not to say that British pohcy at the onset of the crisis 
deserves no criticism. Chapter I revealed severe deficiencies in British  
pohcymaking and showed the Paris plan to be misjudged. However, while the 
British may have made things worse, they did not have the power in 1922-3 to 
resolve the Franco-German conflict, especially given the attitude of the United 
States.
The same was true once the crisis was underway. Benevolent neutrafity was 
not a position of uncomplicated aloofness signifying strength for Britain. Nor 
was it a premeditated and consistent strategy designed to wear out France and 
Germany and ensure an Anglo-Saxon settlement of Europe. On the contrary, 
benevolent neutrality was an ambiguous compromise, hastily concocted in the 
absence of any alternatives. It raised immense difficulties and caused 
considerable embarrassment for the British. Despite her desires to avoid 
commitment, it was impossible for Britain to avoid any kind of involvement on 
the continent. She found herself drawn in because of her Rhineland presence - 
for example regarding the vexatious questions of railways and customs. 
Moreover, benevolent neutrality was benevolent towards France. It 
represented a desperate bid by Britain to minimise the breach with her 
wayward ally. As events during the summer of 1923 show, despite Britain’s 
strong disapproval of French Ruhr policy, she was never prepared to break 
entirely with France. It was Poincaré who was in the driving seat.
This raises another set of questions regarding the revisionist literature. At the 
end of September 1923, w ith British policy in disarray and Germany 
supplicant, Poincaré had a golden opportunity. He failed to capitalise on it. 
This, rather than 1924, marks the turning point in the post-war era. Surely if
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Poincaré had had a farsighted strategy to integrate Germany into the 
European community on French terms or to enlist the help of his allies to 
internationalise European stabüisation and solve the reparation and security 
problems, then he would have seized this opportunity? This dissertation casts 
doubt on whether Poincaré did have such a strategy. The British, despite close 
monitoring of Poincaré’s conduct, identified no such strategy on the part of 
France, nor did they suspect French policy to be driven by a desire to enlist 
British support. Rather, British politicians and officials all concluded that the 
only convincing explanation for Poincaré’s erratic and contradictory actions 
was that, having secured German surrender, he had absolutely no idea what to 
do with it and that he was increasingly losing his grip on the threads of power 
within France. Thus, the conclusions reached here are more in tune with those 
of Trachtenberg than with those of McDougall, Schuker or Keiger.
In contrast to French wavering, in the autumn of 1923, the British at last 
formulated a project for the future. Indeed, the principles behind this ‘project’ 
had always been implicitly present in British thinking, but were most explicitly 
stated by MacDonald. They were that the issue of reparation had to be 
resolved first, and that only then could progress be made towards achieving 
French security, European stability and reconstruction. Reparation thus had 
far-reaching implications for British policy as well as for those of France and 
Germany. The British were convinced that reparation was a dangerous and 
divisive issue with the potential to wreak havoc in Europe. Neither France nor 
Germany could be trusted regarding it, and therefore while reparation remained 
unresolved Britain could not risk greater commitment. Once it was out of the 
way, Britain could become involved, working with both France and Germany 
for reconstruction. This, of course, is what happened in the later 1920s. The 
Dawes plan was quickly followed by the Locarno Agreements in 1925 and by 
Germany’s entry into the League of Nations in 1926.
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But was this the right policy? Its ascendancy marked the triumph of the 
Foreign Office’s more pragmatic approach, and carried the Treasury with it. It 
rejected the Germanophobe views of the War Office. With the benefit of 
hindsight, it might seem that the War Office appraisal was the more accurate 
one. Would it not therefore have been better had Britain followed the War 
Office reasoning and supported France more fully and forcefully? Aside from 
the reasons already given why alignment with France was not a realistic policy 
option, such an interpretation would underestimate the potential which the 
1924 settlement did have to bring lasting stability to Europe.
Historians disagree over the viability of the stability of the later 1920s. For 
example, Maier regards this period as the ftdcrum of the twentieth century - 
parallelling the fundamentals on which post-World War II stability was 
achieved and marking a complete break with the pre-World War I system. On 
the other hand, for historians such as Marks, the Dawes interlude represents 
merely an era of illusion - a false respite based on insecure American financial 
foundations.!
It is not the purpose of this thesis to enter this debate on the later 1920s. 
However, given the significance of the viability of the Dawes plan for 
judgments on British policy preceding it, a word is necessary. German 
recovery (and so European stability) in the later 1920s proved to be illusory 
because it was based on insecure American credit. However, it could be argued 
that it was not the actual Dawes plan which caused such problems, but the 
m assive private investm ent in Germany from America subsequently - 
investment far exceeding the initial recommendations made in 1924. It was 
this development that resulted in the German economy becoming so heavily
! See J. Jacobson, ‘Is there a New International History of the 1920s?’ American Historical 
Review, vol. 88, no. 3 (1983), pp. 617-645.
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dependent on American credit and which had such disastrous effects when the 
American stock exchange collapsed in 1929. The Dawes system was not 
doomed to failure from the start. Had American investment in Glermany not 
been so unlimited, or had Wall Street not crashed, then Weimar democracy 
might have estahUshed firmer foundations and the Dawes /  Locarno system  
proved more durable.
Tragically, however, Wall Street did crash and Germany's prosperity was 
destroyed - with catastrophic consequences. With the benefit of hindsight 
some elements of Britain’s Ruhr policy appear more sinister. In particular, the 
tendency of British officials and politicians privately to lose patience with 
France and sympathise with Germany takes on ominous overtones in the light 
of the 1930s. Take, for example, the Foreign Office’s refusal to worry about 
reported increases in German nationalism in both 1923 and 1924, and its 
tendency to write them off by blaming the French. Thus Lampson 
commented: “The inevitable result of the Ruhr adventure was to intensify 
nationalism in Germany. The French have only themselves to thank for 
that.”2 MacDonald too sympathised with the Germans: “But what can we 
expect? Would we not do the same thing here if we had been defeated and been 
met with the same treatment? Nationalism is inflamed not suppressed by 
suppression.”3 Similarly, Britain’s capacity to stand aside in the autumn of 
1923 when the European crisis reached boiling point perhaps set a precedent 
for avoiding involvement in the 1930s. Events in 1923 also influenced France. 
Memories of the Ruhr trauma and subsequent collapse of the franc swayed her 
policy-makers away from further unilateral action in 1936 - this time in the 
Rhineland and against Hitler.4
2 Minute by Lampson, 14.5.24, on FO 371 9825, C7742/2977/18: Kilmarnock disp. 829,
9.5.24.
3 Minute by MacDonald, 18.4.24, on FO 371 9825, C6157/2977/18: Kilmarnock, disp. 646,
11.4.24.
4 See S.A. Schuker, ‘France and the Remilitarisation of the Rhineland, 1936’, French 
Historical Studies, vol. 14, no. 3 (1986), pp. 299-338.
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In recent years many historians of Britain have concentrated on the issue of 
British decline. Historians such as Bernard Porters and Paul Kennedy^ 
interpret Britain’s history since the end of the nineteenth century as 
dominated by an unremitting process of decline stemming from intrinsic 
structural and economic weakness. David Reynolds questions the simplicity of 
such economic determinism, pointing out the difficulties involved when  
assessing British “power” and emphasising the impact on it of external factors 
such as the rise of other powers. 7 In this debate the interwar period has great 
importance. Both Ferris and McKercher attack the determinist approach to 
‘British history by emphasising the strength of Britain’s position in the 1920s 
and 1930s. Ferris claims that both the strength of Britain in the nineteenth 
century and the degree of her decline to 1940 have been exaggerated. Rather, 
Britain was strong in the 1920s and was perceived as such by other powers.^ 
McKercher continues this approach into the 1930s, claiming that even the 
United States was not in reaUty a threat to British preeminence in this decade. 
The United States had wealth, but had not at this stage converted this wealth 
into tangible expressions of national strength to threaten those of Britain.9
On the whole, the conclusions of this thesis tend to support more pessimistic 
accounts of Britain’s position after the First World War. Emphasis has been 
given to Britain’s lack of freedom of manoeuvre, to the weakness of her position 
regarding both Europe and the United States, and to the fact that foreign 
policy broadly speaking transcended changes of government. However, this
5 B, Porter, Britain. Europe and the World 1850-1986: Delusions of Grandeur. (London, 
1987)
6 P.M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military 
Conflict from 1500 to 2000. (London, 1989)
7 D.J. Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth 
Century. (London, 1991)
8 J.R. Ferris, ‘The Greatest Power on Earth: Great Britain in the 1920s’, International 
History Review, vol. 13, no. 4 (1991), pp. 726-750.
9 B.J.C. McKercher, ‘”Our Most Dangerous Enemy”: Great Britain Pre-eminent in the 
1930s’, International History Review, vol. 13, no. 4, (1991), pp. 751-783.
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thesis does not embrace the economic determinism of the Porter/Kennedy 
school. The reality of Britain’s position towards the Ruhr crisis as one of 
weakness rather than strength has been a major theme throughout, hut the 
reasons for this weakness do not stem purely from inherent, structural faults. 
Many of the overriding considerations affecting Ruhr policy were entirely 
external ones - in particular relating to France, Germany and the United 
States.
It is often said of scholarly research that the closing of one door opens another. 
Historians of France and Germany have pointed to parallells between the two 
post-war eras. For Britain, many fundamentals changed in the decade after 
the Second World War. Even so, this detailed examination of the post-World 
War I era suggests that a comparative approach could yield important 
insights. While concentrating on a short time frame, this study addresses 
major questions regarding Britain’s world role and particularly relating to her 
relationship with Europe. In doing so it sheds light on British history 
throughout the twentieth century.
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